By April 17 the distribution of the Tank Corps was as follows:
| 1st Tank Brigade H.Q. Bois D’Ohlain | 11th Battalion | N.E. of Busnes. |
| 7th „ | Molinghem. | |
| 12th „ | Simencourt. | |
| 2nd Tank Brigade H.Q. Saulty | 6th Battalion | Bailleulval. |
| 10th „ | La Cauchie. | |
| 3rd Tank Brigade H.Q. Molliens-au-Bois | 3rd Battalion | Toutencourt. |
| 9th „ | Merlimont. | |
| 1st „ | Frechencourt. | |
| 4th Tank Brigade H.Q. Godewaersvelde | 4th Battalion | Boescheppe. |
| 5th „ | Berthen. | |
| 13th „ | Boescheppe. | |
| 5th Tank Brigade H.Q. Monchy Cayeux | 2nd Battalion | Blangy. |
| 8th „ | Humières. |
The fighting carried out by the Lewis-gun units was of a severe nature, so much so that the casualties sustained caused the greatest anxiety at the Tank Corps headquarters, as reinforcements from England were exceedingly limited; further, as it was still hoped to save the battalions at home to the Corps, it was especially desirable not to call upon them for drafts.
Early on April 24 the enemy attacked south of the river Somme on a front from Villers-Bretonneux to the Bois de Hangard. This attack is of special interest as it was the first occasion upon which the Germans employed tanks of their own manufacture against us.[30] By means of these tanks the enemy penetrated our front, captured most of the extensive village of Villers-Bretonneux and advanced as far as the Bois de l’Abbé. Prior to this attack, at 1 a.m., a section of tanks of the 1st Battalion, hidden in the Bois de l’Abbé, moved east of the wood owing to the excessive gas shelling. At 8.30 a.m. this section, under the orders of the 23rd Infantry Brigade, moved forward to secure the Cachy switch trench against the enemy’s threatening attack; exactly an hour later two of our machines, both females, came into view of a hostile tank and were put out of action by its gun fire—it should be remembered here that female tanks are armed only with machine guns. Shortly afterwards a British male Mark IV machine hove into sight, and speeding into action there then took place the first tank versus tank duel to be recorded in history. This male soon scored a direct hit on its antagonist, whereupon the enemy evacuated their tank and fled. By this time three more enemy tanks had appeared; these the Mark IV machine engaged, and was in the process of driving off the field of battle when it received a direct hit from a field-gun shell and was put out of action.
South-west of Villers-Bretonneux, seven Whippet machines were sent out at 10.30 a.m. to clear up the situation east of the village of Cachy. Whilst proceeding round the north-east side of this village they suddenly came upon two battalions of Germans massing in a hollow preparatory to making an attack. Without a moment’s hesitation the seven Whippets formed line and charged down the slope right on to the closely formed infantry. Indescribable confusion resulted as the Whippets tore through the German ranks, the enemy scattered in all directions, some threw themselves on their knees before the machines, shrieking for mercy, but only to be run over and crushed to death. In a few minutes no fewer than 400 Germans were killed and wounded. The Whippets, having now completed their task, viz. “clearing up the situation,” returned, one machine being put out of action by artillery fire on the journey home; in all only five casualties amongst the crews were suffered during this action.
The two most remarkable features of this little engagement are: firstly, the helplessness of some 1,200 infantry against seven tanks manned by seven officers and fourteen other ranks; and, secondly, that the tanks left their starting-point, which was 3½ miles from the scene of action, at 10.30 a.m., covered ten miles of ground, fought a battle, and were back home again at 2.30 p.m.
On April 25 further minor tank operations took place in the Villers-Bretonneux area, chiefly east of the Bois d’Aquenne and the Monument, and, on the next day, British tanks for the first time in their history co-operated with the French Army, four tanks of the 1st Battalion being ordered to assist the Moroccan Division in an attack on the Bois de Hangard. This attack was not a success, due to two quite exceptional reasons; two trees were cut down during the night, which were to have acted as landmarks for the tanks, and the smoke barrage was in error put down to the east instead of the west of the German line; consequently the tanks not only lost their direction but were subjected to an intense machine-gun fire when nearing the German position; this prevented the French infantry co-operating with them.
The month of May was chiefly spent in re-sorting the tank battalions and resting the men. The embargo on the importation of tanks from England had now been removed, and Mark V tanks were arriving in France at the rate of sixty a week. This machine, very similar in shape to the Mark IV or Mark I, was a great improvement on all former types, it being a much more mobile and handy weapon. A new system of tactics was at once got out to cover its increase in power, and training was started so as to accustom all ranks to its use.
At about this time a considerable number of French troops were billeted in and around the Tank Corps area and it is a pleasure to record their extreme keenness to learn all they could about tanks and their tactics. General Maistre, commanding the Tenth French Army, with its headquarters then at Beauval, particularly asked that tank demonstrations should be held for the units of his command. This was done, and right through May and June two or three of these demonstrations were given weekly. Besides French troops, units from the Ist, XIth, XIIIth, XVIIth, and XVIIIth English Corps and the Canadian and Australian Corps also attended, the greatest benefit resulting to all taking part.
From the beginning of June onwards preparations were set on foot to have all tank units ready by August 1 for any eventuality. This necessitated intensive training, re-arming and re-equipping. Sledges for supply haulage were prepared, bridges for the passage of light tanks over wide trenches were made, cribs were constructed for the heavy tanks—these were large hexagonal crates which served the same purpose as the tank fascines did at the battle of Cambrai; wire-pulling apparatus was got ready, smoke apparatus ordered, and portable railway ramps made. It was altogether an excessively busy time on the training ground and in the workshops, and, as matters eventually turned out, it was extremely fortunate that this work was taken up at this early date, for, as a future chapter will show, when the Tank Corps was next called upon to make ready for an extensive operation only eight days were obtainable to prepare in.