In this charge the casualties were remarkably few for the fire encountered. I can account for this only on the theory that the enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.

The nearness of night and the enemy still resisting the advance of Thomas' left, prevented a general pursuit that night, but Sheridan pushed forward to Mission Mills.

The resistance on Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and by twelve o'clock at night was in full retreat, and the whole of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga Valley and Missionary Ridge were in our possession, together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small arms.

Thomas was directed to get Granger with his corps, and detachments enough from other commands, including the force available at Kingston, to make twenty thousand men, in readiness to go to the relief of Knoxville, upon the termination of the battle at Chattanooga, these troops to take with them four days' rations and a steamboat loaded with rations to follow up the river.

On the evening of the 25th November orders were given to both Thomas and Sherman to pursue the enemy early the next morning, with all their available force except that under Granger, intended for the relief of Knoxville.

On the morning of the 26th Sherman advanced by way of Chicamauga Station, and Thomas' forces, under Hooker and Palmer, moved on the Rossville road toward Grayville and Ringgold.

The advance of Thomas' forces reached Ringgold on the morning of the 27th, where they found the enemy in strong position in the gorge and on the crest of Taylor's Ridge, from which they dislodged him after a severe fight, in which we lost heavily in valuable officers and men, and continued the pursuit that day until near Tunnel Hill, a distance of twenty miles from Chattanooga.

Davies' division (14th Corps) of Sherman's column reached Ringgold about noon of the same day. Howard's Corps was sent by Sherman to Red Clay to destroy the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, and thus cut off Bragg's communication with Longstreet, which was successfully accomplished.

Had it not been for the imperative necessity of relieving Burnside, I would have pursued the broken and demoralized retreating enemy as long as supplies could have been found in the country. But my advices were that Burnside's supplies would only last until about the 3d of December. It was already getting late to afford the necessary relief. I determined, therefore, to pursue no further. Hooker was directed to hold the position he then occupied until the night of the 31st, but to go no further south at the expense of a fight. Sherman was directed to march to the railroad crossing of the Hiwassee, to protect Granger's flank until he was across that stream, and to prevent further re-enforcements being sent by that route into East Tennessee.

Returning from the front on the 28th, I found that Granger had not yet got off, nor would he have the number of men I had directed. Besides he moved with reluctance and complaints. I therefore determined, notwithstanding the fact that two divisions of Sherman's forces had marched from Memphis and had gone into battle immediately on their arrival at Chattanooga, to send him with his command, and orders in accordance therewith were sent him at Calhoun, to assume command of the troops with Granger in addition to those with him, and proceed with all possible dispatch to the relief of Burnside.