William Pitt and national revival

by J. Holland Rose

Another curious change also came over the scene on the arrival of news at Berlin that Potemkin had offered to restore to the Porte all the Russian conquests of the present war, on condition of peace. This sudden adoption of the rôle of peacemaker by that ambitious and masterful favourite has never been fully explained.[867] It may have been due either to Turkish bribes or to a crafty resolve to checkmate Hertzberg’s scheme of making Turkey pay for Prussia’s gains. For how could the professed friend and ally impose on the Porte sacrifices far greater than those demanded by the enemy? The report that Leopold was disposed to accept the status quo, finding it far less objectionable than Hertzberg’s plan of exchanges, also gave food for thought. Accordingly, Frederick William, before opening negotiations with Austria, decided that this should form the general basis, but with certain modifications. The Turks were to be warned that, as Prussia’s armaments had saved them from destruction, they would now do well to conclude an armistice with Austria and hope for admission to the Triple Alliance. They should also humour their preserver by giving up Western Wallachia to Austria, so that she in her turn might cede the outer districts of Galicia to the Poles, who of course would yield to Prussia her reward for these troublesome bargainings. As for Great Britain, she was expected to favour these scientific readjustments because the trade of the Vistula would then be freed from obstacles, and be opened to her by favourable commercial treaties. Such was Hertzberg’s final plan for the preservation of the status quo.[868] In order to secure the acquiescence of the Turks, he had long kept the Porte on tenter-hooks by delaying the ratification of Dietz’s treaty, and by ordering the recall of that masterful envoy. On the other hand, the Turks were left with a glimmer of hope of eventual assistance from Berlin.

Accordingly, Prussian policy seemed about to win a brilliant triumph at the proposed Conference of Reichenbach, where the Triple Alliance and Austria (Russia having refused Britain’s mediation) were to thrash out these questions; and nothing is more curious than to watch the collapse of Hertzberg’s ingenious web. In order at the outset to settle matters separately with the Austrian envoy, Spielmann, the King of Prussia held Ewart aloof because the British Ambassador consistently warned Hertzberg against the complicated exchanges projected by him. Thereupon Ewart drew up a Memorial insisting that England must be a principal party, and that, as both Austria and Prussia had promised to admit the status quo as the basis of negotiation, the latter could not make war on the former if she consented to it. In that case, or even if he (Ewart) were excluded from the Conference, Great Britain must cancel her engagements to Prussia. He further declared his conviction that Austria would retract her extreme claims and listen to reason.[869]

This sharp protest had some effect on Hertzberg; but the chief difficulty was now with Frederick William. At the head of his splendid army, he seemed to court war. He sent a courier to the Porte to ratify Dietz’s treaty; and he cut off all communications with Austria as though hostilities had begun. At the first three sessions of the Conference (27th-29th June) the Austrian and Prussian envoys indulged in eager but vague wrangling; but the arrival of news from Constantinople that the Turks would never concede the Prussian demands sufficed to depress the bellicose ardour of the monarch. As there was a serious risk of the Porte coming to terms with Russia and Austria, he now harked back towards the status quo. This move, which the Duke of Brunswick and Möllendorf heartily supported, gathered strength when it appeared that Poland would accept none of Hertzberg’s benefits. The arrival of the British note of 2nd July to the same general effect ended the last efforts of Frederick William for Danzig and Thorn.[870] He now gave Hertzberg written orders to abandon at once the whole scheme of exchanges “since it could only serve to commit him with Great Britain as well as with the Porte and Poland.” Whence it appears that Hertzberg’s scientific and philanthropic plans fell through simply because all the States concerned utterly repudiated them.

The renunciation, however, was made not unskilfully. The Prussian and British Ministers were careful to keep secret Hertzberg’s change of front and thus prepared a surprise for Spielmann. That envoy having put forward some equally untenable schemes of aggrandisement, Ewart rose and read out a Memorial, drawn up in concert with his Prussian and Dutch colleagues, demanding an exact restitution of the old boundaries. In vain did the Hapsburg Minister seek to wriggle out of the dilemma by betraying Prussia into glaring inconsistency. Prussia stood firm; and finally he reduced his demands to Orsova and district. Even this cold comfort was denied him. The Triple Alliance was inexorable. Thereupon he demanded the dissolution of Prussia’s compacts with Turkey and Sweden, only to meet with the reply that the Austro-Russian alliance must first be annulled.[871] Thus Hertzberg, even in the hour of personal defeat, brought down the Hapsburg schemes in utter collapse; and the result of the discussions at Reichenbach was the recurrence to the status quo—the very same arrangement which Pitt and Leeds had throughout declared to be the best of all solutions.

Hertzberg’s annoyance at the destruction of his pet plans must have diminished when he heard from Vienna that Austria had secretly empowered Potemkin to make her peace with the Turks on that same basis. If this be true, each of the rivals was playing a game of bluff at Reichenbach; and the sight of the two Ancient Pistols eating the leek in turn must have filled Ewart with a joy such as falls to few diplomatists. Even as regards the Belgians, the British suggestion held good. They were to regain their ancient constitution together with an amnesty for past offences, and a guarantee by the three Allied Powers.[872] Frederick William, in complimenting Hertzberg on the end of the negotiations at Reichenbach, added that they must now assure themselves, through Ewart, of England’s support in imposing the status quo on Russia.[873] A new chapter in the relations of the Powers and in the career of Pitt lay enfolded in this suggestion.

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Shortly after this happy ending to the disputes in Central Europe came the news of a settlement of the war in the Baltic. Once again Gustavus III startled the world. After his sudden and furious attack on Catharine, and her no less fierce counter stroke, it seemed that the struggle must be mortal. But many circumstances occurred to allay their hatred. The aims of the Czarina had always trended southwards; and the war in Finland was ultimately regarded chiefly as an annoying diversion from the crusade against the Turks. Moreover the valour of the Swedes, who closed the doubtful campaign of 1790 with a decided success at sea, added to the difficulties of campaigning in Finland, left little hope of conquest in that quarter so long as the Triple Alliance kept the Danes quiet and subsidized Gustavus. Catharine was in fact fighting against the forces of nature and the resources of England, Prussia, and Holland. Gustavus, too, even in the year 1789 felt the sobering influences of poverty. In 1790 they threatened him with bankruptcy, and at that same time the outlook was far from bright in Finland. Fortunately, the Russians were not in a position to press Gustavus hard. But nothing could stave off the advent of bankruptcy unless the Allies promptly advanced a considerable sum. This they were not prepared to do, for his unceasing importunities had wearied them out. The Dutch declined to help in a matter which concerned them but little, and after long negotiations at Stockholm Great Britain and Prussia agreed on 31st July to advance £200,000, or only two-thirds of the minimum named by the King. By the month of August 1790 the treasury at Stockholm was absolutely empty, so our envoy, Liston, reported.

While Gustavus was chafing at the restraints of poverty, Catharine held out to him alluring hopes. So soon as she heard of the turn which affairs were taking at Reichenbach she resolved to end her quarrel with him in order the better to browbeat Prussia and England. Leopold had early informed her of his resolve to conclude the Turkish war, in accordance with the demands of the Allies; and he also warned her of their intention to deprive Russia of her chief conquest. With a quickness of insight and a magnanimous resolve instinct with the highest statesmanship, she resolved to end the war in the Baltic by offers which would appeal irresistibly to a knight-errant struggling with debts and worries. She therefore despatched a courier to him in Finland, holding out virtually the same terms which the Allies had guaranteed to him.

Gustavus did not long hesitate. It is true that he had the promise of seventeen British battleships, which were in the Downs ready to sail to his succour; Prussia also had already sent one half of the subsidy which he demanded; and he had pledged his troth to the Allies not to make a separate peace with Russia. That step, however, he now decided to take; and the impression afterwards prevailed at London and Berlin, that Russian money had some influence on his decision.[874] However that may be, he sent Baron Armfelt to treat for peace. Where both sides were bent on a speedy settlement, difficulties vanished; and thus on 14th August 1790, the Peace of Werela was signed. It restored the few gains of territory which the belligerents had made, and gave permission to the Swedes to buy grain in Russian ports. The treaty was remarkable chiefly for its omissions. No mention was made of previous Russo-Swedish treaties, which gave the Empire some right to interfere in Swedish affairs. As Liston pointed out, the absence of any such claim was a personal victory for Gustavus; for it increased his authority and depressed that of the Russophile nobles. The King at once asserted his prerogative by condemning to death, despite the entreaties of Liston, the ringleader of the mutiny in Finland and by incarcerating two others for life.[875] Events were to show that the faction was cowed but not wholly crushed. The bullet of Ankerström repaid the debt of vengeance stored up in September 1790.

Equally strange was the abandonment of the Turks by their headstrong ally. Gustavus had gone to war ostensibly in order to prevent their overthrow, and now he left them at the mercy of Catharine. It is true that the signature of the Reichenbach Convention three weeks earlier ended their conflict with Austria; but the indignation of the Sultan, the wrath of the King of Prussia, and the quiet contempt of Pitt manifested the general feeling of the time.[876] Gustavus had salved his conscience by requiring Catharine to accord lenient treatment to the Moslems. The Czarina was quite ready to make any promises to this effect, if they formed no part of the treaty with Sweden. She assured Gustavus of her desire to renew the Treaty of Kainardji rather than continue the war; and Gustavus decided, so he informed Liston, “to trust to the elevated and honourable character of the Empress” on this point. Liston had his doubts. He ventured to express his surprise at the generosity of the imperial promises, which implied the restoration of the Crimea to Turkey, and he remarked that the combined pressure of Great Britain and Prussia had not availed to extort so great a boon. Gustavus, however, persisted in his estimate of the character of Catharine, doubtless because she humoured his latest plan, a crusade to Paris on behalf of the French monarchy, while she further promised him the sum of 2,000,000 roubles for his immediate needs.[877] She, too, sang loudly the praises of the man whom she had sworn to ruin. The cause of this new-born enthusiasm will appear in due course.