A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy

by J. Franck Bright

Battle of Bunker's Hill June 18, 1775.

Condition of the American army.

Although the insurgent troops were justly proud of the gallant stand they had made against disciplined forces, the army when Washington joined it was not such as a general would wish to command. Even in the late battle well authenticated cases of cowardice had occurred among the officers. The militia regiments of the various states regarded each other with jealous eyes; there was no sort of uniformity of dress, no trace of soldierly bearing; the soldiers showed little subordination to officers scarcely better than themselves; and, worse than all, there was a fearful deficiency of powder. It taxed the ability and temper of their new general to the full to bring the motley crowd into order. He exacted the sternest discipline, drew a sharp line between the officers and men, procured hunting shirts to supply the lack of uniform, and by unremitting toil gradually produced a tolerable army. Why General Gage looked quietly on while this process was being carried out it is difficult to say. Even setting aside the lack of ammunition, of which however he was fully informed, he had troops enough to have destroyed the enemy which were blockading him without difficulty, and might thus perhaps have ended the war at a blow.

The Olive Branch Petition.

The slowness which characterizes the English generals at the beginning of the war is probably to be traced to the prevalent idea that reconciliation was still possible, and that the terrible extremity of civil war might be avoided. Even at this very time the Congress was sending to the King a last appeal; but this document, known as the Olive Branch Petition, was not received in England. There was a technical objection to it which secured its rejection; it purported to come from the Congress—an illegal and unrecognized body. The Americans could scarcely indeed have expected that it would have produced any effect. It held out no hope of concession, but expressed only vague wishes for reconciliation. It probably served the turn of those who sent it by allowing them to throw the blame of the future war entirely on the English. It might have been wise on the part of the ministry, even thus late, to have accepted overtures of peace, but it would have been a stretch of wisdom which no man had a right to expect; for the Congress had undoubtedly by its action assumed a position of complete independence and hostility which a Government could scarcely be expected to overlook.

Attack on Canada.

Even before the Olive Branch was sent the Congress had determined to take advantage of the successes of the preceding year, and had organized, under Generals Montgomery and Arnold, an attack upon Canada, which General Carleton was ill prepared to repel with less than 1000 British troops. While Montgomery crossed Lake Champlain and pushed on to Montreal, Arnold, with incredible labour, had made his way up the valley of the Kennebec, and so down the Chaudière, to Quebec. Unable to prevent the junction of the armies, Carleton hastened to throw himself into the capital, and upon the Heights of Abraham succeeded in checking their advance, with the loss of Montgomery their leader. Arnold could do no more than keep up a nominal blockade, so ably was the defence conducted, and the general who superseded him, meeting with no sympathy from the Canadians, was forced to withdraw in disorder beyond Lake Champlain.

Meanwhile the dilatory conduct of Gage, who had now been succeeded by General Howe, had lost Boston to the English. Washington had at length found himself strong enough to take and fortify the Dorchester Heights, which commanded the English lines on Boston Neck. A general engagement, which could scarcely have Howe retires to Halifax. March, 1776. ended otherwise than favourably to the English, would have still rendered the town tenable, and Howe was inclined to bring on a battle. But a continued course of bad weather frustrated his plans, and thinking that for military reasons New York, where the royal party was strong, would make a better base of operations, he determined to withdraw; he accordingly removed all his troops to Halifax, there to await promised reinforcements. So long were the fresh troops in coming that Howe had to leave Halifax without them. There was considerable difficulty in supplying him. The military arrangements of England have been constantly found inefficient at the opening of a war; it was only by purchasing troops at an exorbitant price from the Duke of Brunswick and the Landgrave of Hesse that the immediate want could be supplied. It was therefore only on a limited scale that Howe was enabled to carry out that plan for the arrangement of the troops which was afterwards continued during the war; and which consisted of making New York the centre of operations, to be supported by two subsidiary forces, the one acting in the Southern States, the other from Canada. In pursuance of this plan, he despatched a force against Charleston, in Carolina, under General Clinton, while he himself moved to Sandy Hook, thus threatening New York, whither Washington had hastened from Boston. He was there joined in July by his brother, Admiral Lord Howe, and found himself, with his reinforcements and with the troops which had been sent to Charleston and had returned upon the failure of the expedition, at the head of nearly 30,000 men.

Fresh offers of conciliation rejected.