Accusatory Action: The two items of legislation involved here—one a joint resolution, the other a concurrent resolution—extended the statute of limitations as it affected “the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civilian, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941”[550] and created a joint congressional committee to make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.[551]
Intelligence: The obvious example here is the statute setting up the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. Its Director was intrusted with responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and for operating an American intelligence network.[552]
Protecting Freedom of Communication
It would be distorting the picture not to take into account those instances in which Congress displayed concern lest the control programs it enacted would constrict freedom of communication. Thus while the Price administrator had the power to require licenses of anybody selling commodities regulated by his office, his power did not extend to various media of communication. The selling or distributing of newspapers, periodicals, books or printed or written material, motion pictures or radio time were exempted from the license requirement.[553] The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 permits any member of the Armed Forces to communicate directly or indirectly with any Member of Congress. The statute expressly forbids any one from restricting or preventing a serviceman from writing to his Congressman or Senator. The only limitation placed on such communication is that the subject matter does not violate the law or the regulations necessary to the security and safety of the United States.[554]
Chapter VIII
LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINTS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
It is generally conceded that the problem of the responsibility of administrative officials in a democracy is the very crux of the problem of the maintenance of the democratic system,[555] and that we must look chiefly to the Congress for performance of the task of happily combining administrative responsibility with the administrative discretion so vital to the maintenance of the democratic government in time of peace or war. Members and critics of the federal legislature, particularly since the 77th or first wartime Congress (1941-1942), have acknowledged and responded to the need to equip it more effectively to formulate basic policy as well as to scrutinize administrative execution of the legislative mandate.[556] As appraised by these critics the problem is one of adequately and accurately informing the Congress,[557] of concentrating congressional checks upon essentials rather than trivia,[558] and, in contradiction of those who seek an unchecked executive discretion in time of emergency, of “including closer, stronger, steadier cooperation between the President and the Congress.”[559]
Among recent innovations which may be viewed as the product of this movement to perfect administrative accountability to Congress are the requirements of executive reporting to the Legislative Branch and the “legislative veto.” Whether statutes embodying these devices provide Congress with a check on the Executive Branch in excess of that deemed essential, and in effect, accord to the Legislative Branch an actual participation in the administration of the laws is the major issue to which this chapter is devoted.
Accounting to Committees
In the course of signing H. R. 6042, a defense appropriations bill, on July 15, 1955, President Eisenhower rebuked Congress for including therein Section 638 requiring the Secretary of Defense to secure prior consent of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees before separating from his Department functions which he thinks could better be performed by private industry. The President alleged that the Congress has no right to confer upon its committees the power to veto Executive action or to prevent Executive action from becoming effective. Invoking the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, he declared his intention to ignore this provision.[560]
While the bill which President Eisenhower reluctantly signed represented an effort to delegate a share in the executive function to committees of the Congress, such legislative action is not wholly without precedent. A survey of legislation in the fields of foreign affairs and economic or military emergency since 1933 indicates not infrequent attempts by Congress to secure for its committees some measure of continuing influence over the exercise of powers delegated to the executive. This may take the form of requiring periodic or special reports to policy committees instead of the full houses, it may take the form of compulsory consultation with committees—and whatever this entails by way of consequent committee influence on administrative action, or the committee may be secured a suspensive, enabling, or veto power over administrative action. It would be rash to construct, on the basis of our study, a judgment of the potential good or evil attending the increasing effort of Congress to share the detailed burdens of administration. The trend, it seems clear, exists, however.