The chief danger to public tranquillity arises from the vigorous expansion of some peoples and the decay of others. Nearly all the great nations of Europe are expansive; but on their fringe lie other peoples, notably the Turks, Persians, Koreans, and the peoples of North Africa, who are in a state of decline or semi-anarchy. In such a state of things friction is inevitable and war difficult to avoid, unless in the councils of the nations goodwill and generosity prevail over the suspicion and greed which are too often the dominant motives. Scarcely was the Bosnian-Turkish crisis over before Morocco once more became a danger to the peace of the world.
There the anarchy continued, with results that strained the relations between France and Germany. Nevertheless, on February 8, 1909 (probably owing to the friendly offices of Great Britain[531]), the two rivals came to an agreement that France should respect the independence of Morocco and not oppose German trade in that quarter, while Germany declared that her sole interests there were commercial, and that she would not oppose "the special political interests of France in that country[532]." But, as trade depended on the maintenance of order, this vague compact involved difficulties. Clearly, if disorders continued, the task of France would be onerous and relatively unprofitable, for she would be working largely for the benefit of British and German traders. Indeed, the new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, admitted to the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, that thenceforth Morocco was a fruit destined to fall into the lap of France; only she must humour public opinion in Germany. Unfortunately, the "Consortium," for joint commercial enterprises of French and Germans in Morocco and the French Congo, broke down on points of detail; and this produced a very sore feeling in Germany in the spring of 1911. Further, as the Moorish rebels pushed their raids up to the very gates of Fez, French troops in those same months proceeded to march to that capital (April 1911). The Kaiser saw in that move, and a corresponding advance of Spanish troops in the North, a design to partition Morocco. Failing to secure what he considered satisfactory assurances, he decided to send to Agadir a corvette, the Panther (July 1, 1911), replaced by a cruiser, the Berlin.
Behind him were ambitious parties which sought to compass world-predominance for Germany. The Pan-German, Colonial, and Navy Leagues had gained enormous influence since 1905, when they induced the Kaiser to visit Tangiers; and early in 1911 they issued pamphlets urging the annexation of part of Morocco. The chief, termed West-Marokko deutsch, was inspired by the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Kiderlen-Wächter, who thereafter urged officially that the Government must take into account public opinion--which he himself had manipulated.
Again, as at Tangiers in 1905, Germany's procedure was needlessly provocative if, as the agreement of 1909 declared, her interests in Morocco were solely commercial. If this were so, why send a war-ship, when diplomatic insistence on the terms of 1909 would have met the needs of the case, especially as German trade with Morocco was less than half that of French firms and less than one-third that of British firms? Obviously, Germany was bent on something more than the maintenance of her trade (which, indeed, the French were furthering by suppressing anarchy); otherwise she would not have risked the chance of a collision which might at any time result from the presence of a German cruiser alongside French war-ships in a small harbour.
It is almost certain that the colonial and war parties at Berlin sought to drive on the Kaiser to hostilities. The occasion was favourable. In the spring of 1911 France was a prey to formidable riots of vine-growers. On June 28 occurred an embarrassing change of Ministry. Besides, the French army and navy had not yet recovered from the Socialist régime of previous years. The remodelling of the Russian army was also very far from complete. Moreover, the Tsar and Kaiser had come to a friendly understanding at Potsdam in November 1910, respecting Persia and their attitude towards other questions, so that it was doubtful whether Russia would assist France if French action in Morocco could be made to appear irregular. As for Great Britain, her ability to afford sufficiently large and timely succour to the French was open to question. In the throes of a sharp constitutional crisis, and beset by acute Labour troubles, she was ill-fitted even to defend herself. By the close of 1911 the Navy would include only fourteen first-class ships as against Germany's nine; while Austria was also becoming a Naval Power. The weakness of France and England had appeared in the spring when they gave way before Germany's claims in Asia Minor. On March 18, 1911, by a convention with Turkey she acquired the right to construct from the Bagdad Railway a branch line to Alexandretta, together with large privileges over that port which made it practically German, and the natural outlet for Mesopotamia and North Syria, heretofore in the sphere of Great Britain and France. True, she waived conditionally her claim to push the Bagdad line to the Persian Gulf; but her recent bargain with the Tsar at Potsdam gave her the lion's share of the trade of Western Persia.
After taking these strides in the Levant, Germany ought not to have shown jealousy of French progress in Morocco, where her commerce was small. As in 1905, she was clearly using the occasion to test the validity of the Anglo-French Entente and the effectiveness of British support to France. Probably, too, she desired either a territorial acquisition in South Morocco, for which the colonial party and most of the Press were clamouring; or she intended, in lieu of it, to acquire the French Congo. At present it is not clear at which of these objects she aimed. Kiderlen-Wächter declared privately that Germany must have the Agadir district, and would never merely accept in exchange Congolese territory[533].
Whatever were the real aims of the Kaiser, they ran counter to French and British interests. Moreover, the warning of Sir Edward Grey, on July 4, that we must be consulted as to any new developments, was completely ignored; and even on July 21 the German ambassador in London could give no assurance as to the policy of his Government. Consequently, on that evening Mr. Lloyd George, during a speech at the Mansion House, apprised Germany that any attempt to treat us as a negligible factor in the Cabinet of Nations "would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." The tension must have been far more severe than appeared in the published documents to induce so peace-loving a Minister to speak in those terms. They aroused a storm of passion in the German Press; and, somewhat later, a German admiral, Stiege, declared that they would have justified an immediate declaration of war by Germany[534]. Certainly they were more menacing than is usual in diplomatic parlance; but our cavalier treatment by Germany (possibly due to Bethmann-Hollweg's belief in blunt Bismarckian ways) justified a protest, which, after all, was less questionable than Germany's despatching a cruiser to Agadir, owing to the reserve of the French Foreign Office. Up to July 27 the crisis remained acute; but on that day the German ambassador gave assurances as to a probable agreement with France.
What caused the change of front at Berlin? Probably it was due to a sharp financial crisis (an unexpected result of the political crisis), which would have produced a general crash in German finance, then in an insecure position; and prudence may have counselled the adoption of the less ambitious course, namely a friendly negotiation with the French for territorial expansion in their Congo territory in return for the recognition of their protectorate of Morocco. Such a compromise (which, as we shall see, was finally arrived at) involved no loss for Germany. On the contrary, she gained fertile districts in the tropics and left the French committed to the Morocco venture, which, at great cost to them, would tend finally to benefit commerce in general, and therefore that of Germany.
Also, before the end of these discussions there occurred two events which might well dispose the Kaiser to a compromise with France. Firstly, as a result of his negotiations with Russia (then beset by severe dearth) he secured larger railway and trading concessions in Persia, the compact of August 19 opening the door for further German enterprises in the Levant. Secondly, on September 29, Italy declared war on Turkey, partly (it is said) because recent German activity in Tripoli menaced the ascendancy which she was resolved to acquire in that land. This event greatly deranged the Kaiser's schemes. He had hoped to keep the Triple Alliance intact, and yet add to it the immense potential fighting force of Turkey and the Moslem World. Now, however he might "hedge," he could hardly avoid offending either Rome or Constantinople; and even if he succeeded, his friends would exhaust each other and be useless for the near future. Consequently, the Italo-Turkish War (with its sequel, the Balkan War of 1912) dealt him a severe blow. The Triple Alliance was at once strained nearly to breaking-point by Austria forbidding Italy to undertake naval operations in the Adriatic (probably also in the Aegean). Equally serious was the hostility of Moslems to Europeans in general which compromised the Kaiser's schemes for utilising Islam. Accordingly, for the present, his policy assumed a more peaceful guise.