The battles of the world

by J. Douglas Borthwick

I shall not undertake to describe the order of the battle, nor the valour of the forces on both sides. The reader will naturally suppose, that two such experienced generals did not forget any circumstance which could contribute to the victory. The Carthaginians, after a very obstinate fight, were obliged to fly, leaving 20,000 men on the field of battle, and the like number of prisoners were taken by the Romans. Hannibal escaped in the tumult, and, entering Carthage, owned that he was irrecoverably overthrown, and that the citizens had no other choice left, but to accept of peace on any conditions. Scipio bestowed great eulogiums on Hannibal, chiefly with regard to his capacity in taking advantages, his manner of drawing up his army, and giving out his orders in the engagement; and he affirmed that Hannibal had this day surpassed himself, although the success had not answered his valour and conduct.

With regard to himself, he well knew how to make a proper advantage of the victory, and the consternation with which he had filled the enemy. He commanded one of his lieutenants to march his land army to Carthage, whilst himself prepared to sail the fleet thither.

He was not far from the city, when he met a vessel covered with streamers and olive branches, bringing ten of the most considerable persons of the state, as ambassadors to implore his clemency. However, he dismissed them without making any answer, and bid them come to him at Tunis, where he should halt. The deputies of Carthage, being 30 in number, came to him at the place appointed, and sued for peace in the most submissive terms. He then called a council there, the majority of which were for razing Carthage, and treating the inhabitants with the utmost severity. But the consideration of the time which must necessarily be employed before so strongly fortified a city could be taken, and Scipio’s fear lest a successor might be appointed him whilst he should be employed in the siege, made him incline to clemency.”

ZARAGOZA, SECOND SIEGE OF.—“The sufferings of the gallant Zaragozans, during the former siege, had not subdued the spirit of heroic devotion by which they had been animated. Another trial awaited them, not less memorable and glorious, though less fortunate in its result.

After the defeat of Tudela, Palafox retired to Zaragoza, to make preparations for a second siege. He was not present in the action. The intelligence of its issue came upon him like a thunderbolt; and the refusal of Castanos to throw his troops into Zaragoza, instead of retreating on Madrid, put an end to those feelings of confidence and frankness which had hitherto existed between the generals.

The multiplied disasters of the Spanish armies, however, so far from shaking the resolution of Palafox or the Zaragozans, appear only to have stimulated them to redoubled exertions in the service of their country. Proclamations were issued, commanding all women, old men, and children, to quit the city. Every inhabitant was imperatively called upon to make sacrifice, if necessary, of his life and property, in the common cause; and the whole population were required, by their personal exertions, to contribute to the completion of the fortifications of the city.

The approach of the enemy cut short the preparations for defence. Neither women nor children left the place. Even these refused to seek safety at a distance from their fathers and husbands, and preferred participating in the danger and the glory which awaited them in Zaragoza, to wandering unprotected through a troubled and a suffering country.

During the former siege, the defenders had been embarrassed by the presence of French residents in the city. These had been strictly guarded, with the double object of preventing any intercourse between them and the besiegers, and of protecting them against the fatal effects of popular suspicion, to which, without such precaution, it is more than probable they would have fallen victims. In order to prevent the repetition of such danger and inconvenience, Palafox determined that these unfortunate persons should be removed from the city to other places of confinement. This was done, notwithstanding the hostility of the populace, though not until Palafox had issued a proclamation appealing to Spanish honour and humanity, and imploring the gallant Zaragozans not to stain the sacred cause of liberty and justice by the foul murder of these defenceless victims.

The aid of superstition was not wanting to strengthen the confidence of the Zaragozans. They relied on the miraculous protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had made their favoured city the seat of her peculiar worship. The successful termination of the former siege had given strength to their belief in the beneficent regards of the patron saint. Omens, too, had been observed in the sky. Approaching victory had been prefigured by unwonted conformations of the clouds; and celestial voices were heard in the elements, offering divine promise of glory and protection.

Fortunately, the Zaragozans were not induced, by their belief in these flattering portents, to disregard any of the human means of safety in their power. A continued line of exterior defensive works had been planned and executed, as far as time and circumstances permitted. Yet this, imperfect as it was, added little to the real strength of the city; and, in forming a just estimate of the zeal and courage of the defenders, Zaragoza should almost be considered as an unfortified town. The walls, originally built rather for the purpose of civic impost than defence, were surmounted by 150 pieces of cannon. Large stores of provisions had been formed. Arms and ammunition were in abundance; and the town contained upwards of 20,000 regular troops, besides 15,000 armed peasants.