The majority of the speeches actually end, according to the Attic convention which governed both Tragedy and Oratory, in a few sentences of moderate tone contrasting with the previous excitement; a calm succeeds to the storm of passions. In the forensic speeches there is usually at the very end some appeal for a just verdict, or a statement of the speaker’s conviction that the case may now be safely left to the court’s decision; thus the Leptines ends with a simplicity worthy of Lysias:

‘I cannot see that I need say any more; for I conceive there is no point on which you are not sufficiently instructed’; the Midias more solemnly, ‘On account of all that I have laid before you, and particularly to show respect to the god whose festival Midias is proved to have profaned, punish him by rendering a verdict in accordance with piety and justice.’

In the de Falsa Legatione there is more personal feeling: ‘You must not let him go, but make his punishment an example to all Athens and all Greece.’ The Timocrates is rather similar: ‘Mercy under these circumstances is out of place; to pass a light sentence means to habituate and educate in wrong-doing as many of you as possible.’ The Androtion ends with a personal opinion on the aspect of the offence, and the Aristocrates is in a similar tone. The (first) speech against Aristogiton appeals directly to the personal interests of all the jurors: ‘His offence touches every one, every one of you: and all of you desire to be quit of his wickedness and see him punished.’

The de Corona is remarkable in every way; this great speech, which, arising from causes almost trivial, abandons the slighter issues, and is transformed into a magnificent defence of the patriotic policy, begins with a solemn invocation: ‘I begin, men of Athens, with a prayer to all the gods and goddesses that you may show me in this case as much good-will as I have shown and still show to Athens and to all of you.’ It ends in an unique way with an appeal, not to the court but to a higher tribunal, an appeal which is all the more impressive as its language recalls the sacred formulas of religious utterance. ‘Never, ye gods of heaven, never may you give their conduct your sanction; but, if it be possible, may you impart even to my enemies a sounder mind and heart. But if they are beyond remedy, hurl them to utter and absolute destruction by land and sea; and to the rest of us grant, as quickly as may be, release from the terrors which hang over us, and salvation unshakable.’

The speeches before the assembly are naturally different in their endings from the judicial speeches; there is no criminal to attack, and no crime to stigmatize; the hearers themselves are, as it were, on their defence, and Demosthenes freely points out their faults, but, as has been noticed, individual opponents escape; if there have been evil counsellors, the responsibility for following bad advice rests with the public, and they can only be exhorted to follow a better course. The speeches on the Symmories and on Megalopolis end with a summary of the speaker’s advice. So, too, does that On the Freedom of Rhodes, the last words containing a fine appeal to the lesson of antiquity. ‘Consider that your forefathers dedicated these trophies not in order that you might gaze in admiration upon them, but in the hope that you might imitate the virtues of those who dedicated them.’

Several of the speeches dealing with the Macedonian question end with a short prayer for guidance: thus, the First Philippic, ‘May that counsel prevail which is likely to be to the advantage of all’; the First Olynthiac, ‘May your decision be a sound one, for all your sakes’; the Third Philippic, ‘Whatever you decide, I pray to heaven it may be to your advantage’; the Third Olynthiac, ‘I have told you what I think is to your advantage, and I pray that you may choose what is likely to be of advantage to the State and all yourselves.’

Sometimes there is a greater show of confidence, as in the Second Olynthiac: ‘If you act thus, you will not only commend your present counsellor, but you will have cause to commend your own conduct later on, when you find a general improvement in your prospects.’

The Second Philippic ends with a prayer rather similar to that in the de Corona, though less emphatic; the speech On the Chersonese with a reproof and a warning.[379] The Peace contains no epilogue at all, but breaks off with a sarcasm.

An indication of the nature of the subjects of the genuine speeches may be useful for reference. They may be taken in their three groups: A. Private, B. Public, C. Deliberative speeches.

A.—Speeches in Private Causes