Makers of Japan

by J. Morris

The men to be supplied had to be between the ages of 15 and 45, and served for five years, with liberty to renew their engagement if they so chose.

Each regiment of heavy infantry—6 in all—was composed of 2 battalions, each of which contained 10 sections of 40 men. Then the guard for the Shogun’s castle gates (there were 13 gates in all) was made up of 40 men at each—520 in all. Thus the total of the heavy infantry force was 5320 men.

The light infantry was to protect artillery and convoys, and consisted of 4 battalions, each with 8 sections of 32 men in each. The bodyguard or rifle brigade,—the first to carry modern rifles—numbered 890 men. The heavy cavalry had swords and carbines, and numbered 888 men. The light cavalry carried lances, and were only 192 in number.

The artillery had 6-pounder guns, and 12-in. howitzers,—8 guns to a battery, the men numbering in all 384.

The heavy field artillery (416) men had 12-pounder guns and 15-in. howitzers, and there was half a battery at each gate,—6½ batteries altogether. In the coast defences, including the forts at Shinagawa, Yedo, there were some 2000 artillerymen.

In the staff of the army were 1406 men, many being junior officers, chosen for training for military duties under the eyes of staff officers.

The total effective force of the Shogunate was thus supposed to be about 13,500 men. In reality it did not muster more than 7700 men and 64 officers when the “standing army” was called on to support the waning fortunes of the Shogunate in 1867.

At the time that this nucleus of the modern Japanese army was formed the intrusion, as it was deemed, of foreigners was bitterly resented by the party of exclusion, which had its centre in the Court of Kioto; the Shogun, on the other hand, day by day became more convinced of the futility of such efforts as Japan could make in opposition to the fulfilment of the treaties. There remained to be considered the probable attitude of the great feudatories, who were almost independent of the Shogun though nominally his subordinates, and by whom it was to be anticipated, in not a few instances, that the occasion would be seized for divesting themselves of a yoke which had begun to be burdensome. This factor in the problem was at all events one which no one could with safety ignore. Affairs were further complicated by the circumstance that in 1860, when the discussion was at its height, the two strong chieftains of the south, Mori of Choshiu and Shimadzu of Satsuma, were at variance, and as a result when Mori advocated the out-and-out adoption of a policy of expulsion his powerful opponent in the extreme south of Kiushiu preferred to see an understanding arrived at between the Imperial party and the adherents of the Bakufu, which was responsible for the signature of the treaties with foreign powers. At this time the Shogun Iyemochi was but a youth and politically he was unable to render more than the minimum of service to his party, but it was hoped that a fusion of interests might be brought about by a marriage between his Highness and a sister of the reigning Emperor, which took place in the autumn of 1860. But the scheme conspicuously failed to bring the rival factions into line, and instead of presenting a united front against the “barbarians” the clan enmities and jealousies continued to thrive and in the views entertained on the subject of the admission of strangers there remained as complete a divergence as ever. And not only was there this conflict of opinion prevailing between two well-defined parties in the State but the Shogun’s side grew to be a house divided against itself, for dissensions arose within the Mito clan, thereunto the strongest pillar of the Tokugawa regime, and one of the branches of that family in which the office of Shogun was hereditary. One half of the Mito clan were for the expulsion of foreigners, the other half favoured the strict fulfilment of the Shogun’s bargains. Feeling on these matters at one time ran so high at Mito that the samurai of the clan fought desperately among themselves, and it is possible to trace the decline of the Shogunate’s power to this lamentable internecine strife which sapped the strength of the Tokugawa house and paved the way to its final fall. Another peril to the Shogunate was created by the antagonism of the Lord Mori of Choshiu. His uncompromising hostility to the treaties led him into a direct quarrel with the Bakufu, and he was directed to return to his own province from Kioto. His abrupt dismissal from Court was calculated to arouse the keenest antagonism to the Shogunate on the part of his followers, who carried the news to Hagi, his castle town in the west of Choshiu, and there was from that time war between the clan and the adherents of the Tokugawa house. Thus arose the anomaly that while the Choshiu clan had at that time in its ranks those very men by whose endeavours Japan was ultimately to be induced to abandon a policy of seclusion and to enter the comity of nations, their influence was insufficient to prevent, until a considerably later period, the adoption of an attitude by their feudal chief which was distinctly reactionary. And the reformers, finding themselves in a minority, were compelled to wait their time. The Choshiu men gathered in their strength and marched upon Kioto, resolved to wipe out the disgrace which they conceived attached to them through the unavenged insult to their lord, and as at that date the Choshiu troops were by far the better armed, victory would have rested with them in the battle which ensued within sound, and, indeed, within rifle shot, of the Imperial residence, but for the inadequacy of their numbers. Yamagata, Takasato, and many others who were presently to achieve distinction in their country’s cause, were engaged in this contest, and were ranged under the Jo-I banner, though their presence there as supporters of the principle of expulsion was due to their loyalty to their feudal lord, and in defence of his rights as opposed to the Shogun, rather than to any unwillingness that the country should be opened to international trade and the introduction of Western arts and sciences.

In writing of the pre-Restoration days himself, in 1887, Count Yamagata, as he was then, described the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate as that when, all foreign intercourse being limited to China and Holland, people in Japan knew little of the civilisation of other nations. “Peace,” he said, “universally reigned. The swords were kept in their sheaths, and the arrows lay untouched in their quivers. Luxury and effeminacy followed in the wake of peace. The sudden appearance of the problem of foreign intercourse in the sixth year of Ka-yei [1853] resulted in the universal cry for exclusion. The power of the Shogunate was gradually undermined by this event. It is not to be wondered at that this cry was raised on every side, for people were kept in ignorance of things outside of their own country. Their condition was that of the proverbial frog in the well.

I no naka no kawadzu