The battles of the world

by J. Douglas Borthwick

On the 25th of April, 1706, he again arrived at the Hague for the active duties of the approaching campaign. This year’s warfare began at an earlier period than the previous ones, for the French General, with commendable zeal and activity, took the field in the spring, forced the German lines on the Motter, reduced Dreisenheim and Hagenau, and threatened the Palatinate. The Duke, therefore, left the Hague on the 9th May, the Dutch being now anxious to retain him with them, and offering him uncontrolled power over their forces. Accompanied by Overkirk, he passed through Rimemont, and reached Maestricht on the 12th. Here he reviewed the Dutch troops, and began to take measures for an attack on Namur. But Villeroy received orders from Paris rather to risk a battle than to give up this important place. Hence, in the third week in May, the two armies began to approach each other.

Villeroy and the Elector of Bavaria passed the Dyle, and approached Tirlemont. Their combined forces amounted to about 62,000 men. The Duke, with his English, joined the Dutch at Bilsen on the 20th of May, and on the 22nd he had intelligence of the arrival of the Danish contingent, which raised the strength of his army to about 60,000 men. His first desire, now, was to learn the position of the enemy, and how best to come in contact with them. The field of battle ultimately proved to be in an elevated part of the plain of Brabant, lying between Maestricht, Louvain, and Namur. The village of Ramilies itself is but a few miles to the east of Wavre, the position of Marshal Blucher on the morning of the day of Waterloo.

On the 23rd of May, then, in 1706, the English, Dutch, and Danish army, commencing their march early in the morning, came in sight, about eight o’clock, of the Franco-Bavarian outposts. A fog for some time made everything obscure, but about ten o’clock the two armies stood in presence of each other. The French commander had formed his order of battle with the skill which experience generally gives; but he was opposed by a greater commander, whose eye speedily detected the weaknesses of his position.

The French and Bavarians were drawn up on ground which, by its nature, gave their order of battle a concave form. Thus the attacking enemy would have the advantage of being able to bring his men more rapidly from one side to the other, as required. The left wing of the French, also, though strongly posted, was in a position from which it could not easily move. Marlborough, therefore, was not long in forming his plan, which was, to turn the enemy’s right wing; to seize an elevated position in the rear of that wing, and from that position to outflank the whole army.

He therefore began a feigned attack, by his own right wing, upon the left of the French. Villeroy immediately met this, as Marlborough intended, by sending for fresh troops from his centre, and by weakening his right. Pausing in his apparent attack, Marlborough promptly moved to the left all the infantry that were out of sight of the French, and fell upon the enemy’s right wing, which was posted in Tavieres.

The attack succeeded, and Tavieres was carried. Villeroy, finding out his mistake, hurried his squadron of dragoons to the succour of his right wing; but these squadrons were met by the Danish cavalry emerging from Tavieres, and they were all cut to pieces, or driven into the Mehaigne.

And now Ramilies itself, in the centre, became the object of attack. The Duke ordered up from his own right wing every available squadron, and exposed himself much in leading the attack. He was, at one moment, thrown from his horse, and in danger of being made prisoner. While he was remounting, a cannon-ball killed his equerry, Captain Bingfield, who was assisting him.

But now the allied cavalry had reached the height of Ottomond, in the rear of the French position, and the success of the attack was secured. The French were in utter confusion in all parts of the field, and Ramilies itself was carried. There remained only the left wing of Villeroy’s army; and this, attacked now by the reserves on Marlborough’s right, and by the victorious troops which had cleared Ramilies, gave way as evening drew on, rushed in crowds down the descent behind their position, and fled for Judoigne. The cannon and baggage fell into the hands of the victors, who pursued the flying French and Bavarians until two o’clock in the morning. The allied army did not halt in its pursuit till past midnight, when it had advanced to Meldert, five leagues from the field of battle, and two from Louvian.

This battle cost the Franco-Bavarian army 13,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners: among whom were the Princes of Soubise and Rohan, and a son of Marshal Tallard. The spoils of the day consisted of 80 colours and standards taken from the French; nearly all their artillery, and all the baggage which was in the field. The loss of the Allies was 1066 killed, and 2567 wounded. The vast difference between this, and the loss sustained at Blenheim, shows that the victory of Ramilies was gained by the Duke’s masterly manœuvres; and was not owing merely to the courage of the soldiers.