It is just this point that the critics missed; their minds being controlled by the conventions of the day. They could not see that if the horse-power in a man is x, that the circumference of his activities is a circle with x as its radius. They could not see that if the horse-power of a machine is 100x; its circumference will be vastly greater than that of man’s; neither could they see that whilst in man x is constant, provided the man is supplied regularly with beef, bread and beer, in a machine x may be increased almost indefinitely, and that if a circle with n as its circumference will not embrace the problem, probably all that is necessary is to add more x’s to its radius. Indeed, the science of mechanics is simplicity itself when compared with that of psychology, and as in war mechanics grow so will psychology, in comparison, dwindle, until perhaps we may see in armies as complete a change from hand-weapons to machine-weapons as we have seen in our workshops from hand-tools to machine-tools, and the economy will be as proportionate.
Before the Great War I was a believer in conscription and in the Nation in Arms; I was an 1870 soldier. My sojourn in the Tank Corps has dissipated these ideas. Today I am a believer in war mechanics, that is, in a mechanical army which requires few men and powerful machines. Equally am I a disbeliever in what a venerable acquaintance, old in ideas rather than years, said to me on the afternoon of November 11th, 1918. These are his words, and I repeat them as he exclaimed them: “Thank God we can now get back to real soldiering!”
J. F. C. F.
Langham Hotel, London, W.1.
November 20, 1919.
CONTENTS
| CHAPTER | PAGE | |
| I. | THE ORIGINS OF THE TANK | [1] |
| II. | THE INVENTION OF THE LANDSHIP | [18] |
| III. | MECHANICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS | [35] |
| IV. | THE MARK I TANK AND ITS TACTICS | [49] |
| V. | THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME AND ANCRE | [54] |
| VI. | THE GROWTH OF THE TANK CORPS ORGANISATION | [60] |
| VII. | TANK “ESPRIT DE CORPS” | [68] |
| VIII. | TANK TACTICS | [73] |
| IX. | THE BATTLE OF ARRAS | [81] |
| X. | TANK BATTLE RECORDS | [90] |
| XI. | THE SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA | [98] |
| XII. | STAFF WORK AND BATTLE PREPARATION | [103] |
| XIII. | THE BATTLE OF MESSINES | [108] |
| XIV. | A TACTICAL APPRECIATION | [113] |
| XV. | THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES | [117] |
| XVI. | TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING | [125] |
| XVII. | THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA | [130] |
| XVIII. | ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI | [135] |
| XIX. | THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI | [140] |
| XX. | AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS | [154] |
| XXI. | THE TANK CORPS TRAINING CENTRE | [159] |
| XXII. | THE TANK SUPPLY COMPANIES | [166] |
| XXIII. | THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME | [172] |
| XXIV. | TANK SIGNALLING ORGANISATION | [178] |
| XXV. | THE FRENCH TANK CORPS | [184] |
| XXVI. | PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT OFFENSIVE | [199] |
| XXVII. | THE BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL | [204] |
| XXVIII. | GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS | [212] |
| XXIX. | THE BATTLE OF AMIENS | [217] |
| XXX. | THE FIGHT OF A WHIPPET TANK | [230] |
| XXXI. | GERMAN APPRECIATION OF BRITISH TANKS | [236] |
| XXXII. | AEROPLANE CO-OPERATION WITH TANKS | [242] |
| XXXIII. | THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF ARRAS | [250] |
| XXXIV. | GERMAN ANTI-TANK TACTICS | [260] |
| XXXV. | THE BATTLES OF EPEHY AND CAMBRAI—ST. QUENTIN | [266] |
| XXXVI. | THE U.S.A. TANK CORPS | [277] |
| XXXVII. | THE BATTLES OF THE SELLE AND MAUBEUGE | [283] |
| XXXVIII. | THE 17TH TANK ARMOURED CAR BATTALION | [289] |
| XXXIX. | A RETROSPECT OF WHAT TANKS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED | [297] |
| XL. | A FORECAST OF WHAT TANKS MAY DO | [308] |
| INDEX | [323] |