14. ἐξαλέιψας] ‘having cancelled’. The word ἐξαλέιφειν, like διαγράφειν, signifying ‘to blot out, to erase’, is commonly opposed to ἐγγράφειν ‘to enter a name, etc.’; e.g. Arist. Pax 1181, Lysias c. Nicom. p. 183, Plato Resp. vi. p. 501 B. More especially is it so used in reference to an item in an account, e.g. Demosth. c. Aristog. i. p. 791 ἐγγράφονται πάντες οἱ ὀφλισκάνοντες ... ἐξαλήλιπται τὸ ὄφλημα.
τὸ καθ’ ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ.] ‘the bond standing against us’. The word χειρόγραφον, which means properly an autograph of any kind, is used almost exclusively for a note of hand, a bond or obligation, as having the ‘sign-manual’ of the debtor or contractor: e.g. Tobit v. 3 (comp. ix. 5) ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ τὸ χειρόγραφον, Plut. Mor. p. 829 A τῶν χειρογράφων καὶ συμβολαίων. It is more common in Latin than in Greek, e.g. Cic. Fam. vii. 18 ‘Misi cautionem chirographi mei’, Juv. Sat. xvi. 41 ‘Debitor aut sumptos pergit non reddere nummos, vana supervacui dicens chirographa ligni’ (comp. xiii. 137). Hence chirographum, chirographarius, are frequent terms in the Roman law-books; see Hesse Handlexicon zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts s.v. p. 74.
In the case before us the Jewish people might be said to have signed the contract when they bound themselves by a curse to observe all the enactments of the law (Deut. xxvii. 14–26; comp. Exod. xxiv. 3); and the primary reference would be to them. But ἡμῖν, ἡμῶν, seem to include Gentiles as well as Jews, so that a wider reference must be given to the expression. The δόγματα therefore, though referring primarily to the Mosaic ordinances, will include all forms of positive decrees in which moral or social principles are embodied or religious duties defined; and the ‘bond’ is the moral assent of the conscience, which (as it were) signs and seals the obligation. The Gentiles, though ‘not having a law, are a law to themselves’, ὅιτινες ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτων τῆς συνειδήσεως, Rom. ii. 14, 15. See the notes on Gal. ii. 19, iv. 11. Comp. Orig. Hom. in Gen. xiii. 4 (II. p. 96).
τοῖς δόγμασιν] ‘consisting in ordinances’: comp. Ephes. ii. 15 τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασιν. The word δόγμα is here used in its proper sense of a ‘decree’, ‘ordinance’, corresponding to δογματίζεσθε below, ver. 20. This is its only sense in the N. T.; e.g. Luke ii. 1, Acts xvii. 7, of the Emperor’s decrees; Acts xvi. 4 of the Apostolic ordinances. Here it refers especially to the Mosaic law, as in Joseph. Ant. xv. 5. 3 τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν δογμάτων καὶ τὰ ὁσιώτατα τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, Philo Leg. All. i. 16 (I. p. 54) διατήρησις τῶν ἁγίων δογμάτων, 3 Macc. i. 3 τῶν πατρίων δογμάτων. Comp. Iren. Fragm. 38 (p. 855 Stieren) where, immediately after a reference to our text, τοῖς τῶν Ἰουδαίων δόγμασι προσέρχεσθαι is opposed to πνευματικῶς λειτουργεῖν. In the parallel passage, Ephes. ii. 15, this is the exclusive reference; but here (for reasons explained in the last note) it seems best to give the term a secondary and more extensive application.
The dative is perhaps best explained as governed by the idea of γεγραμμένον involved in χειρόγραφον (comp. Plat. Ep. vii. p. 243 A τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις); as in 1 Tim. ii. 6 τὸ μαρτύριον καιροῖς ἰδίοις, where καιροῖς depends on an implied μεμαρτυρημένον. Otherwise it is taken as closely connected with καθ’ ἡμῶν, ‘the bond which was in force against us by reason of the ordinances’: see Winer § xxxi. p. 273, A. Buttmann p. 80. Possibly an ἐν has dropped out of the text before τοῖς δόγμασιν, owing to the similar ending χειρογραφονεν (comp. Ephes. ii. 15); but, if so, the omission must date from the earliest age, since no existing authorities exhibit any traces of such a reading; see the note on ver. 18 ἃ ἑόρακεν, and comp. Phil. ii. 1 εἴ τις σπλάγχνα.
A wholly different interpretation however prevails universally among Greek commentators both here and in Ephes. ii. 15. They take τοῖς δόγμασιν, ἐν δόγμασιν, to mean the ‘doctrines or precepts of the Gospel’, and so to describe the instrument by which the abrogation of the law was effected. So Chrysostom, Severianus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Theodoret, followed by the later commentators Œcumenius and Theophylact. Strangely enough they do not allude to the correct interpretation; nor (with the exception of the passage ascribed to Irenæus which is quoted above) have I found any distinct traces of it in any Greek father. The grammatical difficulty would be taken to favour this interpretation, which moreover was characteristic of the age when the battle of creeds was fought. But it has been universally abandoned by modern interpreters, as plainly inappropriate to the context and also as severing the substantive δόγμα here from the verb δογματίζειν in ver. 20. The Latin fathers, who had either decretis or sententiis in their version, were saved from this false interpretation; e.g. Hilar. de Trin. i. 12 (II. p. 10), ix. 10 (II. p. 265 sq.), Ambros. Apol. Dav. 13 (I. p. 698), de Fid. iii. 2 (II. p. 499), August. de Pecc. Mer. i. 47 (X. p. 26): though they very commonly took τοῖς δόγμασιν, ἐν δόγμασιν, to refer to the decree of condemnation. Jerome however on Ephes. ii. 15 (VII. p. 581) follows the Greeks. The later Christian sense of δόγμα, meaning ‘doctrine’, came from its secondary classical use, where it was applied to the authoritative and categorical ‘sentences’ of the philosophers: comp. Just. Mart. Apol. i. 7 (p. 56 D) οἱ ἐν Ἕλλησι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀρεστὰ δογματίσαντες ἐκ παντὸς τῷ ἑνὶ ὀνόματι φιλοσοφίας προσαγορεύονται, καίπερ τῶν δογμάτων ἐναντίων ὄντων, Cic. Acad. ii. 9 ‘de suis decretis quæ philosophi vocant δόγματα’, Senec. Epist. xcv. 10 ‘Nulla ars contemplativa sine decretis suis est, quæ Græci vocant dogmata, nobis vel decreta licet adpellare vel scita vel placita’. See the indices to Plutarch, Epictetus, etc., for illustrations of the use of the term. There is an approach towards the ecclesiastical meaning in Ignat. Magn. 13 βεβαιωθῆναι ἐν τοῖς δόγμασιν τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων, Barnab. § 1 τρία οὖν δόγματά ἐστιν Κυρίου (comp. § 9, 10).
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[← ] δόγμασιν, ὃ ἦν ὑπεναντίον ἡμῖν· καὶ αὐτὸ ἦρκεν ἐκ [ →]
ὃ ἦν κ.τ.λ.] ‘which was directly opposed to us’. The former expression, τὸ καθ’ ἡμῶν, referred to the validity of the bond; the present, ὃ ἦν ὑπεναντίον ἡμῖν, describes its active hostility. It is quite a mistake to suppose that the first preposition in ὑπεναντίος mitigates its force, as in ὑποδήλωσις, ὑπόλευκος, ὑπομαίνομαι, ὑποσημαίνειν, etc. Neither in classical writers nor in the LXX has the word any shade of this meaning. It is very commonly used for instance, of things which are directly antagonistic and mutually exclusive: e.g. Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. i. 7 (p. 323) Δημόκριτος ... φησὶ ... τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον εἶναι τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον ... ἐοίκασι δὲ οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγοντες ὑπεναντία (i.e. self-contradictory) φαίνεσθαι λέγειν· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιολογίας κ.τ.λ., [Plato] Alcib. Sec. 138 C ΣΩ. Τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἆρα ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν; ΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.... 139 B ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη; (i.e. how can one thing have two direct opposites?), where the whole argument depends on this sense of ὑπεναντίος. In compounds with ὑπὸ the force of the preposition will generally be determined by the meaning of the other element in the compound; and, as ἐναντίος (ἔναντι) implies locality, a local sense is communicated to ὑπό. Thus ὑπεναντίος may be compared with ὑπαλλάσσειν, ὑπαντᾶν, ὑπαντιάζειν, ὑποτρέχειν (Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 12 ληστὰς ὑποδραμεῖν, ‘to hunt down’), ὑπελάυνειν (Xen. Anab. i. 8. 15 ὑπελάσας ὡς συναντῆσαι, ‘riding up’), ὑφιστάναι (Polyb. i. 50. 6 ὑπέστησε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ναῦν ἀντίπρωρον τοῖς πολεμίοις, ‘he brought up’ his own ship). With this meaning, ‘over against,’ ‘close in upon,’ the preposition does not weaken but enhance the force of ἐναντίος, so that the compound will denote ‘direct,’ ‘close,’ or ‘persistent opposition.’