On account of the bad weather the original plan, namely, to use twenty tanks, was abandoned, and a much more modest scheme was evolved. Three tanks were to operate with the 39th Division opposite St. Pierre Divion. On November 13 these moved forward, and eventually all three stuck in the mud. North of the river Ancre two tanks were sent against Beaumont Hamel; these also became ditched. Next morning three more tanks were sent out to clear up a strong point just south of the last-named village. One of these was hit by a shell, and the remaining two, on reaching the German front line, became ditched. These two tanks were, however, able to bring their 6-pounders and machine-guns to bear on the strong point, and their fire proved so effective that after a short time the Germans holding it surrendered, and 400 prisoners were rounded up by the tank crews—2 officers and 14 other ranks.
From the point of view of the general observer it might be said that, except for one or two small and brilliant operations, the tank during the battle of the Somme had not proved its value. The general observer, however, is seldom the best judge, and when the actual conditions under which tanks were used, during the autumn of 1916, are weighed and the lessons sorted, history’s verdict, it is thought, will be, that they had so far proved their value that September 15, 1916, will in future be noted not so much for the successes gained on that day, but as the birthday of a new epoch in the history of war.
What were these lessons?
(i) That the machine in principle was absolutely sound, and that all it required were certain mechanical improvements.
(ii) That it had not been given a fair trial. It had been constructed for good going and fine weather; it had been, unavoidably, used on pulverised soil, often converted by rain into a pudding of mud.
(iii) That, on account of the secrecy it was necessary to maintain, commanders had little or no conception of the tactics to apply to its use.
(iv) That sufficient time had not been obtainable wherein to give the crews a thorough and careful training.
(v) That tank operations require the most careful preparation and minute reconnaissances in order to render them successful.
(vi) That tanks require leading and controlling in battle, and consequently that a complete system of communication is essential.
(vii) That tanks, like every other arm, require a separate supply organisation to maintain them whilst fighting.