And now a curious thing happened. It was known to the Staff that Jabotinsky was at the time staying in Jaffa, and that he was to be found almost daily at the house of a friend who was living there. About a week after he had sent his letter to the Commander-in-Chief, a Staff-Major from G.H.Q., E.E.F., appeared in Jaffa and took up his quarters in the same house as that in which Jabotinsky's friend dwelt. When the inevitable meeting took place, the Staff-Major, who, by the way, knew Jabotinsky well, remarked that the Commander-in-Chief had received his (Jabotinsky's) letter, and would probably send for him one of these days, but that, in the meantime, it would be well if Jabotinsky stated his grievances then and there to himself. "You can speak to me openly as to a friend," said the Major. "I have some influence at G.H.Q., and I shall be glad to assist in righting any wrong done to Jews."

On hearing this, Jabotinsky unhesitatingly explained the situation, both as to its effects on the Regiment and on Jewish aspirations in Palestine. The result of this "friendly conversation" was a mendacious report written by the Staff-Major to the Deputy Adjutant-General at G.H.Q., E.E.F.

Sometime afterwards, by a mere chance, I saw a copy of this report, and so far as it referred to Jabotinsky, it was practically untrue from beginning to end.

If the responsible authorities at G.H.Q. knew of the method adopted to lure Jabotinsky into the "friendly conversation" which served as a pretext for a gross libel on his character, it reminds one of the good old days when Governments had recourse to "Agents provocateurs." What G.H.Q. certainly should have known was that the accusations levelled at Jabotinsky by a member of their Staff were absolutely untrue. They knew him to be a good and gallant officer who had done his duty, and much more than his duty, faithfully and well to England, but it would appear as if they were greedy for such a document and swallowed it with avidity without any reference to me or, so far as I know, to anybody else.

I think that even the most prejudiced of my readers will admit that in fairness and justice to Jabotinsky this secret report should have been submitted to him for his information, and such explanation and refutation as he could give, before any action was taken against him.

It is strictly laid down in the King's Regulations that all adverse reports must be shown to the officer whose reputation is affected, but, as I have shown over and over again, the Staff of the E.E.F. were apparently a law unto themselves and above even King's Regulations!

I knew nothing whatever of all that had been going on; I knew nothing of Jabotinsky's letter to the Commander-in-Chief; I knew nothing of his interview with the Staff-Major from G.H.Q., and, needless to say, I knew nothing of the report which the latter had written.

My first inkling of the situation was through an official letter emanating from the Deputy Adjutant-General, which stated that "the Commander-in-Chief has his own duly constituted advisers on matters of policy and is not prepared to grant an interview to a Lieutenant of the 38th Battalion Royal Fusiliers to discuss such matters."

From this moment G.H.Q. lost no time in getting rid of Jabotinsky. On the 29th August, 1919, I received an urgent order to send this officer to Kantara for immediate demobilization. This took me by surprise, for I was very short of Jewish Officers, and stood much in need of Jabotinsky's services in the Battalion.