The battle of Maubeuge opened on November 2 with an attack carried out by the IXth Corps west of Landrecies. This attack was supported by three tanks of the 10th Battalion and it was carried out in order to improve our position near Happegarbes preliminary to a big attack on the 4th. All objectives were taken, but unfortunately lost again before nightfall.
November 4 witnessed the last large tank attack of the war, large only in comparison with the number of machines at this time fit for action. The attack was on a broad front of over thirty miles, extending from the river Oise to north of Valenciennes. On the British section of this front thirty-seven tanks were used and were allotted as follows:
| Third Army | VIth Corps | 1 Company 6th Tank Battalion. |
| IVth Corps | 2 Sections 14th Tank Battalion. | |
| Vth Corps | 1 Company 9th Tank Battalion. | |
| Fourth Army | XIIIth Corps | 5 Sections 14th Tank Battalion. |
| 2 Companies 9th Tank Battalion. | ||
| 2 Sections 14th Tank Battalion. | ||
| 17th Armoured Car Battalion. | ||
| IXth Corps | 4 Sections 10th Tank Battalion. |
From the above distribution of tanks it will be seen how exhausted units had become, sections now taking the place of companies and companies of battalions.
Zero hour varied on the Corps fronts from 5.30 to 6.15 a.m. Briefly the action of the tanks was as follows:
Those of the 10th Tank Battalion assisted in the taking of Catillon and Happeharbes; the capture of the former village was an important step in securing the crossing over the Oise canal. Generally speaking the tanks operating with the XIIIth Corps had a successful day, especially in the neighbourhood of Hecq, Preux, and the north-western edge of the forest of Mormal. Although supply tanks[37] are not meant for fighting purposes, three, which were carrying forward bridging material for the 25th Division, came into action near Landrecies. On approaching the canal they found that our infantry were still on its western side, hung up by machine-gun fire. One tank being knocked out, the section commander decided to push on with the other two; this he did, our infantry following these machines as if they were fighting tanks, with the result that the machine-gunners surrendered and the far bank of the canal was secured.
The following day, November 5, saw the last tank action of the war, eight Whippets of the 6th Tank Battalion taking part in an attack of the 3rd Guards Brigade north of the forest of Mormal. The country was most difficult for combined operations, for it was intersected by numerous ditches and fences which rendered it ideal for the rearguard operations the Germans were now fighting all along their front. Either the Whippets had to go forward and so lose touch with our infantry or remain with the infantry and lose touch with the enemy. In spite of these difficulties all objectives were taken, and the last tank action of the war was a success.
During the next few days refitting continued with a view to building up an organised fighting force from the shattered remnants of the Tank Corps; as this was in progress the signing of the armistice terms on November 11 brought hostilities to an end.
Ninety-six days of almost continuous battle had now taken place since the great tank attack at Amiens was launched by the Fourth Army on August 8, since when many of the officers and men of the Tank Corps had been in action as many as fifteen and sixteen times. During this period no fewer than 1,993 tanks and tank armoured cars had been engaged on thirty-nine days in all; 887 machines had been handed over to Salvage, 313 of these being sent to the Central Workshops, and 204 having been repaired and reissued to battalions. Of the above 887 tanks, only fifteen had been struck off the strength as unsalvable. Casualties against establishment had been heavy: 598 officers and 2,826 other ranks being counted amongst killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners; but when it is considered that the total strength of the Tank Corps on August 7 was considerably under that of an infantry division, and that in the old days of the artillery battles, such as the First Battle of the Somme, an infantry division frequently sustained 4,000 casualties in twelve hours fighting, the tank casualties were extraordinarily light. It was no longer a matter of twelve hours’ but of thirty-nine days’ fighting at twelve hours a day. From this we may deduce our final and outstanding lesson from all these battles, namely, that iron mechanically moved is an economiser of blood, that the tank is an economiser of life—the lives of men, men being the most valuable asset any country can possess.
The determination of Sir Douglas Haig had at length been rewarded, and the endeavours which failed at Passchendaele won through finally and irrevocably at Maubeuge. A fitting conclusion to all these operations is to be found in the last dispatch of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies, which hands down to posterity a just judgment on the value of the work carried out by the British Tank Corps during the ever-memorable months of August to November 1918. In these dispatches are to be found the following three paragraphs, which are worth pondering over when the time comes for us to consider the future: