The phenomena upon which Driesch lays considerable stress are those which occur upon a division of certain living embryos. An embryo, when cut in half, displays remarkable powers of self-adjustment and continued development. Each half can, as it were, regulate itself, and make a fresh start; a process which results in two self-contained organisms, though of smaller size than would have resulted from a single undivided organism. The cells which compose the organism seem able to adapt themselves to whatever demands are made upon them. Like workmen building a bridge, all of them can do every single act—if need arise—and the result of their labours is a perfect bridge, even if some of the workmen fall sick or are killed or injured in an accident.
Driesch sums up the results of his researches by saying:
"There is something in the organism's behaviour—in the widest sense of the word—which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same (i.e. to its complete expression in terms of chemistry and physics), and which shows that the living organism is more than a sum or aggregate of its parts; that it is insufficient to call the organism 'a typically combined body' (i.e., a machine), without further explanation."[73]
The Problem of Life.—The problem is: What is it in an organism which causes it to behave in a fashion so impossible for any machine? To answer this question satisfactorily would be to have solved the mystery of life. Biologists do not answer the question; they do not say what this peculiar potency is, but they give it a name. Driesch calls it entelechy, i.e. "purposiveness," and he also speaks of psychoids, i.e. "primitive minds." Names do not carry us very far; but the mere fact that biologists have gone to the trouble of providing a name, is important. It constitutes an admission on their part that there is something mysterious about the organism; for it has been a principle of modern science since the days of Galileo never to appeal to mysterious causes if known ones can be found. The deus ex machina method seems to them fundamentally unsound, and so it is. If every difficulty were considered solved merely by the word "mystery," knowledge would never advance. Labelled ignorance is still ignorance. It is not names, but things that are important. But in this particular instance the application of the name entelechy indicates that, in the opinion of such an authority as Driesch, at any rate, something exists which no merely physical or chemical term can completely describe. And Driesch is typical of the trend of much modern biology. It is only the very extreme optimists who now look for a final explanation of the living organism in terms of physics and chemistry.
Results of the New Biology.—But if life resists all attempts to reduce it to matter and motion, we are confronted with the breakdown of the mechanical theory of the universe, which has been slowly but progressively elaborated since the days of Leonardo da Vinci, and applied impartially to the organic and the inorganic spheres. But this ultra-dogmatic theory now seems too cramped to contain the facts; even scientists resent the claims of materialist-mechanical orthodoxy. Some indeed adopt not merely a critical, but a provocative attitude, and seek to discredit the prestige of mechanics. Professor J. S. Haldane not only vindicates the freedom, but prophesies the speedy advance of biology to a position of pre-eminence. Not only are biological phenomena irreducible to terms of mechanics, but it is mechanics that will have to be re-interpreted in terms of biology.
"It is at least evident that the extension of biological conceptions to the whole of nature may be much nearer than seemed conceivable even a few years ago. When the day of that extension comes, the physical and chemical world as we now conceive it—the world of atoms and energy—will be recognised as nothing but an appearance ... it will stand confessed as a world of abstractions like that of the pure mathematicians."[74]
The New Psychology.—Not only physical and biological, but psychological science will contribute very largely to the reconstruction of view which is now taking place. Particular attention is due to those branches of psychology which deal experimentally with the subconscious, with instincts, with the phenomena of thought transference, psychotherapy, and of so-called "spiritualism." In none of these spheres can research yet be said to have proceeded far enough to justify the luxury of dogmatising over results. Considerable confusion of opinion may still exist, but it is now generally recognised that there is a wide sphere of research in psychical regions which is practically a terra incognita. And those most competent to judge of results seem to be most cautious in their statements. We are in the position of not knowing what a day may bring forth; and an expectant agnosticism with regard to many problems is perhaps the right attitude to adopt. The somewhat arrogant negations of the last generation are now out of place; they were never, in the strict sense, scientific, and they are now demodés. It is extremely difficult to imagine a return to the view which dismisses "mind" from the universe as being an obscure by-product of matter, or a comparatively insignificant "epiphenomenon" accompanying certain obscure chemical or mechanical processes. The old theories, gratifying in their simplicity, will no longer cover the facts.
Psychical Research.—One particular branch of experimental psychology, which has attracted a large measure of public attention, calls for a few remarks. The attempt has been made to give experimental proof of the existence of "disembodied spirits," human or otherwise. The whole subject, exceptionally exposed as it is to the influence of prejudices of various kinds, requires to be treated with great caution, and it is inadvisable, in the present condition of the problem, to make dogmatic statements in any direction.
What appears to be certain is that the occurrence is well established of various phenomena which it is extremely difficult to explain in accordance with our present knowledge of matter, of space, or of mental action.
The occurrence of such phenomena is no longer disputed; but it is over the explanation of them that controversy is active. And it seems quite certain that the very least in the way of concessions that these new facts will force from conservative scientists is a radical revision of current notions of the range of human mental action. The mind is evidently capable of producing certain effects—even upon matter—which would have seemed incredible a short while ago.