During the 10th some 67 tanks in all were engaged, and of these 30 received direct hits.
On August 11 no appreciable change took place on the British front. Lihons was, however, captured by the 1st Australian Division, assisted by ten tanks of the 2nd Battalion, otherwise most of the tank operations consisted in mopping up strong points. On the evening of this day the 4th and 5th Tank Brigades were withdrawn from action to refit.
During the next few days it was decided that, whilst pressure should be kept up south of the Somme, a new battle should open to the north of this river on the Third Army front, and that three Tank Brigades should co-operate in this attack; this necessitated the transfer of the 4th Tank Brigade to the IIIrd Corps north of the Somme and the withdrawal of the 10th, 14th, and 15th Battalions from the Fourth Army area; this left the 4th Tank Brigade with the 1st, 4th, and 5th Battalions, and the 5th Tank Brigade with the 2nd, 8th, and 13th Battalions.
On August 17 the general situation was as follows: A total of 688 tanks had been in action on August 8, 9, 10, and 11; 480 machines had been handed over to Salvage; very few of the remaining machines were actually fit for a lengthy action, and all required a thorough overhaul; four days, as we shall see, were only possible for this, for the next battle was scheduled to open on August 21.
The great battle of Amiens was now at an end. A tremendous physical, and above all, moral blow had been dealt the enemy; not only had he lost 22,000 prisoners and 400 guns, but also all hope of winning the war by force of arms. On August 16 the Fourth Army Commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, issued the following Special Order, which sums up the reason for this great victory:
“The success of the operations of August 8 and succeeding days was largely due to the conspicuous part played by the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Brigades of the Tank Corps, and I desire to place on record my sincere appreciation of the invaluable services rendered both by the Mark V and the Mark V Star and the Whippets.
“The task of secretly assembling so large a number of tanks entailed very hard and continuous work by all concerned for four or five nights previous to the battle.
“The tactical handling of the tanks in action made calls on the skill and physical endurance of the detachments which were met with by a gallantry and devotion beyond all praise.
“I desire to place on record my appreciation of the splendid success that they achieved, and heartily to congratulate the Tank Corps as a whole on the completeness of their arrangements and the admirable prowess exhibited by all ranks actually engaged on this occasion.
“There are many vitally important lessons to be learned from their experiences. These will, I trust, be taken to heart by all concerned and made full use of when next the Tank Corps is called upon to go into battle.
“The part played by the tanks and Whippets in the battle of August 8 was in all respects a very fine performance.”
The success of the operations may be attributed to—surprise, the moral effect of the tanks, the high moral of our own infantry, the rapid advance of our guns, and the good roads for supplies.
The main deductions to be drawn from this battle are:
(i) That once preparations are well in progress it is almost impossible to modify them to meet any change in objective.
(ii) That the staying power of an attack lies in the general reserve. In this attack the tank general reserve was very weak, consequently after August 8 tank attacks began to “peter out.”