ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
General Macomb to the Secretary of War.
Head-Quarters, Plattsburgh,
September 15th, 1814.
To the Honourable
John Armstrong,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.
Sir: I have the honour to communicate for the information of the war department, the particulars of the advance of the enemy into the territory of the United States, the circumstances attending the siege of Plattsburgh, and the defence of the posts entrusted to my charge.
The governor-general of the Canadas, Sir George Prevost, having collected all the disposable force of Lower Canada, with a view of conquering the country as far as Crown Point and Ticonderoga, entered the territories of the United States on the first of the month, and occupied the village of Champlain, there avowed his intentions, and issued orders and proclamations tending to dissuade the people from their allegiance, and inviting them to furnish his army with provisions. He immediately began to press the wagons and teams in the vicinity, and loaded them with his heavy baggage and stores. From this I was persuaded he intended to attack this place. I had but just returned from the lines, where I had commanded a fine brigade, which was broken to form the division under Major-General Izard, ordered to the westward. Being senior officer he left me in command, and except the four companies of the 6th regiment, I had not an organized battalion among those remaining. The garrison was composed of convalescents and recruits of the new regiments, all in the greatest confusion, as well as the ordnance and stores, and the works in no state of defence.
To create an emulation and zeal among the officers and men in completing the works, I divided them into detachments, and placed them near the several forts; declaring in orders, that each detachment was the garrison of its own work, and bound to defend it to the last extremity. The enemy advanced cautiously and by short marches, and our soldiers worked day and night; so that by the time he made his appearance before this place we were prepared to receive him.
General Izard named the principal work Fort Moreau, and to remind the troops of the actions of their brave countrymen, I called the redoubt on the right Fort Brown, and that on the left Fort Scott. Besides these three works, we have two block-houses strongly fortified.
Finding, on examining the returns of the garrison, that our force did not exceed fifteen hundred effective men for duty, and well informed that the enemy had as many thousands, I called on General Mooers, of the New York militia, and arranged with him plans for bringing forth the militia en masse. The inhabitants of the village fled with their families and effects, except a few worthy citizens and some boys, who formed themselves into a party, received rifles, and were exceedingly useful. By the 4th of the month, General Mooers collected about 700 militia, and advanced seven miles on the Beekmantown road, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to skirmish with him as he advanced; also to obstruct the roads with fallen trees, and to break up the bridges.
On the Lake road, at Deer Creek bridge, I posted 200 men under Captain Sproul, of the 13th regiment, with orders to abatis the woods, to place obstructions in the road, and to fortify himself; to this party I added two field pieces. In advance of that position, was Lieutenant-Colonel Appling, with 110 riflemen, watching the movements of the enemy and procuring intelligence. It was ascertained that before daylight on the 6th, the enemy would advance in two columns, on the two roads before mentioned, dividing at Sampson's, a little below Chazy village. The column on the Beekmantown road proceeded most rapidly, the militia skirmished with his advanced parties, and, except a few brave men, fell back most precipitately in the greatest disorder, notwithstanding the British troops did not deign to fire on them, except by their flankers and advanced patrols. The night previous, I ordered Major Wool to advance with a detachment of 250 men, to support the militia, and set them an example of firmness. Also Captain Leonard, of the light artillery, was directed to proceed with two pieces, to be on the ground before day; yet he did not make his appearance before 8 o'clock, when the enemy had approached within two miles of the village. With his conduct, therefore, I am not well pleased. Major Wool, with his party, disputed the road with great obstinacy, but the militia could not be prevailed on to stand, notwithstanding the exertions of their general and staff officers; although the fields were divided by strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy could not possibly cut them off. The State dragoons of New York wear red coats, and they being on the heights to watch the enemy, gave constant alarm to the militia, who mistook them for the enemy, and feared his getting in their rear. Finding the enemy's columns had penetrated within a mile of Plattsburgh, I despatched my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Root, to bring off the detachment at Dead Creek, and to inform Lieutenant-Colonel Appling that I wished him to fall on the enemy's right flank. The colonel fortunately arrived just in time to save his retreat, and to fall in with the head of a column debouching from the woods. Here he poured in a destructive fire from his riflemen at rest, and continued to annoy the column until he formed a junction with Major Wool. The field pieces did considerable execution among the enemy's columns. So undaunted, however, was the enemy, that he never deployed in his whole march, always pressing on our columns. Finding that every road was full of troops crowding on us on all sides, I ordered the field pieces to retire across the bridge and form a battery for its protection, and to cover the retreat of the infantry, which was accordingly done, and the parties of Appling and Wool, as well as that of Sproul, retired alternately, keeping up a brisk fire until they got under cover of the works. The enemy's light troops occupied the houses near the bridge, and kept up a constant firing from the windows and balconies, and annoyed us much. I ordered them to be driven out with hot shot, which soon put the houses in flames, and obliged the sharp-shooters to retire. The whole day, until it was too late to see, the enemy's light troops endeavoured to drive our guards from the bridge, but they suffered dearly for their perseverance. An attempt was also made to cross the upper bridge, where the militia handsomely drove them back. The column which marched by the Lake road was much impeded by the obstructions and the removal of the bridge at Dead Creek, and, as it passed the creek and beach, the gallies kept up a lively and galling fire. Our troops being now all on the south side of the Saranac, I directed the planks to be taken off the bridges and piled up in the form of breastworks, to cover our parties intended for disputing the passage, which afterwards enabled us to hold the bridges against very superior numbers.
From the 7th to the 11th, the enemy was employed in getting on his battering train, and erecting his batteries and approaches, and constantly skirmishing at the bridges and fords. By this time, the militia of New York, and the volunteers of Vermont, were pouring in from all quarters: I advised General Mooers to keep his force along the Saranac, to prevent the enemy's crossing the river, and to send a strong body in his rear to harass him day and night, and keep him in continual alarm. The militia behaved with great spirit after the first day, and the volunteers of Vermont were exceedingly serviceable. Our regular troops, notwithstanding the constant skirmishing and repeated endeavours of the enemy to cross the river, kept at their work day and night strengthening the defences, and evinced a determination to hold out to the last extremity.