A considerable amount of evidence was presented concerning the effect of the strike on the national defense program. The District Court found that certain steel products needed in connection with some aspects of the defense program were unavailable because of the steel strike.
Particular stress was put on the impact of the tie-up on the output of missiles, nuclear submarines and advanced types of rocket engines. The Defense Department reported that two plants supplying component’s for the Polaris missile had been forced to stop production for lack of alloy steel and four others had given notice of the need to do the same within a few days.[809] Moreover, the top priority Project Mercury, an essential part of the nation’s space program was being injured. Exported steel products, vital to the support of the nation’s overseas bases, for NATO, and similar collective security groups would be cut off; continuance of the strike would impair these programs, thus imperiling the national safety.
On these facts, the District Court made the conclusory finding that the strike imperiled the national health and safety and issued an injunction. The court rejected the union’s argument that the statute is unconstitutional because it authorizes the court to issue an injunction which does not enforce a pre-existing legal obligation, but merely creates such an obligation. The court did not pass on the union’s further argument that it should, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, refuse to issue an injunction in this case.
The union promptly filed an appeal and moved the District Court for a brief stay to enable the Union to apply to Judge Staley of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for a stay pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Chief Judge Biggs, writing for the majority, analyzed and rejected the union’s contention that there was no “case or controversy” before the federal court which it could adjudicate in the sense required by the Constitution. Turning to the critical findings of the District Court dealing with the impact of the steel strike, the majority concluded, after a detailed review of the entire record, that the findings of the lower court were not clearly erroneous. Significantly, the majority noted that:
“We cannot accept the Union’s argument in this respect. If our conclusion is correct that there is sufficient evidence in the record of the present or future danger to national health or safety, we conclude that the danger is great enough and calls for a remedy as sweeping as the law will permit. Whether the remedy provided by the Labor-Management Relations Act is sufficient to accomplish a cessation of labor strife is a question not for this court but for Congress. We conclude, therefore, that the court below did not abuse its discretion in granting the relief which the United States prayed for.”[810]
The Supreme Court acted with unusual speed. The Court set Tuesday, November 3, 1959 at 11 a.m. as the time for oral argument. All briefs had to be on file by noon, Monday, November 2, 1959. The injunction issued by the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on October 21, 1959 as modified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on October 22, 1959, was stayed pending the issuance of the judgment of Supreme Court. The petition for certiorari, was filed by the union counsel at 1 p.m. The Government’s response, asking the court to deny review and thus let the injunction stand, arrived about 4 p.m.
Half an hour later the nine Justices met in conference, the session lasting 40 minutes. Reporters learned of the unscheduled meeting from the ringing of gongs that call the Justices to all formal conferences. Out of the session came an order in the case entitled United Steel Workers of America, Petitioner v. United States, et al.[811]
The Supreme Court’s opinion was brief. In the Per Curiam Opinion, the Court stated its acceptance of, and concurrence in, the findings of the lower Federal Courts which had adjudicated the case:
“... Petitioner here contests the findings that the continuation of the strike would imperil the national health and safety. The parties dispute the meaning of the statutory term ‘national health’; the Government insists that the term comprehends the country’s general well-being, its economic health; petitioner urges that simply the physical health of the citizenry is meant. We need not resolve this question, for we think the judgment ... is amply supported on the ground that the strike imperils the national safety. Here we rely upon the evidence of the strike’s effect on specific defense projects; we need not pass on the Government’s contention that ‘national safety’ in this context should be given a broader construction and application.