The battles of the world

by J. Douglas Borthwick

After his supercession in 1808, on the very day of Vimiera, Sir Arthur Wellesley had returned to England; but, happily, the indignation felt by the English people at the convention of Cintra, by which the results of that victory had been thrown away, warned the British government that it was needful in times of great emergency to depart from the rule of seniority, and to select a Commander mainly on the ground of known and proved talent and ability. Hence the victor of Vimiera was again called into the field, and, on the 22nd of April, 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley a second time landed in Portugal.

“The unexpected arrival of a victorious Commander,” says Sir W. Napier, “created the greatest enthusiasm:—the Regency nominated him Captain-General; the people hailed his presence, and an undefined but powerful sentiment that something great would be achieved, pervaded the public mind.” Still, somewhat surprising, and rather overweening, was this confidence; for Sir Arthur Wellesley commanded only 26,000 English and German troops;—the Spanish and Portuguese armies were of little worth, and the French Emperor had at that moment in the Peninsula, a force of two hundred and seventy thousand men.

Sir Arthur lost no time in bringing his troops into action. On the 12th of May he crossed the Douro, in the face of the French army, and carried Oporto. Soult had entered it two months before with 25,500 men; he quitted it with 19,500, having lost by the sword and by sickness, by assassination and capture, 6,000 good soldiers. He had marched into Portugal with 58 pieces of artillery, he quitted it without a gun! Yet Soult was perhaps the greatest of all Napoleon’s Generals. Sir Arthur’s next object was, and indeed it seemed a necessity of his position, to seek the French armies, and to fight them with the least possible delay. The demand of the English, and of the Portuguese also, was to be led against the foe. To raise the spirit of the people of Spain and Portugal, and also of the governments of both countries, it was necessary to show that there was an army and a General in the field, and that neither the army nor the General were afraid of meeting the French.

At this period the Spanish Generals and the Spanish Ministers had not fully proved their entire inefficiency. They still boasted of their power to “drive the French out of Madrid, and out of Spain;” and if the English General had refused to co-operate with them, he would have been charged with cowardice or with treachery. On the 27th of June, 1809, therefore, Sir Arthur, at the head of 22,000 British troops, and with 30 guns, entered Spain, and began his march on Madrid. The Spanish General Cuesta, with an army of 39,000 men, was to co-operate with him.

This co-operation, however, proved to be nothing but hindrance and a source of vexation. The two armies marched forward, Sir Arthur grieved, day by day, by some failure of supplies, means of transport, or other necessary aid. On one occasion a delay of two whole days was created by the Spanish General’s obstinacy. On the 24th of July Sir Arthur wrote to Lord Castlereagh, “I am not able to follow the enemy as I could wish; having found it impossible to procure even one mule, or a cart in Spain; ... My troops have been in actual want of provisions for the last two days.” Meanwhile the Spanish Government took care of its own troops, and left the English to shift for themselves. “The French,” writes Sir Arthur, “can take what they like and will take it—while we cannot even buy common necessaries.”

Joseph, the nominal King of Spain, was apprized of the approach of the English and Spanish forces, and marched out of Madrid with 25,000 French veterans, commanded by Marshals Jourdan and Victor, to meet them. The two armies came into the neighbourhood of each other about the 22nd of July, 1809. Sir Arthur and Cuesta had agreed, on that day, that Victor’s corps, which had been found detached from the rest of the French army, should be attacked on the following day. But when the English troops were getting under arms the next morning, the old Spaniard was not up, and finally, he objected to any attack that day. The fact was, that the French General had contrived to corrupt some of Cuesta’s staff, and thus difficulties were constantly thrown in the way.

Victor, whose discomfiture would have been easy on the 23rd, had now escaped, and had joined Sebastiani and King Joseph. The whole French army now amounted to 56,122 men, and, confident in their strength, the Commanders resolved at once to march upon Talavera, and to attack the Anglo-Spanish army.

Two or three minor engagements preceded the general battle. On the 27th, in the afternoon, Victor’s advanced guards came upon the British outposts, and immediately attacked them. The English troops, some of whom then saw fire for the first time, were thrown into some confusion, and Sir Arthur himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner. A body of 10,000 Spanish which was posted near, took such an alarm, that they broke and fled, giving out that “all was lost.” Sir Arthur, with some difficulty, restored order, brought up fresh troops, and the French were finally driven off. Yet such was the effect of this panic among the Spanish troops, that they went into action the next day with 6000 men less than their previous number.

That same night Victor, encouraged by the effect of the surprise thus narrated, made an attack after sunset on a hill which was the key of the English position. For a moment the French attack succeeded, but General Hill brought up the 48th regiment, and at last expelled the French from the ground which they had gained. The British lost 800 men, and the French 1000, in this affair, which was not ended until long after dark.

As soon, however, as the day dawned, the French renewed the attack.