Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing through my hands.
By the use of two steamboats, one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport, plying between Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented.
Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tennessee, evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge with a view of carrying it, and threatening the enemy's communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th of November. After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our force and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the meantime reconnoissances were made and plans matured for operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the movement of Longstreet and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:
"To
"Major-General A. E. Burnside.
"Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment, and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's forces across the river just at and below the mouth of Chicamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain, The enemy now seem to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
"Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th, as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired.
"Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until that time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution.
"Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain, if they have started and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed after they got even one day east of here.
"U. S. Grant,
"Major-General."
On the 15th, having received from the General-in-Chief a despatch of date the 14th, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger of his abandonment of East Tennessee, unless immediate relief was afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to our arms; and also despatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of my Staff, sent at the instance of General Burnside, informing me more fully of the condition of affairs as detailed to them by him, I telegraphed him as follows: