Left thus to himself, to sustain the whole attack of twice or three times his numbers, the gallant Picton never hesitated. Forming his little band two deep, he waited till the French column came within charging distance. It then halted, and endeavoured to deploy into line. Saluting it, at this moment, with a volley from his whole brigade, Picton gave the word “Charge!” and his men sprang forward with the bayonet. In an instant the whole French column was in confusion; and before they had time to recover themselves, Ponsonby’s brigade of heavy cavalry, the Royals, the Scots Greys, and the Enniskilleners, broke in upon them, and in a few moments the whole side of the hill was covered with fugitives. The heroic leader of “the fighting division,” however, the gallant Picton, fell, shot through the brain in the moment of triumph. Another fierce encounter was at hand. Milhaud’s Cuirassiers were close behind the French columns, and they essayed to retrieve the fight. But the Household Brigade met them, and after a desperate encounter—of the best horsemen in England and the best in France—the whole mass of the French, horse and foot, were driven back in confusion, leaving behind them the eagles of the 45th and 105th regiments, and nearly 3000 prisoners. The grand attack of Ney on the British centre had failed; and the first corps of the French army was so seriously cut up and disorganized, as to be in no condition to renew the attack. We now understand Gourgaud’s confessions, “The enemy’s cavalry made several successful charges on the flank of one of the columns of the first corps;” and, “when the Emperor perceived that some disorder prevailed on our right, he proceeded thither at full gallop.”
It was now considerably past two o’clock. The principal attack had been repelled: the English position had not been forced, or even endangered. “The enemy’s line,” says Gourgaud, “maintained its immobility.” But Napoleon’s second corps had been beaten and much damaged at Hougoumont; and now his first was crippled and nearly disabled in front of La Haye Sainte. In this strait, either Ney or Napoleon, or both of them, still confident in their superior strength, had recourse to a desperate measure, which had, indeed, a probability of success; but which, if it failed, would involve a serious danger.
They had, still untouched, or nearly so, a reserve of what Napoleon himself styles, “twelve thousand select horse,” the two corps of Cuirassiers, the light cavalry of the Guard, and the horse grenadiers and dragoons of the Guard. There need be no dispute as to the strength of this force, since Napoleon himself twice states it to have been 12,000.
THREE O’CLOCK.
At this period of the battle, then, desperate at the two failures on the left and on the right, either Ney or his master launched this enormous mass of “select cavalry” against the centre of the British line. The error, if it is one, is sought by Napoleon to be charged on somebody else. In his bulletin, written at the time, he says:—
“Our two divisions of cuirassiers being engaged, all our cavalry ran at the same moment to support their comrades.”
Gourgaud endeavours to cast the blame upon Ney, saying:—
“Marshal Ney, borne away by excess of ardour, lost sight of the orders he had received; he debouched on the level height, which was immediately crowned by two divisions of Milhaud’s cuirassiers, and the light cavalry of the Guard. The emperor observed to Marshal Soult, “This is a premature movement, which may be attended with fatal consequences.”
These accounts would represent Napoleon himself famous for his rapidity and decision, to have had no command over his own troops. They are, therefore, not credible.
But remembering that Napoleon was himself at this moment in a forward position, and that the heavy cavalry placed in the rear as a reserve force must have defiled past him, we must at least believe him to have permitted this movement. Gourgaud says that Ney ordered forward Milhaud’s Cuirassiers, and that “the emperor ordered Kellerman’s corps to support him.” Colonel Heymes, aide-de-camp to Ney, says, “That movement took place under the eyes of the emperor, who might have stopped it, but did not.” Still as he afterwards, in private conversation, charged the fault on Ney,[32] we must suppose that the marshal, in his desperation, called for the reserve of cavalry, and that Napoleon permitted him to employ them. However this might be, it is certain that about three or four o’clock—the attack of the first corps on the centre and left of the English having failed, the whole mass of the “cavalry of reserve,” was brought forward and thrown upon the centre of the Duke’s position. Such an assault has rarely been made upon any other army in modern times. Deducting the troops in Hougoumont, and the losses from four hours’ fighting, there could not have been at this moment so many as 12,000 British infantry in the whole line. Yet it is from Napoleon’s own narrative that we learn, that upon this weak array there was launched a mass of 12,000 heavy horse, 6,000 of whom wore armour, and who seemed, in their united strength, able positively to ride down the insignificant force of resolute soldiers who still kept the heights of Mont St. Jean.