Livingstone Reports on Slave Trade
This statement regarding the Boer slave policy represented the feeling and knowledge of Englishmen generally along the borders, or when they came into contact with the Dutch and the natives together. Of the missionary sentiment in this connection the works of Livingstone and Moffat and the more recent statements of the Rev. Dr. Stewart afford abundant evidence. And this aside from the aggressive and sometimes mistaken or exaggerated views of Dr. Philip and Cape Town missionary leaders and semi-political preceptors in the earlier days of Kosa or Kaffir warfare. All around the frontier of the two Republics commandos would from time to time attack isolated tribes, with slight excuse and sometimes none at all, burn their kraals, take their cattle and kidnap their women and children. Dr. Livingstone has put it on record,[[2]] after prolonged experience of both Boers and Blacks and with a personal character for honesty and honor which no one will impeach, that "the great objection many of the Boers had, and still have, to English law is that it makes no distinction between black men and white." Elsewhere in the same volume he declares that "it is difficult for a person in a civilized country to conceive that any body of men possessing the common attributes of humanity should with one accord set out ... and proceed to shoot down in cold blood men and women, of a different color it is true, but possessed of domestic feelings and affections equal to their own.... It was long before I could give credit to the tales of bloodshed told by native witnesses; but when I found the Boers themselves, some bewailing and denouncing, others glorying in the bloody scenes in which they had been themselves the actors, I was compelled to admit the validity of the testimony." Early Scenes of Bloodshed The great missionary proceeds, in detail, to describe one of the Boer methods of fighting natives. "When they reach the tribe to be attacked, friendly natives (previously captured) are ranged in front to form as they say 'a shield;' the Boers then coolly fire over their heads till the devoted people flee and leave cattle, wives and children to the captors." He knew of this being done nine times within his own personal experience, and upon no occasion was any Boer blood shed. He also declares that the Boers never intended to abide by the promise regarding slavery made in 1852-4, and describes how a slave raid amongst the Bechuanas was organized and carried out by 400 Boers under Piet Scholz immediately after that engagement was entered into. It was the same all along the line until, in the latter sixties, England began to advance into the interior and to definitely plant her feet upon regions which the Boer deemed himself heir to and, almost, actual owner of. During these years the Natal Mercury, the Cape Argus and the Transvaal Argus—a small but energetic sheet—drew continuous attention to this slave system and policy, and a bulky pamphlet was published in 1868 at Cape Town containing a mass of printed proof as to the real condition of affairs. As Dr. Livingstone says, no attention was ever paid, or intended to be paid, to the pledges in the Conventions. The only effect was to change the name of "slave" to "apprentice." The following paragraph from an authoritative source[[3]] summarizes the situation in this respect:
"Children were kidnapped, trained to work in the fields, had their price and were as little protected by the law as any other live stock on the farm. The 'apprenticeship' never came to an end. Wagon-loads of slaves, 'black-ivory' as they were called, passed through the country and were put up to auction or were exchanged, sometimes for money, and sometimes for a horse, or for a cow and a big pot."
[[2]] Missionary Travels. By David Livingstone. London, 1857.
[[2]] Martineau's Life of Sir Bartle Frere. Vol. II., p. 174.
English Abhorrence of Slavery
Such were some of the causes of British dislike for Boer methods and for naturally unfriendly contact with them through strong sympathy for oppressed races and utter abhorrence of slavery in every shape and form. The relation of the Boer and the native was indeed at the root of much to of British expansion during the last thirty years of the century. The threatened subjugation of Moshesh caused the annexation of Basutoland. The Transvaal attack upon the Bapedi under Sekukuni and its failure precipitated the annexation of 1877. The danger of a Zulu invasion of the same country and of Natal, as a consequence of this attack, caused the war with Cetywayo and the establishment of a feeble and tentative protectorate over Zululand. The raids of the Boers into the latter region and the formation of what they called the "New Republic" caused the ultimate annexation of a greater portion of the whole country and of Pondoland. Their attempt to crush the Batlapins and Barolongs in Bechuanaland and to establish the so-called Republics of Stellaland and Goshen caused the expedition of General Warren and the annexation of the territory. Their effort in 1891 to trek north of the Limpopo and to take possession of a portion of Rhodesia had to be repressed by Dr. Jameson under threats of force. Their previously well-known ambition in this connection had much to do with Mr. Rhodes' determination to extend British power northwards by means of his Chartered Company. Similar efforts in Tongaland had, meanwhile, compelled its ruler to appeal to the Queen's Government for protection in 1887. The complications of British policy with the natives of South Africa north and east of Cape Colony, in the latter half of the century, were, therefore, as much the fault of Boer ambition and arrogance and ill-treatment of the Blacks as were the difficulties in the earlier part of the century with the Hottentots and Bushmen and Kosas.
The Napoleon of South Africa
Of these natives—Bantu, or Kaffirs, or whatever their local names might be—much has been written and much might be said here. The race has produced some great men. Merciless in war they generally were, but it is a question whether the cruelties perpetrated by Matabele or Zulu chiefs have not been excelled by leaders of Christian nations without the aggravation of continuous warfare or the excuse of natural savagery. The religious strife of mediæval Europe, or the fire and sword and tortures of Spain in Mexico and Peru, will occur to every mind. Bravery was an almost universal quality amongst the Bantu, though it varied in degree. Tshaka, the founder of the Zulu nation, possessed boundless ambition, a powerful and ruthless will, a genuine genius for military organization and rule. He was emphatically the native Napoleon of South Africa. Dingaan, his successor, had a few of his qualities; Cetywayo enough of them to constitute him an interesting figure and to give him a permanent place in history. Had he not been obliged to contest his supremacy with the firearms and cannon of the white man, he might have extended his sway up to the Zambesi and been a greater warrior than Tshaka. Moselkatze, until he came into conflict with the emigrant farmers, was a savage potentate of considerable ability. Like Tshaka with his Zulus, he organized the Matabele into a strong military power and ruled the west and north with a rod of iron for many years. His successor, Lobengula, resembled the Zulu Cetywayo in many respects, and in none more than in his final overthrow by the white man. Had conditions been otherwise the two chiefs might have disputed the primacy of South Africa; and it is hard to say which would have won. These men were all warriors by nature and environment and generals by instinct. Moshesh the Basuto was, however, a statesman as well, and his rise and progress and career afford most striking evidence of the natural ability which a savage may possess. Of a somewhat similar character is Khama, the present Chief of the Bechuanas. So much for the greater names among the Bantu.
Native Bravery