General J. C. Smuts related how his expedition to the Cape Colony had originated, and how it had been carried out. Last year, he said, it was the opinion of President Kruger and of their Deputation in Europe that there was good hope for their cause from the Cape Colony. On that ground and also on the reports that they received from there, it was decided to send General de la Rey thither to assume the supreme command as soon as the Cape was strong enough to be considered a third party in the struggle. Later, however, they came to the conclusion that it would be best to act more cautiously, that General de la Rey could hardly be missed in the Western Transvaal, that he (General Smuts) should go with a small commando to ascertain what the possibilities in the Cape Colony were. "I went," he continued, "with 300 men, while 100 men followed me, but 100 men I had to leave behind with General Kritzinger because their horses were too poor. We had a very difficult journey, certainly the most difficult that I and my people ever experienced. I went through the whole of the Cape Colony. I proceeded to Grahamstown, then to Graaff Reinet, and down to the coast again. With a few exceptions I met all the commandos in the Cape Colony. I questioned the leaders and thus came to be well informed on everything. Commandant Kritzinger did not follow me according to agreement, and as I saw that there was a danger of disorder arising I took everything under my command. I found that there were about 1,400 or 1,500 men under arms, and not 3,000 as had been reported. To obtain the exact numbers, however, was almost impossible. Commandant Lotter was captured with his whole commando of 100 men. I have now been in the Cape Colony for about a year, and the number that joined us in that time was about 1,400. The number of men under arms had thus been doubled, and but for the losses there would now have been 3,000 men. There are now about 2,600 men under my command, but then there is another division sent in by General de la Rey under General de Villiers in Griqualand West, about 700 strong, and another in Bechuanaland under Commandant van der Merwe. There are thus about 3,300 men operating in the Cape Colony, and this does not include the men under Myburgh, Wessels, and van Reenen, of whom I know nothing.
The question now is: What help can be expected from the Cape Colony for our cause? There will be no general rising in the Cape. We had very good expectations, and thought that it would not be difficult to cause a general rising there. The people are very enthusiastic—more so than with us; but they have peculiar difficulties. The first is with reference to horses. The British have taken all the horses that could be used, and shot the useless ones. There is, therefore, a great scarcity of horses in the Cape Colony. And, further, it is extraordinarily difficult for the Colonist to rise if he has to fight on foot with the knowledge that if he is captured he will have to undergo heavy punishment. Unmounted men cannot fight in the Cape Colony. You can operate only with mounted commandos, and as we have no horses we cannot accept a tenth of those who are willing to join us. On account of this deficiency of horses, we cannot expect a general rising. Another great difficulty is the absence of grass. The veld over the entire Cape Colony is overgrown with bushes (scrub). There is no grass as in the Republics. Where you have no forage, therefore, the horses cannot exist. Where I have been latterly there is wheat, and I fed my horses on that, but now the wheat is becoming scarce, and there is no prospect of obtaining any more on account of the proclamations of the British, which prohibit all sowing. We have, indeed, issued a counter proclamation, but that has not helped. The question of horses and forage is thus a great stumbling-block for our cause in the Cape. In my opinion, the small commandos in the Cape Colony have done their best. Three British camps were lately taken by them.
The question now arose whether commandos from the Republics could proceed to the Cape Colony, and whether there was an opening for them there.—Yes, there was an opening, but the difficulty was how to get there. More of our commandos from the Republics would be able to exist in the Cape Colony if food became too scarce here, but the great trouble was how to get there. The British have now about 50,000 English and Dutch Africanders under arms.—These conditions have led me to the conclusion that there will be no general rising in the Cape Colony, and that the continuance of the war will depend more on the Republics than upon the Cape Colony."
The meeting was then adjourned till the evening.
On re-assembling, the first speaker was Commandant P. L. Uys (district Pretoria), who said that in his commando there were only 153 mounted men; the other 128 burghers were unmounted. There were still about 2,000 head of cattle, and grain enough to last them for a month. All the Kaffirs in his district were hostile, with the exception of the captain Matello. In the portion of Middelburg under him there were 26 mounted men and 38 burghers on foot.
Commandant H. S. Grobler (Bethal) stated that during all the summer he had had no rest. He still had a commando of 150 men, but no food, and he could trek nowhere, because his horses were too poor. Only recently he had to break through a cordon (kraal), and managed to get through with only 153 men, while 63 were captured. The Bethal district had been devastated from the one end to the other. There was no food left for his commandos, nor for the 300 women and children, who were in a pitiable condition. They were not only without the necessaries of life, but also exposed to danger from the Kaffirs, who had already raped some of the women, which drove some of them to take refuge in the blockhouses.
General Chris. Botha remarked that he represented Swazieland. With regard to provisions, the supply of mealies was almost exhausted. They lived on what they could get from the Kaffirs as a favour. There were no more women with them. His commando of 113 men was still in the Piet Retief district. They had no grain, and had to proceed from one Kaffir-kraal to another to purchase food, which required money. However, they still managed to live. In this way he had helped the Transvaal for two and a half years, and now that he heard that there was food in the Orange Free State he would proceed thither and help them for two and a half years. In the Piet Retief district they had grain for about two months, but no cattle, and they had to live on what they could capture from the enemy. There were 65 families still there, and it was hard to provide for them. Their position was very critical.
Mr. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said that he would go more fully into a few points relating to his district than the Commandant General had been able to do in his general review. In Vryheid during the last six or eight months they had been much harassed by large forces, and the district had been completely devastated. The presence of the families caused the greatest difficulties. Latterly the British refused to receive any more families. They were also continually in danger from Kaffirs, who were decidedly hostile to them. Horses and corn were scarce. But yet, as far as grain was concerned, they would manage, if the enemy did not again make incursions into that district. Recently in the early morning, before daybreak, a Kaffir commando had attacked a Boer commando consisting of 70 men, of whom they had killed 56. The families in that district had said to him: "You must make peace in any case," and he felt it his duty to inform the meeting of this.
General Alberts (Heidelberg) said that for the last twelve months they had had no rest in his district. During the past year they had not been able to plough and sow at all, and a commando could no longer exist there. Three times had they been enclosed in a cordon (kraal), but had fortunately always managed to get out. They had no slaughter-cattle themselves, but had received some from Commandant Roos, of the Orange Free State. His horses were in a most deplorable condition.
Landrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) informed the meeting how matters stood in the Wakkerstroom district. They were dependent upon the Kaffirs for grain; in fact, for everything except meat. They bartered meat from the Kaffirs for mealies. But this year there were scarcely any mealies, and what there were had been badly spoilt by the enemy. With the supply they had, they would be able to manage for another two months, and out of this the families with them would also have to be supported. The supply of slaughter-cattle was also running short, and the horses were in such a poor condition that they could not be used against the enemy for a fortnight. It would perhaps become necessary for the commando to leave the district, and then the great question arose: What would become of the families there?