[310] P. 285.
[311] Bk. ii. ch. 10. p. 293.
[312] Bk. ii. ch. 11.
[313] P. 300 ff.
[314] Bk. ii. ch. 12. 302 ff.
[315] Bk. ii. ch. 13.
[316] Cf. also infra, p. 199 ff.
[317] De Imm. bk. i. ch. 10. pp. 235–8; cf. Infinito, 312 f., 316. Bruno does not use the term “principle of sufficient reason”: his principle is the inverse of that of Leibniz—“whatever has not a sufficient reason for existing is necessarily non-existent,”—Bruno’s being that “whatever has not a sufficient reason for non-existence (i.e. whatever is possible) necessarily exists.”
[318] De Imm. bk. i. ch. 11. p. 239; Infin. 314 f.
[319] De Imm. bk. i. ch. 11. p. 241.