[42] Here, citing Friedrich, he observes “there might well have been no crisis in 1933 if President Roosevelt had been required to appoint another to wield the abnormal display of power which he seemed to find so necessary at the moment.” Id., at 303. But since he later specifically advocates retention of what he describes as “the inherent emergency power of the President” (p. 308), why hobble it by discouraging a presidential finding of the existence of an emergency? Cf. Grier, J., in Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, 669-71 (1862), holding that war (emergency) may commence when the Chief Executive takes up a proferred challenge.
[43] Rossiter, op. cit., pp. 298-306.
[44] Id., at 310-11.
[45] Id., at 309.
[46] The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951), p. 1, see p. 19 infra.
Contemporary Theories in the Light of Recent Experience.
[47] Op. cit., p. 573.
[48] Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1940), p. 180.
[49] Id., at 246.
[50] Id., at 1.