The main lessons learnt from this day’s fighting were—the unsuitability of the Mark IV tank to swamp warfare; the danger of attempting to move tanks through defiles which are swept by hostile artillery fire; the necessity for immediate infantry co-operation whenever the presence of a tank forced an opening, and the continued moral effect of the tank on both the enemy and our own troops.
The next attack in which tanks took part was on August 19, and in spite of the appalling condition of the ground, for it had now been steadily raining for three weeks, a very memorable feat of arms was accomplished. The 48th Division of the XVIIIth Corps had been ordered to execute an attack against certain strongly defended works, and, as it was reckoned that this attack might cost in casualties from 600 to 1,000 men, it was decided to make it a tank operation in spite of the fact that the tanks would have to work along the remains of the roads in place of over the open country. Four tanks were detailed to operate against Hillock farm, Triangle farm, Mon du Hibou, and the Cockcroft; four against Winnipeg cemetery, Springfield, and Vancouver, and four to be kept in reserve at California trench. The operation was to be covered by a smoke barrage, and the infantry were to follow the tanks and make good the strong points captured.
Plate II
GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS DURING THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, SHOWING PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT ON
JUNE 5, 1917.
GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS IN AUGUST 1917, DURING THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.
Eleven tanks entered St. Julien at 4.45 a.m., three ditched, and eight emerged on the St. Julien-Poelcappelle road, when down came the smoke barrage, throwing a complete cloud on the far side of the objectives; at 6 a.m. Hillock farm was occupied, at 6.15 a.m. Mon du Hibou was reduced, and five minutes later the garrison of Triangle farm, putting up a fight, were bayoneted. Thus one point after another was captured, the tanks driving the garrisons underground or away, and the infantry following and making good what the tanks had made possible. In this action the most remarkable results were obtained at very little cost, for instead of 600 casualties the infantry following the tanks only sustained fifteen!
From this date on to October 9 tanks took part in eleven further actions, the majority being fought on the XVIIIth Corps front by the 1st Tank Brigade. On August 22 a particularly plucky fight was put up by a single tank. This machine became ditched in the vicinity of a strong point called Gallipoli, and, for sixty-eight hours on end, fought the enemy, breaking up several counter-attacks; eventually the crew, running short of ammunition, withdrew to our own lines on the night of August 24–25.
Of the attacks which were made with tanks in the latter half of September and the beginning of October, the majority took place along the Poelcappelle road, the most successful being fought on October 4. Of this attack the XVIIIth Corps Commander reported that “the tanks in Poelcappelle were a decisive factor in our success on the left flank”; and their moral effect on the enemy was illustrated by the statement of a captured German officer who gave as the reason of his surrender—“There were tanks—so my company surrendered—I also.”