Lord Wellington had observed that on the land side (and the French had no force upon the water) Lisbon could be completely defended by a series of entrenchments properly manned. Silently, therefore, during many months past, he had been at work on these lines. They were now complete, mounting 600 guns and when manned by 50,000 men they might have defied Napoleon himself at the head of one of his largest armies.

Massena, astonished, employed several days in examining these lines on every side, but at no point could he find an attack to be feasible. One or two attempts were made, in which his troops were roughly handled, and one of his Generals killed. At last, altogether perplexed, he sent off General Foy to Paris to ask of Napoleon what was to be done. But Napoleon himself had no remedy to prescribe, and hence, after remaining before the lines for one whole month, until utter starvation menaced his army, the French Marshal commenced a retreat. He first retired to Santaren, where he remained until the following March. He then finally retreated out of Portugal, having lost, in the short space of seven months, not fewer than 45,000 men, chiefly by exposure, disease, and starvation. Lord Wellington followed him, and at once invested Almeida. Massena ventured on an engagement at Fuentes d’Onore, but failed, and Almeida capitulated to the English on the 12th of May, 1811.

This campaign had greatly raised the hopes and the confidence of England, and had placed the character of her General on an unassailable elevation. Portugal had been defeated, and a French Marshal with a noble army had been driven back in defeat. Lord Wellington now, therefore, resolved to begin offensive operations in Spain, and he sat down before Badajoz. But Napoleon had at last awakened to the real character of this great struggle. He resolved that Badajoz should not be lost. He therefore earnestly and strenuously increased his forces in Spain, until, in September, 1811, they again amounted to 368,000 men. Soult and Marmont received their orders, and approached Badajoz with 60,000 men. Lord Wellington retired, but in July he threatened Ciudad Rodrigo, when again the two French Marshals marched to its relief with a greatly superior army. And now, as the winter approached, both armies went into cantonments, and the campaign of 1811 ended.

But with January, 1812, commenced that career of triumph which only ended at Waterloo. In 1810, Wellington had saved Portugal; in 1811, he had threatened and disquieted the French armies in their possession of Spain; but the opening year was not to close until that possession was very seriously endangered.

Silently, all November and December, Wellington’s preparations were going on. Soult imagined that he was about to renew the siege of Badajoz, but suddenly, in the earliest days of January, a bridge was thrown over the Agueda, and the English army crossed the river and invested Ciudad Rodrigo. The siege commenced on the 8th, and on the 19th the place was stormed and carried. It had cost the French a siege of six weeks to take it from the Spaniards two years before. On hearing of its capture in twelve days, Marmont wrote to Napoleon, saying, “On the 16th, the English batteries opened their fire: on the 19th the place was taken by storm, and fell into the power of the enemy. There is something so incomprehensible in all this, that until I know more I refrain from any observation.”

Badajoz, a far stronger place, was next invested, on the 17th of March, and on the 6th of April it was taken by storm. And here, too, General Lery, a French engineer, expressed his astonishment, writing thus: “I think the capture of Badajoz a very extraordinary event, and I should be at a loss to account for it in any manner consistent with probability.” These two great strongholds, the border-fortresses, had now been taken, and the way was thus opened into the heart of Spain. All Europe saw with astonishment that a little English army, seldom amounting—even with the aid of the Portuguese,—to more than 40,000 men, could counteract the efforts of the best armies of France, led by Napoleon’s most trusted Generals.

After these exploits, Wellington gave his army some rest until the harvest should grow up, and provisions be more easily obtained. But in May he sent General Hill to storm the forts at Almarez on the Tagus, when the French works, with all their artillery and stores, fell into the hands of the English, who lost only 180 men. By this able manœuvre the two armies of Marmont and Soult were separated.

On the 13th of June, the rains having ceased, and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda, and on the 17th be entered Salamanca, the people shouting, singing, and weeping for joy. The forts, however, were still held by French garrisons, and were not taken until the 27th.

On the 8th of July, Marmont, the French General now opposed to Wellington, received a reinforcement of 6000 men, and both he and Wellington began to prepare for a battle. On the 15th and 16th, Marmont, who had previously made several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant army between Toro and the Hornija rivers. Then began a series of manœuvres, continued for several successive days, until, on the 20th, the two armies were in sight, marching on parallel heights within musket-shot of each other in the most perfect array. The strength of each army amounted to from 45,000 to 48,000 men; but of Wellington’s force a considerable portion consisted of Portuguese troops.