In the same spirit, in the table of the troops at Waterloo, (Book ix, p. 128,) we find the infantry of the Guard set down as being 11,500. Yet Gourgaud, Napoleon’s Aide-de-Camp, and Fleury de Chaboulon, his secretary, both concur in stating this infantry to have been 14,000.[20]
Of the heavy cavalry we have already seen, that while Napoleon, in his table, at p. 128, sets it down at 4000, 3000, and 3000, or 10,000 in all, he afterwards twice describes it, at p. 158 and at p. 173, as “these 12,000 select horse.”
Once more, in “Book ix,” p. 129, he states the force detached under Grouchy to have been 34,300. His own companion at St. Helena, General Montholon, in his history, (vol. i, p. 14,) calls this force 42,000.
All this evidence, then, drawn from several quarters, but wholly French, points to one conclusion,—namely, that Napoleon, in forming his tables for “Book ix,” deliberately reduced his real strength at Waterloo by about one-fourth or one-fifth; and that his first statement, in his bulletin issued at the time, was the true one; namely, that his army was only somewhat “less numerous than 95,000.”
And to this conclusion a remarkable support is found, in the behaviour of the two Generals on the day preceding the action. Wellington had beaten nearly every one of Napoleon’s Marshals;[21]—and could not but feel a degree of exultation at the thought of meeting the master of them all. Napoleon, on his part, had to encounter a General who had never been conquered. Supposing, then, the armies to have been nearly equal in strength, what might have been anticipated, but a degree of eager anticipation on Wellington’s side, and of seriousness on Napoleon’s? Instead of which, what do we hear? The Duke writes to Marshal Blucher, that he will accept battle, if the Marshal will assist him with one corps of his army. Meanwhile, Napoleon’s only anxiety is lest the English should escape him. “He was surprised,” writes his secretary, Fleury, “when daylight discovered to him that the English army had not quitted its positions, but appeared disposed to accept battle.” “He returned to his head-quarters (Book ix, p. 125) full of satisfaction at the great fault committed by the enemy’s General.” “He held this,” says Brialmont, “to be rashness, and a fault, exclaiming, ‘At last, then, I have them,—these English!’” Do not these views and anticipations, on the part of both of the Generals, make it quite evident that each of them was fully aware of the great superiority of the French army; and of the temerity of which the Duke would be guilty if, without any assurance of support, he ventured on an engagement in the face of such odds?
It is worth remark, too, that while several of the best English writers have accepted with the most good-natured simplicity, Napoleon’s own account of the force with which he fought this battle—French historians, even when admirers of Napoleon, show much less faith in his assertions. Thus, Lamartine, having Napoleon’s ixth Book before him, in which the number, “sixty-eight thousand, six hundred and fifty men,” is strenuously insisted on—quietly disregards the fiction, and repeatedly speaks of the French force as being “eighty thousand men.”[22]
But Napoleon’s “certainty of success,” of which he speaks at p. 127 of his Book ix, rested more upon the superior quality of his troops than on their superior numbers. He was thoroughly well aware, both of the slight value of the Belgian and Hanoverian auxiliaries, and of the excellence of his own troops. And the Duke, also, knew full well both of these facts. On the 8th of May he had written to Lord Stewart, “I have got an infamous army; very weak and ill-equipped; and a very inexperienced staff.” And seven days after the battle, he repeated to Lord Bathurst, that he had got “not only the worst troops, but the worst-equipped army, with the worst staff, that ever was brought together.”[23]
On the other hand, Napoleon’s army was, for its amount, the finest that he had ever led into the field. Thus his secretary, Fleury, says, “The whole army was superb, and full of ardour.” Lamartine speaks of it as “his grand army of chosen men; every battalion of which had a soul equal to the utmost extremity.” Napoleon himself, in “Book ix,” says: “The spectacle was really magnificent: the earth seemed proud of being trod by such intrepid combatants.” And at St. Helena he told O’Meara: “My troops were so good, that I esteemed them sufficient to beat a hundred and twenty thousand.”[24]
Thus, as Brialmont remarks, whatever might be the numerical proportion of the two armies, “when we come to look at the respective qualities of the troops, the inferiority of the Anglo-Belgian army was enormous. Not only was it composed of heterogeneous elements, but it consisted almost entirely of young soldiers, a large proportion of whom had never been under fire. The Hanoverian contingent was made up of militia; and many regiments were fit only for garrison duty.”[25]