A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy

by J. Franck Bright

Attempted negotiations.

The war was really so causeless and so prejudicial to the success of the allies in Europe, that the Emperor of Russia attempted, in 1813, to bring it to a close by mediation, and although his offer was declined, a negotiation was entered into at Ghent which ultimately proved successful. But before the negotiators advanced far in their labours the war threatened to assume a more serious character. On the cessation of hostilities in the south of France, a considerable number of the English troops were embarked at Bordeaux direct for America, without even being allowed to return home, and increased energy began to show itself in all directions. A large fleet under Rear-Admiral Cockburn, and a body of troops under General Ross, were despatched to the Chesapeake, and a combined attack by land and water was made upon Washington, the Federal capital. The success of the expedition, Capture of Washington. which was complete, was stained by the destruction of all public property, offices, and buildings in the city. An outcry was raised, not only in America but in Europe, at what was regarded as an act of vandalism. It is said that the English Government had ordered it as a retaliation for the barbarities of the Americans on the Canadian frontier, and as it is confessed that private property was scrupulously spared, it may well be a question whether in fact such a destruction of national property is not a better manner of exhibiting the severity of war than the destruction of private property which so constantly attends it.

The capture of Washington was followed by other expeditions of a like nature with less satisfactory results. Large and systematic operations against a continent are at all times difficult, and certainly they were beyond the capacity of the English ministry as then constituted. They relapsed into all the old errors of the American War, and the military operations were reduced to mere piratical excursions. An effort was indeed made upon the only side where a base of operations existed, but on so small a scale and so badly directed as to be entirely useless. A combined attack by land and water was arranged against Plattsburg upon Lake Champlain. The dilatoriness of the commander, Sir George Prevost, allowed the flotilla to begin the fight unaided; it was completely beaten, and its destruction putting an end to all hope of success, the army withdrew. An attack on Baltimore met with no better fate, but the greater part of the province of Maine was taken and occupied. The arrival of the Peninsula troops, no longer well commanded, had produced but little effect; the negotiations at Ghent were gradually drawing to a conclusion. The Convention was signed on the 24th of December. It was, as might be expected from the temper of the two nations, little more than a compromise. The real points at issue were scarcely touched, the boundaries were left for future negotiation. Such as it was it came too late to save England from one more disaster. An expedition similar in character to those already mentioned had been directed against New Orleans. The place was vigorously defended by General Jackson. Natural difficulties and mismanagement met the English at every turn. The earth was too sandy to allow of redoubts; while the Americans used cotton bales, which answered admirably as defences, the English found nothing better than barrels of sugar and molasses. When the storming parties reached the enemy's lines they found that their fascines and scaling-ladders had been neglected; the assault became impracticable. As the approach of the town had been completely exposed to the fire of the enemy, very heavy loss had been sustained, three English generals, and among them Sir Edmund Pakenham, had been killed, and Lambert, who had succeeded to the command, thought it better to withdraw the army.

Abdication of Napoleon.

The American War was thus still at its height when the ministry had been called upon to arrange the fate of the late Conqueror of Europe. When the allies, in their advance towards France, had assembled at Frankfort, not yet certain of success, and conscious that their work would be easy could they separate Napoleon's interests from those of the nation, they had offered to negotiate at a general Congress upon the fixed condition that France should abandon Italy, Holland, Germany and Spain, and confine itself to its natural boundaries. Napoleon, suspecting not without reason their intentions in accepting the Congress, had refused the conditions. His refusal had been followed by a very able proclamation of the allies, separating the interests of the ruler from that of the people, and promising that France should retain its just weight in the balance of nations. Conscious of the effect of this declaration, which exactly suited the feelings of the majority of Frenchmen, Napoleon hastened to accept the conditions. But he was told it was too late. Traitors had already informed the allied sovereigns that they were strong enough to avoid compromise. The great campaign which followed had shown how much could yet be done by the Emperor's genius. Again negotiations were opened at Châtillon; Napoleon expressed the utmost readiness to accept the terms of Frankfort. But the ultimatum of the allies had now risen, the Rhine boundary was no longer to be conceded. Napoleon could not make up his mind to allow France to issue from the war less than when he had first taken possession of the Government. The Treaty of Châtillon was broken off and war was again resumed; and as though to express the completeness of their determination, the allied sovereigns entered into a treaty at Chaumont (March 1), by which they bound themselves together for twenty years, promised each to supply 150,000 men, to which England was to add a subsidy of £5,000,000. The knowledge of this treaty made Napoleon feel that some desperate stroke alone could save him. He passed with his forces into the rear of the allies; he was nearer, as he himself said, to Vienna than they were to Paris. The movement put them in great perplexity. To leave so formidable a person upon their communications seemed too dangerous a step. Again treason served them in good stead. Their friends in Paris, at the head of whom was Talleyrand, urged them at once to move upon the capital. Joseph Bonaparte, who had been left in charge there, with Marmont and Mortier, fought a last battle before the very walls. Joseph lost heart, and ordered the marshals to capitulate, the army was withdrawn behind the city, and Paris was in the hands of the allies. This was fatal to all Napoleon's hopes. He came to Fontainebleau, there found himself gradually deserted, heard how his marshals one after the other had joined the victorious allies, and on the 4th of April signed his abdication, consenting to withdraw to the Isle of Elba, which was to be constituted into a principality for his convenience. He was to be allowed 400 soldiers, his wife and child were to be placed in possession of Placentia and Parma, and he was to retain the title of Emperor. In the settlement of the affairs of France and Europe he was to have no voice. The last stroke of ill-fortune seemed to have come upon him when his Austrian wife, overpersuaded by her relations, deserted him, and set off with his young son to Vienna. During his ten months' residence in the Isle of Elba the settlement of Europe was being carried on by the diplomatists of all the powers assembled at Vienna.

Thus the Tory ministry seemed at last to have reaped the fruit of their lengthened efforts, and to have justified their long retention of office. But we shall look in vain for any merit in their policy but General sketch of the Tory policy. one, and that is steadfastness. The accidental discovery, for it was little more, of a general of surpassing genius had enabled them to hide under his greatness their own mediocrity; his skill had covered their constantly-repeated blunders, and fortune had supplied them with an enemy whose enthusiastic self-confidence, arbitrary temper, and insatiable ambition, had neutralized his transcendent genius, had forced upon them allies whom their own skill could not have secured, and had even alienated the people whose natural representative he was. With these advantages they had been able to obtain that success which a fixed line of policy even when itself erroneous not unfrequently secures. They had raised England to a position of the highest importance, the success of Europe against Napoleon was indisputably due to her. Yet it cannot be said that they were urged by patriotic motives. Throughout their conduct had been dictated by the interests of their class. They had recognized in Napoleon the great subverter of old institutions, the arch-enemy of the aristocratic order. It was in this capacity chiefly that they had pursued him with such firm and undeviating hostility. Of the events which took place during their ministry, of the successful skill and bravery of soldiers and sailors, of the establishment of national independence whether in England or on the Continent, all Englishmen may be proud. Those who, reading history by the light of subsequent events, still hold that a strong aristocratic element is a necessary ingredient of constitutional liberty will admire their motives. But to those who feel that growth and advance is the essential principle of the life of a nation, and that those only are good governors who are capable of understanding and of carrying out the necessities of advancing civilization, their sole claim to respect (and that is after all no small one) will be that they knew their own minds, and in spite of all difficulties realized their object.

Home government.

The same motive of class aggrandizement which detracts from the virtue of the foreign policy of this ministry underlay the whole administration of home affairs. There was an incapacity to look at public affairs from any but a class or aristocratic point of view. The natural consequence was a constantly increasing mass of discontent among the lower orders, only kept in restraint by an overmastering fear felt by all those higher in rank of the possible revolutionary tendencies of any attempt at change. Much of the discontent was of course the inevitable consequence of the circumstances in which England was placed, and for which the Government was only answerable in so far as it created those circumstances. At the same time it is impossible not to blame the complacent manner in which the misery was ignored and the occasional success of individual merchants and contractors regarded as evidences of national prosperity. At the beginning of the year 1810, Perceval, who in the interest of the Government had been preventing as far as possible all inquiry into the Walcheren failure, was bold enough at the opening of the session to take credit to himself for that expedition, and to declare that the national prosperity was great, and that public works had been carried out as successfully as in the times of profound peace. Such assertions could not have been made without some slight foundation. While the Continental System and the Orders in Council had together almost closed the European trade, certain other irregular doors had been opened; the removal of the Portuguese court to the Brazils had given hopes of an enlarged South American trade, and the two islands of Heligoland and Anholt had been fortified and turned into smuggling centres with some success. Certain public works, as the Waterloo and Vauxhall bridges, had been opened. But before the year was over the condition of the country surely proved that the prosperity boasted of was a mere phantom. The American trade proved ruinous to those who had rushed into it; the British goods on the Baltic had been seized and confiscated; the public works had been carried on by a lavish issue of paper money, which was now rapidly depreciating. A bad harvest came to increase the difficulties of the time. Early in the spring wheat was already at 102s. a quarter: though £7,000,000 worth was imported, it rose in August to 116s. But then, under the influence of a good harvest, it suddenly dropped to 94s.—thus the agricultural interest was also involved in ruin.

Depression of trade.

Under all these influences there was a collapse of credit. There were 273 stoppages of payment instead of the ordinary average of 100, and before the year was out no less than 2314 commissions of bankruptcy were issued. This misery and depression lasted till the end of the war. Indeed, in the following years, 1811 and 1812, it was constantly increasing. The depression of commerce was so great and the collapse of credit so general that an advance of £6,000,000 to the merchants on due security was authorized by Parliament. The withdrawal of Russia from the Continental System, and its apparent inclination to throw off Napoleon's influence, slightly revived business. But this improvement was neutralized by the fearful winter and spring, which destroyed much of the harvest, and again raised the price of wheat. The apparent opposition between the interests of the manufacturing and agricultural classes was very curiously marked. A plentiful harvest in 1813, and the opening of many continental ports, did much to revive both trade and manufactures; but it was accompanied by a fall in the price of corn from 17ls. to 75s. The consequence was widespread distress among the agriculturists, which involved the country banks, so that in the two following years 240 of them stopped payment. So great a crash could not fail to affect the manufacturing interest also; apparently for the instant the very restoration of peace brought widespread ruin.