P.S. I have received your despatch, my troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to re-enforce others.
McClernand.
The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for re-enforcements, as represented in his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between 12 m. and 1 p.m., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's division, which was all of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made and resulted in the increase of our mortality list full fifty per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.
About 3.50 p.m., I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as follows:
Headquarters 13th Army Corps,
May 22, 1863.
To
Major-General U. S. Grant,
Department of the Tennessee.
General: I have received your despatch in regard to General Quinby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by rifle pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard pressed.
John A. McClernand,
Major-General commanding.
The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization.
After the failure of the 22d, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the 3d of July, when all was about ready for a final assault.
There was a great scarcity of Engineer officers in the beginning, but under the skillful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined this command during the siege, such practical experience was gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular Engineer officers.