[241] Pitt MSS., 196.
[242] "H. O.," Adm. Medit., 1793.
[243] Ibid.
[244] "F. O.," Spain, 28. St. Helens to Grenville, 4th and 11th September.
[245] "W. O.," 6 (10). See Fortescue (iv, pt. i, chs. vi, vii) for criticisms of these measures.
[246] The arguments of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson in "Owens College Essays," do not convince me that Napoleon alone devised that plan. Chuquet's conclusion ("Toulon," 176), "Bonaparte partageait l'avis des représentants," seems to me thoroughly sound. So, too, Cottin, "Toulon et les Anglais," ch. xi.
[247] "F. O.," Spain, 28.
[248] "H. O." (Adm. Medit., 1793). Nevertheless Hood sent off a small squadron to offer help to Paoli in Corsica, but with very disappointing results. On 7th October he writes: "Paoli is a composition of art and deceipt [sic]." He also dwells on the hostile conduct of Genoa and Tuscany.
[249] Martens, v, 473–83. In "H. O.," Secrs. of State, 4, is a despatch of General Acton of 30th October 1793 to Sir W. Hamilton, stating that when transports reach Naples, they will take off 1,200 more troops for Toulon, making a total of 6,300. But ships and supplies of food were wanting. The troops must be commanded by a Neapolitan, Marshal Fortiquerri, whom Hood had censured for incompetence!
[250] On 15th September Pitt wrote to the Earl of Westmorland, Viceroy of Ireland, asking him to send the flank companies (the best men) of the regiments then in Ireland. Westmorland agreed on 18th September, but said they could not sail in less than three weeks. As the crisis at Toulon deepened, Pitt, about the middle of November, begged the Lord Lieutenant to send the 35th, 41st, and 42nd regiments from Ireland to Toulon. On 20th November Westmorland agreed (though pointing out the danger of an Irish rising). On the 30th he said the two latter regiments were ready to sail from Cork whenever the transports should arrive; but the delays in the arrival and sailing of transports had always been serious—a prophetic remark (Pitt MSS., 331).