The cases I have mentioned are the only acts of the "thirty-nine," or of any of them, upon the direct issue, which I have been able to discover.

To enumerate the persons who thus acted as being four in 1784, two in 1787, seventeen in 1789, three in 1798, two in 7804, and two in 1819-1820, there would be thirty of them. But this would be counting John Langdon, Roger Sherman, William Few, Rufus King, and George Read each twice, and Abraham Baldwin three times. The true number of those of the "thirty-nine" whom I have shown to have acted upon the question which, by the text, they understood better than we, is twenty-three, leaving sixteen not shown to have acted upon it in any way.

Here, then, we have twenty-three out of our thirty-nine fathers "who framed the government under which we live," who have, upon their official responsibility and their corporal oaths, acted upon the very question which the text affirms they "understood just as well, and even better, than we do now"; and twenty-one of them—a clear majority of the whole "thirty-nine"—so acting upon it as to make them guilty of gross political impropriety and willful perjury if, in their understanding, any proper division between local and Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to support, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal territories. Thus the twenty-one acted; and, as actions speak louder than words, so actions under such responsibility speak still louder.

When you come to evidence about a large and complex state of affairs, which is the kind of fact that so many of the arguments of practical life deal with, though you will still be dealing with a fact, yet the very nature of the fact changes the value and the character of your evidence. It is a comparatively simple matter to determine whether a certain woman faced forward or backward as she was getting off a street car, or whether the eggs of a sea urchin do or do not begin to germinate under the influence of a certain chemical substance; but it is far from simple to determine whether a free elective course has or has not inured to greater intelligence and cultivation in the graduates of a certain college, or whether the graduates of another college where the classical course is maintained have keener and more flexible minds and more refined tastes as a result of their study of the classics. In such cases as these the citing of direct evidence brings on you difficulties of a different kind from those you face when you are establishing a single, simple fact. Here you will usually depend on two main sources of evidence: statistics, and the evidence of recognized authorities on the subject.

30. Statistics. Statistics, which are collections of figures, are notoriously treacherous. On many important subjects, such, for example, as the practical effect of the elective system, it is impossible to get them; and on many other subjects, such as the effects of a protective tariff, they must be had in so enormous masses, if they are to be trusted at all, that only profound students can handle them. Where the facts are complicated, and interests are tangled, moreover, many sets of figures may enter into the question, as notably in the case of a tariff; so clearly is this difficulty now recognized that Congress has authorized a tariff board made up of distinguished students of economics and men of long experience in dealing with tariff matters to collect and study the facts and make recommendations based on them. Similarly, with the investigation into the liquor question made fifteen years ago by the Committee of Fifty: the whole question had been so tangled by assertion and counter-assertion that it became desirable to have an investigation into the facts by men of recognized ability and impartiality.[20][!--Note--]

In general, to use statistics safely you need a wide acquaintance with a subject, especially where the question is in any way mixed up with men's feelings, whether through politics or not. All the statistics we have make dead against great armaments and preparation for war; yet while human nature is what it is, necessary prudence seems to require every nation of any size to have them. A very little human nature will upset a very great body of statistics. Furthermore, in most human affairs results are produced by a multiplicity of causes; and though statistics may throw light on three quarters of all the causes that are potent in any given case, yet the other quarter which are irreducible to definite statement may wholly alter the result. If you are using statistics in your argument, therefore, as evidence of some large and complex fact, you should usually justify them to some extent by showing that there are no counteracting forces which they do not cover.

With this precaution, however, statistics are the foundation of most arguments on large questions. If you were arguing in favor of the purchase of local waterworks, you would present figures showing the number of houses using the public water supply, the rates paid, the profits of the company, the exact points at which public control could work economies. If you were arguing for a rule that no man shall play on a university team until he has been registered a year at the university, you would need statistics to show how many men would be affected by the rule. If you were arguing for a single session at a school instead of two, you would show exactly how many students in the school live more than a mile away from the building. In every case where statistics can be presented in such a way as to make clear that they fairly cover the ground, they are most valuable evidence. They give the argument the effect of being founded on a rock. If it be obvious that the statistics have been freshly gathered, and are not merely casual and second-hand gleanings, they have still greater effect, for then they have a secondary force in testifying to the personal knowledge that the witness has of the subject. We shall see later the danger of the fallacy of generalizing on too narrow a basis: a generalization based on a good body of statistics runs no danger of this fallacy.

31. The Opinion of Recognized Authorities. The other chief source of evidence to establish a fact which consists of a large and complex state of affairs is the opinion of recognized authorities on the subject. The strength of such evidence depends on whether the audience will accept the person you cite as having authority on the matter. Most of us read some newspaper or periodical in the opinions of which we have confidence, because they seem to be based on investigation and competent knowledge. The annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury is excellent evidence on the state of the national finances. The reports of presidents of colleges are excellent evidence from authorities on such questions as the value of the elective system or the effect of raising the standard of admission. The report of a dean or of a schoolmaster on the value of organized athletics is effective if the audience knows that he likes out-of-door sports and takes time to see the games. Evidence drawn from an authority who is likely to be used by the other side is doubly effective, since your readers recognize that his competence is admitted.

If a man has given his life to the study of a subject and has published books that are of recognized authority, his evidence will be of especial weight. Mr. Bryce's opinion on all questions concerning a state of affairs in this country would be recognized at once as weighty, for he has given time and study to collecting the multitude of small facts which constitute the large fact. His opinion that political honesty is increasing with us has brought comfort to many good citizens who had grown despondent over the accounts of recurrent rascality in the newspapers and magazines. This is a typical case for the citation of authorities; for the facts are enormous in number, very widely scattered, and often contradictory. Only a man who has taken the pains to keep himself constantly informed, whose judgment has been trained by long consideration and comparison of the facts, and who is born with the judicial temperament can attain the authority of Mr. Bryce.

There will be cases on which you will have the right to put yourself forward as an authority, for on many subjects which fall within the range of undergraduates their knowledge is first-hand. On all questions of athletics, especially, an undergraduate is apt to have freshly in mind a considerable mass of facts. In the same way, on the results of certain requirements for admission to college, you can speak from recent experience. In matters concerning your own city, too, you may have original knowledge.