MERIT OF CONGRUITY. SCHOLASTIC DISTINCTION.
The subject of discussion between Eck and Carlstadt was important. "Before conversion," said Carlstadt, "the will of man is incapable of doing good; every good work comes entirely and exclusively from God, who gives first the will to do, and afterwards the ability to perform." This truth is proclaimed by the Scriptures, which say, "It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure,"[78] and by Augustine, who, in disputing with the Pelagians, delivers it in almost the very same terms. Every work in which there is neither love to God nor obedience to his will, is, in his sight, devoid of the only quality which could render it truly good, even should it be in other respects dictated by the most honourable human motives. Now there is in man a natural enmity to God—an enmity which he is utterly unable to suppress. He has not the power to do so—he even wants the will. If ever, therefore, it is to be suppressed, it must be by the power of God.
This is the doctrine of free will, so much declaimed against in the world, and yet so simple. It had been the doctrine of the church. But the schoolmen had explained it in a manner which caused it to be misunderstood. "No doubt," said they, "the natural will of man cannot do any thing which is truly pleasing to God; but it can do much to render man more capable and more worthy of receiving divine grace." These preparatives they termed merit of congruity;[79] "because," as St. Thomas expressed it, "it is congruous for God to bestow peculiar favour on those who make a good use of their will." In regard, again, to the conversion which man must undergo, it is no doubt true that, according to the schoolmen, the grace of God behoved to accomplish it, but still without excluding his natural powers. "These powers," said they, "have not been annihilated by sin; sin only puts an obstacle in the way of their development; but as soon as this obstacle is removed (and this, according to them, was what the grace of God had to do,) these powers begin again to act." To use one of their favourite comparisons—"the bird whose legs are tied does not thereby lose either its powers, or forget the art of flying, though it must be loosed by some other hand before it can be able again to use its wings." "The same," said they, "is the case with man."[80]
FREE WILL. ITS TRUE NATURE.
Such was the question discussed between Eck and Carlstadt. At first Eck seemed to deny Carlstadt's propositions out and out, but feeling the difficulty of maintaining his ground, said, "I grant that the will has not power to do a good work, but receives it from God." "Confess then," rejoined Carlstadt, overjoyed at obtaining such a concession, "that every good work comes entirely from God." "Every good work comes indeed from God," replied the schoolman subtlely, "but not entirely." "There," exclaimed Melancthon, "goes a discovery well worthy of theological science." "An apple," added Eck, "is all produced by the sun, but not altogether, and without the co-operation of the tree."[81] Assuredly no man ever thought of maintaining that an apple is all produced by the sun.
"Very well," said his opponents, going still deeper into this delicate question, so important in philosophy and in religion, "let us consider how God acts on man, and how man conducts himself when so acted on." "I acknowledge," said Eck, "that in conversion the first impulse comes from God, and that the human will is entirely passive."[82] So far the disputants were agreed. "I acknowledge," said Carlstadt, on his part, "that after this first action on the part of God, something must come from man, something which St. Paul calls the will, and which the fathers designate by consent." Here again both parties were agreed—but at this point the separation began. "This consent of man," said Eck, "comes partly from our natural will, and partly from the grace of God."[83] "No," said Carlstadt, "this will in man is entirely created by God."[84] Hereupon Eck began to express astonishment and indignation at words so well fitted to impress man with a sense of his utter nothingness. "Your doctrine," exclaims he, "makes man a stone or a block, incapable of any counter action...." "What," replied the Reformers, "does not the faculty of receiving the powers which God produces in him (a faculty which we admit that he possesses) sufficiently distinguish him from a stone and a block?" "But," resumed their antagonist, "by denying man all natural power, you contradict experience." "We deny not," was the reply, "that man possesses certain powers, and has in him a faculty of reflecting, meditating, and choosing. We only consider these powers and faculties as mere instruments, incapable of doing any thing that is good until the hand of God sets them in motion. They are like the saw in the hands of the sawyer."[85]
CARLSTADT'S NOTE BOOK. PORTRAIT OF MELANCTHON.
The great question of liberty was here debated, and it was easy to demonstrate that the doctrine of the Reformers did not divest man of the liberty of a moral agent or make him a passive machine. The liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of acting conformably to his choice. Every action done without external constraint, and in consequence of the determination of the mind itself, is a free action. The mind is determined by motives, but we constantly see that the same motives act differently on different minds. Many do not act conformably to the motives which their judgment approves. This inefficiency of motives is attributable to the obstacles which they meet with in the corruption of the understanding and the heart. Now, God, by giving a new heart and a new spirit, removes those obstacles, and thereby so far from depriving man of freedom, on the contrary, removes what prevented him from acting freely, and in obedience to the dictates of his conscience. In the language of the gospel it renders him "free indeed." (John, viii, 36.)
A slight incident for a short time interrupted the debate. Carlstadt (this is Eck's account[86]) had prepared different heads of argument; and, as is done by many of the orators of our day, read what he had written. Eck saw in this only a school boy's tactics, and objected. Carlstadt embarrassed, and fearing he might be taken at a disadvantage if deprived of his note-book, insisted on retaining it. "Ah!" said the scholastic doctor, quite proud of the advantage which he thought he had over him, "his memory is shorter than mine." The point having been submitted to arbiters, it was decided that quotations from the Fathers might be read, but that in other respects the discussion should be extempore.
This first part of the discussion often met with interruption from the audience. They ruffed and screamed. Any proposition offensive to the ears of the majority instantly aroused their clamour, and then, as in our day, it was necessary to call to order. The disputants also occasionally allowed themselves to be carried away in the heat of discussion.