(ii) A hitch or failure in carrying out the plan of attack.
(iii) An exceptional display of resource, initiative, and courage on the part of some individual German soldier.
In general the keynote of the German anti-tank defence was lack of foresight, the development of tanks not being appreciated. Among the very large number of captured orders dealing with anti-tank defence there is no recorded instance of any anticipation of superior types of tanks to those already in use. The German General Staff lacked imagination and the faculty of appreciating the value of weapons that had not been explained to them whilst at school; obsolescence dimmed their foresight.
CHAPTER XXXV
THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI—ST. QUENTIN
On September 4 all Tank Brigades were withdrawn from Armies and placed in G.H.Q. reserve to refit and reorganise. When this had been completed Tank Brigades were constituted as follows:
| 1st Tank Brigade | 7th Battalion | Mark IV. |
| 11th „ | Mark V Star. | |
| 12th „ | Mark IV. | |
| 15th „ | Mark V Star. | |
| 2nd Tank Brigade | 10th „ | Mark V. |
| 14th „ | Mark V. | |
| 3rd Tank Brigade | 3rd „ | Medium A. |
| 6th „ | Medium A. | |
| 9th „ | Mark V. | |
| 17th „ | Armoured cars. | |
| 4th Tank Brigade | 1st „ | Mark V. |
| 4th „ | Mark V. | |
| 5th „ | Mark V. | |
| 301st American Battalion | Mark V Star. | |
| 5th Tank Brigade | 2nd Battalion | Mark V. |
| 8th „ | Mark V. | |
| 13th „ | Mark V. |
At 7 a.m. on September 17, in a heavy storm of rain, the Fourth and Third Armies initiated the battle of Epehy by attacking on a front of some seventeen miles from Holnon to Gouzeaucourt, the First French Army co-operating south of Holnon.
On September 18 the 4th and 5th Tank Brigades were released from G.H.Q. reserve and allotted to the Fourth Army, the 2nd Tank Battalion having been transferred to this Army on September 13.