[27] The statement made in the daily press that General Elles’ order ran—“England expects every tank to do its damnedest,” was a pure journalistic invention and one in very bad taste.
[28] “Battle Notes” were issued from time to time by Tank Corps Headquarters to all tank crews. Their object was to stimulate “esprit de corps and moral.” They were human documents for the most part, referring not only to the tank but also to other arms.
[29] From this it must not be deduced that the officers and men of the Tank Corps would not obey orders, but that the officer in command of the Supply Companies was a student of human nature. Why order when a simple act like this will do the ordering?
[30] The German reports published in April asserted that tanks were used against the British Army on March 21. As nothing is definitely known of their effect they probably failed to come into action.
[31] General de Bourgon was a great friend of the Tank Corps; he presented its Headquarters mess with a charming trophy.
[32] Nine heavy battalions with 324 machines and two medium battalions with 96. Besides these tanks, there were 42 in mechanical reserve, 96 supply tanks, and 22 gun-carriers. In all, and not counting the machines of the 9th Tank Battalion, there were 580 tanks.
[33] This was borne witness to by British troops near by.
[34] Captain of the company to which this tank belonged.
[35] This was contrary to Tank Corps “Standing Battle Orders.”
[36] This report was written by Lieut. Arnold after his return from Germany. The tank was eventually found close to the railway on the eastern side of the Harbonnières-Rosières road.