With the Judæans in the Palestine Campaign

by J. H. Patterson

The local Military Authorities, however, seemed oblivious of the fact that there was a much bigger question involved than that which loomed so largely in their eyes on the Palestine horizon. There was England's world policy to be considered, and her Statesmen had already decided that it was very much in her interests to win over to her side Jewish help and sympathy the world over. Let no one under-estimate what that help meant to the Allies during the Great War. The Jewish element, owing to the Balfour Declaration, came solidly to our side in every land, and in America greatly helped to counter the German propaganda which was fast gripping hold of the United States. It was unfortunate that this far-sighted and wise policy of our Imperial Statesmen was never grasped by their local agents in Palestine.

In the E.E.F., so far as one on the spot could judge, but scant heed was paid to any policy unless it bore on local affairs and coincided with the point of view held by G.H.Q. and the satellites revolving round it.

If only a little wise diplomacy had been employed, I am strongly of the opinion that it would have been quite practicable for the local authorities to have treated the Jewish problem fairly and on the lines of the Balfour Declaration and, at the same time, have retained the Arabs on our side. After all the Arabs were as much interested in the downfall of the Turk as we were ourselves, and, to his honour be it said, the Emir Feisal never showed himself hostile to Jewish aspirations. On the contrary he expressed the utmost goodwill and worked hand in hand with Dr. Weizmann for the common good of both peoples.

The Jew and the Arab are necessary to each other in the Near East, and if England wishes to retain her Empire it is vital to her interests to keep friendly with both. I am afraid that at the moment we are at a discount to the East of Suez. During the stress of war certain promises were made to the Arabs which appear difficult to redeem, mainly due to the policy of France in Syria. I admire France immensely, and that is why I so much deplore her imperialistic aims beyond the Lebanons. She is sowing a rich crop of troubles for herself in these regions, and I am certain that ere long we shall see her reaping a bitter harvest. I met a much travelled French officer in Cairo, who had just relinquished an administrative post in Beyrout, and he told me that, if his Government was wise, it would clear out of Syria, where it would have nothing but trouble for generations to come. "If only," he went on, "England would give us a bit of Africa and take Syria instead, France would make a good bargain."

We, however, do not want Syria, but we do want to see a strong and settled Arab state in these strictly Arab regions, and I sincerely hope that our Statesmen will be wise enough, and energetic enough, to bring about such a desirable consummation. If we permit the Bolshevists and Turks to oust us from our friendship with the Jews and Arabs, and with King Hussein and his son the Emir Feisal (now the King of Irak), upon whom we have alternately blown hot and cold, just as it pleased France to pipe the tune then we shall witness the beginning of the end of our power and prestige in the Orient.

My trip to G.H.Q. was not quite in vain, for just before we left Egypt sanction was given to enlist Palestinian volunteers. I sent to Judæa a specially trained recruiting party, all fluent Hebrew speakers, under the command of Lieutenant Lipsey, to report to Major James de Rothschild of the 39th Battalion, who was the officer appointed to supervise this work in Egypt and Palestine.

The response to Major de Rothschild's appeal was enthusiastic—in fact his chief trouble was to keep out grey-beards and unfledged youths, so eager were all to join up.

Lieutenant Lipsey had some difficulty in keeping his end up in Jerusalem, where there were many anti-Zionists, but finally he worsted his opponents and emerged triumphant with nearly 1,000 recruits.