The battles of the world

by J. Douglas Borthwick

But he does not even postpone their arrival until two o’clock:—two pages earlier he insists upon it that he saw them, in the distance, at noon.[34] Now as it is absolutely certain that, with the greatest exertion, the earliest of the Prussian brigades were unable to reach the field until half-past four, we may be sure that at twelve o’clock they must have been eight or ten miles off! Hence this passage in “Book ix” must either be a downright fiction; or else Napoleon must have discovered on a distant hill a party of the Prussian staff who had ridden forward to observe the position of affairs, and who must have been magnified by his alarms into an army-corps!

The real time of the arrival of the Prussians is one of the most clearly-defined facts of the whole history. All the witnesses agree upon it. We have just cited Gourgaud’s words, that “at half-past four General Domont observed a division of 8,000 to 10,000 Prussians debouching from the woods of Frischenois.”

In strict agreement with which the Prussian official account says.

“It was half-past four o’clock.... The difficulties of the road had retarded the march of the Prussian columns; so that only two brigades had arrived at the covered position which was assigned them. The generals resolved to begin the attack with the troops which they had at hand.”[35]

And General Drouet, who was at Napoleon’s side during the action, said, in his speech in the Chamber of Peers on the 24th of June, 1815,—“The Prussians began to attack us at about half-past five in the afternoon.”

It is quite clear, then, and beyond all dispute, that the Prussians first began to enter the field of battle, and to be visible to the French at half-past four in the afternoon; that the Prussian commanders immediately proceeded to make arrangements for an attack;—and that their first collision with the French troops took place about half-past five in the afternoon.

But Napoleon had been forewarned of their approach; for his flying parties had brought in, he tells us, two or three hours before, a Prussian hussar who was bearing a letter to the Duke of Wellington, announcing that General Bulow and his corps were on their march. Hence Napoleon had already set apart his sixth corps, under Count Lobau, to receive the Prussians whenever they should make their appearance.

He introduces at this period many complaints of Marshal Grouchy, who, he pretends, ought to have followed Bulow’s corps, and have taken part in the battle of Waterloo. This is the very height of injustice and absurdity; since he had employed Grouchy distinctly to follow and occupy the attention of the main body of the Prussian army; and in obedience to this command the marshal was at that moment engaged with the Prussian third corps at Wavre. But, on looking at Napoleon’s first bulletin of the battle, we see that this aspersion of Grouchy is an afterthought,—a mere device to lessen his own defeat. Writing at the time, and giving to France a full account of the battle, in that bulletin not one word of any default of Grouchy’s appears.

This, of itself, is enough to show the hollowness of the excuse for the loss of the battle. Grouchy himself, when the “ixth Book” made its appearance, instantly wrote and published an indignant denial of its statements; and Brialmont remarks, that “Napoleon has so expressed himself to make it clear that he was anxious to diminish the amount of his own responsibility by sacrificing the reputation of his subordinates. Thus he pretends that he received on the night of the 17th a letter from Grouchy, which letter never could have existed.”

But Gourgaud himself, Napoleon’s own aide-de-camp, is the best witness in exculpation of Grouchy. He tells us, that in the afternoon, hearing the cannonade of Waterloo, General Excelmans urged upon Grouchy to leave following the Prussians and to march towards the cannonade. But Grouchy, “though he burnt with desire to take part in the great battle, showed Excelmans his instructions, which were to march upon Wavre, and said, that he could not take such a responsibility on himself.”[36] It is clear therefore, that up to the afternoon of the 18th Grouchy had no other orders than those which bade him follow the Prussians who were in position at Wavre.