A 21st Infantry Divisional Order dated August 15 contained the following:
“Recent fighting has shown that our infantry is capable of repelling an unsupported hostile infantry attack and is not dependent on our protective barrage.
“On the other hand, a massed tank attack, as put in by the enemy during the recent fighting, requires stronger artillery defensive measures.
“The duty of the infantry is to keep the enemy advancing under cover of the tanks (whether infantry, cavalry, or aeroplanes) away from our artillery in order to give the latter freedom of action in its main rôle, viz.: the engagement of tanks.”
This clear statement that the main duty of the artillery has become the engagement of tanks is noteworthy, especially when compared with previous orders which stated that the allotment of artillery to tank defences must not interfere with defensive barrages and counter-battery work.
This document continues:
“Counter-attacks against hostile infantry supported by tanks do not offer any chances of success and demand unnecessary sacrifices; they must, therefore, only be launched if the tanks have been put out of action.”
Thus two of the mainstays of the former German defence, i.e. “the protective barrage” and “the immediate counter-attack,” were abandoned in the event of tank attacks.
Yet one more order is interesting, that issued on August 12 to the Crown Prince’s Group of Armies:
“G.H.Q. reports that during the recent fighting on the fronts of the Second and Eighteenth Armies, large numbers of tanks broke through on narrow fronts, and pushing straight forward, rapidly attacked battery positions and the Headquarters of Divisions.
“In many cases no defence could be made in time against the tanks, which attacked them from all sides.
“Anti-tank defence must now be developed to deal with such situations.”
“Messages concerning tanks will have priority over all other messages or calls whatsoever” is the last extract we will here quote, this order being sent out on September 8, 1918. These few words alone are sufficient to show that the enemy at last had awakened to the danger of the tank and was now making frenzied efforts to organise, at all costs, an efficient anti-tank defence.
It was now no longer the pluck of our Royal Air Force, the courage of our infantry, or the masses of our shells, it was the tank which threatened the German with destruction and against which he now concentrated all his energy. These efforts were, however, so belated that even the schemes and orders issued were contradictory and lacking in co-ordination; the actual practice was, needless to say, still more diverse.