The general effect of the provisions for service was to equip Japan down to the end of 1904 with an army on a peace footing of 8000 officers and 152,000 men, which was capable of being raised on a war footing to 14,000 officers and 630,000 men, but that was before the law increasing the term of service in the Territorial Army to ten years, promulgated in September 1904, came into operation. The term had previously been five years only. The lengthening of the term will have had the result of vastly adding to the possibilities of the army in numbers on a war footing. The budget appropriation for this large army was for the fiscal year ending with March 1906 as nearly as possible £4,000,000.
It may be useful to insert here for the sake of comparison the cost of some other armies to their respective countries:—
| Russia | £38,330,000 |
| Germany | 31,674,000 |
| Great Britain | 28,600,000 |
| France | 27,000,000 |
| Austro-Hungary | 13,150,000 |
| Italy | 11,160,000 |
In Japan the service is universal and compulsory, with exemption only for physical disability. At a rough estimate 410,000 youths reach the prescribed age annually, but less than one-third of this number are selected for the maintenance of the standing army, as men of superior physique, a term which palpably is elastic enough to admit of the choice of precisely the number required from the vast assemblage of youths presenting themselves every year for enrolment.
To judge of Japan’s strength, then, by her standing army would be a huge mistake, or even to wholly estimate it from the figures given as that of her army on a war footing, as was proved by the last campaign, for there were vast numbers of men who had completed their twelve (now 17) years and four months’ service in the active army, the first reserve, and territorial army, who were still liable until they became full forty. Moreover, the territorial army and its reserves are composed of men who are as a rule in good marching condition, for they are in the majority of cases engaged in normal times in agriculture or other industries, and physically equal to any tasks they may be called on to undertake. Conscription has made of Japan the great military power that she may, with strict justice, claim to be, but owing to the light in which military service is there regarded it is never a burden on the population. On the contrary, the system is really a voluntary one, since it is every youth’s hope and ambition to be among those first chosen to enter the ranks of the active army and a source of grief to him when he is drafted into the depot corps.
It was, then, not simply with a nation possessing a powerful army but with veritably a nation in arms that Russia had to contend when the war was begun in February 1904, and no more definite, straightforward history of that mighty contest has been given to the world than the brief account of its origin, progress, and conclusion which, according to a journal published in the Far East, fell from Marshal Yamagata’s own lips not long ago. Referring to the events of the spring of 1904, he said:—
“Russian aggression in the Far East became so notorious, and took on such serious dimensions after Russia obtained the lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan that it was felt that a conflict of the interests of Japan and Russia was imminent. I considered most carefully measures to counteract this aggression, and took counsel with all my colleagues and friends. We came to the decision to forestall Russia in Korea, as the historical and geographical relations of Korea with our Empire demanded that we should have the peninsula in our power, rather than it should fall into that of Russia. To attain this object we decided to construct the Seoul-Fusan railway, and did not neglect to elaborate any other necessary measures, as circumstances required, to oppose Russia. In the meantime Russia steadily augmented her naval strength in the Far East, and by about March 1903 her naval force here was almost equal to our own. Russia failed to fulfil her promise to evacuate Manchuria, and by steadily reinforcing her army and navy her designs came to be generally acknowledged. The Japanese Government, therefore, decided to protest against these designs, and entered upon negotiations in July 1903, with a view to arriving at an arrangement diplomatically. These negotiations proved very difficult, and towards the end of November the situation became desperate. By this time we were determined that Korea should under no circumstances be left in the hands of Russia. Frankly I may say that we were not confident of defeating Russia, for she was considered to be one of the greatest powers of the world. We had some hope, however, in our navy. The naval forces of the two countries were almost equally balanced, but fortunately our navy had had experience in fighting in the past ten years, while Russia had had none. As to the strength of the army, there was great disparity, the Russians having 4,000,000 men and Japan only 500,000. There was certainly a limit in the strength of the army that could be sent by Russia’s one line of railway, but the Russian equipment in arms was in no way inferior, even if it was not superior, to that of our army, and the education of the officers was almost equal. We had, therefore, no advantage over the Russian army, with the exception, as we thought, of the skill of our troops in fighting in such hilly country as Korea and Manchuria. Thus we had very little prospect of success in land fighting, it having been altogether impossible to assure ourselves of success in the way that the lay mind is apt to think. It was a critical and anxious time when hostilities were commenced, but the army was determined, we knew, to fight to a man in defence of the Empire. On the campaign being opened, however, we were able to obtain a success far beyond that which we had hoped for. This was to be ascribed to the virtue of the Emperor and to the valour of the officers and men, and the army and navy are to be congratulated thereon.
From about the time of the great victory at Mukden a suggestion was made in Europe and America that for the sake of humanity peace should be restored, and shortly after the defeat of the Russian fleet in the battle of the Sea of Japan, President Roosevelt, acting from humanitarian motives, advised the two belligerents to make peace, with the result already known.
Some of the people appear to be strongly opposed to the terms. Each man has a right to his own opinion, and it is only natural that opinion should be divided upon so momentous a question. In deciding to conclude peace the Government carefully investigated the present financial capacity of the Empire,—the plans made for its future development,—the general political situation of the world,—as well as the fact that Russia was constantly aggressive and warlike. After full consideration the Government then came to the conclusion that if hostilities were continued any longer it would hardly be possible to obtain compensation for the vast expenditure involved, and no better result could be secured than was to be obtained by concluding peace there and then. The continuation of the war, it was thought, would require a further heavy sacrifice and the only result would be to exhaust the funds required for the promotion of works in Korea and Manchuria. Thereupon the members of the Government agreed without a dissenting voice to conclude peace without delay. There was no difference, as alleged, among the members of the Government—no ‘strong party.’ If the peace be condemned by some people, I am for my part quite willing to accept the name of being a member of the ‘weak’ party, and all the other Elder Statesmen and Cabinet Ministers will share my view.”