A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy

by J. Franck Bright

But it was too late to be of any use. The French army, considerably more numerous than any troops Prussia could bring against it, was already in Franconia, a few marches from the frontier. There was no time to put to good account the strong national feeling which had been excited. Prussia could rely upon its army alone, and though strong in the military reminiscences of the Great Frederick and admirably appointed, the Prussian troops had never seen war; the generals were old men wedded to obsolete traditions, while the King, in his anxiety to please Napoleon, had even gone so far as to discharge Mismanagement of Prussia. many of his troops in the previous year. The consequence of an encounter between such an army and the veterans of Napoleon might have been foreseen. The catastrophe was hastened by the bad arrangements of the generals. The King and his Court and crowds of enthusiastic nobility were with the army, but the chief command was in the hands of the Duke of Brunswick, an old man past seventy. Anxious to incorporate the troops of Hesse-Cassel, he repeated the error of the Austrians of the previous year, and advancing far beyond the Elbe, which forms the only good line of defence of which Prussia can boast, he took up a position between Eisenach and Weimar, covered by the Thuringian Forest, behind which the French could make any dispositions for the assault they pleased. The mistake was much too obvious to escape the eyes of Napoleon. His army passed rapidly through the defiles which lead to the upper waters of the Saal, and proceeding down the course of that river, interposed themselves between Brunswick and the Elbe. Perceiving too late his false position, the Duke attempted to withdraw towards Magdeburg. With the larger portion of his army he found himself stopped near Auerstadt as he approached Naumbourg on the Saal, by the division of Davoust, while the Prince of Hohenlohe, with a smaller division Battle of Jena. Oct. 14, 1806. of the army, who was to have followed him, was fallen upon and overwhelmed at Jena by Napoleon himself with the greater part of his army. Beaten back from Auerstadt, Brunswick retired towards Weimar, only to meet the fugitives of Hohenlohe's army and their victorious pursuers. His troops were involved in the disaster, the whole Prussian army was broken and destroyed, and that one day's defeat drew with it the destruction of the monarchy. Such fugitive detachments as still kept together were one by one destroyed, and Napoleon entered Berlin in triumph (Oct. 27).

The temporary annihilation of Austria at Austerlitz, and the complete overthrow of Prussia at Jena, had made Napoleon master of nearly the whole of Europe. Nothing is more remarkable than the rapid expansion of his ambition; each new success seemed to supply him with a new starting-point for further schemes. His mind, in spite of its practical character, had a strong tendency towards romance; as in his youth he had been fired with the idea of a great Eastern monarchy, so now, as circumstances had been favourable to him, the idea of repeating the rôle of Charlemagne, and the re-establishment of the Empire of the West, seems to have been prominent in his mind. Already, in his dealings with the Pope, in the Confederation of the Rhine, and in the creation of vassal kingdoms, he had shown his wish to imitate the conduct of that great ruler. The idea was confirmed by the conquest of Prussia, and strengthened by a petition from one of his armies that he would take the title of Emperor of the West. Russia was the only opponent left upon the Continent. If Russia could be either conquered or won over, not only would he have been in truth the Western Emperor, but he would have the means, as he believed, of wreaking his vengeance upon his detested rival England, which still refused to yield to his ascendancy. Already The Berlin Decree. Nov. 21, 1806. in fact, he believed that this vengeance was in his grasp. On the 21st of November he issued the extraordinary measure known as the Berlin Decree. Even during the negotiations with Fox he had insisted upon Prussia closing against English traffic the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. The measure had not been a success, 400 Prussian vessels had been seized in reprisal, and the mouths of the North German rivers declared in a state of blockade. That blockade had been real. But the Emperor now, as he said by a just use of the law of retaliation (while he was unable with safety to place a single ship upon the ocean), declared that the whole of the British Isles were in a state of blockade, forbad on the part of all his dependent countries any commerce or correspondence with them, declared every subject of England found in a country occupied by French troops a prisoner of war, and all English merchandise, even all private property of Englishmen, confiscated. Thus was established what is known as the Continental system. It laboured under three disadvantages. In the first place, it was absolutely impracticable, Europe could not be supplied without England, as Napoleon himself found in the course of the year when he authorized the clothing of his own army with English cloth; secondly, it enabled England by retaliatory measures to destroy every mercantile marine in Europe except its own; thirdly, it was so distressing and vexatious, and interfered so wantonly both with private property and the supply of necessaries for the people, that, more than anything else that Napoleon did, it excited popular indignation against him, and tended to his downfall. And yet it was not without a certain plausible excuse, which rested on the difference then existing between the laws of war as carried on by land and upon the sea. By land the property of an enemy was not considered lawful prize unless it belonged to the hostile government itself; by sea the property of peaceable merchants was liable to seizure and confiscation. By land no one was considered a prisoner of war unless taken with arms in his hand; by sea the crews of merchantmen were imprisoned as well as those of armed vessels. The second point which formed Napoleon's excuse was the extension given by England to the right of blockade. These two points afforded the pretext under which the Decree was promulgated, and was declared to be a fundamental law of the French Empire, till England should recognize the laws of war to be the same by sea and by land, and should consent to restrict the right of blockade to fortified towns actually invested by a sufficient force. In issuing his Decree, then, Napoleon put on a specious appearance of magnanimity, and took upon himself the part which he was fond of assuming, that of champion of the rights of nations against the tyranny of the English.

The necessity under which England as a belligerent lay of employing to the full the power which usage gave it of necessity inflicted considerable inconvenience upon neutral powers. The retaliatory measures which the Government thought it wise to take still further injured the neutrals, and threatened almost to Orders in Council. annihilate the American trade. A series of orders in Council was issued, extending from January to November 1807. By the first of these orders vessels were forbidden to trade between any ports in the possession of France, or of her allies if under her control. By the second, issued in November, after the extension of the Continental system to the Mediterranean, general reprisals were granted against the goods, ships, and inhabitants of Tuscany, Naples, Dalmatia, and the Ionian Islands. By the third, all ports from which the flag of England was excluded were declared in blockade, all trade in their produce unlawful, and their ships a prize, while all vessels carrying certificates of origin (a measure which Napoleon had insisted upon to prevent evasion of his system) were declared liable to capture. By the fourth, another plan of evasion was forbidden; the sale of ships by a belligerent to a neutral was declared illegal, because the French had managed to preserve much of their commerce by fictitious sales, enabling them to continue their business under neutral flags. The Americans were the chief sufferers Their effect on America. by these orders, and the irritation already felt by them was so increased that it ultimately ripened into war. Their two special grievances were the constant search of their vessels for deserters, and the refusal of the British authorities to recognize their customhouse arrangements. By the English law as then existing an English subject could not get rid of his nationality. But America was full of English and Irish emigrants and deserters from English ships, and the Americans had the constant mortification of seeing even their war-ships stopped and searched, and the asylum of their flag violated by the apprehension, under the rough justice of English naval officers, of many of their best seamen. By the neutral laws direct trading between the colony of a belligerent and its mother country was forbidden, but neutrals might trade for their own supply with the colonies. More than this, if they imported from the colonies more than they wanted they might re-export it even to the mother country; the proof of a bona fide interrupted voyage was the payment of the customhouse dues in the ports of the neutral. But these dues were in America paid not in money but in bonds, which were cancelled when the goods were re-exported. The payment of goods was therefore fictitious, and English officials refused to recognize them. The irritation produced by these two causes was but slightly allayed by negotiations in 1809, and, as will be subsequently mentioned, the people, especially the Southerners, forced the States into war in 1812.

To enable Napoleon to carry out his idea either of a Western Empire or of the complete annihilation of English trade it was necessary that war with Russia should continue. As a means for injuring that power he had already held out hopes of restoration of liberty to Poland, and in December he was received as a national saviour at Warsaw; but some remnant of the Prussian army had formed a junction with the forces of the Czar, and Benigsen, in command of the combined armies, refused to give the French a resting time in their new quarters. Napoleon had again himself to take the Battle of Eylau. Feb. 7, 1807. field. The allies fell back northwards to Eylau, not far from Königsberg, and there, on the 7th of February, was fought a great battle, which, for almost the first time, the French could not claim as a victory. Their exhaustion was great. Three times within seven months fresh conscriptions had been ordered in France. The firmness of the Russians at Eylau gave rise to well-grounded hopes that the chance of checking Napoleon had arrived, but money and reinforcements of troops were sorely wanted.

Incapacity of the Grenville ministry.

But at this critical moment the Grenville ministry exhibited to the full its incapacity for carrying on war. The Emperor of Russia was told that he need expect no great assistance from England, and money was doled out to him with ridiculous parsimony. There was indeed in England a total misapprehension of the necessities of a great war. Since the time of Marlborough and Queen Anne the idea of war on a large scale, except upon the sea, seemed to have wholly disappeared from the minds of the public men of the country. Even the great successes of Chatham had depended principally upon his good fortune in securing the alliance of Frederick the Great, and now all the resources of England were frittered away in a ridiculous series of small expeditions. When a concentration of troops and a frank and open-handed assistance to its allies might have saved Europe, the English Government taught them by its conduct, that while urging them to fight it would practically desert them at the moment when its assistance was wanted, and spend its men and money on such frivolous expeditions as the attack on Buenos Ayres, Alexandria, or upon the Dardanelles. These were the three military projects of the Grenville ministry.

Expedition to Buenos Ayres. May 1807.

In 1806 the English had recaptured from the Dutch the Cape of Good Hope. Sir Home Popham, who commanded the fleet, without orders from Government, determined upon a similar assault upon the Spanish colonies in America, and proceeded to capture Buenos Ayres. He thence wrote home a triumphant letter calling upon the English merchants to come to the magnificent new market he had opened. His triumph was of short duration. The colonists rallied under command of a French colonel, the city was recaptured, and the troops compelled to surrender as prisoners of war. In February 1807, 3000 men were sent out under Sir Samuel Auchmuty to assist Popham. Too late to save Buenos Ayres, he attacked and captured Monte Video. Before his success was known fresh reinforcements were sent out under General Whitelocke, with orders to assume the chief command, and with Popham's forces recapture Buenos Ayres. The attempt was a disgraceful failure; the troops were ordered to enter the city with unloaded muskets, and to rendezvous in the central square. The effect of so strange an attempt at street fighting may be easily conjectured. From the side-streets, housetops, and barricades thrown up across the roads, a destructive fire was kept up. Though Auchmuty met with some success, by nightfall 2500 of the English were either killed or prisoners, and Whitelocke was glad to accept the freedom of the prisoners both of the present engagement and of the past year, and to withdraw his troops, surrendering Monte Video and all he had conquered. In the judgment of the court martial which tried Whitelocke he was held totally unfit to serve his Majesty in any military capacity whatever, and the popular voice changed his name to General Whitefeather.

Turkey declares war against Russia.

During the continuance of the great European war the friendship of Turkey had been a constant object with the great powers. The ambassadors from Russia, France, and England had used all their powers of persuasion and menace to secure the adhesion of the Sultan. Before the end of the year 1806 the threats of Russia had had the effect of driving the Sultan to the friendship of France, and the Porte had declared war with Russia just after the battle of Jena. Wanting his troops for the defence of his own country, and being at that time in close friendship with England, Alexander requested the English Government to take charge of his interests at the Turkish capital, and Expedition to the Dardanelles. Feb. 1807. despatch a fleet to oblige Selim to give up his friendship with France. The plan, being one which could be carried out by the navy, suited the policy of the Grenville Government, and orders were sent to Lord Collingwood, then cruising off Cadiz, to send a squadron to the Dardanelles. He was not allowed to choose his own commander, but received orders from home to appoint Sir John Duckworth. Nothing could be worse managed than the expedition. Collingwood had given strict charge to Duckworth not to be drawn into negotiations. But when the passage of the Dardanelles, at that time almost unfortified, was forced, Duckworth, forgetful of Collingwood's advice, suffered himself to be entangled in negotiations. Sebastiani, the French ambassador, aroused the temper of the Turks, and instructed them in the best manner of fortifying their coasts. The English fleet was in danger of being shut up in the Straits. It became necessary to withdraw; but that step was no longer easy. On the 1st of March the fleet sailed back through the Dardanelles. Batteries had been erected at every point, and though the fleet succeeded in running the gauntlet through the terrible fire, with the loss of only some 300 men, it found itself entirely prevented from any return. The object of the expedition had completely failed, and the only resource left was to keep the Turkish fleet blockaded.