A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy

by J. Franck Bright

It was agreed to act in accordance with the Treaty of Chaumont, each of the four great powers supplying its quota of troops, or in the case of England an equivalent in money. While the Prussians and the English with their allies were to advance into France and the Netherlands, the other powers were to pass the Rhine and join in a great advance upon Paris. It was hoped that by the end of April 500,000 men would be ready for the great movement. The French Court had taken refuge in the Netherlands, and as the people of that country were already half inclined to join the French, it seemed certain that that country would be the chief seat of operations; the war there was intrusted to the Anglo-allies under Wellington, and the Prussians under Prince Blücher. The hope of speedy action was quickly seen to be vain. Since the peace many countries had disbanded their troops, many of the best English regiments had been sent to America, and in spite of its long experience, the English Government showed its usual weakness in the war administration. Wellington was convinced of the necessity of postponing the opening of the campaign till June or July.

This delay gave Napoleon an opportunity of striking the first blow, and although he could immediately dispose of not more than 125,000 men, and although the English and Prussian armies amounted to 220,000, the arrangement of the allied troops gave him much hope of a successful campaign. Bent upon covering Napoleon enters Belgium. Brussels, uncertain where the blow which he felt sure would soon be struck would fall and in order to facilitate the subsistence of his troops, Wellington had spread his army over a long line of frontier, from the neighbourhood of Charleroi to Antwerp and Ostend. In like manner the Prussian corps were spread eastward from Charleroi to Liège. Trusting to the wide dissemination of the allied troops to render concentration difficult, Napoleon thought to push between the English and Prussian armies, and to crush them one after the other. With all his old skill, he rapidly collected his army on the Sambre, issued on the 14th June a stirring general order, and on the 15th attacked the Prussians at Charleroi, passed the Sambre, and drove them back along the Namur road to a position near Sombreffe, which Blücher had already appointed as a point of concentration should he be attacked from Charleroi. At the same time the left of the French army under Ney was sent directly northward along the road to Brussels, to clear it of English and prevent the junction of the allies.

Up to this point Napoleon's plans seemed thoroughly successful. He had already rendered any immediate junction of the armies difficult, if not impossible; with one part of his army he had already reached the chosen ground of the Prussians, and found it occupied by one only out of their four corps; with his left he had advanced to the position of Quatre Bras against the English, where as yet no considerable portion of the allies had arrived. But a strange slowness marks his course in this campaign. Instead of bringing up all his troops for an attack in both directions, in the early morning of the 16th, he allowed his main body to pass the night on the Sambre, while there was an interval of twelve miles between Battle of Ligny. Ney's position and that of his rear. Consequently all the morning was passed in bringing up these troops, and it was past noon before either at Quatre Bras or Ligny any formidable attacks were made on the enemy. During that time two more Prussian corps had arrived at Ligny, and Wellington's troops were hastening to support the small force at Quatre Bras. Napoleon therefore, instead of being able to destroy a single Prussian corps, found himself involved in a bloody and hard-contested battle. He was indeed victorious, but the victory was not of that crushing and decisive character which his precarious position rendered necessary Battle of Quatre Bras. for him. At Quatre Bras, instead of a brief skirmish which would have enabled him to give assistance to Napoleon at Ligny, Ney found it necessary to fight a battle, and that not a successful one. The Allies, who in the morning were scarcely 8000 strong, made good their position till reinforcements arrived. When evening closed their preponderance was such that Ney was compelled to withdraw his troops to Frasnes. So hard had he been pressed that he had found it necessary to summon to his aid the corps of D'Erlon, which almost at the same time received orders from Napoleon to fall on the Prussian right flank, and thus complete the victory of Ligny. Confused by these contradictory orders, D'Erlon's corps of 20,000 men passed the day, without striking a blow, between the two battlefields, in either of which his presence might have had a decisive effect. As it was, Napoleon overrated the success against the Prussians, and fell into a fatal error with regard to the line of their retreat. Convinced that they would fall back towards Namur and Liège, he detached Marshal Grouchy with 30,000 men to follow Retreat of Blücher's army. them in that direction, while he himself brought his main body to join Ney, with the intention of following and destroying the English, who were compelled by Blücher's defeat to fall back towards Brussels. But the Prussian generals, Blücher and Gneisenau, the chief of his staff, were not so easily shaken off. Determined still to afford assistance to their allies, they withdrew northwards towards Wavre, while Grouchy and his troops were in vain seeking them towards the east. From Wavre, which was reached late in the evening of the 17th, Blücher was enabled to assure Wellington of his approach, and to promise the assistance not of two divisions only, for which the English general had asked, but of his whole army. Relying on this promise, Wellington determined to fight.

Position of Waterloo.

To give time for the arrival of the Prussians it was necessary that his battle should be a defensive one. The position, which he had long before studied and selected, was admirably adapted for the purpose. Nearly two miles south of Waterloo is the village of St. Jean, where the highroads from Charleroi and Nivelle towards Brussels join. Just south of this the undulating country forms a somewhat continuous ridge, lying east and west, crossed at right angles by the Charleroi road. Along the south of the ridge lies a rich and cultivated valley, which in about a mile swells again into a corresponding range of elevated ground. Three or four farmhouses lie on the foot or on the southern slope of the northern line of hills, so that the position resembles, as Wellington said, a wall of a bastion with advancing angles. The English troops were placed along the ridge, and occupied the farmhouses. The centre was placed between the two highroads, having in front the farm of La Haye Sainte standing on the western side of the Charleroi road. The right was covered by the château of Hougomont, with stone buildings and enclosures, while the left stretched to the farms of Papelotte and La Haye. Wavre is about seven miles from St. Jean, directly to the east, and expecting the arrival of Blücher, Wellington allowed his left to be the weakest part of his line. His care for his right was indeed exaggerated; he thought it possible that an attempt might be made to reach Brussels by outflanking him in that direction, and before all things desirous of preserving the capital, he detached a body of 17,000 men to Hal (eight miles to the west of his position), and thus seriously and uselessly weakened his line of battle. The French position corresponded to the English. Its centre also lay on the Charleroi road and the range of heights parallel to those occupied by the English, on which is the farmhouse of La Belle Alliance. Its right extended to Frischermont, opposite to La Haye, having somewhat in its rear the village of Planchenoit; the left reached beyond Hougomont. In number the armies were not unequally matched. Wellington commanded about 68,000 men, Napoleon 70,000, but the English army consisted of troops of various nations, some of whom were thoroughly untrustworthy, and was inferior in cavalry by at least 3000 men, and in artillery by upwards of 100 guns.

Battle of Waterloo.

By eight o'clock on the morning of the 18th the English were under arms, but Napoleon, ignorant of the movements of the Prussians, and anxious probably to excite the temper of his own troops, and display his power to those of the allies who were already wavering in their allegiance, delayed his attack till nearly mid-day, and employed the morning in a great review of his troops. The weather also on the 17th had been very stormy, the ground was saturated and heavy; and though this difficulty would likewise have affected his opponents, firm ground was no doubt more important for the attack than for the defence. It is probable that those wasted hours saved the English army, for the same condition of the ground told with terrible force upon the advance of the Prussians, who had to make their way through swampy defiles, where the artillery could scarcely be moved. Their advance was very slow, and nothing but the firm determination of their leaders to keep their word to Wellington would have enabled them to overcome the obstacles in their way. The battle began about half-past eleven by an assault upon Hougomont, which Napoleon intended to carry, and thus mask his real great attack upon the centre and left of the English. The firm resistance of the garrison, consisting of a portion of the English Guards and the troops of Nassau and Hanover, frustrated this first move. The capture of the château, which should have been a mere preliminary step in the great plan, became an object in itself; fresh troops were constantly brought against it, it was as constantly reinforced from the English line, and throughout the whole day its defence neutralized a considerable portion of the French infantry. It was not till five o'clock that Napoleon brought a couple of howitzers to bear upon it. Though the buildings were speedily in flames, the defence was continued, and it remained throughout the day uncaptured. During the first attack upon Hougomont skirmishing and firing had been going on along the whole line preparatory to the great movement against the left. That movement was rather hastened than postponed by a discovery which was made about one o'clock. About that time troops were seen moving near a wood to the north-east of the English position between Wavre and Ohain. At first Napoleon took them for the troops of Grouchy, to whom he had sent information of the true direction of the Prussian retreat. They proved however to be the foremost troops of Bülow's Prussian corps. But the Emperor, still believing that Grouchy would at all events prevent the arrival of the main body of the Prussians, determined if possible to complete the destruction of the English before taking notice of the approaching troops. At half-past one, under a furious cannonade, the first corps, D'Erlon's, marched against the English left between Papelotte and La Haye Sainte. Although their peculiar formation, in great closely-packed masses, exposed them fearfully to the fire of the English artillery, they pressed forward up the English slope, threw the first line, consisting of allies, into confusion, and were not repulsed till Picton brought up the main body of the English left, who charged them with the bayonet and drove them backward. As they were already shaken, the English heavy cavalry, the Household Brigade, and what is known as the Union Brigade, consisting of the Scotch Greys, the Enniskillen Dragoons, and Royals, charged with fearful effect. Carried away by their energy, they rode right up the French slope to the battery of La Belle Alliance; scattered and exhausted by their charge, they were fallen upon and very roughly handled by the French Lancers, and only saved from destruction by the advance of the English light cavalry. However, the first great attack of the French had been triumphantly repulsed, though with terrible loss. Both Picton and Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry, were killed. It was not long before a second attack was made. Apparently about four o'clock, Ney was ordered to assault the centre and right centre of the English to the west of the Charleroi road. The attack was made chiefly with cavalry. Much of the infantry were indeed employed round Hougomont and in the attack of La Haye Sainte, which never ceased. For two hours the cavalry charges continued; they were opposed by the allied troops thrown into square, the squares being placed checkerwise behind the crest of the ridge. It is uncertain whether any squares were broken; it is certain at all events that though the line on the whole held firm, reinforcements had to be brought from the right, and that there was a moment between five and six o'clock when the centre was in the greatest danger. After an heroic defence La Haye Sainte had been abandoned for want of ammunition. The French held therefore a position close to the English ridge, and the infantry of Donzelot's division were gradually making their way to the line which the cavalry charge had shattered. But to complete the lodgment effected in the line on the ridge more infantry were absolutely necessary, and these were not forthcoming. When Ney sent to demand them of the Emperor, his messenger was met with the reply, "Does he want me to make them?" In fact, since about half-past four o'clock the advance of the Prussians had made itself clearly felt. General Lobau had been sent to check them, and with him some battalions of the Imperial Guard. But the numbers of the Prussians constantly increased; it was in vain that they were more than once driven out of Planchenois by the Guard, at six o'clock they had established themselves there, threatening even the rear of the French and the Charleroi road, their line of retreat; and by seven o'clock Ziethen's corps, which had pushed directly westward, had joined the left of the English army, so that the French troops in Papelotte occupied an advanced angle, surrounded both in front and flank by the enemy. It was thus that reinforcements could not be sent to Ney, and the second great effort of the French was rendered useless. But Napoleon did not yet give up all for lost. He knew that the English must be much exhausted, and determined to try one great effort more with that portion of the Imperial Guard which had still been kept in reserve. It was a general assault along the whole line, but the most important part of it was the advance of the Guard upon the English centre. To oppose them the English brigade of Guards under Maitland had been brought forward. As the French columns topped the ridge the Guards sprang to their feet, and at a distance of fifty paces poured in a fire which shook the advancing masses, and charged them with the bayonet. The columns of the Guard rolled backward to the valley. At the same time a second column had met with the same fate; the 52nd regiment under Colborne had advanced so as to form an angle with the main line; as the French column passed them they poured in a destructive fire, and charged directly upon their flank. The course of that charge was unchecked, the 52nd regiment continued to follow the flying French right across the valley. Almost at the same time, the French in the angle at Papelotte had also been driven back by the Prussians; and the English light cavalry under Vandelour and Vivian had likewise charged, overthrowing the troops opposed to them; thus in three parts of the field the French were in flight. A general order to advance was given, and after a short but broken resistance, the whole mass of the French army fled in complete rout. About nine o'clock Wellington and Blücher met at the farmhouse of La Belle Alliance, lately the French headquarters. The pursuit was intrusted to the Prussians, less exhausted than their English allies, and was followed up by Gneisenau along the Charleroi road as far as Frasnes. The loss in this great battle was very heavy on all sides; that of England is put at 13,000, that of Prussia at 7000, and of France between 23,000 and 30,000. It was however decisive.

The allies in Paris.

The advance of the allies into France was unchecked, and on the 7th of July Paris was again occupied. The entrance of the allies upon the country of France at once exhibited the different feelings by which they were actuated; while Blücher and the Prussians thought of nothing but vengeance, Wellington, true to the constant policy of England, insisted upon regarding France as a friendly country to which he was restoring its legitimate sovereign. He succeeded in restraining his violent colleague, who wished to put Napoleon to death, to lay a large contribution on Paris, and to blow up the bridge of Jena over the Seine, the name of which he considered an insult to Prussia. Wellington had no instructions how to act with regard to Napoleon, he therefore allowed him to follow his own course. The Emperor, embarking in an English frigate, the Bellerophon, attempted in his usual theatrical manner to claim the hospitality of the Prince Regent, but the dread of his name and ambition, and the proved danger of allowing him to remain in Napoleon banished to St. Helena. Europe, prevented the English Government from entertaining any such ideas, and Napoleon was sent to end his days as a prisoner in St. Helena.