Burgoyne's disasters.

Though successful in itself, the real object of Howe's expedition had not been obtained, it had not enabled the army of New York to go to the assistance of Burgoyne, and that general had been compelled to surrender with all his army on the 17th of October. In June he had advanced along the west side of Lake Champlain, and had taken the fortress of Ticonderoga, Fort Anne, and Fort Edward on the Hudson. Hearing that the Americans had supplies but slightly guarded at Bennington, on the road to the Connecticut river, he sent a small detachment to secure them. This was the beginning of his misfortunes; the difficulties proved greater than was expected, the expedition failed and had to retire in haste, with the loss of all its artillery. However, trusting to the co-operation of the army from New York, and of a force which was to make its way from the great lakes by Fort Stanwix down the upper Hudson and join him before Albany, Burgoyne continued to advance. He collected thirty days' supplies and crossed the Hudson, thus cutting himself off from Canada, and relying for safety upon his power of opening communication with New York. The militia of the neighbouring district at once rose behind him, thus completely severing his communications. His Indian auxiliaries had left him; he could not rely much on his Canadian troops, and now found himself in face of General Schuyler with 16,000 men. The help on which he had calculated did not come, Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger failed before Fort Stanwix, and Clinton was unable to leave New York. Burgoyne attempted an assault on the American position before Behmus's Heights, north of Stillwater, but failed. To advance seemed impossible, he therefore ordered a retreat, though this was scarcely less difficult. He had told Clinton that he could hold out till the 12th of October, and when that day came he was still close to Saratoga, and now neither retreat nor advance was possible. His boats upon the lake, which afforded him his sole means of procuring supplies or of transport, had been destroyed; he had no choice but to make some sort of surrender. On the 17th of October a convention was signed by which he surrendered his whole force to General Gates, who had assumed the chief command of the American troops. His army was allowed to march out of camp with the honours of war to the bank of the river, there to lay down their arms, and to be forwarded to England, under promise not to serve again during the war. Though the reception of the prisoners by both generals and men was most generous, and though Burgoyne lived as a guest in General Schuyler's house, the terms of the convention were not honestly fulfilled; Burgoyne, indeed, was allowed to return to England, but the main part of the army was detained in America for several years. The blame of this breach of treaty is held to attach to Congress only, and not to Washington.

Effect of American affairs on the Parliament. Oct. 1776.

The autumn session of 1776 had been opened with a speech full of the successes of the English arms. The battle of Brooklyn, the fall of New York, the expulsion of the invaders from Canada, were all topics of congratulation. The feeling of the nation went with the Government, and the opposition in Parliament dwindled to a very small minority; but in spite of their weakness they continued to urge conciliatory measures, and at the beginning of the session, both in the Upper and Lower House, amendments in that sense were moved to the address. So plain was it, however, that such efforts were wholly useless, that Lord Rockingham's party ostentatiously retired from all public questions, attending the House only during private business. Fox indeed, who had left the ministry in 1773, and had become the foremost champion of the American cause, remained in his place, but the rest of the party did not reappear, till, finding their step worse than useless, they took the opportunity of a debate upon the Civil List to return to public life.

Increase of the Civil List.

This debate arose on a demand for an increase to the Civil List of £100,000 a year, and £600,000 to pay off the debts already owing. Under the existing circumstances the necessity for the measure was obvious, for the King's ordinary tradesmen were unpaid, and his servants' wages in arrears. The Civil List already amounted to £800,000 a year, and the known personal frugality of the King and Queen rendered the disappearance of so large a sum the more scandalous. In fact, nearly £600,000 had been spent since 1769 in secret service. It was easy to explain the insufficiency of the Civil List and the permanence of the ministerial majority in Parliament; not only had the Pension List been largely increased, but there were a swarm of sinecure officers about the Court, from grand falconers in the House of Peers to turnspits of the kitchen who sat in the House of Commons. The Civil List was increased, but the grant was accompanied by a strong expression, on the part of Sir Norton Fletcher, of the feeling of the House, that under the existing pressure of taxation such extravagant use of public money was much to be blamed,—words which were subsequently formally accepted by the House as their own.

Chatham's motion. May 30, 1777.

The session closed with another effort on the part of the Opposition. On this occasion it was Lord Chatham who led the attack. He returned, after two years of illness, and still swathed in flannel, to move an address, urging the King to arrest the misfortunes in America. The measures he advised were unconditional redress of grievances, and repeal of all penal statutes; in other words, he would have granted all the demands of the Americans with the exception of their independence. But, while urging moderate counsels with regard to America, he blazed out at the idea of an alliance of the colonists with the French, and demanded instant war. American intrigues with France. His motion was of course lost. His fears of an alliance with France were not however unfounded; already, before the Declaration of Independence, Silas Deane had been sent over to Europe to try and make some arrangement. If the confession of the culprit is to be believed, Deane's handiwork was to be seen in the nefarious plans of a man called John the Painter, who in the December of the preceding year (1776) had attempted to fire the dockyards of Portsmouth. Again, immediately after the Declaration of Independence, Adams and Franklin had been sent over as accredited agents to make a commercial and defensive alliance with France. But though they had been well received both by the ministry and by the salons of Paris, where for the time Franklin was the fashion, their representations were mistrusted, and no real help was given. The French had no wish to engage in a failing cause, and continued to keep up an appearance of friendship with England, even, at the instigation of our ambassador, issuing, though probably intentionally too late, a lettre de cachet to stop the Marquis of Lafayette from sailing to join the colonists. He had no difficulty in avoiding it, and was present with Washington during the Philadelphian campaign. But the Court of France was in fact only watching the turn of events. The news of the defeat of Burgoyne had scarcely France acknowledges the independence of America. Dec. 1777. reached Europe before the independence of America was acknowledged and a commercial treaty made. In case of France becoming involved in the war with England, this treaty was to be extended into one by which France engaged to supply military assistance on the sole condition that America should never acknowledge the supremacy of Great Britain.

Chatham's energy in Parliament. Nov. 20, 1777.

Already, by the time of the meeting of Parliament for the autumn session, rumours of Burgoyne's difficulties had reached England, though no news of his final disaster had arrived. The danger of war with France, to which Chatham had alluded in the spring, seemed to increase, and men's thoughts began to turn towards the great statesman who had before saved England in similar difficulties. Nor did Chatham refuse to respond to the general expectation; not for many years had he shown such activity as in this session. In moving an amendment on the address, he demanded the withdrawal of all troops from America, stigmatized with due severity the employment of savage Indians in the war, and strove to rouse the national spirit against France. But the energy and eloquence he exhibited throughout the session were unavailing. He consistently upheld the view that conquest of America was quite impossible, that it was worse than useless to carry on the war, and that all the demands of the colonists should be granted with the exception of independence. This, he said in the strongest words, it was impossible for England to grant. He relied, no doubt, on the natural hostility between the colonists and France, and it is possible that, had he been placed in office, his policy might have been successful. He was loved and trusted by the Americans; concessions from his hands might have been received. He was feared by France; his plan of removing the troops from America would have left the resources of England free for a foreign war; his threats and his name might have deterred the French from war. But certainly no other man could carry out such a policy, and so it was generally felt; North himself acknowledged the impossibility, and was most desirous of resigning; Lord George Germaine, who, disgraced at Minden as a military man, had become as member of the Government the chief supporter of repressive measures in America, was also preparing to give up his post. The ministry seemed on the point of giving way, and indeed the necessity for such a step was increasing rapidly. Early in December came the terrible news of Saratoga, and three weeks later the preliminaries of the treaty between France and the colonies were agreed upon, though the French ministry had not scrupled to cover their intentions by false statements on the matter.