"Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South; but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected, until the result of our first effort is known. I will add, however, what is not now shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chicamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.
"U. S. Grant,
"Major-General."
Sherman's forces were moved from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides, our division threatening the enemy's left flank in the direction of Trenton, crossing at Brown's Ferry, up the north bank of the Tennessee to near the mouth of South Chicamauga, where they were kept concealed from the enemy until they were ready to force a crossing. Pontoons for throwing a bridge across the river were built and placed in the North Chicamauga, near its mouth, a few miles further up, without attracting the attention of the enemy. It was expected we would be able to effect the crossing on the 21st of November, but owing to heavy rains, Sherman was unable to get up until the afternoon of the 23d, and then only with Generals Morgan L. Smith's, John E. Smith's, and Hugh Ewing's divisions of the 15th Corps, under command of Major-General Frank P. Blair, of his army. The pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry having been broken by the drift consequent upon the rise in the river and rafts sent down by the enemy, the other division (Osterhaus') was detained on the south side, and was on the night of the 23d ordered, unless it could get across by eight o'clock the next morning, to report to Hooker, who was instructed, in this event, to attack Lookout Mountain, as contemplated in the original plan.
A deserter from the rebel army, who came into our lines on the night of the 22d November, reported Bragg falling back. The following letter from Bragg, received by flag of truce on the 20th, tended to confirm this report:
"Headquarters, Army of the Tennessee,
"In the Field, 20th November, 1863.
"To
"Major-General U. S. Grant,
"Commanding United States Forces, Chattanooga.
"General: As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.
"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Braxton Bragg,
"General commanding."
Not being willing that he should get his army off in good order, Thomas was directed early on the morning of the 23d to ascertain the truth or falsity of this report by driving in his pickets and making him develop his line. This he did with the troops stationed at Chattanooga, and Howard's corps (which had been brought into Chattanooga because of the apprehended danger to our pontoon bridges from the rise in the river and the enemy's rafts) in the most gallant style, driving the enemy from his first line and securing to us what is known as "Indian Hill" or "Orchard Knoll," and the low range of hills south of it. These points were fortified during the night and artillery put in position on them. The report of this deserter was evidently not intended to deceive, but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. It was afterward ascertained that one division of Buckner's corps had gone to join Longstreet, and a second division of the same corps had started, but was brought back in consequence of our attack.
On the night of the 23d of November Sherman, with three divisions of his army, strengthened by Davis' division of Thomas', which had been stationed along on the north bank of the river, convenient to where the crossing was to be effected, was ready for operations.
At an hour sufficiently early to secure the south bank of the river, just below the mouth of the South Chicamauga, by dawn of day, the pontoons in the North Chicamauga were loaded with thirty armed men each, and floated quietly past the enemy's pickets, landed and captured all but one of the guard, twenty in number, before the enemy was aware of the presence of a foe. The steamboat "Dunbar" with a barge in tow, after having finished ferrying across the river the horses procured from Sherman, with which to move Thomas' artillery, was sent up from Chattanooga to aid in crossing artillery and troops, and by daylight of the morning of the 24th of November, eight thousand men were on the south side of the Tennessee and fortified in rifle trenches. By twelve o'clock m. the pontoon bridges across the Tennessee and the Chicamauga were laid, and the remainder of Sherman's forces crossed over, and at half-past three p.m. the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge to near the railroad tunnel was in Sherman's possession. During the night he fortified the position thus secured, making it equal if not superior in strength to that held by the enemy.