CHAPTER XIII
THE BATTLE OF MESSINES
The situation at the end of April 1917 was a difficult one for the Allies. The failure to penetrate the Drocourt-Queant line had rendered the whole plan of the British attack east of Arras abortive; this was bad enough, but indeed a minor incident when compared with the failure of the great French attack in Champagne. It was towards making good this failure that the rest of the year’s operations had to be directed.
The ambitious plan of cutting off the Arras-Soissons-Reims salient having failed, the next blow was to be directed against the German right flank. The object of this attack was to drive this flank back sufficiently far to deprive the Germans of the coast line between Nieuport and the Dutch frontier, and to render their position about Lille sufficiently insecure to force them to evacuate it and so open the road to Antwerp and Brussels.
The possibility of such an operation as this had long been contemplated, and, as early as the summer of 1916, preparations for it had been taken in hand by the British Second Army. By May 1917 these were completed, including the construction of an extensive system of railways in the Ypres area and the mining of most of the western flank of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge.
The operation was to be divided into two main phases, firstly the taking of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge so as to secure the right flank of the second phase and to deny the enemy important points of observation, and secondly the attack north of this ridge with the object of occupying the coast line and of pushing forward towards Ghent. The first phase constituted the battle of Messines, the subject of this chapter, and the second the Third Battle of Ypres.
It had been foreseen early in the year that such an attack was possible, and that in all probability tanks would be called upon to take part in it, consequently, as early as March 1917, reconnaissances of the whole of the Ypres area had been taken in hand by the Heavy Branch. In April this surmise proved correct, and the 2nd Brigade, consisting of A and B Battalions, was selected for this operation. In May these two battalions were equipped with thirty-six Mark IV tanks each.
Railheads were selected at Ouderdom and at Clapham Junction (one mile south of Dranoutre), and though they were within the shelled area, they fulfilled most of the requirements demanded of a tank railhead. Advanced parties began arriving at these stations on May 14, and between May 23 and 27, A and B Battalions followed them. Supply dumps were then formed, and arrangements were made to carry forward one complete fill for all tanks operating by means of Supply Tanks, which were first used in this battle. These tanks consisted of discarded Mark I machines with specially made supply sponsons fitted to them.
The positions of assembly were selected quite close to railheads, B Battalion tanks being hidden away in a wood, and A Battalion’s in specially built shelters representing huts. The spoor left by the tanks, as they moved to these positions, was obliterated by means of harrows so that no enemy’s aeroplane happening to cross over our lines this way would notice anything suspicious on the ground.
BATTLE OF MESSINES
June 7th 1917.
