The specific statements appear to show that the correspondent had a better comprehension of the situation than the general. The correspondent says that the guns were fired upon with rifle and shell fire, but went on and opened a steady fire and remained there an hour and a half. What point of time of this hour and a half General Buller refers to in stating that at this "moment" he heard that the batteries were "out of action," is for investigation. Later on, we ascertain that the general had sent these guns "back." They must, therefore, have been turned from the fruitless attack on the left to help the one that seemed more hopeful on the right, but this couldn't happen in a moment. The artillery fire caused that of the enemy to abate, but at the distance of 1,250 yards from the objective the horses of the batteries were killed and so many of the men fell that the guns could not be served, and more than that, the ammunition could not be replenished.
This is the most striking example given in active service of the efficacy of the modern rifle. It overpowered the well-served artillery rapid-fire twelve-pounders. The exhaustion of the ammunition may be in part attributed to the activity of the batteries in the attack on the left. As the men were disabled, so that the guns could not be served, it was not worth while to forward ammunition, and dispatches state that at the time when the guns ceased firing, "twenty carts went to the rear with the wounded." This, of course, by grace of the Boers.
Boers Capture the Guns
A further statement is that the artillery detachment "doubled back," which means retreated without order and into a depression—a donga or ravine—where they "found they were protected from the enemy's fire, but exposed to the burning heat of the sun." General Buller and staff rode in that direction. Two of the staff were hit, and the General himself touched, when heroic efforts were made in which the only son of Lord Roberts fell in the act of rescuing the two guns that were restored to the British army. The presence of the Commander-in-Chief at the scene of the greatest danger is noted, but his resources must have been at the time exhausted. The correspondent we have just quoted covers a considerable lapse of time in these words: "At a late hour in the afternoon, while the men were lying without hope of succor under the rays of the still blazing sun, a strong party of Boers crossed the river.[[1]] Firing was stopped, and they surrounded the guns which had been taken to the donga for shelter, and captured the whole of them. This is positive, and appears to be at least as authentic as anything official. There is a great gap in the story of the battle that still is to be credited to the censor. A correspondent's letter, early wired, says the Boers crossed the river, and it would appear at this place, but other accounts say that they were intrenched on the British side of the river a little further to the right so extensively they could not be flanked, and they were so numerous they had been offensive and caused the Commander-in-Chief to refer to them as "oppressing his right flank," which was to threaten his retreat. General Buller and his staff are not referred to further than in their appearance in attempting to save the guns. Whether the British artillery and small arms were of as long range as those of the enemy, is one of the questions that rises up and will not down in this connection. The extent of the disaster to the British is emphasized by the knowledge that the guns captured and carried off by the Boers were not only 800 yards distant from the river, but had been, after the batteries had ceased firing, taken into the ravine which was used for shelter only—at least, that is one of the assertions that are made. Colonel Bullock, who attempted to reinforce the artillery and was driven into the ravine, and forced to surrender, but at the same time the men with him "managed to make good their escape in the confusion."
[[1]] They had a bridge behind a hill over the Tugela, bearing on Buller's right.
Why Were the Guns Lost
Another question forces itself upon the student of the situation as it existed at this time: Why could not the guns on the British side of the river, more than a furlong from the bank, be put under the fire of British marksmen and saved? Why were the Boers, who came over and swarmed around them safe, while the British had been crushed on that very spot by an "inferno" fire? The Boers could hardly have been in superior force and position on both sides of the river. Early in the action the British had captured Colenso and the houses near the bridge. That position should have offered advantages for those who could consider the propriety of remaining upon the defensive. General Buller certainly was wise in not sacrificing lives in attempts that he saw would for some cause be vain to bring off the guns; indeed, he should have desisted when beaten on the left. The life of Captain Roberts had been sacrificed in the attempt to recover the guns, but the long-range rifle in the hands of marksmen could have detained them on the ground where they were abandoned. If the position of the enemy was impregnable from the beginning, as is the conclusion in England, the commanding general should have known it and had the courage of his conviction to accept the defeat on the left as the end of the day's experiment. It was according to his reputation, however, to repeat the effort to force the river with increase of energy. But all depended upon the distance from the river that was to be passed—a battery could be in range of the Boer's position and not stricken with their rifle fire and put out of action. There was no eye that made and applied this measurement. It is another form of the question: At what distance is a self-cocking revolver a better weapon than a magazine rifle?
Buller's Explanation
The key to the intelligence of the further proceedings is that the Boers were strongly posted on the south side of the river and pressing at close quarters the right wing of the British army. General Buller explains his refusal to continue the effort to gain possession of the abandoned artillery and the men sheltered in the ravine of retreat, saying, "Of the eighteen horses thirteen were killed, and, as several of the drivers were wounded, I would not allow another attempt, as it seemed they would be a shell mark." This is definite, but not conclusive. The wounding of several drivers does not seem to have been important enough to change the fortunes of the fight; but the fact that, the general adds, he could not sacrifice life in a gallant attempt to force a passage, "unsupported by artillery," gives the reason, and a good one, for not attempting to "force a passage." The language implies that Buller was at the moment the battery was put out of action attempting to cross at the second ford—the one on the right. Of course, it was not possible to do that without the support of artillery, and it might be very difficult with the support of artillery. Conduct of the Men The general in one sentence refers to the intense heat, and adds that the conduct of the troops was "excellent," and says, in conclusion, "We abandoned ten guns." Right after saying he would not try to force a passage without artillery he remarked, "I directed the troops to withdraw, which they did in good order. Throughout the day a considerable force of the enemy was pressing on my right flank, but was kept back by the mounted men under Lord Dundonald." Though they were kept back, they were making themselves very disagreeable on General Buller's side of the river; and this happened, as exactly stated, under "the still blazing sun." One company of riflemen, half a mile away, with plenty of ammunition, if marksmen, could have made the abandoned guns too hot for the Boers to take away. The last line of the official report is, "We have retired to our camp at Chieveley." There was nothing else to do. The day was lost, and full particulars show the Boer position was impregnable. Buller had to make the attacks, and it was good generalship that gave up the assaults with a loss less than eight per cent. of troops engaged.
Fuller Accounts Needed