As was natural after his great successes, Marlborough expected that the next year would be one of much importance. Seeing the impossibility of himself assisting Savoy, he had contrived to persuade the King of Prussia to allow 8000 of his troops to proceed to Italy, and to serve under Eugene, who had been despatched thither. His own intention was to follow up his late victory by an invasion of France. He had intended that this invasion should be by the valley of the Moselle, upon which a joint attack was to have been made, by himself up the river, and by Louis of Baden coming from Landau. The plan had been so far foreseen, that the ablest of the French generals, Marshal Villars, was stationed on the Moselle, while Flanders was intrusted to Villeroi, and Marsin continued in Alsace. The weak co-operation of the German Prince rendered the plan abortive, nor did the death of the Emperor Leopold, nor the succession of Joseph the young King of the Romans, increase for any length of time the vigour of the Imperial armies. But while Marlborough was still waiting for the Margrave's assistance, Villeroi had suddenly assumed the offensive, had retaken some of the fortresses of the Meuse, and invested Liège. As usual, on the slightest sign of danger, the Dutch were clamorous for Marlborough's return. His disappointment on the Moselle inclined him to listen to them, and his appearance in Flanders at once re-established affairs. Though disappointed in his main object, he still intended to fight a great battle; but, as usual, jealousy of the allied commanders, and the constant slowness and opposition of the Dutch general, prevented him from bringing on an engagement. He however succeeded in breaking the great line of French fortifications extending from Antwerp to Namur upon the Meuse, and in advancing to the attack of Brussels across the plain of Waterloo, where, but for the opposition he met with among his own colleagues, a great battle might have been fought: he writes, that he felt sure that, had he fought such a battle, it would have been a greater victory than that of Blenheim. However, his difficulties were more than he could overcome. The year passed away without great events, and the French began to think that he had owed his victories to chance. Upon the Rhine, Louis of Baden, though he had been so backward in his support of Marlborough, showed the ability which he really possessed by winning a great battle at the end of the year at Hagenau, unfortunately too late to assist Marlborough in his plans. In Italy, though Eugene won the battle of Cassano, the position of the Duke of Savoy became continually more precarious, and the crisis had not passed.
Peterborough's success in Spain.
It was in fact not with either of the great regular armies that the allies this year won any great successes, but with the small and mixed forces in Spain, which had been placed under the eccentric but vigorous command of Lord Peterborough. Leaving Galway to prosecute the war in the west, this general, who held with Sir Cloudesley Shovel a joint command of the fleet also, drew the Prince of Darmstadt from Gibraltar, and sailed round the east of Spain. After some successes on the eastern coast, he was eager to march direct upon Madrid. But the Archduke Charles, now calling himself Charles III., who was with him, listened in preference to the suggestions of Darmstadt, who had once been Governor of Catalonia, and trusted much to his influence in that province. The plan of an attack upon Madrid was therefore overridden, and the army proceeded to besiege Barcelona. Serious quarrels occurred between the leaders, for which Peterborough's want of caution was no doubt much to blame, and the siege was on the point of being given up. Already the heavy cannon were withdrawn from the trenches and carried on board ship, when suddenly Peterborough appeared in the tent of the Prince of Darmstadt, with whom he was not on speaking terms, and telling him that he intended to attack the enemy that night, challenged him to follow him. Laying aside his animosity, the Prince at once accompanied him. Peterborough's intention was to capture the citadel of Montjuich, a fort at some little distance from the town itself, and this he trusted to do by a sudden attack when the enemy were off their guard. The attempt was perfectly successful. The English troops followed the defenders pell mell into the walls of the fortress. Scarcely was the stronghold taken than the Spaniards began to advance from the town to retake it. Peterborough rode forward to reconnoitre; a panic seized his troops in his absence, and they were already relinquishing the fort, when he galloped back and rallied them, and fortunately found that their absence had been unperceived. The possession of this citadel was followed before long by the fall of the city, which capitulated on the 9th of October (1705). The greater portion of the troops in Barcelona, and much of the open country, at once declared for King Charles. The kingdom of Valencia followed this example, and in the capital of that province Peterborough subsequently took up his abode. Nor did his successes end there. In the following year, the French, under Marshal Tessé and King Philip himself, attempted to regain Barcelona. The Count of Toulouse, a natural son of the French King, blockaded it from the sea. Peterborough, moving from Valencia with but 3000 regular troops, did his best to employ Tessé's army, which was 20,000 strong. But the siege went forward uninterruptedly. Already the trenches were within 150 yards of the wall, and an immediate assault was to be expected, when the English fleet under Sir John Leake, second in command, approached. Though his numbers were nearly equal to those of the Count of Toulouse, Leake, a prudent commander, wished to wait for expected reinforcements under Byng. But Peterborough, feeling that delay would be ruinous, determined upon a strange step to compel immediate action. He got on board an open boat and proceeded in quest of the English fleet. After searching for a whole day and night in vain, he at length reached the squadron. Having produced a new commission which had been given him, which gave him full command over Leake whenever he was himself on board, he at once hoisted his flag and gave orders for the attack. But meanwhile, hearing of the arrival of the English, the Count of Toulouse had withdrawn his fleet, the town could be easily approached from the sea, and Tessé thought it better to raise the siege. After this brilliant exploit, Peterborough again wished to march upon Madrid from Valencia, but King Charles, on the advice of his German council, whom Peterborough speaks of by the contemptuous name of "the Vienna crew," determined upon advancing straight through Aragon, and called upon Peterborough to move his troops from Valencia to join him on the march. Meanwhile the army of the west, under Galway and Das Minas, had, after considerable delay, moved upon Madrid also, and had occupied it. They found, however, the feeling there strongly in favour of King Philip. As Aragon and Catalonia had favoured Charles, so, in the spirit of hereditary opposition, the Castilians devoted themselves to the interest of Philip. So strong was the opposition they met with, that the allies had to leave the capital and fall back eastward towards the approaching army of Charles, with whom they formed a junction. But in the combined army there were far too many commanders for vigorous action. Peterborough, the only man of genius among them, found himself constantly thwarted: he put no restraint upon his tongue. Bitter quarrels were the consequence, and he found it necessary to leave the army and betake himself to Italy, which had been his original destination, in order to negotiate with the Genoese for a supply of money.
Battle of Ramillies May 23rd 1706.
The same year which saw these sudden and unexpected successes in Spain was marked by still more complete success against the French in other parts of Europe. Marlborough was determined to wipe out the bad impression which the inactivity of the last campaign had caused. His own ardent wish was to march with the army as he had in the Blenheim campaign, and to throw himself into Italy, where the critical position of affairs still continued. Finding it impossible to gratify this wish, he determined that he would at least do something vigorous in Flanders which might serve as a diversion to his friend Eugene in Italy. Bringing his army therefore across the lines which he had broken the year before in the neighbourhood of the sources of the little river Gheet, he came in sight of Villeroi, with whose army the Elector of Bavaria, having lost all troops of his own, was now serving. The place where the armies met was Ramillies. Thither Villeroi had drawn his troops, with the intention of covering Battle of Ramillies. May 23, 1706. Namur, which Marlborough's advance seemed to threaten. The French general had received instructions to risk a battle to save that town, and therefore afforded Marlborough the opportunity he so much desired. The French army was very strongly posted upon a range of heights forming a semicircle round the sources of the little Gheet river. Their right almost touched the Mehaigne river, and was covered by the villages of Tavière and Ramillies. Across it ran an old road known as the road of Queen Brunehaud, closely adjoining which, in the highest part of the position, was a barrow known as the Tomb of Ottomond: from this point the position swept round till it terminated at the village of Autre-Eglise, being covered from that point by the Gheet and the marshes in which it rises. The steepness of the heights at Autre-Eglise, and the river and marsh in its front, rendered the position almost impregnable, but at the same time made it difficult for the troops stationed there to act upon the offensive. Marlborough at once saw that he had the advantage of occupying the inside of a circle, so that to any given point the movement of his troops was shorter than that of his enemy's could be. He saw also that the Tomb of Ottomond was the key of the position. If this was once in his possession, the whole line of the enemy could be enfiladed. He ordered therefore a vigorous but false assault on Autre-Eglise. His feint succeeded; both the French generals rode to that part of the field, believing it to be the point of danger. Then Marlborough ordered the real attack to be made in the neighbourhood of Tavière, Ramillies, and the road of Brunehaud. He was enabled to draw troops from his right to strengthen his left in their attack, and after some warm fighting, especially about the village of Ramillies, the position was forced, the English troops formed at right angles to their original position, and pressed onward along the high ground occupied by the enemy. Villeroi and the Elector found it impossible to save the day. Fresh difficulty was caused by the breaking down of the French baggage as it was withdrawing northwards towards Judoigne. Thus interrupted, the retreat became a rout; the enemy were pursued far beyond Judoigne to within two leagues of Louvain. They did not even rest there; a hurried consultation was held by torchlight in the market-place, and the flight immediately continued towards Brussels. The river Dyle, which Marlborough had failed to pass the preceding year, was thus left open.
The consequences of this victory were unexpectedly great. Brussels opened its gates to the advancing conquerors; King Charles was proclaimed King in the capital of the Spanish Netherlands; even the line of the Scheldt was deserted, and Ghent, Bruges, and Oudenarde, fell into the hands of the allies; the great naval strongholds, Antwerp and Ostend, which had before now sustained memorable sieges, surrendered, the one on account of some quarrel within its walls, the other because of its inability to withstand the advancing allies. The list of conquests is concluded by the strongholds of Menin and Ath. In fact the effect of the battle was to drive the French entirely out of the Netherlands; Mons and Namur being the only towns of importance still remaining in their hands.
The battle even influenced affairs in Italy. The complete disorganization of the French army in Flanders made a change of commanders imperatively necessary. Vendome, regarded in some ways as the ablest French general, was summoned from Italy, where he had been acting successfully against Eugene. He had driven the Imperial army to Saves Eugene in Italy. retreat behind the Adige; the Milanese had thus been cleared, and Piedmont conquered with the exception of Turin. Into that last fortress the unfortunate Duke had withdrawn. For the purpose of taking it, a well-appointed army, under the Duke de la Feuillade, son-in-law of Chamillart the war minister, but without other claims to the command, crossed the Alps and invested the town. It was of the last importance that it should be relieved, and Eugene determined upon a march, bold even to rashness, for the purpose. Crossing the Po not far from its mouth, he followed the river upwards upon its south bank. The obstacles he encountered were many; but Vendome at this critical moment was recalled to Flanders, and Marsin and the Duke of Orleans, who took the command, allowed Eugene to cross river after river without opposition, contenting themselves with following his movements upon the opposite bank of the river. At length Eugene approached Turin, formed a junction with the Duke of Savoy, whom the laxity of the siege had allowed to leave the city with 10,000 men, and passing beyond Turin, turned his back upon France, and marched against the investing army. The siege had been carried on without skill, the lines were of immense length, and severed into various sections by the numerous rivers which join the Po in the neighbourhood of Turin. Orleans was eager to lead the troops out of the trenches and risk a pitched battle, which, as the French had a considerable advantage in numbers, might easily have resulted in Eugene's defeat. He was overruled by Marsin, who unexpectedly produced a commission as commander-in-chief, and the army awaited the assault in their trenches. Even in this position they were badly commanded. Three generals, issuing sometimes contradictory orders, prevented the proper concentration of troops, and when Eugene marched against that section of the works which lay between the Doria and the Stura, not more than a third of the French army is said to have been ready to oppose him. The route of the French was complete, 200 guns, and much stores and money, fell a prey to the victors (Sept. 7). The effect of the victory was greater than the victory itself. It was found impossible to lead the broken troops into the Milanese; they fell back in confusion behind the Alps, thus leaving the force on the Adige to be surrounded by enemies. Piedmont returned to its allegiance, and in fact the whole of Italy was irretrievably lost to France, and compelled to join the Grand Alliance.