A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy

by J. Franck Bright

Napoleon's position in Europe.

It was not to be supposed that Napoleon would calmly watch the defeat of his troops even in an obscure corner of Europe, still less when their defeat seemed to thwart the completeness of his system, and was connected with events which had driven his brother from his throne. Though he knew that conquered Prussia beneath the surface was glowing with inextinguishable hatred, and though Austria, in spite of the war against England in which she was nominally engaged, was strengthening her army and re-establishing her finances in a way which seemed to threaten fresh efforts at freedom on her part, he determined to turn the full strength of his Empire upon the devoted Peninsula. He felt that so long as his friendship with Russia existed, so long as the Peace of Tilsitt held firm, his position was tolerably secure. He therefore renewed his alliance with Russia at a meeting with the Czar at Erfurth (Oct. 12), and suddenly ordered the widely scattered divisions of the grand army to concentrate on Paris preparatory to marching into Spain.

Preparations in Spain.

Unconscious of the coming danger and of the vast strength of its enemy, the central Junta at Madrid went on with its ill-arranged preparations to secure the freedom of Spain, and with its idle boasts as to the strength of the national armies. The English Government had not yet lost faith in Spanish assertions, nor learnt the absolute worthlessness of Spanish generals and armies; the fables of the Junta gained credence, and while all the other generals who had gone to Portugal were recalled, some 25,000 men were intrusted to Sir John Moore, with orders to advance into Spain and assist the Spanish troops, which were now occupying the valley of the Ebro and closing the French frontier. Even had the Spanish troops been worth anything, there was an absurd disproportion between the forces prepared and the scene of action for which they were intended. Nor did this weakness fail to strike military men. The Duke of York, though by no means a first-rate general, called the attention of Government to the wide dissipation of the Spanish troops, and the great distance of Portugal from the scene of action, and gave it as his opinion that to employ less than 60,000 men was merely to waste them. The Government refused to listen to his advice, Lord Castlereagh, the War Minister, was unmoved, and Moore was sent forward to certain failure. With a raw commissariat, and ill supplied with money, although it was at that very time being lavished upon the Spaniards, he embarked upon his dangerous march through a country where the roads were so bad that his Sir John Moore's march to Salamanca. Oct. artillery to reach Salamanca had to proceed all up the valley of the Tagus almost to Madrid and come back to meet him at Salamanca, where he was to be joined by reinforcements from England under Sir David Baird. Moore's concentration at Salamanca was wholly based on the supposition that the Spanish armies were strong enough at all events to retard, if not wholly to resist, the invasion of the French. Yet the grand army was rapidly approaching, and before long the forces collected upon the frontier rendered resistance hopeless. In September arrangements were made for the incorporation of the troops coming from Germany with those already in Spain, and eight great corps d'armée, commanded by six French marshals and Generals Junot and St. Cyr, besides the Imperial Guard, were collected to bear down all opposition.

Napoleon arrives at Vittoria. Nov. 8, 1808.

While Moore was painfully completing his concentration at Salamanca, Napoleon himself arrived at Vittoria, and almost immediately the Spanish troops, which the English general was to support, were scattered to the winds.

Destruction of the Spanish armies. Napoleon at Madrid. Dec. 4, 1808.

From his central position the Emperor was able to concentrate his chief force now on his right, now on his left. In a rapid succession of victories Lefèbvre and Soult destroyed the armies upon the left and centre of the Spanish line, and on the 11th of November Blake was entirely ruined at Espinosa. Immediately the whole strength of the French army was turned against the right, and on the 23rd of the same month Lannes crushed Palafox and Castaños at Tudela. All the boasted armies of Spain were thus swept away as it were in a moment, and Napoleon advanced upon Madrid, forced the passage of the Somo-Sierra, and after some slight opposition took possession of the capital on the 4th of December. The news of the defeats of Espinosa and Tudela reached Moore at Salamanca before his artillery had joined him. He resolved to await its arrival, and then to retreat.

Meanwhile, although Napoleon at the head of nearly 400,000 men was pressing onward rapidly to Madrid, in a few days to drive the members of the supreme Junta fugitives to Badajos, the old system of misrepresentation was kept up. Mr. Frere, the English plenipotentiary, had been persuaded to share in the illusions of the Junta, and he wrote peremptory letters, urging Moore to advance, and to rally the Spanish armies around him behind the Tagus. But news had at length reached Moore that those Spanish armies did not exist; the national excitement he had been taught to expect was nowhere visible, and he presently heard that the capital itself was in the hands of Napoleon. For 25,000 or 30,000 English soldiers to oppose the grand army with Napoleon at its head was simply ridiculous; their retreat was a matter of necessity. But Moore determined before Sir John Moore's retreat. retreating to relieve if possible the pressure upon the south of Spain, by pushing forward against Soult and threatening the French communications with France. In acting thus he judged that Napoleon was far more likely to direct his efforts against the English force than to spend his time in subduing the southern provinces, which would easily fall into his hands afterwards. He therefore advanced towards the Carrion river, where Soult had collected his army. The measure succeeded. Napoleon heard of the advance on the 21st; dismissing all thought of the Spaniards, he checked the further advance of his troops, and turned all his attention to crushing the English. On receipt of the news that Napoleon had left Madrid, Moore, who had been hoping to strike a blow before the arrival of Napoleon, at once began his retreat. He was closely followed by Soult, while Napoleon, forcing the passes of the Guadarama, which were deep in snow, came up from the south upon his flank. The retreat was attended with great difficulty. Moore's troops were young, the subordination was not perfect, and the enemy pressed him close; and at length, on the 1st of January, Napoleon and Soult formed a junction at Astorga, and their combined army amounted to 70,000 men. In ten days Napoleon had moved in the depth of winter 50,000 men across 200 miles of hostile country. But Moore's rapidity had spoilt the effect of even this stupendous march; he had already passed Astorga.

Napoleon leaves Spain.