History for ready reference, Volume 2, El Dorado to Greaves

by J. N. Larned

Prague, to claim [and to receive] from the Emperor, who was
residing in the Bohemian capital, additional rewards for the
important services so lately rendered. The boon solicited was
nothing less than the Duchy of Mecklenburg, which was to be
taken from its legitimate princes, on the ground of their
having joined the King of Denmark, and bestowed on the
successful general. ... Hitherto the ocean had alone arrested
the progress of Wallenstein: a fleet was now to be formed,
which should enable him to give laws beyond the Belts, and
perhaps beyond the Baltic also. Every seaport in Mecklenburg
and Pomerania is ordered to be taken possession of and
fortified. ... The siege of Stralsund, which was resolved upon
early in 1628, constitutes one of the most memorable
operations of the war. Not merely because it furnishes an
additional proof of what may be effected by skill, courage and
resolution, against vastly superior forces, but because its
result influenced, in an eminent degree, some of the most
important events that followed. When Wallenstein ordered the
seaports along the coast of Pomerania to be occupied,
Stralsund, claiming its privilege as an imperial and Hanseatic
free town, refused to admit his troops. ... After a good deal
of negotiation, which only cost the people of Stralsund some
large sums of money, paid away in presents to the imperial
officers, Arnheim invested the place on the 7th of May with
8,000 men. ...
{1473}
The town ... , unable to obtain assistance from the Duke of
Pomerania, the lord superior of the province, who, however
willing, had no means of furnishing relief, placed itself
under the protection of Sweden; and Gustavus Adolphus, fully
sensible of the importance of the place, immediately
dispatched the celebrated David Leslie, at the head of 600
men, to aid in its defence. Count Brahe, with 1,000 more, soon
followed; so that when Wallenstein reached the army on the
27th of June, he found himself opposed by a garrison of
experienced soldiers, who had already retaken all the outworks
which Arnheim had captured in the first instance. ... Rain
began to fall in such torrents that the trenches were entirely
filled, and the flat moor ground, on which the army was encamped,
became completely inundated and untenable. The proud spirit of
Friedland, unused to yield, still persevered; but sickness
attacked the troops, and the Danes having landed at Jasmund,
he was obliged to march against them with the best part of his
forces; and in fact to raise the siege. ... The Danes having
effected their object, in causing the siege of Stralsund to be
raised, withdrew their troops from Jasmund, and landed them
again at Wolgast. Here, however, Wallenstein surprised, and
defeated them with great loss. ... There being on all sides a
willingness to bring the war to an end, peace was ...
concluded at Lubeck in January 1629. By this treaty the Danes
recovered, without reserve or indemnity, all their former
possessions; only pledging themselves not again to interfere
in the affairs of the Empire. ... The peace of Lubeck left
Wallenstein absolute master in Germany, and without an equal
in greatness: his spirit seemed to hover like a storm-charged
cloud over the land, crushing to the earth every hope of
liberty and successful resistance. Mansfeld and Christian of
Brunswick had disappeared from the scene; Frederick V. had
retired into obscurity. Tilly and Pappenheim, his former
rivals, now condescended to receive favours, and to solicit
pensions and rewards through the medium of his intercession.
Even Maximilian of Bavaria was second in greatness to the
all-dreaded Duke of Friedland: Europe held no uncrowned head
that was his equal in fame, and no crowned head that surpassed
him in power. ... Ferdinand, elated with success, had
neglected the opportunity, again afforded him by the peace of
Lubeck, for restoring tranquillity to the empire. ... Instead
of a general peace, Ferdinand signed the fatal Edict of
Restitution, by which the Protestants were called upon to
restore all the Catholic Church property they had sequestrated
since the religious pacification of 1555: such sequestration
being, according to the Emperor's interpretation, contrary to
the spirit of the treaty of Passau. The right of
long-established possession was here entirely overlooked; and
Ferdinand forgot, in his zeal for the church, that he was
actually setting himself up as a judge, in a case in which he
was a party also. It was farther added, that, according to the
same treaty, freedom of departure from Catholic countries, was
the only privilege which Protestants had a right to claim from
Catholic princes. This decree came like a thunder-burst over
Protestant Germany. Two archbishopricks, 12 bishopricks, and a
countless number of convents and clerical domains, which the
Protestants had confiscated, and applied to their own
purposes, were now to be surrendered. Imperial commissioners
were appointed to carry the mandate into effect, and, to
secure immediate obedience, troops were placed at the disposal
of the new officials. Wherever these functionaries appeared,
the Protestant service was instantly suspended; the churches
deprived of their bells; altars and pulpits pulled down; all
Protestant books, bibles and catechisms were seized; and
gibbets were erected to terrify those who might be disposed to
resist. All Protestants who refused to change their religion
were expelled from Augsburg: summary proceedings of the same
kind were resorted to in other places. Armed with absolute
power, the commissioners soon proceeded from reclaiming the
property of the church to seize that of individuals. The
estates of all persons who had served under Mansfeld, Baden,
Christian of Brunswick; of all who had aided Frederick V., or
rendered themselves obnoxious to the Emperor, were seized and
confiscated. ... The Duke of Friedland, who now ruled with
dictatorial sway over Germany, had been ordered to carry the
Edict of Restitution into effect, in all the countries
occupied by his troops. The task, if we believe historians,
was executed with unbending rigour."
J. Mitchell,
Life of Wallenstein,
chapters 2-3.
ALSO IN:
L. Häusser,
The Period of the Reformation,
1517 to 1648, chapter 33.
GERMANY: A. D. 1627-1631.
War of the Emperor and Spain with France, over the succession
to the duchy of Mantua.
See ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631.
GERMANY: A. D. 1630.
The Thirty Years War:
Universal hostility to Wallenstein.
His dismissal by the Emperor.
The rising of a new champion of Protestantism in Sweden.
"Wallenstein had ever shown great toleration in his own
domains; but it is not to be denied that ... he aided to carry
out the edict [of Restitution] in the most barbarous and
relentless manner. It would be as tedious as painful to dwell
upon all the cruelties which were committed, and the
oppression that was exercised, by the imperial commissioners;
but a spirit of resistance was aroused in the hearts of the
German people, which only waited for opportunity to display
itself. Nor was it alone against the emperor that wrath and
indignation was excited. Wallenstein drew down upon his head
even more dangerous enmity than that which sprung up against
Ferdinand. He ruled in Germany with almost despotic sway; for
the emperor himself seemed at this time little more than a
tool in his hands. His manners were unpopular, stern,
reserved, and gloomy. . . . Princes were kept waiting in his
ante-chamber; and all petitions and remonstrances against his
stern decrees were treated with the mortifying scorn which
adds insult to injury. The magnificence of his train, the
splendor of his household, the luxury and profusion that
spread every where around him, afforded continual sources of
envy and jealous hate to the ancient nobility of the empire.
The Protestants throughout the land were his avowed and
implacable enemies; and the Roman Catholic princes viewed him
with fear and suspicion. Maximilian of Bavaria, whose star had
waned under the growing luster of Wallenstein's renown, who
had lost that authority in the empire which he knew to be due
to his services and his genius, solely by the rise and
influence of Wallenstein, and whose ambitious designs of
ruling Germany through an emperor dependent upon him for
power, had been frustrated entirely by the genius which placed
the imperial throne upon a firm and independent basis, took no
pains to conceal his hostility to the Duke of Friedland. ...
{1474}
Though the soldiery still generally loved him, their officers
hated the hand that put a limit to the oppression by which
they throve, and would fain have resisted its power. ... While
these feelings were gathering strength in Germany; while
Wallenstein, with no friends, though many supporters, saw
himself an object of jealousy or hatred to the leaders of
every party throughout the empire; and while the suppressed
but cherished indignation of all Protestant Germany was
preparing for the emperor a dreadful day of reckoning, events
were taking place in other countries which hurried on rapidly
the dangers that Wallenstein had foreseen. In France, a weak
king, and a powerful, politic, and relentless minister,
appeared in undissembled hostility to the house of Austria;
and the famous Cardinal de Richelieu busied himself,
successfully, to raise up enemies to the German branch of that
family. ... In Poland, Sigismund, after vainly contending with
Gustavus Adolphus, and receiving an inefficient aid from
Germany, was anxious to conclude the disastrous war with
Sweden. Richelieu interfered; Oxenstiern negotiated on the
part of Gustavus; and a truce of six years was concluded in
August, 1629, by which the veteran and victorious Swedish
troops were set free to act in any other direction. A great
part of Livonia was virtually ceded to Gustavus, together with
the towns and territories of Memel, Braunsberg and Elbingen,
and the strong fortress of Pillau. At the same time, Richelieu
impressed upon the mind of Gustavus the honor, the advantage,
and the necessity of reducing the immense power of the
emperor, and delivering the Protestant states of Germany from
the oppression under which they groaned. ... Confident in his
own powers of mind and warlike skill, supported by the love
and admiration of his people, relying on the valor and
discipline of' his troops, and foreseeing all the mighty
combinations which were certain to take place in his favor,
Gustavus hesitated but little. He consulted with his
ministers, indeed heard and answered every objection that
could be raised; and then applied to the Senate at Stockholm
to insure that his plans were approved, and that his efforts
would be seconded by his people. His enterprise met with the
most enthusiastic approbation; and then succeeded all the
bustle of active preparation. ... While this storm was
gathering in the North, while the towns of Sweden were
bristling with arms, and her ports filled with ships,
Ferdinand was driven or persuaded to an act the most fatal to
himself, and the most favorable to the King of Sweden. A Diet
was summoned to meet at Ratisbon early in the year 1630; and
the chief object of the emperor in taking a step so dangerous
to the power he had really acquired, and to the projects so
boldly put forth in his name, seems to have been to cause his
son to be elected King of the Romans. ... The name of the
archduke, King of Hungary, is proposed to the Diet for
election as King of the Romans, and a scene of indescribable
confusion and murmuring takes place: A voice demands that,
before any such election is considered, the complaints of the
people of Germany against the imperial armies shall be heard;
and then a perfect storm of accusations pours down. Every sort
of tyranny and oppression, every sort of cruelty and exaction,
every sort of licentiousness and vice is attributed to the
emperor's troops; but the hatred and the charges all
concentrate themselves upon the head of the great commander of
the imperial forces; and there is a shout for his instant
dismissal. ... Ferdinand hesitated, and affected much surprise
at the charges brought against his general and his armies. He
yielded in the end, however; and it is said, upon very good
authority, that his ruinous decision was brought about by the
arts of the same skillful politician who had conjured up the
storm which now menaced the empire from the north. Richelieu
had sent an embassador to Ratisbon. ... In the train of the
embassador came the well-known intriguing friar, Father
Joseph, the most unscrupulous and cunning of the cardinal's
emissaries; and he, we are assured, found means to persuade
the emperor that, by yielding to the demand of the electors
and removing Wallenstein for a time, he might obtain the
election of the King of Hungary, and then reinstate the Duke
of Friedland in his command as soon as popular anger had
subsided. However that might be, Ferdinand, as I have said,
yielded, openly expressing his regret at the step he was about
to take, and the apprehensions which he entertained for the
consequences. Count Questenberg and another nobleman, who had
been long on intimate terms with Wallenstein, were sent to the
camp to notify to him his removal from command, and to soften
the disgrace by assuring him of the emperor's gratitude and
affection."
G. P. R. James,
Dark Scenes of History: Wallenstein,
chapters 3-4.
ALSO IN:
S. R. Gardiner,
The Thirty Years' War,
chapter 7, section 3.
A. Gindely,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
volume 2, chapter 1.
GERMANY: A. D. 1630-1631.
The Thirty Years War:
The Coming of Gustavus Adolphus.
His occupation of Pomerania and Brandenburg.
The horrible fate of Magdeburg at the hands of Tilly's
ruffians.
"On June 24, 1630, one hundred years, to a day, after the
Augsburg Confession was promulgated, Gustavus Adolphus landed
on the coast of Pomerania, near the mouth of the river Peene,
with 13,000 men, veteran troops, whose rigid discipline was
sustained by their piety, and who were simple-minded, noble,
and glowing with the spirit of the battle. He had reasons
enough for declaring war against Ferdinand, even if 10,000 of
Wallenstein's troops had not been sent to aid Sigismund
against him. But the controlling motive, in his own mind, was
to succor the imperiled cause of religious freedom in Germany.
Coming as the protector of the evangelic Church, he expected
to be joined by the Protestant princes. But he was
disappointed. Only the trampled and tortured people of North
Germany, who in their despair were ready for revolts and
conspiracies of their own, welcomed him as their deliverer
from the bandits of Wallenstein and the League. Gustavus
Adolphus appeared before Stettin, and by threats compelled the
old duke, Bogislaw XIV., to open to him his capital city, He
then took measures to secure possession of Pomerania. His army
grew rapidly, while that of the emperor was widely dispersed,
so that he now advanced into Brandenburg. George William, the
elector, was a weak prince, though a Protestant, and a brother
of the Queen of Sweden; he was guided by his Catholic
chancellor, Schwarzenberg, and had painfully striven to keep
neutral throughout the war, neither side, however, respecting
his neutrality.
{1475}
In dread of the plans of Gustavus Adolphus concerning
Pomerania and Prussia, he held aloof from him. Meanwhile
Tilly, general-in-chief of the troops of the emperor and the
League, drew near, but suddenly turned aside to New
Brandenburg, in the Mecklenburg territory, now occupied by the
Swedes, captured it after three assaults, and put the garrison
to the sword (1631). He then laid siege to Magdeburg. Gustavus
Adolphus took Frankfort-on-the-Oder, where there was an
imperial garrison, and treated it, in retaliation, with the
same severity. Thence, in the spring of 1631, he set out for
Berlin. ... In Potsdam he heard of the fall of Magdeburg. He
then marched with flying banners into Berlin, and compelled
the elector to become his ally. Magdeburg was the strong
refuge of Protestantism, and the most important trading centre
in North Germany. It had resisted the Augsburg Interim of
1548, and now resisted the Edict of Restitution, rejected the
newly appointed prince bishop, Leopold William, son of the
emperor himself, and refused to receive the emperor's
garrison. The city was therefore banned by the emperor, and
was besieged for many weeks by Pappenheim, a general of the
League, who was then reinforced by Tilly himself with his
army. Gustavus Adolphus was unable to make an advance, in view
of the equivocal attitude of the two great Protestant electors,
without exposing his rear to garrisoned fortresses. From
Brandenburg as well as Saxony he asked in vain for help to
save the Protestant city. Thus Magdeburg fell, May 10, 1631.
The citizens were deceived by a pretended withdrawal of the
enemy. But suddenly, at early dawn, the badly guarded
fortifications were stormed."
C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
chapter 18, sections 3-4.
Two gates of the city having been opened by the storming
party, "Tilly marched in with part of his infantry.
Immediately occupying the principal streets, he drove the
citizens with pointed cannon into their dwellings, there to
await their destiny. They were not long held in suspense; a
word from Tilly decided the fate of Magdeburg. Even a more
humane general would in vain have recommended mercy to such
soldiers; but Tilly never made the attempt. Left by their
general's silence masters of the lives of all the citizens,
the soldiery broke into the houses to satiate their most
brutal appetites. The prayers of innocence excited some
compassion in the hearts of the Germans, but none in the rude
breasts of Pappenheim's Walloons. Scarcely had the savage
cruelty commenced, when the other gates were thrown open, and
the cavalry, with the fearful hordes of the Croats, poured in
upon the devoted inhabitants. Here commenced a scene of
horrors for which history has no language--poetry no pencil.
Neither innocent childhood, nor helpless old age; neither
youth, sex, rank, nor beauty, could disarm the fury of the
conquerors. Wives were abused in the arms of their husbands,
daughters at the feet of their parents; and the defenceless
sex exposed to the double sacrifice of virtue and life. No
situation, however obscure, or however sacred, escaped the
rapacity of the enemy. In a single church fifty-three women
were found beheaded. The Croats amused themselves with
throwing children into the flames; Pappenheim's Walloons with
stabbing infants at the mother's breast. Some officers of the
League, horror-struck at this dreadful scene, ventured to
remind Tilly that he had it in his power to stop the carnage.
'Return in an hour,' was his answer; 'I will see what I can
do; the soldier must have some reward for his danger and
toils.' These horrors lasted with unabated fury, till at last
the smoke and flames proved a check to the plunderers. To
augment the confusion and to divert the resistance of the
inhabitants, the Imperialists had, in the commencement of the
assault, fired the town in several places. The wind rising
rapidly, spread the flames, till the blaze became universal.
Fearful, indeed, was the tumult amid clouds of smoke, heaps of
dead bodies, the clash of swords, the crash of falling ruins,
and streams of blood. The atmosphere glowed; and the
intolerable heat forced at last even the murderers to take
refuge in their camp. In less than twelve hours, this strong,
populous, and flourishing city, one of the finest in Germany,
was reduced to ashes, with the exception of two churches and a
few houses. ... The avarice of the officers had saved 400 of
the richest citizens, in the hope of extorting from them an
exorbitant ransom. But this humanity was confined to the
officers of the League, whom the ruthless barbarity of the
Imperialists caused to be regarded as guardian angels.
Scarcely had the fury of the flames abated, when the
Imperialists returned to renew the pillage amid the ruins and
ashes of the town. Many were suffocated by the smoke; many
found rich booty in the cellars, where the citizens had
concealed their more valuable effects. On the 13th of May,
Tilly himself appeared in the town, after the streets had been
cleared of ashes and dead bodies. Horrible and revolting to
humanity was the scene that presented itself. The living
crawling from under the dead, children wandering about with
heart-rending cries, calling for their parents; and infants
still sucking the breasts of their lifeless mothers. More than
6,000 bodies were thrown into the Elbe to clear the streets; a
much greater number had been consumed by the flames. The whole
number of the slain was reckoned at not less than 30,000. The
entrance of the general, which took place on the 14th, put a
stop to the plunder, and saved the few who had hitherto
contrived to escape. About a thousand people were taken out of
the cathedral, where they had remained three days and two
nights, without food, and in momentary fear of death."
F. Schiller,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
book 2.
ALSO IN:
Sir E. Cust,
Lives of the Warriors of the
Thirty Years' War, part 1.
GERMANY: A. D. 1631 (January).
The Thirty Years War:
The Treaty of Bärwalde between Gustavus Adolphus and the king
of France.
"On the 13th of January, 1631, the Treaty of Barwalde was
concluded between France and Sweden. Hard cash had been the
principal subject of the negotiation, and Louis XIII. had
agreed to pay Gustavus a lump sum of $120,000 in consideration
of his recent expenditure,--a further sum of $400,000 a year
for six years to come. Until that time, or until a general
peace, if such should supervene earlier, Sweden was to keep in
the field an army of 30,000 foot and 6, 000 horse. The object
of the alliance was declared to be 'the protection of their
common friends, the security of the Baltic, the freedom of
commerce, the restitution of the oppressed members of the
Empire, the destruction of the newly erected fortresses in the
Baltic, the North Sea, and in the Grisons territory, so that
all should be left in the state in which it was before the
German war had begun.'
{1476}
Sweden was not to 'violate the Imperial constitution' where
she conquered; she was to leave the Catholic religion
undisturbed in all districts where she found it existing. She
was to observe towards Bavaria and the League--the spoilt
darlings of Richelieu's anti-Austrian policy--friendship or
neutrality, so far as they would observe it towards her. If,
at the end of six years, the objects were not accomplished,
the treaty was to be renewed."
C. R. L. Fletcher,
Gustavus Adolphus and the Struggle
of Protestantism for Existence,
chapter 9.
GERMANY: A. D. 1631.
The Thirty Years War:
The elector of Brandenburg brought to terms by the king of
Sweden.
The elector of Saxony frightened into line.
Defeat of Tilly at Leipsig (Breitenfeld).
Effects of the great victory.
"Loud were the cries against Gustavus for not having relieved
Magdeburg. To answer them he felt himself bound to publish a
careful apology. In this document he declared, among other
things, that if he could have obtained from the Elector of
Brandenburg the passage of Küstrin he might not only have
raised the siege of Magdeburg but have destroyed the whole of
the Imperial army. The passage, however, had been denied him;
and though the preservation of Magdeburg so much concerned the
Elector of Saxony, he could obtain from him a passage toward
it neither by Wittemberg, nor the Bridge of Dessau, nor such
assistance in provision and shipping as was necessary for the
success of the enterprise. ... Something more than mere
persuasion had induced the Elector of Brandenburg, after the
capture of Francfort, to grant Gustavus possession of Spandau
for a month. The month expired on the 8th of June; and the
elector demanded back his stronghold. The king, fettered by
his promise, surrendered it; but the next day, having marched
to Berlin and pointed his guns against the palace, the ladies
came forth as mediators, and the elector consented both to
surrender Spandau again and to pay, for the maintenance of the
Swedish troops, a monthly subsidy of 30,000 rix-dollars. At
the end of May Tilly removed from Magdeburg and the Elbe to
Ascherleben. This enabled the king to take Werben, on the
confluence of the Elbe and Havel, where, after the reduction
of Tangermünde and Havelberg, he established his celebrated
camp." In the latter part of July, Tilly made two attacks on
the king's camp at Werben, and was repulsed on both occasions
with heavy loss. "In the middle of August, Gustavus broke up
his camp. His force at that time, according to the
muster-rolls, amounted to 13,000 foot, and 8,850 cavalry. He
drew towards Leipsig, then threatened by Tilly, who, having
been joined at Eisleben by 15,000 men under Fürstenburg, now
possessed an army 40,000 strong to enforce the emperor's ban
against the Leipsig decrees [or resolutions of a congress of
Protestant princes which had assembled at Leipsig in February,
1631, moved to some organized common action by the Edict of
Restitution] within the limits of the electorate. The Elector
of Saxony was almost frightened out of his wits by the
impending danger. ... His grief and rage at the fall of
Magdeburg had been so great that, for two days after receiving
the news, he would admit no one into his presence. But that
dire event only added to his perplexity; he could resolve
neither upon submission, nor upon vengeance. In May, indeed,
terrified by the threats of Ferdinand, he discontinued his
levies, and disbanded a part of his troops already enlisted:
but in June he sent Arnim to Gustavus with such overtures that
the king drank his health, and seemed to have grown sanguine
in the hope of his alliance. In July, his courage still
rising, he permitted Gustavus to recruit in his dominions. In
August, his courage falling again at the approach of
Fürstenburg, he gave him and his troops a free passage through
Thuringia." But now, later in the same month, he sent word to
Gustavus Adolphus "that not only Wittemberg but the whole
electorate was open to him; that not only his son, but
himself, would serve under the king; that he would advance one
month's payment for the Swedish troops immediately, and give
security for two monthly payments more. ... Gustavus rejoiced
to find the Duke of Saxony in this temper, and, in pursuance
of a league now entered into with him, and the Elector of
Brandenburg, crossed the Elbe at Wittemberg on the 4th of
September. The Saxons, from 16,000 to 20,000 strong, moving
simultaneously from Torgau, the confederated armies met at
Düben on the Mulda, three leagues from Leipsig. At a
conference held there, it was debated whether it would be
better to protract the war or to hazard a battle. The king
took the former side, but yielded to the strong
representations of the Duke of Saxony. ... On the 6th of
September the allies came within six or eight miles of the
enemy, where they halted for the night. ... Breitenfeld, the
place at which Tilly, urged by the importunity of Pappenheim,
had chosen to offer battle, was an extensive plain, in part
recently ploughed, about a mile from Leipsig and near the
cemetery of that city. Leipsig had surrendered to Tilly two
days before. The Imperial army, estimated at 44,000 men,
occupied a rising ground on the plain. ... The army was drawn
up in one line of great depth, having the infantry in the
centre, the cavalry on the wings, according to the Spanish
order of battle, The king subdivided his army, about 20,000
strong, into centre and wings, each of which consisted of two
lines and a reserve. ... To this disposition is attributed, in
a great degree, the success of the day. ... The files being so
comparatively shallow, artillery made less havoc among them.
Then, again, the division of the army into small maniples,
with considerable intervals between each, gave space for
evolutions, and the power of throwing the troops with rapidity
wherever their services or support might be found requisite.
... The battle began at 12 o'clock." It only ended with the
setting of the sun; but long before that time the great army
of Tilly was substantially destroyed. It had scattered the
Saxons easily enough, and sent them flying, with their
worthless elector; but Gustavus and his disciplined, brave,
powerfully handled Swedes had broken and ruined the stout but
clumsy imperial lines. "It is scarcely possible to exaggerate
the importance of this success. On the event of that day, as
Gustavus himself said, the whole (Protestant) cause, 'summa
rei,' depended. The success was great in itself. The numbers
engaged on either side had been nearly equal. Not so their
loss. The Imperial loss in killed and wounded, according to
Swedish computation, was from 8,000 to 10,000; according to
the enemy's own account, between 6,000 and 7,000; while all
seem to agree that the loss on the side of the allies was only
2,700, of which 2,000 were Saxon, 700 Swedes. Besides,
Gustavus won the whole of the enemy's artillery, and more than
100 standards. Then the army of Tilly being annihilated left
him free to choose his next point of attack, almost his next
victory."
B. Chapman,
History of Gustavus Adolphus,
chapter 8.
{1477}
"The battle of Breitenfeld was an epoch in war, and it was an
epoch in history. It was an epoch in war, because first in it
was displayed on a great scale the superiority of mobility
over weight. It was an epoch in history, because it broke the
force upon which the revived Catholicism had relied for the
extension of its empire over Europe. ... 'Germany might tear
herself and be torn to pieces for yet another half-generation,
but the actual result of the Thirty-Years' War was as good as
achieved.'"
C. R. L. Fletcher,
Gustavus Adolphus and the Struggle
of Protestantism for Existence,
chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
G. B. Malleson,
The Battle-fields of Germany,
chapter 1.
GERMANY: A. D. 1631-1632.
The Thirty Years War:
Movements and plans of the Swedish king in southern Germany.
Temporary recovery of the Palatinate.
Occupation of Bavaria.
The Saxons in Bohemia.
Battle of the Lech.
Death of Tilly.
Wallenstein's recall.
Siege and relief of Nuremberg.
Battle of Lützen, and death of Gustavus Adolphus.
"This battle, sometimes called Breitenwald [Breitenfeld],
sometimes the First Battle of Leipsic, ... was the first
victory on the Protestant side that had been achieved. It was
Tilly's first defeat after thirty battles. It filled with joy
those who had hitherto been depressed and hopeless. Cities
which had dreaded to declare themselves for fear of the fate
of Magdeburg began to lift up their heads, and vacillating
princes to think that they could safely take the part which
they preferred. Gustavus knew, however, that he must let the
Germans do as much as possible for themselves, or he should
arouse their national jealousy of him as a foreign conqueror.
So he sent the Elector of Saxony to awaken the old spirit in
Bohemia. As for himself, his great counsellor, Oxenstierna,
wanted him to march straight on Vienna, but this was not his
object. He wanted primarily to deliver the northern states,
and to encourage the merchant cities, Ulm, Augsburg,
Nuremberg, which had all along been Protestant, and to deliver
the Palatinate from its oppressors. And, out of mortification,
a strange ally offered himself, namely, Wallenstein, who
wanted revenge on the Catholic League which had insisted on
his dismissal, and the Emperor who had yielded to them. ... He
said that if Gustavus would trust him, he would soon get his
old army together again, and chase Ferdinand and the Jesuits
beyond the Alps. But Gustavus did not trust him, though he sat
quiet at Prague while the Saxons were in possession of the
city, plundering everywhere, and the Elector sending off to
Dresden fifty waggon-loads filled with the treasures of the
Emperor Rudolf's museum. ... Many exiles returned, and there
was a general resumption of the Hussite form of worship.
Gustavus had marched to Erfurt, and then turned towards the
Maine, where there was a long row of those prince bishoprics
established on the frontier by the policy of
Charlemagne--Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Fulda, Köln, Triers, Mentz,
Wurms, Spiers. These had never been secularised and were
popularly called the Priests' Lane. They had given all their
forces to the Catholic League, and Gustavus meant to repay
himself upon them. He permitted no cruelties, no persecutions;
but he levied heavy contributions, and his troops made merry
with the good Rhenish wine when he kept his Christmas at
Mentz. He invited the dispossessed Elector Palatine to join
him, and Frederick started for the camp, after the christening
of his thirteenth child. ... The suite was numerous enough to
fill forty coaches, escorted by seventy horse--pretty well
for an exiled prince dependent on the bounty of Holland and
England. ... There was the utmost enthusiasm for the Swede in
England, and the Marquess of Hamilton obtained permission to
raise a body of volunteers to join the Swedish standards, and
in the August of 1631 brought 6,000 English and Scots in four
small regiments; but they proved of little use ... many dying.
... So far as the King's plans can be understood, he meant to
have formed a number of Protestant principalities, and united
them in what he called 'Corpus Evangelicorum' around the
Baltic and the Elbe, as a balance to the Austrian Roman
Catholic power in southern Germany. Frederick wanted to raise
an army of his own people and take the command, but to this
Gustavus would not consent, having probably no great
confidence in his capacity. All the Palatinate was free from
the enemy except the three fortresses of Heidelberg,
Frankenthal, and Kreuznach, and the last of these was
immediately besieged. ... In the midst of the exultation
Frederick was grieved to learn that his beautiful home at
Heidelberg had been ravaged by fire, probably by the Spanish
garrison in expectation of having to abandon it. But as Tilly
was collecting his forces again, Gustavus would not wait to
master that place or Frankenthal, and recrossed the Rhine. Sir
Harry Vane had been sent as ambassador from Charles I. to
arrange for the restoration of the Palatinate, the King
offering £10,000 a mouth for the expense of the war, and
proposing that if, as was only too probable, he should be
prevented from performing this promise, some of the fortresses
should be left as guarantees in the hands of the Swedes.
Frederick took great and petulant offence at this stipulation,
and complained, with tears in his eyes, to Vane and the
Marquess of Hamilton. ... He persuaded them to suppress this
article, though they warned him that if the treaty failed it
would be by his own fault. It did in fact fail, for, as usual,
the English money was not forthcoming, and even if it had
been, Gustavus declared that he would be no man's servant for
a few thousand pounds. Frederick also refused the King's own
stipulation, that Lutherans should enjoy equal rights with
Calvinists. Moreover, the Swedish success had been
considerably more than was desired by his French allies. ...
Louis XIII. was distressed, but Richelieu silenced him, only
attempting to make a treaty with the Swedes by which the
Elector of Bavaria and the Catholic League should be neutral
on condition of the restoration of the bishops. To this,
however, Gustavus could not fully consent, and imposed
conditions which the Catholics could not accept. Tilly was
collecting his forces and threatening Nuremberg, but the Swedes
advanced, and he was forced to retreat, so that it was as a
deliverer that, on the 31st March [1632], Gustavus was received
in beautiful old Nuremberg with a rapture of welcome. ...
{1478}
Tilly had taken post on the Lech, and Maximilian was
collecting an army in Bavaria. The object of Gustavus was now
to beat one or other of them before they could join together:
so he marched forward, took Donauwerth, and tried to take
Ingoldstadt, but found it would occupy too much time, and,
though all the generals were of a contrary opinion, resolved
to attack Tilly and force the passage of the Lech. The
Imperialists had fortified it to the utmost, but in their very
teeth the Swedes succeeded in taking advantage of a bend in
the river to play on them with their formidable artillery,
construct a pontoon bridge, and, after a desperate struggle,
effect a passage. Tilly was struck by a cannon-shot in the
knee," and died soon afterwards. "On went Gustavus to Augsburg
... where the Emperor had expelled the Lutheran pastors and
cleared the municipal council of Protestant burgomasters. In
restoring the former state of things, Gustavus took a fresh
step, making the magistrates not only swear fidelity to him as
an ally till the end of the war, but as a sovereign. This made
the Germans begin to wonder what were his ulterior views. Then
he marched on upon Bavaria, intending to bridge the Danube and
take Ratisbon, but two strong forts prevented this. ... He,
however, made his way into the country between the Inn and the
Lech, Maximilian retreating before him. ... At Munich the
inhabitants brought him their keys. As they knelt he said,
'Rise, worship God, not man.' ... To compensate the soldiers
for not plundering the city, the King gave them each a crown
on the day of their entrance. ... Catholic Germany was in
despair. There was only one general in whom there was any
hope, and that was the discarded Wallenstein. ... He made
himself be courted. He would not come to Vienna, only to Znaim
in Moravia, where he made his terms like an independent
prince. ... At last he undertook to collect an army, but
refused to take the command for more than three months. His
name was enough to bring his Friedlanders flocking to his
standard. Not only Catholics, but Protestants came, viewing
Gustavus as a foreign invader. ... Wallenstein received
subsidies not only from the Emperor, but from the Pope and the
King of Spain, towards levying and equipping them, and by the
end of the three months he had the full 40,000 all in full
order for the march. Then he resigned the command. ... He
affected to be bent only on going back to his tower and his
stars at Prague [the study of astrology being his favorite
occupation], and to yield slowly to the proposals made him. He
was to be Generalissimo, neither Emperor nor Archduke was ever
to enter his camp; he was to name all his officers, and have
absolute control. ... Moreover, he might levy contributions as
he chose, and dispose as he pleased of lands and property
taken from the enemy; Mecklenburg was to be secured to him,
together with further rewards yet unspecified; and when
Bohemia was freed from the enemy, the Emperor was to live
there, no doubt under his control. ... There was no help for
it, and Wallenstein thus became the chief power in the Empire,
in fact a dictator. The power was conferred on him in April.
The first thing he did was to turn the Saxons out of Bohemia,
which was an easy matter." At Egra, Wallenstein was joined by
the Elector of Bavaria, which raised the Catholic force to
60,000. "The whole army marched upon Nuremberg, and Gustavus,
with only 20,000 men, dashed back to its defence. Wallenstein
had intrenched himself on an eminence called Fürth." As
Nuremberg was terribly distressed, his own army suffering, and
being infected with the lawless habits of German warfare,
Gustavus found it necessary to attempt (August 24) the
storming of the Imperialists' camp. He was repulsed, after
losing 3,000 of his Swedes and thrice as many Germans. He then
returned to Bavaria, while Wallenstein, abandoning his hope of
taking Nuremberg, moved into Saxony and began ravaging the
country. The Swedish king followed him so quickly that he had,
no time to establish the fortified camp he had intended, but
was forced to take up an intrenched position at Lützen. There
he was attacked on the 6th of November, 1632, and defeated in
a desperate battle, which became one of the memorable
conflicts in history because it brought to an end the great
and splendid career of Gustavus Adolphus, the Swede. The king
fell as he was leading a charge, and the fierce fight went on
over his body until the enemy had been driven from the field.
C. M. Yonge,
Cameos from English History,
6th series, chapter 19.
ALSO IN:
G. B. Malleson,
Battle-fields of Germany,
chapters 2-3.
R. C. Trench,
Gustavus Adolphus in Germany.
J. L. Stevens,
History of Gustavus Adolphus,
chapters 15-18.
GERMANY: A. D. 1631-1641.
The Thirty Years War:
The war in Lorraine.
Possession of the duchy taken by the French.
See LORRAINE: A. D. 1624-1663.
GERMANY: A. D. 1632-1634.
The Thirty Years War:
Retirement of Wallenstein to Bohemia.
Oxenstiern in the leadership of the Protestant cause.
Union of Heilbronn.
Inaction and suspicious conduct of Wallenstein.
The Ban pronounced against him.
His assassination.
"The account of the battle [of Lützen] transmitted by
Wallenstein to the Imperial Court, led Ferdinand to think that
he had gained the day. ... But ... the reputed conqueror was
glad to shelter himself behind the mountains of the Bohemian
frontier. After the battle, Wallenstein found it necessary to
evacuate Saxony in all haste; and, leaving garrisons at
Leipsic, Plauen, Zwickau, Chemnitz, Freiberg, Meissen, and
Frauenstein, he reached Bohemia without further loss, and put
his army into winter-quarters. After his arrival at Prague, he
caused many of his officers to be executed for their conduct
at Lützen, among whom were several who belonged to families of
distinction, nor would he allow them to plead the Emperor's
pardon. A few he rewarded. The harshness of his proceedings
increased the hatred already felt for him by many of his
officers, and especially the Italian portion: of them. ...
Axel Oxenstiern, the Swedish Chancellor, succeeded, on the
death of Gustavus Adolphus, to the supreme direction of the
affairs of Sweden in Germany, and was invested by the Council
at Stockholm with full powers both to direct the army and to
negotiate with the German courts. Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar
retained the military command of the Swedish-German army,
divisions of which were cantoned from the Baltic to the
Danube.
{1479}
After driving the Imperialists from Saxony, Bernhard had
hastened into Franconia, the bishoprics of which, according to
a promise of Gustavus, were to be erected in his favour into a
duchy; but, after taking Bamberg, his assistance was invoked
by General Horn, on the Upper Danube. One of the first cares
of Oxenstiern was to consolidate the German alliance; and, in
March 1633, he summoned a meeting at Heilbronn of the States
of the four Circles of the Upper and Lower Rhine, Franconia,
and Suabia, as well as deputies from Nuremberg, Strasburg,
Frankfort, Ulm, Augsburg, and other cities of the empire. The
assembly was also attended by ambassadors from France,
England, and Holland; and on April 9th was effected the Union
of Heilbronn. Brandenburg and Saxony stood aloof; nor was
France, though she renewed the alliance with Sweden, included
in the Union. The French minister at Heilbronn assisted,
however, in the formation of the Union, although he
endeavoured to limit the power of Oxenstiern, to whom the
conduct of the war was intrusted. At the same time, the Swedes
also concluded a treaty with the Palatinate, now governed, or
rather claimed to be governed, by Louis Philip, brother of the
Elector Frederick V., as guardian and regent for the latter's
youthful son Charles Louis. The unfortunate Frederick had
expired at Mentz in his 37th year, not many days after the
death of Gustavus Adolphus. ... Swedish garrisons were to be
maintained in Frankenthal, Bacharach, Kaub, and other places;
Mannheim was to be at the disposal of the Swedes so long as
the war should last. ... After the junction of Duke Bernhard
with Horn, the Swedish army,--for so we shall continue to call
it, though composed in great part of Germans,--endeavoured to
penetrate into Bavaria; but the Imperial General Altringer,
aided by John von Werth, a commander of distinction, succeeded
in covering Munich, and enabled Maximilian to return to his
capital. The Swedish generals were also embarrassed by a
mutiny of their mercenaries, as well as by their own
misunderstandings and quarrels; and all that Duke Bernhard was
able to accomplish in the campaign of 1633, besides some
forays into Bavaria, was the capture of Ratisbon in November."
T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 4, chapter 6 (volume 2).
Wallenstein, meantime, had been doing little. "After a long
period of inaction in Bohemia, he marched during the summer of
1633, with imperial pomp and splendor, into Silesia. There he
found a mixed army of Swedes, Saxons, and Brandenburgers, with
Matthias Thurn, who began the war, among them. Wallenstein
finally shut in this army [at Steinau] so that he might have
captured it; but he let it go, and went back to Bohemia, where
he began to negotiate with Saxony for peace. Meanwhile the
alliance formed at Heilbronn had brought Maximilian of Bavaria
into great distress. Regensburg [Ratisbon], hitherto occupied by
him, and regarded as an outwork of Bavaria and Austria, had
been taken by Bernard of Weimar. But Wallenstein, whom the
emperor sent to the rescue, only went into the Upper
Palatinate, and then returned to Bohemia. He seemed to look
upon that country as a strong and commanding position from
which he could dictate peace. He carried on secret
negotiations with France, Sweden, and all the emperor's
enemies. He had, indeed, the power to do this under his
commission; but his attitude toward his master became
constantly more equivocal. The emperor was anxious to be rid
of him without making him an enemy, and wished to give to his
own son, the young King of Hungary, the command in chief. But
the danger of losing his place drove Wallenstein to bolder
schemes. At his camp at Pilsen, all his principal officers
were induced by him to unite in a written request that he
should in no case desert them--a step which seemed much like a
conspiracy. But some of the generals, as Gallas, Aldringer,
and Piccolomini, soon abandoned Wallenstein, and gave warning
to the emperor. He secretly signed a patent deposing
Wallenstein, and placed it in the hands of Piccolomini and
Gallas, January 24, 1634, but acted with the profoundest
dissimulation until he had made sure of most of the commanders
who served under him. Then, suddenly, on February 18,
Wallenstein, his brother-in-law Tertzski, Ilow, Neumann, and
Kinsky were put under the ban, and the general's possessions
were confiscated. Now, at length, Wallenstein openly revolted,
and began to treat with the Swedes for desertion to them; but
they did not fully trust him. Attended only by five Sclavonic
regiments, who remained faithful to him, he went to Eger,
where he was to meet troops of Bernard of Weimar; but before
he could join them, he and the friends named above were
assassinated, February 25, by traitors who had remained in his
intimate companionship, and whom he trusted, under the command
of Colonel Butler, an Irishman, employed by Piccolomini."
C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
chapter 18, section 10.
ALSO IN:
F. Schiller,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
book 4.
J. Mitchell,
Life of Wallenstein,
chapters 8-10.
Sir E. Cust,
Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years' War,
part 1.
GERMANY: A, D. 1634-1639.
The Thirty Years War:
Successes of the Imperialists.
Their victory at Nördlingen.
Richelieu and France become active in the war.
Duke Bernhard's conquest of Alsace.
Richelieu's appropriation of the conquest for France.
"Want of union among the Protestants prevented them from
deriving all the benefit which they had at first anticipated
from Wallenstein's death. The King of Hungary assumed the
command of the army, and by the aid of money, which was
plentifully distributed, the soldiers were, without
difficulty, kept in obedience; not the slightest attempt was
any where made to resist the Emperor's orders. On the other
hand, Bernhard of Weimar and Field-Marshal Horn were masters
of Bavaria. In July 1634, they gained a complete victory at
Landshut, over General Altringer, who was slain in the action.
... The Swedes, who had so long been victorious, were, in their
turn, destined to taste the bitterness of defeat. 15,000
Spaniards, under the Cardinal Infant, son of Philip III.,
entered Germany [see NETHERLANDS: A.D. 1621-1633, and
1635-1638], and in conjunction with the imperial army, under
the King of Hungary, laid siege to Nördlingen. Field-Marshal
Horn, and Bernhard of Weimar, hurried to the relief of the
place. Owing to the superiority of the enemy, who was besides
strongly intrenched, the Swedish commanders had no intention
to hazard a battle, before the arrival of the Rhin-graff Count
Otho, with another division of the army, which was already
close at hand; but the impetuosity of the Duke of Weimar lost
every thing.
{1480}
Horn had succeeded in carrying a hill, called the Amsberg, a
strong point, which placed him in communication with the town,
and almost secured the victory. Bernhard, thinking that so
favourable an opening should not be neglected, hurried on to
the attack of another post. It was taken and retaken; both
armies were gradually, and without method, drawn into the
combat, which, after eight hours' duration, ended in the
complete defeat of the Swedes. Horn was made prisoner; and
Bernhard escaped on a borrowed horse. ... The defeat of'
Nördlingen almost ruined the Swedish cause in Germany; the
spell of invincibility was gone, and the effects of the panic
far surpassed those which the sword had produced. Strong
fortresses were abandoned before the enemy came in sight;
provinces were evacuated, and armies, that had been deemed
almost inconquerable, deserted their chiefs, and broke into
bands of lawless robbers, who pillaged their way in every
direction. Bavaria, Suabia and Franconia were lost; and it was
only behind the Rhine that the scattered fugitives could again
be brought into something like order. ... The Emperor refused
to grant the Swedes any other terms of peace than permission
to retire from the empire. The Elector of Saxony, forgetful of
what was due to his religion, and forgetful of all that Sweden
had done for his country, concluded, at Prague, a separate
peace with the Emperor; and soon afterwards joined the
Imperialists against his former allies. The fortunes of the
Protestants would have sunk beneath this additional blow, had
not France come to their aid. Richelieu had before only
nourished the war by means of subsidies, and had, at one time,
become nearly as jealous of the Swedes as of the Austrians;
but no sooner was their power broken, than the crafty priest
took an active share in the contest."
J. Mitchell,
Life of Wallenstein,
chapter 10.
"Richelieu entered resolutely into the contest, and in 1635
displayed enormous diplomatic activity. He wished not only to
reduce Austria, but, at the same time, Spain. Spanish
soldiers, Spanish treasure, and Spanish generals made in great
part the strength of the imperial armies, and Spain besides
never ceased to ferment internal troubles in France. Richelieu
signed the treaty of Compiegne with the Swedes against
Ferdinand II. By its conditions he granted them considerable
subsidies in order that they should continue the war in
Germany. He made the treaty of St. Germain en Laye with
Bernard of Saxe Weimar, to whom he promised an annual
allowance of money as well as Alsace, provided that he should
remain in arms to wrest Franche-Comté from Philip IV. He made
the treaty of Paris with the Dutch, who were to help the King
of France to conquer Flanders, which was to be divided between
France and the United Provinces. He made the treaty of Rivoli
with the dukes of Savoy, of Parma, and of Mantua, who were to
undertake in concert with France the invasion of the
territories of Milan and to receive a portion of the spoils of
Spain. At the same time he declared war against the Spanish
Government, which had arrested and imprisoned the Elector of
Trèves, the ally of France, and refused to surrender him when
demanded. Hostilities immediately began on five different
theatres of war--in the Low Countries, on the Rhine, in
Eastern Germany, in Italy, and in Spain. The army of the
Rhine, commanded by Cardinal de la Valette, was to operate in
conjunction with the corps of Bernard of Saxe Weimar against
the Imperialists, commanded by Count Gallas. To this army
Turenne was attached. It consisted of 20,000 infantry, 5,000
cavalry, and 14 guns. This was the army upon which Richelieu
mainly relied. ... Valette was to annoy the enemy without
exposing himself, and was not to approach the Rhine; but
induced by Bernard, who had a dashing spirit and wished to
reconquer all he had lost, encouraged by the terror of the
Imperialists who raised the siege of Mayence, he determined to
pass the river. He was not long in repenting of that step. He
established his troops round Mayence and revictualled this
place, which was occupied by a Swedish garrison, throwing in
all the supplies of which the town had need. The Imperialists,
who had calculated on this imprudence, immediately took to
cutting off his supplies, so that soon everything was wanting
in the French camp. ... The scourge of famine threatened the
French: it was necessary to retreat, to recross the Rhine, to
pass the Sarre, and seek a refuge at Metz. Few retreats have
been so difficult and so sad. The army was in such a pitiable
condition that round Mayence the men had to be fed with roots
and green grapes, and the horses with branches of trees. ...
The sick and the weary were abandoned, the guns were buried,
villages were burnt to stay the pursuit of the enemy, and to
prevent the wretched soldiers who would fall out of the ranks
from taking refuge in them."
H. M. Hozier,
Turenne,
chapter 2.
"Meanwhile, Saxony had concluded with the Emperor at Pirna, at
the close of 1634, a convention which ripened into a treaty of
alliance, to which almost all the princes of Northern Germany
subscribed, at Prague, in the month of May following. The
Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg were thus changed into
enemies of Sweden. The Swedish General, Banner [or Baner],
who, at the period of the battle of Nördlingen, had been
encamped side by side with the Saxon army on the White Hill
near Prague, had, on the first indication of wavering on the

part of its Elector, managed skilfully to withdraw his troops
from the dangerous proximity. On the 22nd October 1635, he
defeated the Saxon army, at Dömitz on the Elbe, then invaded
Brandenburg, took Havelberg, and even threatened Berlin.
Compelled by the approach of a Saxon and Imperialist army to
quit his prey, he turned and beat the combined army at
Wittstock (24th September 1636). After that battle, he drew
the reinforced Imperialists, commanded by Gallas, after him
into Pomerania; there he caused them great losses by cutting
off their supplies, then forced them back into Saxony, and,
following them up closely, attacked and beat them badly at
Chemnitz (4th April, 1639)." In the south, Duke Bernhard had
gained meantime some solid successes. After his retreat from
Mayence, in 1635, he had concluded his secret treaty with
Richelieu, placing himself wholly at the service of France,
and receiving the promise of 4,000,000 francs yearly, for the
support of his army, and the ultimate sovereignty of Alsace
for himself. "Having concerted measures with La Valette
[1636], ... he invaded Lorraine, drove the enemy thence,
taking Saarburg and Pfalzburg, and then, entering Alsace, took
Saverne. His career of conquest in Alsace was checked by the
invasion of Burgundy by Gallas, with an army of 40,000 men.
{1481}
Duke Bernhard marched with all haste to Dijon, and forced
Gallas to fall back, with great loss, beyond the Saone
(November 1636). Pursuing his advantages, early the following
year he forced the passage of the Saone at Gray, despite the
vivid resistance of Prince Charles of Lorraine (June 1637),
and pursued that commander as far as Besançon. Reinforced
during the autumn, he marched towards the Upper Rhine, and,
undertaking a winter campaign, captured Lauffenburg, after a
skirmish with John of Werth; then Säckingen and Waldshut, and
laid siege to Rheinfelden. The Imperialist army, led by John
of Werth, succeeded, indeed, after a very hot encounter, in
relieving that place; but three days later Duke Bernhard
attacked and completely defeated it (21st February 1638),
taking prisoners not only John of Werth himself, but the
generals, Savelli, Enkefort, and Sperreuter. The consequences
of this victory were the fall of Rheinfelden, Rötteln,
Neuenberg, and Freiburg. Duke Bernhard then laid siege to
Breisach (July 1638). ... The Imperial general, Götz, advanced
at the head of a force considerably outnumbering that of Duke
Bernhard. Leaving a portion of his army before the place, Duke
Bernhard then drew to himself Turenne, who was lying in the
vicinity with 3,000 men, fell upon the Imperialists at
Wittenweiher (30th July), completely defeated them, and
captured their whole convoy. Another Imperialist army, led by
the Duke of Lorraine in person, shared a similar fate at
Thann, in the Sundgau, on the 4th October following. Götz, who
was hastening with a strengthened army to support the Duke of
Lorraine, attacked Duke Bernhard ten days later, but was
repulsed with great loss. Breisach capitulated on the 7th
December. Duke Bernhard took possession of it in his own name,
and foiled all the efforts of Richelieu to secure it for
France, by garrisoning it with German soldiers. To compensate
the French Cardinal Minister for Breisach, Duke Bernhard
undertook a winter campaign to drive the Imperialists from
Franche-Comté. Entering that province at the end of December,
he speedily made himself master of its richest part. He then
returned to Alsace with the resolution to cross the Rhine and
carry the war once again into Bavaria," and then, in junction
with Banner, to Vienna. "He had made all the necessary
preparations for this enterprise, had actually sent his army
across the Rhine, when he died very suddenly, not without
suspicion of poison, at Neuberg am Rhein (8th July, 1639). The
lands he had conquered he bequeathed to his brother. ... But
Richelieu paid no attention to the wishes of the dead general.
Before any of the family could interfere, he had secured all
the fortresses in Alsace, even Breisach, which was its key,
for France."
G. B. Malleson,
The Battle-fields of Germany,
chapter 5.
"During [1639] Piccolomini, at the head of the Imperialist and
Spanish troops, gave battle to the French at Diedenhofen. The
battle took place on the 7th of June, and the French were
beaten and suffered great losses."
A. Gindely,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
chapter 8.
ALSO IN:
Sir E. Cust,
Lives of the Warriors of the Thirty Years' War,
part 2.
S. R. Gardiner,
The Thirty Years' War,
chapter 9, section 5.
GERMANY: A. D. 1635-1638.
The Thirty Years War:
Campaigns in the Netherlands.
The Dutch and French against the Spaniards.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1635-1638.
GERMANY: A. D. 1636-1637.
Diet at Ratisbon.
Attempted negotiations of peace.
Death of the Emperor Ferdinand II
"An electoral diet was assembled at Ratisbon, by the emperor
in person, on the 15th of September, 1636, for the ostensible
purpose of restoring peace, for which some vague negotiations
had been opened under the mediation of the pope and the king
of Denmark, and congresses appointed at Hamburgh and Cologne;
but with the real view of procuring the election of his son
Ferdinand as king of the Romans. ... Ferdinand was elected
with only the fruitless protest of the Palatine family, and
the dissenting voice of the elector of Treves. ... The emperor
did not long survive this happy event. He died on the 15th of
February, 1637. ... Ferdinand ... seems to have been the first
who formally established the right of primogeniture in all his
hereditary territories. By his testament, dated May 10th.
1621, he ordered that all his Austrian dominions should
devolve on his eldest male descendant, and fixed the majority
at 18 years."
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 56 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1637.
Election of the Emperor Ferdinand III.
GERMANY: A. D. 1640-1645.
The Thirty Years War:
Campaigns of Baner and Torstenson.
The second Breitenfeld.
Jankowitz.
Mergentheim.
Allerheim.
War in Denmark.
Swedish army in Austria.
Saxony forced to neutrality.
"The war still went on for eight years, but the only influence
that it exerted upon the subsequent Peace was that it overcame
the last doubts of the Imperial court as to the indispensable
principles of the Peace. ... The first event of importance on
the theatre of war after Bernhard's death was Baner's attempt
to join the army of Weimar in central Germany. Not in a
condition to pass the winter in Bohemia, and threatened in
Saxony and Silesia, he ... commenced [March, 1640] a retreat
amidst fearful devastations, crossed the Elbe at Leitmeritz,
and arrived April 3rd at Zwickau. He succeeded in joining with
the mercenaries of Weimar and the troops of Lüneburg and Hesse
at Saalfeld;" but no joint action was found possible. "Until
December, the war on both sides consisted of marches hither
and thither, accompanied with horrible devastation; but
nothing decisive occurred. In September the Diet met at
Ratisbon. While wearisome attempts were being made to bend the
obstinacy of Austria, Baner resolved to compel her to yield by
a bold stroke, to invade the Upper Palatinate, to surprise
Ratisbon, and to put an end to the Diet and Emperor together.
... Not without difficulty Guebriant [commanding the French in
Alsace] was induced to follow, and to join Baner at Erfurt.
... But the surprise of Ratisbon was a failure. ... The armies
now separated again. Baner exhausted his powers of persuasion
in vain to induce Guebriant to go with him. The French went
westward. Hard pressed himself, Baner proceeded by forced
marches towards Bohemia, and by the end of March reached
Zwickau, where he met Guebriant again, and they had a sharp
conflict with the Imperialists on the Saal. There Baner died,
on the 21st of May, 1641, leaving his army in a most critical
condition, The warfare of the Swedish-French arms was come to
a standstill.
{1482}
Both armies were near dissolution, when, in November,
Torstenson, the last of the Gustavus Adolphus school of
generals, and the one who most nearly equalled the master,
appeared with the Swedish army, and by a few vigorous strokes,
which followed each other with unexampled rapidity, restored
the supremacy of its arms. ... After three months of rest,
which he mainly devoted to the reorganization and payment of
his army, by the middle of January [1642] he had advanced
towards the Elbe and the Altmark; and as the Imperial forces
were weakened by sending troops to the Rhine, he formed the
great project of proceeding through Silesia to the Austrian
hereditary dominions. On April 3rd he crossed the Elbe at
Werben, between the Imperial troops, increased his army to
20,000 men, stormed Glogau on May 4th, stood before
Schweidnitz on the 30th, and defeated Francis Albert of
Lauenburg; Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Oppeln fell into his
hands. Meanwhile Guebriant, after subduing the defiant and
mutinous spirit of his troops by means of money and promises,
had, on January 17th, defeated the Imperialists near Kempen,
not far from Crefeld [at Hulst], for which he was honoured
with the dignity of marshal. But this was a short-lived gleam
of light, and was soon followed by dark days, occasioned by
want of money and discontent in the camp. ... He had turned
eastward from the Rhine to seek quarters for his murmuring
troops in nether Germany, when Torstenson effected a decision
in Saxony. After relieving Glogau, and having in vain tried to
enter Bohemia, he had joined the detachments of Königsmark and
Wrangel, and on October 30th he appeared before Leipzig. On
November 2nd there was a battle near Breitenfeld, which ended
in a disastrous defeat of the Imperialists and Leipzig
surrendered to Torstenson three weeks afterwards. In spite of
all the advantages which Torstenson gained for himself, it
never came to a united action with the French; and the first
victory won by the French in the Netherlands, in May, 1643,
did not alter this state of things. Torstenson ... was
suddenly called to a remote scene of war in the north. King
Christian IV. of Denmark had been persuaded, by means of the
old Danish jealousy of Sweden, to take up arms for the
Emperor. He declared war just as Torstenson was proceeding to
Austria. Vienna was now saved; but so much the worse for
Denmark. In forced marches, which were justly admired,
Torstenson set out from Silesia towards Denmark at the end of
October, conducted a masterly campaign against the Danes, beat
them wherever he met with them, conquered Holstein and
Schleswig, pushed on to Jutland, then, while Wrangel and Horn
carried on the war (till the peace of Brömsebro, August,
1645), he returned and again took up the war against the
Imperialists, everywhere an unvanquished general. The
Imperialists under the incompetent Gallas intended to give
Denmark breathing-time by creating a diversion; but it did not
save Denmark, and brought another defeat upon themselves.
Gallas did not bring back more than 2,000 men from Magdeburg
to Bohemia, and they were in a very disorganized state. He was
pursued by Torstenson, while Ragoczy threatened Hungary. The
Emperor hastily collected what forces he could command, and
resolved to give battle. Torstenson had advanced as far as
Glattau in February, and on March 6th, 1645, a battle was
fought near Jankowitz, three miles from Tabor. It was the most
brilliant victory ever gained by the Swedes. The Imperial army
was cut to pieces; several of its leaders imprisoned or
killed. In a few weeks Torstenson conquered Moravia and
Austria as far as the Danube. Not far from the capital itself
he took possession of the Wolfsbrücke. As in 1618, Vienna was
in great danger." But the ill-success of the French "always
counterbalanced the Swedes' advantages. Either they were
beaten just as the Swedes were victorious, or could not turn a
victory to account. So it was during this year [1645]. The
west frontier of the empire was guarded on the imperial side
by Mercy, together with John of Werth, after he was liberated
from prison. On 26th March, Turenne crossed the Rhine, and
advanced towards Franconia. There he encamped near Mergentheim
and Rosenberg. On 5th May, a battle near Mergentheim ended
with the entire defeat of the French, and Turenne escaped with
the greatest difficulty by way of Hammelburg, towards Fulda.
The victors pushed on to the Rhine. To avenge this defeat,
Enghien was sent from Paris, and, at the beginning of July,
arrived at Spires, with 12,000 men. His forces, together with
Königsmark's, the remnant of Turenne's and the Hessians,
amounted to 30,000 men. At first Mercy dexterously avoided a
battle under unfavourable circumstances, but on August 3d the
contest was inevitable. A bloody battle was fought between
Nördlingen and Donauwörth, near Allerheim [called the battle
of Nordlingen, by the French], which was long doubtful, but,
after tremendous losses, resulted in the victory of the
French. Mercy's fall, Werth's imprudent advance, and a final
brave assault of the Hessians, decided the day. But the
victors were so weakened that they could not fully take
advantage of it. Condé was ill; and in the autumn Turenne was
compelled, not without perceptible damage to the cause, to
retreat with his army to the Neckar and the Rhine. Neither had
Torstenson been able to maintain his position in Austria. He
had been obliged to raise the siege of Brunn, and learnt at
the same time that Ragoczy had just made peace with the
Emperor. Obliged to retire to Bohemia, he found his forces
considerably diminished. Meanwhile, Kônigsmark had won an
important advantage. While Torstenson was in Austria he gained
a firm footing in Saxony. Then came the news of Allerheim, and
of the peace of Brömsebro. Except Dresden and Königstein, all
the important points were in the hands of the Swedes; so, on
the 6th of September [1645], the Elector John George concluded
a treaty of neutrality for six months. Besides money and
supplies, the Swedes received Leipzig, Torgau, and the right
of passage through the country. Meanwhile, Torstenson had
retreated into the north-east of Bohemia, and severe physical
sufferings compelled him to give up the command. He was
succeeded by Charles Gustavus Wrangel."
L. Hausser,
The Period of the Reformation,
1517 to 1648, chapter 39.
ALSO IN:
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 58 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1642-1643.
The Thirty Years War:
Condé's victory at Rocroi and campaign on the Moselle.
See FRANCE: A.D. 1642-1648, and 1643.
{1483}
GERMANY: A. D. 1643-1644.
The Thirty Years War:
Campaigns of Turenne and Condé against Merci, on the Upper
Rhine.
Dütlingen.
Freiburg.
Philipsburg.
"After the death of Bernard of Saxe Weimar, Marshal Guébriant
had been placed in command of the troops of Weimar. He had
besieged and taken Rottweil in Suabia, but had there been
killed. Rantzau, who succeeded him in command of the Weimar
army, marched (24-25 November, 1643) upon Dütlingen [or
Tuttlingen], on the Upper Rhine, was there beaten by Mercy and
made prisoner, with the loss of many officers and 7,000
soldiers. This was a great triumph for the Bavarians; a
terrible disaster for France. The whole of the German infantry
in the French service was dispersed or taken, the cavalry
retreated as they best could upon the Rhine. ... Circumstances
required active measures. Plenipotentiaries had just assembled
at Münster to begin the negotiations which ended with the
peace of Westphalia. It was desired that the French Government
should support the French diplomatist by quick successes. ...
Turenne was sent to the Rhine with reinforcements. ... He
re-established discipline, and breathed into [the army] a new
spirit. ... At the same time, by negotiations, the prisoners
who had been taken at Dütlingen were restored to France, the
gaps in the ranks were filled up, and in the spring of 1644
Turenne found himself at the head of 9,000 men, of whom 5,000
were cavalry, and was in a position to take the field." He
"pushed through the Black Forest, and near the source of the
Danube gained a success over a Bavarian detachment. For some
reason which is not clear he threw a garrison into Freiburg,
and retired across the Rhine. Had he remained near the town he
would have prevented Mercy from investing it. So soon as
Turenne was over the river, Mercy besieged Freiburg, and
although Turenne advanced to relieve the place, a stupid error
of some of his infantry made him fail, and Freiburg
capitulated to Mercy."
H. M. Hozier,
Turenne,
chapter 3 and 5.
"Affairs being in so bad a state about the Black Forest, the
Great Condé, at that time Duc d'Enghien, was brought up, with
10,000 men; thus raising the French to a number above the
enemy's. He came crowned with the immortal laurels of Rocroi;
and in virtue of his birth, as a prince of the blood-royal,
took precedence of the highest officers in the service. Merci,
a capable and daring general, aware of his inferiority, now
posted himself a short distance from Freyburg, in a position
almost inaccessible. He garnished it with felled trees and
intrenchments, mountains, woods, and marshes, which of
themselves defied attack." Turenne advocated a flank movement,
instead of a direct assault upon Merci's position; but Condé,
reckless of his soldiers' lives, persisted in leading them
against the enemy's works. "A terrible action ensued (August
3, 1644). Turenne made a long detour through a defile; Condé,
awaiting his arrival on the ground, postponed the assault till
three hours before sunset, and then ascended the steep. Merci
had the worse, and retreated to a fresh position on the Black
Mountain, where he successfully repulsed for one day Condé's
columns (August 5). In this action Gaspard Merci was killed.
Condé now adopted the flank movement, which, originally
recommended by Turenne, would have saved much bloodshed; and
Merci, hard pressed, escaped by a rapid retreat, leaving
behind him his artillery and baggage (August 9). These are the
'three days of Freyburg.' To retake the captured Freyburg after
their victory ... was the natural suggestion first heard." But
Turenne persuaded Condé that the reduction of Philipsburg was
more important. "Philipsburg was taken after a short siege;
and its fall was accompanied by the submission of the adjacent
towns of Germersheim, Speier, Worms, Mentz, Oppenheim and
Landau. Condé at this conjuncture left the Upper Rhine, and
took away his regiments with him."
T. O. Cockayne,
Life of Turenne,
pages 20-22.
ALSO IN:
G. B. Malleson,
The Battle-fields of Germany,
chapter 6.
GERMANY: A. D. 1646-1648.
The Thirty Years War:
Its final campaigns.
The sufferings of Bavaria.
Truce and peace negotiations initiated by the Elector
Maximilian.
The ending of the war at Prague.
"The retreat of the French [after the battle of Allerheim]
enabled the enemy to turn his whole force upon the Swedes in
Bohemia. Gustavus Wrangel, no unworthy successor of Banner and
Torstensohn, had, in 1646, been appointed Commander-in-chief
of the Swedish army. ... The Archduke, after reinforcing his
army ... moved against Wrangel, in the hope of being able to
overwhelm him by his superior force before Koenigsmark could
join him, or the French effect a diversion in his favour.
Wrangel, however, did not await him." He moved through Upper
Saxony and Hesse, to Weimar, where he was joined by the flying
corps of Koenigsmark. Finally, after much delay, he was joined
likewise by Turenne and the French. "The junction took place
at Giessen, and they now felt themselves strong enough to meet
the enemy. The latter had followed the Swedes into Hesse, in
order to intercept their commissariat, and to prevent their
union with Turenne. In both designs they had been
unsuccessful; and the Imperialists now saw themselves cut off
from the Maine, and exposed to great scarcity and want from
the loss of their magazines. Wrangel took advantage of their
weakness to execute a plan by which he hoped to give a new
turn to the war. ... He determined to follow the course of the
Danube, and to break into the Austrian territories through the
midst of Bavaria. ... He moved hastily, ... defeated a
Bavarian corps near Donauwerth, and passed that river, as well
as the Lech, unopposed. But by wasting his time in the
unsuccessful siege of Augsburg, he gave opportunity to the
Imperialists, not only to relieve that city, but also to
repulse him as far as Lauingen. No sooner, however, had they
turned towards Suabia, with a view to remove the war from
Bavaria, than, seizing the opportunity, he repassed the Lech,
and guarded the passage of it against the Imperialists
themselves. Bavaria now lay open and defenceless before him;
the French and Swedes quickly overran it; and the soldiery
indemnified themselves for all dangers by frightful outrages,
robberies, and extortions. The arrival of the Imperial troops,
who at last succeeded in passing the Lech at Thierhaupten,
only increased the misery of this country, which friend and
foe indiscriminately plundered. And now, for the first time
during the whole course of this war, the courage of
Maximilian, which for eight-and-twenty years had stood
unshaken amidst fearful dangers, began to waver. Ferdinand
II., his school-companion at Ingolstadt, and the friend of his
youth, was no more; and, with the death of his friend and
benefactor, the strong tie was dissolved which had linked the
Elector to the House of Austria. ...
{1484}
Accordingly, the motives which the artifices of France now put
in operation, in order to detach him from the Austrian
alliance, and to induce him to lay down his arms, were drawn
entirely from political considerations. ... The Elector of
Bavaria was unfortunately led to believe that the Spaniards
alone were disinclined to peace, and that nothing but Spanish
influence had induced the Emperor so long to resist a
cessation of hostilities. Maximilian detested the Spaniards,
and could never forgive their having opposed his application
for the Palatine Electorate. ... All doubts disappeared; and,
convinced of the necessity of this step, he thought he should
sufficiently discharge his obligations to the Emperor if he
invited him also to share in the benefit of the truce. The
deputies of the three crowns, and of Bavaria, met at Ulm, to
adjust the conditions. But it was soon evident, from the
instructions of the Austrian ambassador, that it was not the
intention of the Emperor to second the conclusion of a truce,
but if possible· to prevent it. ... The good intentions of the
Elector of Bavaria, to include the Emperor in the benefit of
the truce, having been thus rendered unavailing, he felt
himself justified in providing for his own safety. ... He
agreed to the Swedes extending their quarters in Suabia and
Franconia, and to his own being restricted to Bavaria and the
Palatinate. The conquests which he had made in Suabia were
ceded to the allies, who, on their part, restored to him what
they had taken from Bavaria. Cologne and Hesse Cassel were
also included in the truce. After the conclusion of this
treaty, upon the 14th March, 1647, the French and Swedes left
Bavaria. ... Turenne, according to agreement, marched into
Wurtemburg, where he forced the Landgrave of Darmstadt and the
Elector of Mentz to imitate the example of Bavaria, and to
embrace the neutrality. And now, at last, France seemed to
have attained the great object of its policy, that of
depriving the Emperor of the support of the League, and of his
Protestant allies. ... But ... after a brief crisis, the
fallen power of Austria rose again to a formidable strength.
The jealousy which France entertained of Sweden, prevented it
from permitting the total ruin of the Emperor, or allowing the
Swedes to obtain such a preponderance in Germany, which might
have been destructive to France herself. Accordingly, the
French minister declined to take advantage of the distresses
of Austria; and the army of Turenne, separating from that of
Wrangel, retired to the frontiers of the Netherlands. Wrangel,
indeed, after moving from Suabia into Franconia, taking
Schweinfurt, ... attempted to make his way into Bohemia, and
laid siege to Egra, the key of that kingdom. To relieve this
fortress, the Emperor, put his last army in motion, and placed
himself at its head. But ... on his arrival Egra was already
taken." Meantime the Emperor had engaged in intrigues with the
Bavarian officers and had nearly seduced the whole army of the
Elector. The latter discovered this conspiracy in time to
thwart it; but he now suddenly, on his own behalf, struck
hands with the Emperor again, and threw over his late
agreements with the Swedes and French. "He had not derived
from the truce the advantages he expected. Far from tending to
accelerate a general peace, it had a pernicious influence upon
the negociations at Munster and Osnaburg, and had made the
allies bolder in their demands." Maximilian, therefore,
renounced the truce and began hostilities anew. "This
resolution, and the assistance which he immediately despatched
to the Emperor in Bohemia, threatened materially to injure the
Swedes, and Wrangel was compelled in haste to evacuate that
kingdom. He retired through Thuringia into Westphalia and
Lunenburg, in the hope of forming a junction with the French
army under Turenne, while the Imperial and Bavarian army
followed him to the Weser, under Melander and Gronsfeld. His
ruin was inevitable if the enemy should overtake him before
his junction with Turenne; but the same consideration which
had just saved the Emperor now proved the salvation of the
Swedes. ... The Elector of Bavaria could not allow the Emperor
to obtain so decisive a preponderance as, by the sudden
alteration of affairs, might delay the chances of a general
peace. ... Now that the power of the Emperor threatened once
more to attain a dangerous superiority, Maximilian at once
ceased to pursue the Swedes. ... Melander, prevented by the
Bavarians from further pursuing Wrangel, crossed by Jena and
Erfurt into Hesse. ... In this exhausted country, his army was
oppressed by want, while Wrangel was recruiting his strength,
and remounting his cavalry in Lunenburg. Too weak to maintain
his wretched quarters against the Swedish general, when he
opened the campaign in the winter of 1648, and marched against
Hesse, he was obliged to retire with disgrace, and take refuge
on the banks of the Danube. ... Turenne received permission to
join the Swedes; and the last campaign of this eventful war
was now opened by the united armies. Driving Melander before
them along the Danube, they threw supplies into Egra, which
was besieged by the Imperialists, and defeated the Imperial
and Bavarian armies on the Danube, which ventured to oppose
them at Susmarshausen, where Melander was mortally wounded."
They then forced a passage of the Lech, at the point where
Gustavus Adolphus formerly overcame Tilly, and ravaged Bavaria
once more; while nothing but a prolonged rain-storm, which
flooded the Inn, saved Austria from a similar devastation.
Koenigsmark, with his flying corps, entered Bohemia,
penetrated to Prague and surprised and captured the lesser
side of the city (the Kleinsite), thus acquiring the
reputation of "closing the Thirty Years' War by the last
brilliant achievement. This decisive stroke, which vanquished
the Emperor's irresolution, cost the Swedes only the loss of a
single man. But the old town, the larger half of Prague, which
is divided into two parts by the Moldau, by its vigorous
resistance wearied out the efforts of the Palatine, Charles
Gustavus, the successor of Christina on the throne, who had
arrived from Sweden with fresh troops. ... The approach of
winter at last drove the besiegers into their quarters, and in
the meantime the intelligence arrived that a peace had been
signed at Munster, on the 24th October,"--the "solemn and ever
memorable and sacred treaty which is known by the name of the
Peace of Westphalia."
F. Schiller,
History of the Thirty Years' War,
book 5.
ALSO IN:
G. B. Malleson,
The Battle-fields of Germany,
chapter 7.
{1485}
GERMANY: The Thirty Years War:
Its horrors.
Its destructiveness.
The state of the country at its close.
"The materials of which the armies were composed passed
inevitably from bad to worse. This, which had been a civil war
at the first, did not continue such for long; or rather it
united presently all the dreadfulness of a civil war and a
foreign. It was not long before the hosts which trampled the
German soil had in large part ceased to be German; every
region of Europe sending of its children, and, as it would
seem, of those whom it must have been gladdest to be rid of,
to swell the ranks of the destroyers. ... From all quarters
they came trooping, not singly, but in whole battalions. ...
All armies draw after them a train of camp-followers; they are
a plague which in the very nature of things is inevitable. But
never perhaps did this evil rise to so enormous a height as
now. Toward the close of this War an Imperial army of 40,000
men was found to be attended by the ugly accompaniment of
140,000 of these. The conflict had in fact by this time lasted
so long that the soldiery had become as a distinct nation,
camping in the midst of another; and the march of an army like
the migration of some wild nomade horde, moving with wives and
children through the land. And not with these only. There were
others too in its train, as may easily be supposed. ... It is
a thought to make one shudder, the passage of one of these
armies with its foul retinue through some fair and smiling and
well-ordered region--what it found, and what it must have left
it, and what its doings there will have been. Bear in mind
that there was seldom in these armies any attempt whatever at
a regular commissariat; rations being never issued except to
the actual soldiers, and most irregularly to them; that the
soldier's pay too was almost always enormously in arrear, so
that he could not purchase even if he would. ... It was indeed
the bitterest irony of all, that this War, which claimed at the
outset to be waged for the highest religious objects, for the
glory of God and for the highest interests of His Church,
should be signalized ere long by a more shameless treading
under foot of all laws human and divine, disgraced by worse
and wickeder outrages against God, and against man, the image
of God, than probably any war which modern Christendom has
seen. The three master sins of our fallen nature, hate, lust,
and covetousness, were all rampant to the full. ... Soon it
became evident that there was no safety in almost any
remoteness from that which might be the scene of warfare at
the actual moment. When all in their immediate neighbourhood
was wasted, armed bands variously disguised, as merchants, as
gipsies, as travellers, or sometimes as women, would penetrate
far into the land. ... Nor was the condition of the larger
towns much better. ... It did not need actual siege or capture
to make them acquainted with the miseries of the time. With no
draught-cattle to bring firewood in, there was no help for it
but that abandoned houses, by degrees whole streets, and
sometimes the greater part of a town, should be pulled down to
prevent those of its inhabitants who remained from perishing
by cold, the city thus living upon and gradually consuming
itself. ... Under conditions like these, it is not wonderful
that the fields were left nearly or altogether untilled; for
who would sow what he could never hope to reap? ... What
wonder that famine, thus invited, should before long have
arrived? ... Persons were found dead in the fields with grass
in their mouths; while the tanners' and knackers' yards were
beset for the putrid carcasses of beasts; the multitudes,
fierce with hunger, hardly enduring to wait till the skin had
been stript away. The bodies of malefactors, broken on the
wheel, were secretly removed to serve for food; or men climbed
up the gibbets, and tore down the bodies which were suspended
there, and devoured them. This, indeed, was a supply which was
not likely to fail. ... Prisoners in Alsace were killed that
they might be eaten. Children were enticed from home. ...
Putting all together, it is not too much to say that the
crowning horrors of Samaria, of Jerusalem, of Saguntum, found
their parallels, and often worse than their parallels, in
Christian Germany only two centuries ago. I had thought at one
time that there were isolated examples of these horrors, one
here, one there, just enough to warrant the assertion that
such things were done; but my conviction now is that they were
very frequent indeed, and in almost every part of the land.
... Districts which had for centuries been in the occupation
of civilized men were repossessed by forests. ... When Peace
was at length proclaimed, and Germany had leisure to take an
inventory of her losses, it was not altogether impossible to
make a rude and rough estimate. ... The statistics, so far as
they were got together, tell a terrible tale. ... Of the
population it was found that three-fourths, in some parts a
far larger proportion, had perished; or, not having perished,
were not less effectually lost to their native land, having
fled to Switzerland, to Holland, and to other countries, never
to return from them again. Thus in one group of twenty
villages which had not exceptionally suffered, 85 per cent.,
or more than four-fifths of the inhabitants, had disappeared.
... Of the houses, three-fourths were destroyed. ... Careful
German writers assure us that there are districts which at
this present day [1872] have just attained the population, the
agricultural wealth, the productive powers which they had when
the War commenced."
R. C. Trench,
Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, and other
Lectures on the Thirty Years' War,
lectures 3 and 5.
See, also, BOHEMIA: A. D. 1621-1648.
GERMANY: A. D. 1648.
The Peace of Westphalia.
Cession of Alsace to France.
Separation of Switzerland from the Empire.
Loosening of the constitutional bonds of the Empire.
"The opening of the peace negotiations between the Emperor and
his enemies was ... fixed for the 25th of March, 1642, and the
cities of Münster and Osnabrück as the places of the sitting;
but neither in this year nor in the next did it take place. It
was not until the year 1644 that in the former of these
cities" were assembled the following: The Papal Nuncio and the
envoy of the Republic of Venice, acting as mediators, two
imperial ambassadors, two representatives of France, three of
Spain, and the Catholic Electors; later came also the Catholic
Princes. To Osnabrück, Sweden sent two ambassadors and France
three, while the Electors, the German Princes and the imperial
cities were represented. Questions of etiquette, which demanded
prior settlement, occupied months, and serious matters when
reached were dealt with slowly and jealously, with many
interruptions. It was not until the 24th of October, 1648,
that the articles of peace forming the two treaties of Münster
and Osnabrück, and known together as the Peace of Westphalia,
were signed by all the negotiators at Münster.
{1486}
The more important of the provisions of the two instruments
were the following "To France was secured the perpetual
possession of the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, as
also Moyenvic and Pignerol, with the right to keep a garrison
in Philipsburg, and finally Breisach, Alsace, with its ten
imperial cities, and the Sundgau. The Emperor bound himself to
gain the assent of the Archduke Ferdinand, of Tyrol and Spain,
to this last-named cession. France made good to the Archduke this
loss by the payment of 3,000,000 francs. Although it was not
expressly provided that the connection with the Empire of the
German provinces ceded to France should be dissolved, yet the
separation became, as a matter of fact, a complete one. The
Emperor did not summon the Kings of France to the Diets of the
Empire, and the latter made no demand for such summons. ... In
relation to Italy, the French treaty provided that the peace
concluded in 1631 [see ITALY: A. D. 1627-1631] should remain
in force, except the part relating to Pignerol. ['Pinerolo was
definitely put under the French overlordship.']
G. W. Kitchin,
History of France,
volume 3, page 98.
Switzerland was made independent of the German Empire; but the
Circle of Burgundy [the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté]
was still to form a part of the Empire, and after the close of
the war between France and Spain, in which the Emperor and the
Empire were to take no part, was to be included in the peace.
No aid was to be rendered to the Duke of Lorraine against
France, although the Emperor and the Empire were left free to
mediate for him a peace. Sweden received Hither Pomerania,
including the Island of Rügen, from Further Pomerania the
Island of Wollin and several cities, with their surroundings,
among which were Stettin, as also the expectancy of Further
Pomerania in case of the extinction of the house of
Brandenburg. Furthermore, it received the city of Wismar, in
Mecklenburg, and the Bishoprics of Bremen [secularized and
made a Grand Duchy] and Verden, with reservation of the rights
and immunities of the city of Bremen. Sweden was to hold all
the ceded territory as feudal tenures of the Empire, and be
represented for them in the Imperial Diet. ... Brandenburg
received for its loss of Pomerania the Bishoprics of
Halberstadt, Minden, and Camin, and the expectancy of that of
Magdeburg as soon as this should become vacant by the death of
its Administrator, the Saxon Prince, although the four
bailiwicks separated from it were to remain with Saxony as
provided in the Peace of Prague. ... The house of
Brunswick-Lüneberg was to renounce its right to the
coadjutorship of Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, and
Ratzeburg, and, in return for this renunciation, was to
alternate with a Catholic prelate in the possession of the
Bishopric of Osnabrück. ... To Duke Maximilian of Bavaria was
conveyed the Electorate, together with the Upper Palatinate,
to be hereditary in his family of the line of William, for
which he, on the other hand, was to surrender to the Emperor
the account of the 13,000,000 florins which he had made for
the execution of the sentence against the Palsgrave Frederic.
To the Palsgrave, Charles Lewis, son of the proscribed Elector
[Frederic, who had died in 1632], was given back the Lower
Palatinate, while a new Electorate, the eighth, was created
for him. ... There were numerous provisions relating to the
restoration of the Dukes of Würtemberg, the Margraves of
Baden, and the Counts of Nassau and those of Hanau to several
parts of the territories which either belonged to them or were
contested. A general amnesty was indeed provided, and everyone
was to be restored to the possession of the lands which he had
held before the war. This general article was, however,
limited by various special provisions, as that in relation to
the Palsgrave, and was not to be applied to Austria at all.
... Specially important are the sections which relate to the
settlement of religious grievances. The treaty of Passau and
the Augsburg religious peace were confirmed; the 1st of
January, 1624, was fixed as the time which was to govern
mutual reclamations between the Catholics and Protestants;
both parties were secured the right to all ecclesiastical
foundations, whether in mediate or immediate connection with
the Empire, which they severally held in possession on the
first day of January, 1624; if any such had been taken from
them after this date, restoration was to be made, unless
otherwise specially provided. The Ecclesiastical Reservation
was acknowledged by the Protestants, and Protestant holders of
ecclesiastical property were freely admitted to the Imperial
Diets. The right of reformation was conceded to the Estates,
and permission to emigrate to the subjects; while it was at
the same time provided that, if in 1624 Protestant subjects of
Catholic Princes, or the reverse, enjoyed freedom of religion,
this right should not in the future be diminished. It was
specially granted for Silesia that all the concessions which
had been made before the war to the Dukes of Liegnitz,
Münsterburg, and Oels, and to the city of Breslau, relating to
the free exercise of the Augsburg Confession, should remain in
force. ... Finally, the Reformed--that is, the adherents of
Calvinism--were placed upon the same ground with those of the
Augsburg Confession; and it was provided that if a Lutheran
Estate of the Empire should become a Calvinist, or the
reverse, his subjects should not be forced to change with
their Prince."
A. Gindely,
History of the Thirty Years' War,'
volume 2, chapter 10.
"The emperor, in his own name, and in behalf of his family and
the 'empire, ceded the full sovereignty of Upper and Lower
Alsace, with the prefecture of Haguenau, or the ten towns
[Haguenau, Schelestadt, Weissemburgh, Colmar, Landau,
Oberenheim, Rosheim, Munster in the Val de St. Gregoire,
Kaiserberg, and Turingheim], and their dependencies. But by
one of those contradictions which are common in treaties, when
both parties wish to preserve their respective claims, another
article was introduced, binding the king of France to leave
the ecclesiastics and immediate nobility of those provinces in
the immediacy which they had hitherto possessed with regard to
the Roman empire, and not to pretend to any sovereignty over
them, but to remain content with such rights as belonged to
the house of Austria. Yet this was again contradicted by a
declaration, that this exception should not derogate from the
supreme sovereignty before yielded to the king of France."
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 59 (volume 2).

{1487}
"Respecting the rights of sovereignty due to the princes and
the relations of the states of the empire with the emperor,
the Peace of Westphalia contained such regulations as must in
the course of time produce a still greater relaxation of those
ties, already partially loosened, which held together the
empire in one entirety. ... At the Peace of Westphalia the
independence of the princes was made completely legal. They
received the entire right of sovereignty over their territory,
together with the power of making war, concluding peace, and
forming alliances among themselves, as well as with foreign
powers, provided such alliances were not to the injury of the
empire. But what a feeble obstacle must this clause have
presented? For henceforward, if a prince of the empire, having
formed an alliance with a foreign power, became hostile to the
emperor, he could immediately avail himself of the pretext
that it was for the benefit of the empire, the maintenance of
his rights, and the liberty of Germany. And in order that the
said pretext might, with some appearance of right, be made
available on every occasion, foreigners established themselves
as the guardians of the empire; and accordingly France and
Sweden took upon themselves the responsibility of legislating
as guarantees, not only for the Germanic constitution, but for
everything else that was concluded in the Peace of Westphalia
at Münster and Osnaburg. Added to this, in reference to the
imperial cities, whose rights had hitherto never been
definitively fixed, it was now declared that they should
always be included under the head of the other states, and
that they should command a decisive voice in the diets;
thenceforth, therefore, their votes and those of the other
states--the electoral and other princes--should be of equal
validity."
F. Kohlrausch,
History of Germany,
chapter 26.
Peace between Spain and the United Provinces was embodied in a
separate treaty, but negotiated at Münster, and concluded and
signed a few months earlier in the same year. The war between
Spain and France went on.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1646-1648.
GERMANY: A. D. 1648.
Effects of the Peace of Westphalia on the Empire.
It becomes a loose confederacy and purely German.
"It may ... be said of this famous peace, as of the other
so-called 'fundamental law of the Empire,' the Golden Bull,
that it did no more than legalize a condition of things
already in existence, but which by being legalized acquired
new importance. ... While the political situation, to use a
current phrase, had changed within the last two hundred years,
the eyes with which men regarded it had changed still more.
Never by their fiercest enemies in earlier times, not once by
the Popes or Lombard republicans in the heat of their strife
with the Franconian and Swabian Cæsars, had the Emperors been
reproached as mere German kings, or their claim to be the
lawful heirs of Rome denied. The Protestant jurists of the
16th or rather of the 17th century were the first persons who
ventured to scoff at the pretended lordship of the world, and
declare their Empire to be nothing more than a German
monarchy, in dealing with which no superstitious reverence
need prevent its subjects from making the best terms they
could for themselves, and controlling a sovereign whose
religious predilections made him the friend of their enemies.
... It was by these views ... that the states, or rather
France and Sweden acting on their behalf, were guided in the
negotiations of Osnabrück and Münster. By extorting a full
recognition of the sovereignty of all the princes, Catholics
and Protestants alike, in their respective territories, they
bound the Emperor from any direct interference with the
administration, either in particular districts or throughout
the Empire. All affairs of public importance, including the
rights of making war or peace, of levying contributions,
raising troops, building fortresses, passing or interpreting
laws, were henceforth to be left entirely in the hands of the
Diet. ... Both Lutherans and Calvinists were declared free
from all jurisdiction of the Pope or any Catholic prelate.
Thus the last link which bound Germany to Rome was snapped,
the last of the principles by virtue of which the Empire had
existed was abandoned. For the Empire now contained and
recognized as its members persons who formed a visible body at
open war with the Holy Roman Church; and its constitution
admitted schismatics to a full share in all those civil rights
which, according to the doctrines of the early Middle Age,
could be enjoyed by no one who was out of the communion of the
Catholic Church. The Peace of Westphalia was therefore an
abrogation of the sovereignty of Rome, and of the theory of
Church and State with which the name of Rome was associated.
And in this light was it regarded by Pope Innocent X., who
commanded his legate to protest against it, and subsequently
declared it void by the bull 'Zelo domus Dei.' ... The Peace
of Westphalia is an era in imperial history not less clearly
marked than the coronation of Otto the Great, or the death of
Frederick II. As from the days of Maximilian it had borne a
mixed or transitional character, well expressed by the name
Romano-Germanic, so henceforth it is in everything but title
purely and solely a German Empire. Properly, indeed, it was no
longer an empire at all, but a Confederation, and that of the
loosest sort. For it had no common treasury, no efficient
common tribunals, no means of coercing a refractory member;
its states were of different religions, were governed
according to different forms, were administered judicially and
financially without any regard to each other. ... There were
300 petty principalities between the Alps and the Baltic, each
with its own laws, its own courts, ... its little armies, its
separate coinage, its tolls and custom-houses on the frontier,
its crowd of meddlesome and pedantic officials. ... This
vicious system, which paralyzed the trade, the literature, and
the political thought of Germany, had been forming itself for
some time, but did not become fully established until the
Peace of Westphalia, by emancipating the princes from imperial
control, had made them despots in their own territories."
J. Bryce,
The Holy Roman Empire,
chapter 19.
{1488}
GERMANY: A. D. 1648-1705.
After the Peace of Westphalia.
French influence in the Empire.
Creation of the Ninth Elector.
After the Peace of Westphalia, the remainder of the reign of
Ferdinand III. "passed in tranquillity. ... He caused his son
to be elected king of the Romans, under the title of Ferdinand
IV.; but the young prince, already king of Bohemia and
Hungary, preceded him to the tomb, and left the question of
the succession to be decided by a diet. Ferdinand III. died in
1657. ... The interregnum, and, indeed, the century which
followed the death of Ferdinand, showed the alarming
preponderance of the influence gained by France in the affairs
of the empire, and the consequent criminality of the princes
who had first invoked the assistance of that power. Her recent
victories, her character as joint guarantee of the treaty of
Westphalia, and the contiguity of her possessions to the
states of the empire, encouraged her ministers to demand the
imperial crown for the youthful Louis XIV. Still more
extraordinary is the fact that four of the electors were
gained, by that monarch's gold, to espouse his views. ...
Fortunately for Germany and for Europe, the electors of
Treves, Brandenburg, and Saxony, were too patriotic to
sanction this infatuated proposal; they threatened to elect a
native prince of their own authority,--a menace which caused
the rest to co-operate with them; so that, after some
fruitless negotiations, Leopold, son of the late emperor, king
of Bohemia and of Hungary, was raised to the vacant dignity.
His reign was one of great humiliation to his house and to the
empire. Without talents for government, without generosity,
feeble, bigoted, and pusillanimous, he was little qualified to
augment the glory of the country. ... Throughout his long
reign [1657-1705], he had the mortification to witness, on the
part of Louis XIV., a series of the most unprovoked, wanton, and
unprincipled usurpations ever recorded in history. ...
Internally, the reign of Leopold affords some interesting
particulars. ... Not the least is the establishment of a ninth
electoral dignity in favour of Ernest Augustus, Duke of
Brunswick Lunenburg, who then became (1692) the first elector
of Hanover. This was the act of Leopold, in return for
important aid in money and troops from two princes of that
house; but it could not be effected without the concurrence of
the electoral body, who long resisted it. ... The
establishment of a permanent diet, attended, not by the
electors in person, but by their representatives, is one of
the most striking peculiarities of Leopold's reign."
S. A. Dunham,
History of the Germanic Empire,
book 3, chapter 3 (volume 3).
See, DIET, THE GERMANIC.
GERMANY: A. D. 1648-1780.
The Austrian incubus.
"Before the Thirty Years' War the territories of the German
Hapsburgs were not very considerable. The greatest part of
Hungary was in the hands of the Turks; the Tyrol belonged to a
collateral line; and, in the other provinces, the independence
of the Nobility was much stronger than the sovereignty of the
Archdukes. The Nobles were all zealous protestants, so that a
monarchical power could only be created after a victory of the
Catholic faith. For the first time since 1621, the crown was
seen in these regions to assume a really dominant position.
Efforts in this direction had been zealously carried on since
1648; the Tyrolese Estates now lost their most important
privileges; and, above all, the Emperor succeeded, by the help
of Polish and German troops, in driving out the Turks from
Hungary, and at the same time crushing the national freedom of
the Magyars with frightful bloodshed. By these victories the
Monarchy gained, in the first place, a large increase of
territory--which placed it nearly on a level with France. In
the second place it acquired at home the power of raising as
many taxes and soldiers as were necessary to increase the army
to the extent of its wishes; and of distributing its officials
and troops--without distinction of nation--as imperial
servants, throughout its dominions. And thus it secured
submission at home and disposable strength for its operations
abroad. Here it stopped short. As it had no national, and,
consequently, no warm and natural relation to any of its
provinces--which were merely used as passive tools to promote
the lofty aims of the Hapsburg family--the Government had no
intention of using its power at home for the furtherance of
the public good, or the building up of a generally useful
Administration. The Nobility had no longer the strength to
resist the demands of the Crown for men and money, but it
still retained exemption from taxes, the jurisdiction and
police among its own peasants, and a multitude of feudal
rights, which, often enough, degraded the peasant to the
condition of a serf, and everywhere bound down agriculture in
the most galling bonds. Of manufactures there were little or
none; trade was carried on on the system of guilds. The State
officials exercised but little influence over the internal
affairs of the Communes, or Provinces; and the privileged
orders had full liberty to prosecute their own interests among
their inferiors with inconsiderate selfishness. In this
aristocracy, the Church, from its wealth and its close
internal unity, assumed the first place; and its superior
importance was still farther enhanced by the fact of its being
the chief bond of unity between the otherwise so loosely
compacted portions of the Empire. ... The Church attached the
Nobility to the Government; for we must not forget that a very
considerable portion of the estates of the Nobles had passed
into the hands of new possessors who had received them as a
reward for being good catholics. The Church, too, taught all
the youth of the Empire--in all its different languages--
obedience to the House of Hapsburg, and received from the
Crown, in return, exclusive control of the national education.
It formed, in spite of the resistance of nationalities, a sort
of public opinion in favour of the unity of the Empire; and the
Crown, in return, excluded all non-catholic opinions from the
schools, from literature and religion. Austria, therefore,
continued to be catholic, even after 1648; and by this we
mean, not only that its Princes were personally devout--or
that the Catholic clergy were supported in the performance of
their spiritual functions--or that the institutions of the
Church were liberally supported--but also that the State
directed its policy according to ecclesiastical views, made
use of the Church for political purposes, and crushed every
movement hostile to it in all other spheres of the national
life. In Austria, therefore, it was not merely a question of
theological differences, but of the deepest and most
comprehensive points of distinction between the mediæval and
the modern world. Austria was still, in its whole nature, a
Mediæval State or Confederacy of States. The consequences of
this condition were most strikingly seen in its relation to
Germany. In the first place, there was a complete separation,
in regard to all mental and spiritual matters, between the
great body of the Empire, and its powerful Eastern member.
This was the period, in which Germany was awaking to a new
intellectual life in modern Europe, and laying the foundation
of its modern science in every branch--in History and
Statistics, Chemistry and Geology, Jurisprudence and
Philosophy--and assuming by its Literature, an equal rank with
other nations in national refinement and civilization.
{1489}
By the works of genius which this period produced Austria
remained entirely uninfluenced; and it has been said, that
Werther had only been made known to the Viennese in the form
of fireworks in the Prater. The literary policy allowed no
seed of modern culture to enter the Empire; and the Jesuit
schools had rendered the soil unfit for its reception. All the
progress of German civilization, at this period, was based on
the principle of the independence of the mind in art and
science. The education of the Jesuits, on the contrary, though
unsurpassed where the object is to prepare men for a special
purpose, commences by disowning individual peculiarities, and
the right of a man to choose his own career. There was, at
this time, no other characteristic of an Austrian than an
entire estrangement from the progress of the German mind. ...
The progress of the people in science and art, in politics and
military strength, was only seen in the larger secular
territories, which, after 1648, enjoyed their own sovereignty;
and even these were checked in their movements at every step
by the remnants of the Imperial Constitution. The Members of
the Empire alone, in whom the decaying remains of Mediæval
existence still lingered on--the Ecclesiastical Princes--the
small Counts--the Imperial Knights and the Imperial
Towns,--clung to the Emperor and the Imperial Diet. In these,
partly from their small extent of territory, partly from the
inefficiency of their institutions, neither active industry,
nor public spirit, nor national pride, were to be found. In
all which tended to elevate the nation, and raise its hopes
for the future, they took, at this period, as little part as
Austria herself. ... The Imperial constitution, therefore, was
inwardly decayed, and stood in no relation to the internal
growth of the nation. ... There was the same divergence
between Austria and Germany with respect to their foreign
interests, as we have observed in their internal relations.
After the Turks had been driven from Hungary, and the Swedes
from the half of' Pomerania, Germany had only two neighbours
whom it was a matter of vital importance to watch,--the Poles
and the French. In the South, on the contrary, it had no
interests in opposition to Italy, except the protection of its
frontier by the possession or the neutrality of the Alpine
passes. And yet it was just towards Italy that the eyes of the
House of Hapsburg had been uninterruptedly directed for centuries
past. The favourite traditions of the family, and their
political and ecclesiastical interest in securing the support
of the Pope, and thereby that of the Clergy, constantly
impelled them to consolidate and extend their dominion in that
country. All other considerations yielded to this; and this is
intelligible enough from an Austrian point of view; but it was
not on that account less injurious to the German Empire. How
strikingly was this opposition of interests displayed at the
end of the glorious war of the Spanish succession, when the
Emperor rejected a peace which would have restored Strasburg
and Alsace to the Empire, because only Naples, and not Sicily
also, was offered to Austria! How sharply defined do the same
relations present themselves to our view, in the last years of
the Hapsburg dynasty, at the peace of Vienna in 1738!--on
which occasion the Emperor--in order at least to gain Tuscany,
as a compensation for the loss of Naples,--gave up Lorraine to
the French, without even consulting the Empire, which he had
dragged into the war. Austria thus maintained a predominant
influence in Italy; but the Empire, during the whole century
after the Peace of Westphalia, did not obtain a single
noteworthy advantage over France. How much more was this the
case with respect to Poland, which during the whole period of
the religious wars had been the most zealous ally of Spain and
the Hapsburgs, and which subsequently seemed to threaten no
danger to Austrian interests."
H. Von Sybel,
History of the French Revolution,
book 2, chapter 1 (volume 1).
GERMANY: A. D. 1658.
Election of the Emperor, Leopold I.
GERMANY: A. D. 1660-1664.
Renewed war with the Turks.
Victory of St. Gothard.
Transylvania liberated.
A twenty years truce.
See HUNGARY: A. D. 1660-1664.
GERMANY: A. D. 1672-1679.
The war of the Coalition against Louis XIV.
See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1672-1674,
and 1674-1678;
also NIMEGUEN, PEACE OF.
GERMANY: A. D. 1675-1678.
War with Sweden.
Battle of Fehrbellin.
See BRANDENBURG: A.D. 1640-1688;
and SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1644-1697.
GERMANY: A. D. 1679-1681.
The final absorption of Alsace and Les Trois-Evêchés by
France, with boundaries widened.
Bold encroachments of the French Chambers of Reannexation.
The seizure of Strasburg.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1679-1681.
GERMANY: A. D. 1686.
The League of Augsburg against Louis XIV.
"The Duke of Orleans, the French King's brother, had married
the sister of the Elector Palatine, the last of the House of
Simmern, who died in May 1685, when his next relative, the
Count Palatine Philip William, Duke of Neuberg, took
possession of the Electorate. The Duchess of Orleans had by
her marriage contract renounced all her feudal rights to the
Palatinate, but not her claims to the allodial property and
the moveables of her family." These latter claims, taken in
hand by Louis XIV. on behalf of his sister-in-law, were made
so formidable that the new Elector appealed to the Empire for
protection, "and, thus redoubled the uneasiness felt in
Germany, and indeed throughout the greater part of Europe,
respecting the schemes of Louis. The Prince of Orange availed
himself of these suspicions to forward his plans against
Louis. He artfully inflamed the general alarm, and at length
succeeded in inducing the Emperor Leopold, the Kings of Spain,
and Sweden, as princes of the Empire, the Electors of Saxony
and Bavaria, the circles of Suabia, Franconia, Upper Saxony,
and Bavaria, to enter into the celebrated League of Augsburg
(July 9th 1686). The object of this league was to maintain the
Treaties of Münster and Nimeguen and the Truce of Ratisbon. If
any of the members of it was attacked he was to be assisted by
the whole confederacy; 60,000 men were to be raised, who were
to be frequently drilled, and to form a camp during some weeks
of every year, and a common fund for their support was to be
established at Frankfort. The League was to be in force only
for three years, but might be prolonged at the expiration of
that term should the public safety require it. The Elector
Palatine, who was in fact the party most directly interested,
acceded to the League early in September, as well as the Duke
of Holstein Gottorp."
T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 5, chapter 5 (volume 3).
{1490}
"To Madame's great anger France set up a claim to the
Palatinate on her behalf, Louvois persuading the King and the
royal family that with a few vigorous measures the Palatinate
would be abandoned by the Neubourgs and annexed to France as
part of Madame's dowry. This led to the devastation of the
states, to which Madame [Charlotte Elizabeth, the Duchess of
Orleans] so often and so bitterly alludes during the next ten
years. Obliged by Louis XIV. 's policy to represent herself as
desirous to recover her rights over her father's and brother's
succession, in many documents which she was never even shown,
Madame protested in all her private letters against France's
action in the matter, and made every one at court thoroughly
aware of her grief and disapproval of what the king was doing
on her behalf."
Life and Letters of Charlotte Elizabeth,
Princess Palatine,
chapter 2.
GERMANY: A. D. 1689-1696.
The War of the League of Augsburg, or Grand Alliance,
against Louis XIV.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690 to 1695-1696.
GERMANY: A. D. 1690.
The second Devastation of the Palatinate.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1689-1690.
GERMANY: A. D. 1700.
Interest in the question of the Spanish Succession.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1698-1700.
GERMANY: A. D. 1700.
Prussia raised to the dignity of a kingdom.
See PRUSSIA: A. D. 1700.
GERMANY: A. D. 1700-1740.
The first king of Prussia and his shabby court.
The second king, his Brobdingnagian army
and his extraordinary character.
The up-bringing of Frederick the Great.
The "Great Elector" of Brandenburg "left to his son Frederic a
principality as considerable as any which was not called a
kingdom."
See BRANDENBURG: A. D. 1640-1688.
"Frederic aspired to the style of royalty. Ostentatious and
profuse, negligent of his true interests and of his high
duties, insatiably eager for frivolous distinctions, he added
nothing to the real weight of the state which he governed:
perhaps he transmitted his inheritance to his children
impaired rather than augmented in value; but he succeeded in
gaining the great object of his life, the title of King. In
the year 1700 he assumed this new dignity. He had, on that
occasion to undergo all the mortifications which fall to the
lot of ambitious upstarts. Compared with the other crowned
heads of Europe, he made a figure resembling that which a
Nabob or a Commissary, who had bought a title, would make in
the company of Peers whose ancestors had been attainted for
treason against the Plantagenets. The envy of the class which
Frederic quitted, and the civil scorn of the class into which
he intruded himself, were marked in very significant ways. ...
Frederic was succeeded by his son, Frederic William, a prince
who must be allowed to have possessed some talents for
administration, but whose character as disfigured by odious
vices, and whose eccentricities were such as had never before
been seen out of a madhouse. He was exact and diligent in the
transacting of business; and he was the first who formed the
design of obtaining for Prussia a place among the European
powers, altogether out of proportion to her extent and
population, by means of a strong military organization. Strict
economy enabled him to keep up a peace establishment of 60,000
troops. These troops were disciplined in such a manner, that,
placed beside them, the household regiments of Versailles and
St. James's would have appeared an awkward squad. The master
of such a force could not but be regarded by all his
neighbours as a formidable enemy and a valuable ally. But the
mind of Frederic William was so ill regulated, that all his
inclinations became passions, and all his passions partook of
the character of moral and intellectual disease. His parsimony
degenerated into sordid avarice. His taste for military pomp
and order became a mania, like that of a Dutch burgomaster for
tulips, or that of a member of the Roxburghe Club for Caxtons.
While the envoys of the Court of Berlin were in a state of
such squalid poverty as moved the laughter of foreign
capitals; while the food placed before the princes and
princesses of the blood-royal of Prussia was too scanty to
appease hunger, and so bad that even hunger loathed it, no
price was thought too extravagant for tall recruits. The
ambition of the king was to form a brigade of giants, and
every country was ransacked by his agents for men above the
ordinary stature. ... Though his dominant passion was the love
of military display, he was yet one of the most pacific of
princes. We are afraid that his aversion to war was not the
effect of humanity, but was merely one of his thousand whims.
His feeling about his troops seems to have resembled a miser's
feeling about his money. He loved to collect them, to count
them, to see them increase; but he could not find it in his
heart to break in upon the precious hoard. He looked forward
to some future time when his Patagonian battalions were to
drive hostile infantry before them like sheep: but this future
time was always receding; and it is probable that, if his life
had been prolonged 30 years, his superb army would never have
seen any harder service than a sham fight in the fields near
Berlin. But the great military means which he had collected
were destined to be employed by a spirit far more daring and
inventive than his own. Frederic, surnamed the Great, son of
Frederic William, was born in January 1712. It may safely be
pronounced that he had received from nature a strong and sharp
understanding, and a rare firmness of temper and intensity of
will. As to the other parts of his character, it is difficult
to say whether they are to be ascribed to nature, or to the
strange training which he underwent. The history of his
boyhood is painfully interesting. Oliver Twist in the parish
work-house, Smike at Dotheboys Hall, were petted children when
compared with this wretched heir-apparent of a crown. The
nature of Frederic William was hard and bad, and the habit of
exercising arbitrary power had made him frightfully savage.
His rage constantly vented itself to right and left in curses
and blows. When his Majesty took a walk, every human being
fled before him, as if a tiger had broken loose from a
menagerie. ... But it was in his own house that he was most
unreasonable and ferocious. His palace was hell, and he the
most execrable of fiends. ... Early in the year 1740, Frederic
William met death with a firmness and dignity worthy of a
better and wiser man; and Frederic, who had just completed his
28th year, became king of Prussia."
Lord Macaulay,
Frederic the Great (Essays).
{1491}
"Frederick William I. became ... the founder of the first
modern State in Germany. His was a nature in which the
repulsive and the imposing, the uncouth and the admirable,
were closely united. In his manners a rough and unrefined
peasant, in his family a tyrant, in his government a despot,
choleric almost to madness, his reign would have been a curse
to the country, had he not united with his unlimited power a
rare executive ability and an incorruptible fidelity to duty;
and from first to last he consecrated all his powers to the
common weal. By him effective limitations were put upon the
independent action of the provinces, and upon the overgrown
privileges of the estates. He did not do away with the guilds
of the different orders, but placed them under the strict
control of a strongly centralized superintendence, and
compelled their members to make every necessary sacrifice for
the sake of assisting him in his efforts for the prosperity
and power of Prussia. It is astonishing to see with what
practical judgment he recognized a needed measure both in
general and in detail; how he trained a body of officials,
suited in all grades to the requirements of their position;
how he disciplined them in activity, prudence, and rectitude,
by strict inspection, by encouraging instruction, and by
brutal punishments; how he enforced order and economy in the
public finances; how he improved the administration of his own
domains, so that it became a fruitful example to all
proprietors; and how, full of the desire to make the peasants
free owners of the soil, although he did not yet venture on
such a radical measure, he nevertheless constantly protected
the poor against the arbitrariness and oppression of the
higher classes. ... There was no department of life to which
he did not give encouragement and assistance; it is also true
that there was none which he did not render subservient to his
own will, and the products of which he did not make conducive
to the one great end,--the independence and aggrandizement of
the State. So that he who was the ruler of, at most, three
million people, created, without exhausting the country, a
standing army of eighty thousand men: a remarkably skilful and
ready army, which he disciplined with barbarous severity on
the slightest occasion, at the same time that he looked out
for the welfare of every soldier even in the smallest detail,
according to his saying, that 'a king's warrior must live
better than a gentleman's servant.' What he had in his mind,
almost a hundred years before Scharnhorst, was the universal
obligation of military service; but it fared with him in
regard to this as in regard to the freedom of the peasants:
strong as he was, he could not turn the world he lived in
upside down; he contented himself with bequeathing his best
ideas to a more propitious future. The foundations of the
government rested upon the estates in spite of all monarchical
reforms. Thus, beside the federative Empire of the Hapsburgs,
arose the small, compact Prussian State, which, by reason of
the concentration of its forces, was a match for its
five-times-larger rival."
H. Von Sybel,
The Founding of the German Empire by William I.,
book 1, chapter 2 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
T. Carlyle,
History of Frederick II., called the Great,
book 3, chapter 19, books 5-10 (volumes 1-2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1702.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
Siege of Landau.
Battle of Friedlingen.
On the part of the Imperialists, the War of the Spanish
Succession was opened on the Rhine frontier in June 1702, by a
movement of the army commanded by the Margrave Louis of Baden,
which "came over the Rhine and laid siege to the important
fortress of Landau,--the bulwark of Alsace as it was then
regarded. The Margrave was subsequently joined by the
Emperor's eldest son, the young King of the Romans, who
desired to share in the glory, though not in the toils of the
expected conquest. ... The Maréchal de Catinat, one of the
soldiers of whom France has most reason to be proud,--the
virtuous Catinat as Rousseau terms him--held command at this
period in Alsace. So inferior were his numbers that he could
make no attempt to relieve Landau. But after its reduction an
opportunity appeared in which by detaching a portion of his
army he might retrieve the fortunes of France in another
quarter. The Elector of Bavaria, after much irresolution, had
openly espoused the cause of Louis. He seized upon the city of
Ulm and issued a proclamation in favor of his new ally. To
support his movements an enterprising and ambitious officer,
the Marquis de Villars, was sent across the Rhine with part of
the army of Alsace. The declaration of the Elector of Bavaria
and the advance of Villars into Germany disquieted in no
slight degree the Prince Louis of Baden. Leaving a sufficient
garrison in Landau, he also passed the Rhine. The two armies
met at Friedlingen on the 14th of October. Louis of Baden, a
ponderous tactician bred in the wars against the Turks, might
out-manœuvre some Grand Vizier, but was no match for the
quick-witted Frenchman. He was signally defeated with the loss
of 3,000 men; soon after which, the season being now far
advanced, Villars led back his army to winter quarters in
France. His victory of Friedlingen gained for him at
Versailles the rank of Maréchal de France."
Earl Stanhope (Lord Mahon),
History of England: Reign of Queen Anne,
chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 68 (volume 2).
See, also; NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704,
and SPAIN: A. D. 1702.
GERMANY: A. D. 1703.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
Campaigns on the Upper Rhine and in Bavaria.
"Early in June [A. D. 1703], Marshal Tallard assumed the
command of the French forces in Alsace, ... took Prissac on
the 7th of September, and invested Landau on the 16th of
October. The allies, under the Prince of Hesse, attempted to
raise the siege, but were defeated with considerable loss;
and, soon after, Landau surrendered, thus terminating with
disaster the campaign on the Upper Rhine. Still more
considerable were the losses sustained in Bavaria. Marshal
Villars commanded there, and, at the head of the French and
Bavarians, defeated General Stirum, who headed the
Imperialists, on the 20th of September. In December, Marshal
Marsin, who had succeeded Villars in the command, made himself
master of the important city of Augsburg, and in January,
1704, the Bavarians got possession of Passau. Meanwhile, a
formidable insurrection had broken out in Hungary, which so
distracted the cabinet of Vienna that the capital seemed to be
threatened by the combined forces of the French and Bavarians
after the fall of Passau. ... Instead of confining the war to
one of posts and sieges in Flanders and Italy, it was resolved
[by the French] to throw the bulk of their forces at once into
Bavaria, and operate against Austria from the heart of
Germany, by pouring down the valley of the Danube.
{1492}
The advanced post held there by the Elector of Bavaria in
front, forming a salient angle, penetrating, as it were, into
the Imperial dominions, the menacing aspect of the Hungarian
insurrection in the rear, promised the most successful issue
to this decisive operation. For this purpose, Marshal Tallard,
with the French army on the Upper Rhine, received orders to
cross the Black Forest and advance into Swabia, and unite with
the Elector of Bavaria, which he accordingly did at Donawerth,
in the beginning of July. Marshal Villeroy, with forty
battalions and thirty-nine squadrons, was to break off from
the army in Flanders and support the advance by a movement on
the Moselle, so as to be in a condition to join the main army
on the Danube, of which it would form, as it were, the left
wing; while Vendôme, with the army of Italy, was to penetrate
into the Tyrol, and advance by Innspruck on Salzburg. The
united armies, which it was calculated, after deducting all
the losses of the campaign, would muster 80,000 combatants,
was then to move direct by Lintz and the valley of the Danube
on Vienna, while a large detachment penetrated into Hungary to
lend a hand to the already formidable insurrection in that
kingdom. The plan was grandly conceived. ... Marlborough, by
means of the secret information which he obtained from the
French head-quarters, had got full intelligence of it, and its
dangers to the allies, if it succeeded, struck him as much as
the chances of great advantage to them if ably thwarted. His
line was instantly taken."
A. Alison,
Military Life of Marlborough,
chapter 2, sections 30-33.
The measures taken by Marlborough to defeat the plans of the
French in this campaign are briefly stated in the account of
his first campaigns in the Netherlands.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1702-1704.
ALSO IN:
H. Martin,
History of France: Age of Louis XIV.
(translated by M. L. Booth), volume 2, chapter 5.
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 69 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1704.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
Marlborough and Prince Eugene on the Danube.
The Battle of Blenheim.
"Marlborough, with his motley army of English, Dutch, Danes
and Germans, concealing his main purpose, was marching south
along the Rhine, with a design to strike his critical blow, by
attacking the French armies that were forming for the campaign
of the Danube, and thus protect the Emperor and Vienna, and
punish the Elector of Bavaria, whose territories would be then
exposed. On the route, Marlborough was joined by Prince Eugene
and the Margrave of Baden: but as a new French force was
approaching, Prince Eugene was sent to keep it in check.
Marlborough and the Prince of Baden, with united forces of
about 60,000 men, then advanced, in rapid marches, and took,
by gallant assault, the fortifications of the Schellenberg in
Bavaria, and the old town of Donauworth, a critical and
commanding position on the Danube. The allies were now masters
of the main passages of the Danube--and had a strong place as
a basis of action. The allied leaders thereupon sent troops
into the heart of Bavaria, and devastated the country even to
the vicinity of Munich--burning and destroying as they
marched, and taking several minor fortresses. Marlborough's
forces and those of Prince Eugene were distant from each other
some forty miles, when came the news of the march of a French
army of 25,000 men under Tallard, to form a junction with the
others, to succor the Elector, and take revenge for the defeat
of the Schellenberg. Two French Marshals, Tallard and Marsin,
were now in command: their design was to attack Marlborough
and Eugene's armies in detail. By rapid marches, Marlborough
crossed the Danube and joined Prince Eugene near Donauworth,
and thereupon occurred one of the most important and decisive
contests of modern times, fought between the old town of
Hochstadt and the village of Blenheim, about fifteen miles
south of Donauworth. The skilful tactics of the allied
generals precipitated the battle. The allied French and
Bavarians numbered 60,000 [56,000; Malleson] men--the English,
Dutch and Germans and other allies, about 53,000 [52,000;
Malleson]. The allies were allowed to cross an intervening
brook without opposition, and form their lines. A great
charge, in full force, of the allies was then made; they broke
the enemy's extended line; and an ensuing charge of cavalry
scattered his forces right and left, and drove many into the
Danube. More than 14,000 French and Bavarians, who had not
struck a blow, except to defend their position, entrenched and
shut up in the village of Blenheim, waiting for orders to
move, were then surrounded by the victorious allies, and
compelled to surrender as prisoners of war. The scattered
remnants of the French and Bavarian army either disbanded, or
were driven over the Rhine. The garrison at Ulm capitulated,
and the Elector fled into France."
J. W. Gerard,
The Peace of Utrecht,
chapter 16.
"The armies of Marchin and of Max Emanuel [of Bavaria] had
been defeated; that of Tallard had been annihilated. Whilst
the loss of the victors in killed and wounded reached 12,000
men, that of the French and Bavarians exceeded 14,000. In
addition, the latter lost 13,000 men taken prisoners, 47
pieces of cannon, 25 standards, and 90 colours. Such was the
battle of Blenheim. It was one of the decisive battles of
history, and it changed the character of the war. Up to that
moment, the action of France against. Germany had been
aggressive; thenceforward it became purely defensive.
Blenheim, in fact, dashed to the ground the hopes of Louis
XIV. and Max Emanuel of Bavaria. It saved the house of
Habsburg in Germany, and helped it greatly in Hungary. It
showed likewise that it was possible to inflict a crushing
defeat on the armies of Louis XIV."
Colonel G. B. Malleson,
Prince Eugene of Savoy,
chapter 6.
"Marlborough [after the battle], having detached part of his
force to besiege Ulm, drew near with the bulk of his army to
the Rhine, which he passed near Philipsburg on the 6th of
September, and soon after commenced the siege of Landau, on
the French side; Prince Louis, with 20,000 men, forming the
besieging force, and Eugene and Marlborough, with 30,000, the
covering army. Villeroi, with the French army, abandoned an
intrenched camp which he had constructed to cover the town.
Marlborough followed, and made every effort to bring the
French marshal to battle, but in vain. ... Ulm surrendered on
the 16th of September, ... which gave the allies a solid
foundation on the Danube, and effectually crushed the power of
the Elector of Bavaria, who, isolated now in the midst of his
enemies, had no alternative but to abandon his dominions and
seek refuge in Brussels, where he arrived in the end of
September. ...
{1493}
The Electress of Bavaria, who had been left regent of that
state in the absence of the Elector in Flanders, had now no
resource left but submission; and a treaty was accordingly
concluded in the beginning of November, by which she agreed to
disband all her troops. Trêves and Traerbach were taken in the
end of December; the Hungarian insurrection was suppressed;
Landau capitulated in the beginning of the same month; a
diversion which the enemy attempted toward Trêves was defeated
by Marlborough's activity and vigilance, and that city put in
a sufficient posture of defense; and, the campaign being now
finished, that accomplished commander returned to the Hague
and London."
A. Alison,
Military Life of Marlborough,
chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
G. B. Malleson,
Battle-fields of Germany,
chapter 10.
W. Coxe,
Memoirs of Marlborough,
chapters 22-26 (volume 1).
J. H. Burton,
History of the Reign of Queen Anne,
chapter 6 (volume 1).
H. Martin,
History of France: Age of Louis XIV.,
volume 2, chapter 5.
GERMANY: A. D. 1705.
The Election of the Emperor Joseph I.
GERMANY: A. D. 1705.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
The dissolution of Bavaria.
"The campaign of 1705 was destitute of any important events on
the side of Germany. ... In Bavaria, the peasants, irritated
by the oppressions of the Austrian government, rose in a body
in the autumn, and, could they have been supported by France,
would have placed the Emperor in great danger; but without
that aid the insurrection only proved fatal to themselves. The
insurgents were beaten in detail, and the Emperor now resolved
on the complete dissolution of Bavaria as a state. The four
elder sons of Maximilian were carried to Klagenfurt in
Carinthia, to be there educated under the strictest inspection
as Counts of Wittelsbach, while the younger sons were
consigned to the care of a court lady at Munich, and the
daughters sent to a convent. The Electress, who had been on a
visit to Venice, was not permitted to return to her dominions,
and the Elector Maximilian, as well as the Elector of Cologne,
was, by a decree of the Electoral College, placed under the
ban of the Empire. The Upper Palatinate was restored to the
Elector Palatine. ... The remaining Bavarian territories were
confiscated, and divided among various princes."
T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 5, chapter 6 (volume 3).
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 72 (volume 3).
The campaign of 1705 in the Netherlands was unimportant; but
in Spain it had brilliant results.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1705;
and NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1705.
GERMANY: A. D. 1706-1711.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
Successes of the French.
During 1706, little was attempted on either side by the forces
which watched each other along the Rhine. In 1707 Villars, the
French commander, obtained liberty to act. "The Emperor,
greatly preoccupied with Hungary, had furnished but
indifferent resources to the new general of the army of the
Rhine, Brandenburg-Baireuth; the German army was ill paid and
in bad condition in its immense lines on the right bank, which
extended along the Rhine from Philippsburg as far as
Stolhofen, then, in a square, from Stolhofen to the Black
Mountains by Bühl. May 22, the lines were attacked
simultaneously at four points. ... The success was complete;
the enemy fled into the mountains, abandoning artillery,
baggage, and munitions, and did not stop till beyond the
Neckar. The lines were razed; Swabia and a part of Franconia
were put under contribution. Villars marched on Stuttgart,
crossed the Neckar, and subjected the whole country to ransom
as far as the Danube. The enemies in vain rallied and
reinforced themselves with tardy contingents of the Empire;
they could not prevent Villars from laying under contribution
the Lower Neckar, then the country between the Danube and Lake
Constance, and from maintaining himself beyond the Rhine till
he went into winter-quarters. French parties scoured the
country as conquerors as far as the fatal field of Hochstadt."
At the beginning of the campaign of 1708, it was the plan of
the allies to make their chief attack on France "by the way of
the Rhine and the Moselle, with two armies of 60,000 men each,
under the command of the Elector of Hanover and Eugene, whilst
Marlborough occupied the great French army in Flanders." But
this plan was changed. "Eugene left the Elector of Hanover in
the north of Swabia, behind the lines of Etlingen, which the
allies had raised during the winter to replace the lines of
Bühl at Stolhofen, and, with 24,000 soldiers collected on the
Moselle, he marched by the way of Coblentz towards Belgium
(June 30). The French forces of the Rhine and the Moselle
followed this movement." The campaign then ensuing in the
Netherlands was that which was signalized by Marlborough and
Eugene's victory at Oudenarde and the siege of Lille. In 1709,
"the attention of Europe, as in 1708, was chiefly directed to
Flanders; but it was not only on that side that France was
menaced. France was to be encroached upon at once on the north
and the east. Whilst the great allied army penetrated into
Artois, the army of the Rhine and the army of the Alps were to
penetrate, the latter into Bresse by the way of Savoy, the
former into Franche-Comté by the way of Alsace, and to combine
their operations. ... The Germans had not taken the offensive
in Alsace till in the month of August. Marshal Harcourt, with
over 20,000 men, had covered himself with the lines of the
Lauter: the Elector of Hanover, who had crossed the Rhine at
Philippsburg with superior forces, did not attack Harcourt,
and strove to amuse him whilst 8,000 or 9,000 Germans, left in
Swabia with General Merci, moved rapidly on Neuberg ... and
established there a tête-du-pont in order to enter Upper
Alsace." By swiftly sending a sufficient force to attack and
defeat Merci at Neuberg, August 26, Harcourt completely
frustrated these plans. "The Elector of Hanover recrossed the
river and retired behind the lines of Etlingen." During the
two following years the French and German forces on the side
of the Rhine did little more than observe one another.
H. Martin,
History of France: Age of Louis XIV:,
volume 2, chapters 5-6.
Meantime, Ramillies, Oudenarde and Malplaquet had been fought
in the Netherlands; Prince Eugene had won his victory at
Turin, and the contest had been practically decided in Spain,
at Almanza.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1706-1707,
1708-1709, 1710-1712;
ITALY: A. D. 1701-1713;
SPAIN: A. D. 1706, 1707, and 1707-1710;
and ENGLAND: A. D. 1710-1712.
ALSO IN:
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapters 75-79 (volume 3).
F. P. Guizot,
Popular History of France,
chapter 45 (volume 5).
GERMANY: A. D. 1711.
Election of the Emperor Charles VI.
{1494}
GERMANY: A. D. 1711.
The War of the Spanish Succession:
Change in the circumstances of the war.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1711.
GERMANY: A. D. 1713-1719.
The Emperor's continued differences with the King of Spain.
The Triple Alliance.
The Quadruple Alliance.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725.
GERMANY: A. D. 1714.
Ending of the War of the Spanish Succession:
The Peace of Utrecht and the Treaty of Rastadt.
See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.
GERMANY: A. D. 1732-1733.
Interference in the election of the King of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1732-1733.
GERMANY: A. D. 1733-1735.
The War of the Polish Succession.
Cession of Lorraine to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.
GERMANY: A. D. 1740.
The question of the Austrian Succession.
The Pragmatic Sanction.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1718-1738, and 1740.
GERMANY: A. D. 1740-1756.
Early years of the reign of Frederick the Great in Prussia.
The War of the Austrian Succession.
When Frederick II., known as Frederick the Great, succeeded
his father, in 1740, "nobody had the least suspicion that a
tyrant of extraordinary military and political talents, of
industry more extraordinary still, without fear, without
faith, and without mercy, had ascended the throne."
Lord Macaulay,
Frederic the Great (Essays).
The reign of Frederick II. "was expected to be an effeminate
one; but when at the age of twenty-nine he became king, he
forgot his pleasures, thought of nothing but glory, and no
longer employed himself but in attention to his finances, his
army, his policy, and his laws. His provinces were scattered,
his resources weak, his power precarious; his army of seventy
thousand soldiers was more remarkable for handsomeness of the
men, and the elegance of their appearance, than for their
discipline. He augmented it, instructed it, exercised it, and
fortune began to open the field of glory to him at the moment
he was fully prepared to enjoy her favours. Charles XII. was
dead, and his station filled by a king without authority.
Russia, deprived of Peter the Great, who had only rough-hewn
her civilization, languished under the feeble government of
the Empress Anne, and of a cruel and ignorant minister.
Augustus III. King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, a Prince
devoid of character, could not inspire him with any dread.
Louis XV., a weak and peaceable king, was governed by Cardinal
Fleuri, who loved peace, but always by his weakness suffered
himself to be drawn into war. He presented to Frederic rather
a support than an obstacle. The court of France had espoused
the cause of Charles VII. against Francis I. Maria Theresa,
wife of Francis, and Queen of Hungary, saw herself threatened
by England, Holland, and France; and whilst she had but little
reason to hope the preservation of her hereditary dominions,
that arrogant princess wished to place her husband on the
Imperial Throne. This quarrel kindled the flames of war in
Europe; the genius of Frederic saw by a single glance that the
moment was arrived for elevating Prussia to the second order of
powers; he made an offer to Maria Theresa to defend her, if
she would cede Silesia to him, and threatened her with war in
case of refusal. The Empress, whose firmness nothing could
shake, impoliticly refused that proposition; war was declared,
and Frederic entered Silesia at the head of eighty thousand
men. This first war lasted eighteen months.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1740 to 1741.
Frederic, by gaining five battles, shewed that Europe would
recognize one great man more in her bloody annals. He had
begun the war from ambition, and contrary to strict justice;
he concluded it with ability, but by the abandonment of France
his ally, without giving her information of it, and he thus
put in practice, when he was seated on the throne, the
principles of Machiavel, whom he had refuted before he
ascended it. Men judge according to the event. The hero was
absolved by victory from the wrongs with which justice
reproached him; and this brilliant example serves to confirm
men in that error, too generally and too lightly adopted, that
ability in politics is incompatible with the strict rule of
morality. Four years after, in [1744], Frederic again took up
arms.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1743-1744 to 1744-1745.
He invaded Bohemia, Upper Silesia, and Moravia. Vienna thought
him at her gates; but the defection of the Bavarians, the
retreat of the French, and the return of Prince Charles into
Bohemia, rapidly changed the face of affairs. The position of
Frederic became as dangerous as it had been menacing; he was
on the point of being lost, and he saw himself compelled to

retire with as much precipitation, as he had advanced with
boldness. The gaining the battle of Hohen-Friedberg saved him.
That retreat and that victory fixed the seal to his
reputation. It was after this action that he wrote to Louis
XV. 'I have just discharged in Silesia the bill of exchange
which your majesty drew on me at Fontenoy.' A letter so much
the more modest, as Frederic had conquered, and Louis had only
been witness to a victory. He displayed the same genius and the
same activity in the campaign of 1745, and once more abandoned
France in making his separate peace at Dresden. By this treaty
Francis was peaceably assured of the empire, and the cession
of Silesia was confirmed to Frederic. France during this war
committed some wrongs, which might palliate the abandonment of
Prussia. The French did not keep Prince Charles within bounds,
they made no diversion into Germany, and fought no where but
in Flanders. ... In 1756, Europe was again in a flame. France
and England declared war against each other, and both sought
alliances; Frederic ranged himself on the side of England, and
by that became the object of the unreflecting vengeance of the
French, and of the alliance of that power with Austria;
Austria also formed an alliance with the Court of Petersburg
by means of a Saxon secretary; Frederic discovered the project
of the Courts of Petersburg, Dresden, and Vienna, to invade
the Prussian dominions. He was before-hand with them, and
began the war by some conquests."
L. P. Ségur, the elder,
History of the Principal Events of the Reign of Frederic
William II., King of Prussia,
volume 1, pages 2-6.
GERMANY: A. D. 1742.
The Elector of Bavaria crowned Emperor (Charles VII.).
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (OCTOBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1745.
The consort of Maria Theresa elected Emperor (Francis I.).
Rise of the imperial house of Hapsburg-Lorraine.
See AUSTRIA: A. D.1745 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER);
also, 1744-1745.
GERMANY: A. D. 1748.
End and results of the War of the Austrian Succession.
See AIX-LA-CHAPELLE. THE CONGRESS.
{1495}
GERMANY: A. D. 1755-1756.
The Seven Years War:
Its causes and provocations.
"The great national quarrel between England and the powers
which restrained her free movements on the sea and her
extension of colonies, had never ceased. England would have
the freedom of the sea: and on land she pushed population and
ploughs where France paraded soldiers. In such a struggle war
must come, but, by laws invariable as the laws of nature, the
population will win in the end. After much bickering, blows
began in 1754, and at the beginning of 1755 England despatched
the ill-fated Braddock with a small force, which was destroyed
in July. ... As yet, however, the quarrel was only colonial.
England embittered it by seizing French ships without any
declaration of war. But why did Frederick [of Prussia] strike
in, if indeed he desired peace? In truth there was no choice
for him. As early as 1752-53 his secret agents had discovered
that Austria, Russia and Saxony were hatching a plot for the
destruction of Prussia, and such a partition as afterwards
befell unhappy Poland. In 1753 a Saxon official, Mentzel by
name, began to supply the Prussian agents with copies of
secret documents from the archives at Dresden, which proved
that, during the whole of the peace, negotiations had been
proceeding for a simultaneous attack on Frederick, though the
astute Brühl [Saxon minister], mindful of former defeats,
objected to playing the part of jackal to the neighbouring
lions. In short, by the end of 1755 the king knew that
preparations were already on foot in Austria and Russia, and
that he would probably be attacked next year certainly, or, at
latest, the year after. A great war was coming between England
and France, in which the continental power would attack
Hanover, and tread closely on the skirts of Prussia. The
situation was dangerous, and became terribly menacing when
England bargained with Russia to subsidise a Muscovite army of
55,000 men for defence of Hanover. Russia consented with
alacrity. Money was all that the czarina needed for her
preparations against Frederick, and in the autumn of 1755 she
assembled, not 55,000, but 70,000 men on the Prussian
frontier, nominally for the use of England. But throughout the
winter all the talk at St. Petersburg was of Frederick's
destruction in the coming spring. It was time for him to stir.
His first move was one of policy. He offered England a
'neutrality convention' by which the two powers jointly should
guarantee the German Reich against all foreign intervention
during the coming war. On the 16th of January, 1756, the
convention was signed in London, and the Russian agreement
thrown over, as it could well be, since it had not been
ratified. Europe was now ranking herself for the struggle. In
preceding years, the Austrian diplomatist, Kaunitz, had so
managed the French court, especially through the medium of
Madame de Pompadour, that Louis XV. was now on the side of
Maria Theresa, who had bowed her neck so far as to write to
the French king's mistress as 'Ma Cousine,' while Frederick
forgot policy, and spoke of the Pompadour in slighting terms.
'Je ne la connais pas,' said he once, and was never forgiven.
... The agreement with Russia to partition Prussia had already
been made, and Frederick's sharp tongue had betrayed him into
calling the czarina that 'Infame catin du nord.' Saxony waited
for the appearance of her stronger neighbours in order to join
them. England alone was Frederick's ally."
Colonel C. B. Brackenbury,
Frederick the Great,
chapter 9.
"The secret sources of the Third Silesian War, since called
'Seven-Years War,' go back to 1745; nay, we may say, to the
First Invasion of Silesia in 1740. For it was in Maria
Theresa's incurable sorrow at loss of Silesia, and her
inextinguishable hope to reconquer it, that this and all
Friedrich's other Wars had their origin. ... Traitor Menzel
the Saxon Kanzellist ... has been busy for Prussia ever since
'the end of 1752.' Got admittance to the Presses; sent his
first Excerpt 'about the time of Easter-Fair 1753,'--time of
Voltaire's taking wing. And has been at work ever since.
Copying Despatches from the most secret Saxon Repositories;
ready always on Excellency Maltzahn's indicating the Piece
wanted [Maltzahn being the Prussian Minister at Dresden]. ...
Menzel ... lasted in free activity till 1757; and was then put
under lock and key. Was not hanged: sat prisoner for
twenty-seven years after; over-grown with hair, legs and arms
chained together, heavy iron-bar uniting both ankles; diet
bread-and-water;--for the rest, healthy; and died, not very
miserable it is said, in 1784."
T. Carlyle,
History of Friedrich II. of Prussia,
book 17, chapter 1 (volume 7).
ALSO IN:
Duc de Broglie,
The King's Secret,
chapters 1-2 (volume 1).
Frederick II.,
History of the Seven Years War
(Posthumous Works, volume 2), chapter 3.
H. Tuttle,
History of Prussia, 1745-1756
(volume 3), chapters 6-9.
F. Von Raumer,
Contributions to Modern History:
Frederick II. and his Times, chapters 24-28.
See, also,
ENGLAND: A. D. 1754-1755;
and AUSTRIA: A. D. 1755-1763.
GERMANY: A. D. 1756.
The Seven Years War:
Frederick strikes the first blow.
Saxony subdued.
"Finding that the storm was wholly inevitable, and must burst
on him next year, he [Frederick], with bold sagacity,
determined to forestall it. First, then, in August, 1756, his
ambassador at Vienna had orders to demand of the Empress Queen
a statement of her intentions, to announce war as the
alternative, and to declare that he would accept no answer 'in
the style of an oracle.' The answer, as he expected, was
evasive. Without further delay an army of 60,000 Prussians,
headed by Frederick in person, poured into Saxony. The Queen
of Poland was taken in Dresden: the King of Poland [Augustus
III. Elector of Saxony, and, by election, King of Poland] and
his troops were blockaded in Pirna. Thus did Frederick
commence that mighty struggle which is known to Germans by the
name of the Seven Years' War. The first object of the Prussian
monarch at Dresden was to obtain possession of the original
documents of the coalition against him, whose existence he
knew by means of the traitor Menzel. The Queen of Poland, no
less aware than Frederick of the importance of these papers,
had carried them to her own bed-chamber. She sat down on the
trunk which contained the most material ones, and declared to
the Prussian officer sent to seize them that nothing but force
should move her from the spot. [The official account of this
occurrence which Carlyle produces represents the Queen as
'standing before the door' of the 'archive apartment' in which
the compromising documents were locked up, she having
previously sealed the door.] This officer was of Scottish
blood, General Keith, the Earl Marischal's brother.
{1496}
'All Europe,' said the Queen, 'would exclaim against this
outrage; and then, sir, you will be the victim; depend upon
it, your King is a man to sacrifice you to his own honour!'
Keith, who knew Frederick's character, was startled, and sent
for further orders; but on receiving a reiteration of the
first he did his duty. The papers were then made public,
appended to a manifesto in vindication of Frederick's conduct;
and they convinced the world that, although the apparent
aggressor in his invasion of Saxony, he had only acted on the
principles of self-defence. Meanwhile, the Prussian army
closely blockaded the Saxon in Pirna, but the Austrian, under
Marshal Brown, an officer of British extraction, was advancing
to its relief through the mountain passes of Bohemia.
Frederick left a sufficient force to maintain the blockade,
marched against Brown with the remainder, and gave him battle
at Lowositz [or Lobositz] on the 1st of October. It proved a
hard-fought day; the King no longer found, as he says in one
of his letters, the old Austrians he remembered; and his loss
in killed and wounded was greater than theirs [3,308 against
2,984]; but victory declared on his side. Then retracing his
steps towards Pirna he compelled, by the pressure of famine,
the whole Saxon army, 17,000 strong, to an unconditional
surrender. The officers were sent home on parole, but the
soldiers were induced, partly by force and partly by
persuasion, to enlist in the Prussian ranks, and swear
fidelity to Frederick. Their former sovereign, King Augustus,
remained securely perched on his castle-rock of Königstein,
but, becoming weary of confinement, solicited, and was most
readily granted, passports to Warsaw. During the whole winter
Frederick fixed his head-quarters at Dresden, treating Saxony
in all respects as a conquered province, or as one of his own.
Troops and taxes were levied throughout that rich and populous
land with unsparing rigour, and were directed against the very
cause which the sovereign of that land had embraced."
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 33 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
T. Carlyle,
History of Friedrich II.,
book 17, chapters 4-8 (volume 7).
Lord Dover,
Life of Frederick IL,
volume 2, chapter 1.
GERMANY: A.-D. 1756-1757.
The Seven Years War:
Frederick under the Ban of the Empire.
The coalition against Frederick.
"All through the winter Austria strained every nerve to
consolidate her alliances, and she did not scruple to use her
position at the head of the Empire, in order to drag that body
into the quarrel that had arisen between two of its members.
On his own responsibility, without consulting the electors,
princes, and cities, the Emperor passed sentence on Frederick,
and condemned him, unheard, as a disturber of the peace. Many
of the great cities altogether refused to publish the
Emperor's decree, and even among the states generally
subservient to Austria there were some that were alarmed at so
flagrant a disregard of law and precedent. It may have seemed
a sign of what was to be expected should Prussia be
annihilated, and no state remain in Germany that dared to lift
up its voice against Austria. Nevertheless, in spite of this
feeling, and in spite of the opposition of nearly all the
Protestant states, Austria succeeded in inducing the Empire to
espouse her cause. In all three colleges of electors, princes,
and cities she obtained a majority, and at a diet held on
January 17, 1757, it was resolved that an army of the Empire
should be set on foot for the purpose of making war on
Prussia. Some months later Frederick was put to the ban of the
Empire. But the use of this antiquated weapon served rather to
throw ridicule on those who employed it than to injure him
against whom it was launched. ... It has been calculated that
the population of the States arrayed against Frederick the
Great amounted to 90,000,000, and that they put 430,000 men
into the field in the year 1757. The population of Prussia was
4,500,000, her army 200,000 strong; but, after deducting the
garrisons of the fortresses, there remained little over
150,000 men available for service in the field. The odds
against Frederick were great, but they were not absolutely
overwhelming. His territories were scattered and difficult of
defence, the extremities hardly defensible at all; but he
occupied a central position from which he might, by rapidity
of movement, be able to take his assailants in detail, unless
their plans were distinguished by a harmony unusual in the
efforts of a coalition."
F. W. Longman,
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War,
chapter 8, section 3.
GERMANY: A. D. 1756-1758.
War of Prussia with Sweden in Pomerania.
See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1720-1792.
GERMANY: A. D. 1757 (April-June).
The Seven Years War:
Frederick's, invasion of Bohemia.
Victory at Prague and defeat at Kolin.
"At the commencement of 1757, the grand confederacy against
the king of Prussia was consolidated by the efforts and
intrigues of the court of Vienna. The French had drawn
together 80,000 men on the Rhine, under the command of marshal
d' Etrées; the army of execution was assembling in the empire;
the Swedes were preparing to penetrate into Pomerania, and
60,000 Russians were stationed on the frontiers of Livonia,
waiting the season of action to burst into the kingdom of
Prussia. With this favourable aspect of affairs, the empress
prepared for the campaign by augmenting her forces in Hungary
and Bohemia to 150,000 men; the main army, stationed in the
vicinity of Prague, was commanded by Prince Charles, who was
assisted by the skill of marshal Brown, and the other corps
intrusted to count Daun. Frederic possessed too much foresight
and vigilance to remain inactive while his enemies were
collecting their forces; he therefore resolved to carry the
war into the heart of the Austrian territories, and by a
decisive stroke to shake the basis of the confederacy. He
covered this plan with consummate address; he affected great
trepidation and uncertainty, and, to deceive the Austrians
into a belief that he only intended to maintain himself in
Saxony, put Dresden in a state of defence, broke down the
bridges, and marked out various camps in the vicinity. In the
midst of this apparent alarm three Prussian columns burst into
Bohemia, in April, and rapidly advanced towards Prague. ...
The Austrians, pressed on all sides, retreated with
precipitation under the walls of Prague, on the southern side
of the Moldau, while the Prussians advancing towards the
capital formed two bodies; one under Schwerin remaining at
Jung Bunzlau, and the other, headed by the king, occupying the
heights between the Moldau and the Weisseberg.
{1497}
Expecting to be joined by marshal Daun, who was hastening from
Moravia, the Austrians remained on the defensive; but prince
Charles took so strong a position as seemed to defy all
apprehensions of an attack. ... These obstacles, however, were
insufficient to arrest the daring spirit of Frederic, who
resolved to attack the Austrians before the arrival of Daun.
Leaving a corps under prince Maurice above Prague, he crossed
the Moldau near Rostock and Podabe on the 5th of May, with
16,000 men, and on the following morning at break of day was
joined by the corps under marshal Schwerin. ... Victory
declared on the side of the Prussians, but was purchased by
the loss of their best troops, not less than 18,000, even by
the avowal of the king, being killed, with many of his bravest
officers, and Schwerin, the father of the Prussian discipline,
and the guide of Frederic in the career of victory. Of the
Austrians 8,000 were killed and wounded, 9,000 made prisoners,
and 28,000 shut up within the walls of Prague. ... A column of
16,000 Austrians made good their retreat along the Moldau to
join the army of marshal Daun. Prague was instantly blockaded
by the victorious army, and not less than 100,000 souls were
confined within the walls, almost without the means of
subsistence. They were soon reduced to the greatest
extremities. ... In this disastrous moment the house of
Austria was preserved from impending destruction by the skill
and caution of a general, who now, for the first time,
appeared at the head of an army. This general was Leopold
count Daun, a native of Bohemia. ... Daun had marched through
Moravia towards Prague, to effect a junction with prince
Charles. On arriving at Boehmischgrod, within a few miles of
Prague, he was apprised of the recent defeat, and halted a few
days to collect the fugitives, till his corps swelled so
considerably that Frederic detached against him the prince of
Bevern with 20,000 men." Daun declined battle and retreated,
until he had collected an army of 60,000 men and restored
their courage. He then advanced, forcing back the prince of
Bevern, and when Frederick, joining the latter with
reinforcements, attacked him at Kolin, on the 18th of June, he
inflicted on the Prussian king a disastrous defeat--the first
which Frederick had known. The Prussian troops, "for the first
time defeated, gave way to despondency, and in their retreat
exclaimed, 'This is our Pultawa.' Daun purchased the victory
with the loss of 9,000 men; but on the side of the Prussians
not less than 14,000 were killed, wounded, and taken
prisoners, and 43 pieces of artillery, with 22 standards, fell
into the hands of the Austrians. Maria Theresa ... conveyed in
person the news of this important victory to the countess
Daun, and instituted the military order of merit, or the Order
of Maria Theresa, with which she decorated the commander and
officers who had most signalised themselves, and dated its
commencement from the æra of that glorious victory. To give
repose to the troops, and to replace the magazines which had
been destroyed by the Prussians, Daun remained several days on
the field of battle; and as he advanced to Prague found that
the Prussians had raised the siege on the 20th of June, and
were retreating with precipitation towards Saxony and
Lusatia."
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 112 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
Colonel C. B. Brackenbury,
Frederick the Great,
chapters 11-12.
F. Kugler,
Pict. History of Germany during the
Reign of Frederick the Great,
chapter 25.
GERMANY: A. D. 1757 (July-December).
The Seven Years War:
Darkening and brightening of Frederick's career.
Closter-Seven.
Rossbach.
Leuthen.
The enemies of the King of Prussia "were now closing upon him
from every side. The provinces beyond the Vistula became the
prey of Russian hordes, to which only one division of
Prussians under Marshal Lehwald was opposed. In the result,
however, their own devastations, and the consequent want of
supplies, proved a check to their further progress during this
campaign. In Westphalia above 80,000 effective French soldiers
were advancing, commanded by the Mareschal d'Estrées, a
grandson of the famous minister Louvois. The Duke of
Cumberland, who had undertaken to defend his father's
electorate against them, was at the head of a motley army of
scarce 50,000 men. ... His military talents were not such as
to supply his want of numbers or of combination; he allowed
the French to pass the deep and rapid Weser unopposed; he gave
them no disturbance when laying waste great part of the
Electorate; he only fell back from position to position until
at length the enemy came up with him at the village of
Hastenback near Hameln. There, on the 26th of July, an action
was fought, and the Duke was worsted with the loss of several
hundred men, The only resource of His Royal Highness was a
retreat across the wide Lüneberg moors, to cover the town of
Stade towards the mouth of the Elbe, where the archives and
other valuable effects from Hanover had been already deposited
for safety." Intrigue at Versailles having recalled D'Estrées
and sent the Duke de Richelieu into his place, the latter
pressed the Duke of Cumberland so closely, hemming him in and
cutting off his communications, that he was soon glad to make
terms. On the 8th of September the English Duke signed, at
Closter-Seven, a convention under which the auxiliary troops
in his army were sent home, the Hanoverians dispersed, and
only a garrison left at Stade. "After the battle of Kolin and
the Convention of Closter-Seven, the position of Frederick,--
hemmed in on almost every side by victorious enemies,--was not
only most dangerous but well-nigh desperate. To his own eyes
it seemed so. He resolved in his thoughts, and discussed with
his friends, the voluntary death of Otho as a worthy example
to follow. Fully resolved never to fall alive into the hands
of his enemies, nor yet to survive any decisive overthrow, he
carried about his person a sure poison in a small glass phial.
Yet ... he could still, with indomitable skill and energy, make
every preparation for encountering the Prince de Soubise. He
marched against the French commander at the head of only
22,000 men; but these were veterans, trained in the strictest
discipline, and full of confidence in their chief. Soubise, on
the other hand, owed his appointment in part to his
illustrious lineage, as head of the House of Rohan, and still
more to Court-favour, as the minion of Madame de Pompadour,
but in no degree to his own experience or abilities. He had
under his orders nearly 40,000 of his countrymen, and nearly
20,000 troops of the Empire; for the Germanic diet also had
been induced to join the league against Frederick. On the 5th
of November the two armies came to a battle at Rosbach [or
Rossbach], close to the plain of Lützen, where in the
preceding century Gustavus Adolphus conquered and fell.
{1498}
By the skilful manœvres of Frederick the French were brought
to believe that the Prussians intended nothing but retreat,
and they advanced in high spirits as if only to pursue the
fugitives. Of a sudden they found themselves attacked with all
the compactness of discipline, and all the courage of despair.
The troops of the Empire, a motley crew, fled at the first
fire. ... So rapid was the victory that the right wing of the
Prussians, under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, was never
engaged at all. Great numbers of the French were cut down in
their flight by the Prussian cavalry, not a few perished in
the waters of the Saale, and full 7,000 were made prisoners,
with a large amount of baggage, artillery and standards. ...
The battle of Rosbach was not more remarkable for its military
results than for its moral influence. It was hailed throughout
Germany as a triumph of the Teutonic over the Gallic race. ...
So precarious was now Frederick's position that the battle of
Rosbach, as he said himself, gained him nothing but leisure to
fight another battle elsewhere. During his absence on the
Saale, the Austrian armies had poured over the mountains into
Silesia; they had defeated the Prussians under the Duke of
Bevern; they had taken the main fortress, Schweidnitz, and the
capital, Breslau; nearly the whole province was already
theirs. A flying detachment of 4,000 cavalry, under General
Haddick, had even pushed into Brandenburg, and levied a
contribution from the city of Berlin [entering one of the
suburbs of the Prussian capital and holding it for twelve
hours]. The advancing season seemed to require winter
quarters, but Frederick never dreamed of rest until Silesia
was recovered. He hastened by forced marches from the Saale to
the Oder, gathering reinforcements while he went along. As he
drew near Breslau, the Imperial commander, Prince Charles of
Lorraine, flushed with recent victory and confident in
superior numbers, disregarded the prudent advice of Marshal
Daun, and descended from an almost inaccessible position to
give the King of Prussia battle on the open plain. ... On the
5th of December, one month from the battle of Rosbach, the two
armies met at Leuthen, a small village near Breslau, Frederick
with 40,000, Prince Charles of Lorraine with between 60,000
and 70,000 men. For several hours did the conflict rage
doubtfully and fiercely. It was decided mainly by the skill
and the spirit of the Prussian monarch. 'The battle of
Leuthen,' says Napoleon, 'was a master-piece. Did it even
stand alone it would of itself entitle Frederick to immortal
fame.' In killed, wounded and taken, the Austrians lost no
less than 27,000 men; above 50 standards, above 100 cannon,
above 4,000 waggons, became the spoil of the victors; Breslau
was taken, Schweidnitz blockaded, Silesia recovered; the
remnant of the Imperial forces fled back across the mountains;
and Frederick, after one of the longest and most glorious
campaigns that History records, at length allowed himself and
his soldiers some repose."
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 34 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
T. Carlyle,
History of Friedrich II.,
book 18, chapters 5-10.
Lord Dover,
Life of Frederick II.,
volume 2, chapters 3-4.
Sir E. Cust,
Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century,
volume 2, pages 217-240.
GERMANY: A. D. 1758.
The Seven Years War:
Campaign in Hanover.
Siege of Olmütz.
Russian defeat at Zorndorf.
Prussian defeat at Hochkirch.
"Before the end of 1757, England began to take a more active
part on the Continent. Lord Chatham brought about the
rejection of the Convention of Closter-Zeven by Parliament,
and the recall of Cumberland by the king. The efficient Prince
Ferdinand of Brunswick was proposed by Frederick and made
commander of the English and Hanoverian forces. He opened the
campaign of 1758 in the winter. The French, under Clermont,
being without discipline or control, he drove them in headlong
flight out of their winter-quarters in Hanover and Westphalia,
to the Rhine and across it; and on June 23 defeated them at
the battle of Crefeld. A French army under Soubise afterward
crossed the Rhine higher up, and Ferdinand, retreated, but
succeeded in protecting the west as far as the Weser against
General Contades. Frederick first retook Schweidnitz, April
16. He then, in order to prevent the junction of the Russians
and Austrians, ventured to attack Austria, and invaded
Moravia. His brother, Prince Henry, had but a small force in
Saxony, and Frederick thought that he could best cover that
country by an attack on Austria. But the siege of Olmütz
detained him from May until July, and his prospects grew more
doubtful. The Austrians captured a convoy of 300 wagons of
military stores, which Ziethen was to have escorted to him.
[Instead of 800, the convoy comprised 3,000 to 4,000 wagons,
of which only 200 reached the Prussian camp, and its
destruction by General Loudon completely frustrated
Frederick's plan of campaign.] Frederick raised the siege,
and, by an admirable retreat, brought his army through Bohemia
by way of Königgrätz to Landshut. Here he received bad news.
The Russians, under Fermor, were again in Prussia, occupying
the eastern province, but treating it mildly as a conquered
country, where the empress already received the homage of the
people. They then advanced, with frightful ravages, through
Pomerania and Neumark to the Oder, and were now near Küstrin,
which they laid in ashes. Frederick made haste to meet them.
He was so indignant at the desolation of the country and the
suffering of his people that he forbade quarter to be given.
The report of this fact also embittered the Russians. At
Zorndorf, Frederick met the enemy, 50,000 strong, August 25,
1758. They were drawn up in a great square or phalanx, in the
ancient, half-barbarous manner. A frightfully bloody fight
followed, since the Russians would not yield, and were cut
down in heaps. Seidlitz, the victor of Rossbach, by a timely
charge of his cavalry, captured the Russian artillery, and
crushed their right wing. On the second day the Russians were
driven back, but not without inflicting heavy loss on the
Prussians, who, though they suffered much less than their
enemies, left more than one third of their force on the field.
The Russians were compelled to withdraw from Prussia.
Frederick then hastened to Saxony, where his brother Henry was
sorely pressed by Daun and the imperial army. He could not
even wait to relieve Silesia, where Neisse, his principal
fortress, was threatened. Daun, hearing of his approach, took
up a position in his way, between Bautzen and Görlitz. But
Frederick, whose contempt for this prudent and slow general
was excessive, occupied a camp in a weak and exposed position,
at Hochkirch, under Daun's very eyes, against the protest of
his own generals.
{1499}
He remained there three days unmolested; but on October 14,
the day fixed for advancing, the Austrians attacked him with
twice his numbers. A desperate fight took place in the burning
village; the Prussians were driven out, and lost many guns.
Frederick himself was in imminent danger, and his friends
Keith and Duke Francis of Brunswick fell at his side. Yet the
army did not lose its spirit or its discipline. Within eleven
days Frederick, who had been joined by his brother Henry, was
in Silesia, and relieved Neisse and Kosel. Thus the campaign
of 1758 ended favorably to Frederick. The pope sent Daun a
consecrated hat and sword, as a testimonial for his victory at
Hochkirch."
C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
book 5, chapter 23, sections 7-9.
ALSO IN:
G. B. Malleson,
Military Life of Loudon,
chapters 7-8.
F. Kugler,
Pict. History of Germany during the
Reign of Frederick the Great,
chapters 29-31.
Frederick II.,
History of the Seven Years War
(Posthumous Works, volume 2), chapter 8.
GERMANY: A. D. 1759 (April-August).
The Seven Years War:
Prince Ferdinand's Hanoverian campaign.
Defeat at Bergen and victory at Minden.
In the Hanoverian field of war, where Prince Ferdinand of
Brunswick held command, the campaign of 1759 was important,
and prosperous in the end for the allies of Prussia. "Besides
the Hanoverians and Hessians in British pay, he [Prince
Ferdinand] had under his direction 10,000 or 12,000 British
soldiers, amongst whom, since the death of the Duke of
Marlborough, Lord George Sackville was the senior officer. The
French, on their part, were making great exertions, under the
new administration of the Duke de Choiseul; large
reinforcements were sent into Germany, and early in the year
they surprised by stratagem the free city of Frankfort and
made it the place of arms for their southern army. No object
could be of greater moment to Ferdinand than to dislodge them
from this important post." Marching quickly, with 30,000 of
his army, he attacked the French, under the Duke de Broglie,
at Bergen, on the Nidda, in front of Frankfort, April 13, and
was repulsed, after heavy fighting, with a loss of 2,000 men.
"This reverse would, it was supposed, reduce Prince Ferdinand
to the defensive during the remainder of the campaign. Both De
Broglie and Contades eagerly pushed forward, their opponents
giving way before them. Combining their forces, they reduced
Cassel, Munster, and Minden, and they felt assured that the
whole Electorate must soon again be theirs. Already had the
archives and the most valuable property been sent off from
Hanover to Stade. Already did a new Hastenbeck--a new
Closter-Seven--rise in view. But it was under such
difficulties that the genius of Ferdinand shone forth. With a
far inferior army (for thus much is acknowledged, although I
do not find the French numbers clearly or precisely stated),
he still maintained his ground on the left of the Weser, and
supplied every defect by his superiority of tactics. He left a
detachment of 5,000 men exposed, and seemingly unguarded, as a
bait to lure De Contades from his strong position at Minden.
The French Mareschal was deceived by the feint, and directed
the Duke De Broglie to march forward and profit by the
blunder, as he deemed it to be. On the 1st of August,
accordingly, De Broglie advanced into the plain, his force
divided in eight columns." Instead of the small corps
expected, he found the whole army of the allies in front of
him. De Contades hurried to his assistance, and the French,
forced to accept battle in an unfavorable position, were
overcome. At the decisive moment of their retreat, "the Prince
sent his orders to Lord George Sackville, who commanded the
whole English and some German cavalry on the right wing of the
Allies, and who had hitherto been kept back as a reserve. The
orders were to charge and overwhelm the French in their
retreat, before they could reach any clear ground to rally.
Had these orders been duly fulfilled, it is acknowledged by
French writers that their army must have been utterly
destroyed; but Lord George either could not or would not
understand what was enjoined on him. ... Under such
circumstances the victory of Minden would not have been signal
or complete but for a previous and most high-spirited
precaution of Prince Ferdinand. He had sent round to the rear
of the French a body of 10,000 men, under his nephew--and also
the King of Prussia's--the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick.
... Thus Ferdinand became master of the passes, and the French
were constrained to continue their retreat in disorder. Upon the
whole, their loss was 8,000 men killed, wounded, or taken, 30
pieces of artillery, and 17 standards. ... Great was the
rejoicing in England at the victory of Minden"; but loud the
outcry against Lord George Sackville, who was recalled and
dismissed from all his employments.
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 36 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
Sir E. Cust,
Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century,
volume 2, pages 327-333.
GERMANY: A. D. 1759 (July-November).
The Seven Years War:
Disasters of Frederick.
Kunersdorf.
Dresden.
Maxen.
"Three years of the war were gone and the ardour of
Frederick's' enemies showed no signs of abating. The war was
unpopular in the Russian army, but the Czarina thought no
sacrifice too great for the gratification of her hatred.
France was sick of it too, and tottering on the verge of
national bankruptcy, but Louis was kept true to his
engagements by domestic influences and by the unbending
determination of Maria Theresa never to lay down arms until
Prussia was thoroughly humbled. ... Already Frederick was at
his wits' end for men and money. Of the splendid infantry
which had stormed the heights at Prague, and stemmed the rout
of Kollin, very little now remained. ... Moreover, Austria,
relying on her vastly larger population, had ceased to
exchange prisoners, and after the end of 1759 Russia followed
her example. ... Frederick's pecuniary difficulties were even
greater still. But for the English subsidy he could hardly
have subsisted at all. ... The summer was half gone before
there was any serious fighting. Frederick had got together
125,000 men of some sort, besides garrison troops, but he no
longer felt strong enough to take the initiative, and the
Austrians were equally indisposed to attack without the
co-operation of their allies. Towards the middle of July the
Russians, under Count Soltikoff, issued from Posen, advanced
to the Oder', and, after defeating a weak Prussian corps near
Kay, took possession of Frankfort.
{1500}
It now became necessary for the king to march in person
against them, the more especially as Laudon [or Loudon] with
18,000 Austrians was on his way to join Soltikoff. Before he
could reach Frankfort, Laudon, eluding with much dexterity the
vigilance of his enemies, effected his junction, and
Frederick, with 48,000 men, found himself confronted by an
army 78,000 strong. The Russians were encamped on the heights
of Kunersdorf, east of Frankfort." Frederick attacked them,
August 12, with brilliant success at first, routing their left
wing and taking 70 guns, with several thousand prisoners. "The
Prussian generals then besought the king to rest content with
the advantage he had gained. The day was intensely hot; his
soldiers had been on foot for twelve hours, and were suffering
severely from thirst and exhaustion; moreover, if the Russians
were let alone, they would probably go off quietly in the
night, as they had done after Zorndorf. Unhappily Frederick
refused to take counsel. He wanted to destroy the Russian
army, not merely to defeat it; he had seized the Frankfort
bridge and cut off its retreat." He persisted in his attack
and was beaten off. "The Prussians were in full retreat when
Laudon swept down upon them with eighteen fresh squadrons. The
retreat became a rout more disorderly than in any battle of
the war except Rossbach. The king, stupefied with his
disaster, could hardly be induced to quit the field, and was
heard to mutter, 'Is there then no cursed bullet that can
reach me?' The defeat was overwhelming. Had it been properly
followed up, it must have put an end to the war, and
Kunersdorf would have ranked among the decisive battles of the
world. Berlin lay open to the enemy; the royal family fled to
Magdeburg. For the first (and last) time in his life Frederick
gave way utterly to despair. 'I have no resources left,' he wrote
to the minister Finckenstein the evening after the battle,
'and to tell the truth I hold all for lost. I shall not
survive the ruin of my country. Farewell for ever.' The same
night he resigned the command of the army to General Finck.
Eighteen thousand, five hundred of his soldiers were killed,
wounded, or prisoners, and the rest were so scattered that no
more than 3,000 remained under his command. All the artillery
was lost, and most of his best generals were killed or
wounded. ... By degrees, however, the prospect brightened. The
fugitives kept coming in, and the enemy neglected to give the
finishing stroke. Frederick shook off his despair, and resumed
the command of his army. Artillery was ordered up from Berlin,
and the troops serving against the Swedes were recalled from
Pomerania. Within a week of Kunersdorf he was at the head of
33,000 men, and in a position to send relief to Dresden, which
was besieged by an Austrian and Imperialist army. The relief,
as it happened, arrived just too late." Dresden was
surrendered by its commandant, Schmettau, on the 4th of
September, to the great wrath of Frederick. By a wonderful
march of fifty-eight miles in fifty hours, Prince Henry, the
brother of Frederick, prevented the Austrians from gaining the
whole electorate of Saxony. The Russians and the Austrians
quarrelled, the former complaining that they were left to do
all the fighting, and presently they withdrew into Poland.
"With the departure of the Russians, the campaign would
probably have ended, had not Frederick's desire to close it
with a victory led him into a fresh disaster, hardly less
serious and far more disgraceful than that of Kunersdorf. ...
With the view of hastening the retreat of the Austrians, and
of driving them, if possible, into the difficult Pirna
country, he ordered General Finck to take post with his corps
at Maxen, to bar their direct line of communications with
Bohemia." As the result, Finck, with his whole corps, of
12,000, were overwhelmed and taken prisoners. "The
capitulation of Maxen was no less destructive of Frederick's
plans than galling to his pride. The Austrians now retained
Dresden, a place of great strategical importance, though the
king, in the hope of dislodging them, exposed the wrecks of
his army to the ruinous hardships of a winter campaign, in
weather of unusual severity, and borrowed 12,000 men of
Ferdinand of Brunswick to cover his flank while so engaged.
The new year had commenced before he allowed his harassed
troops to go into winter-quarters."
F. W. Longman,
Frederick the Great and the Seven Years War,
chapter 10, section 2.
ALSO IN:
T. Carlyle,
History of Friedrich II.;
book 19, chapters 4-7.
Frederick II.,
History of the Seven Years War
(Posthumous Works, volume 3), chapter 10.
GERMANY: A. D. 1760.
The Seven Years War:
Saxony reconquered by Frederick.
Dresden bombarded.
Battles of Liegnitz, Torgau and Warburg.
"The campaign of 1759 had extended far into the winter, and
Frederick conceived the bold idea of renewing it while the
vigilance of his enemies was relaxed in winter quarters, and
of making another effort to drive the Austrians from Saxony.
His head-quarters were at Freyberg. Having received
reinforcements from Prince Ferdinand, and been joined by
12,000 men under the hereditary prince, he left the latter to
keep guard behind the Mulde, and in January 1760, at a time
when the snow lay deep upon the ground, he made a fierce
spring upon the Austrians, who were posted at Dippoldiswalde;
but General Maguire, who commanded there, baffled him by the
vigilance and skill with which he guarded every pass, and
compelled him to retrace his steps to Freyberg. When the
winter had passed and the regular campaign had opened, Laudohn
[Loudon], one of the most active of the Austrian generals--the
same who had borne a great part in the victories of
Hochkirchen and Kunersdorf--entered Silesia, surprised with a
greatly superior force the Prussian General Fouqué, compelled
him, with some thousands of soldiers, to surrender [at
Landshut, June 22], and a few days later reduced the important
fortress of Glatz [July 26]. Frederick, at the first news of
the danger of Fouqué, marched rapidly towards Silesia, Daun
slowly following, while an Austrian corps, under General Lacy,
impeded his march by incessant skirmishes. On learning the
surrender of Fouqué, Frederick at once turned and hastened
towards Dresden. It was July, and the heat was so intense that
on a single day more than a hundred of his soldiers dropped dead
upon the march. He hoped to gain some days upon Daun, who was
still pursuing, and to become master of Dresden before
succours arrived. As he expected, he soon outstripped the
Austrian general, and the materials for the siege were
collected with astonishing rapidity, but General Maguire, who
commanded at Dresden, defended it with complete success till
the approach of the Austrian army obliged Frederick to retire.
{1501}
Baffled in his design, he took a characteristic vengeance by
bombarding that beautiful city with red-hot balls,
slaughtering multitudes of its peaceable inhabitants, and
reducing whole quarters to ashes; and he then darted again
upon Silesia, still followed by the Austrian general. Laudohn
had just met with his first reverse, having failed in the
siege of Breslau [an attempted surprise and a brief
bombardment]; on August 15, when Daun was still far off,
Frederick fell upon him and beat him in the battle of
Liegnitz. [The statement that 'Daun was still far off' appears
to be erroneous. Loudon and Daun had formed a junction four
days before, and had planned a concerted attack on Frederick's
camp; Loudon was struck and defeated while making the movement
agreed upon, and Daun was only a few miles away at the time.]
Soon after, however, this success was counterbalanced by Lacy
and Totleben, who; at the head of some Austrians and Russians,
had marched upon Berlin, which, after a brave resistance, was
once more captured and ruthlessly plundered; but on the
approach of Frederick the enemy speedily retreated. Frederick
then turned again towards Saxony, which was again occupied by
Daun, and on November 3 he attacked his old enemy in his
strong entrenchments at Torgau. Daun, in addition to the
advantage of position, had the advantage of great numerical
superiority, for his army was reckoned at 65,000, while that
of Frederick was not more than 44,000. But the generalship of
Frederick gained the victory. General Ziethen succeeded in
attacking the Austrians in the rear, gaining the height, and
throwing them into confusion. Daun was wounded and disabled,
and General O'Donnell, who was next in command, was unable to
restore the Austrian line. The day was conspicuous for its
carnage, even among the bloody battles of the Seven Years'
War: 20,000 Austrians were killed, wounded, or prisoners,
while 14,000 Prussians were left on the field. The battle
closed the campaign for the year, leaving all Saxony in the
possession of the Prussians, with the exception of Dresden,
which was still held by Maguire. The English and German army,
under Prince Ferdinand, succeeded in the meantime in keeping
at bay a very superior French army, under Marshal Broglio; and
several slight skirmishes took place, with various results.
The battle of Warburg, which was the most important, was won
chiefly by the British cavalry, but Prince Ferdinand failed in
his attempts to take Wesel and Gottingen; and at the close of
the year the French took up their quarters at Cassel."
W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England, 18th Century,
chapter 8 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
W. Coxe,
History of the House of Austria,
chapter 115 (volume 3).
G. B. Malleson,
Military Life of Loudon,
chapter 10.
T. Carlyle,
History of Friedrich II.,
book 20, chapters 1-6.
GERMANY: A. D. 1761-1762.
The Seven Years War:
The closing campaigns.
"All Frederick's exertions produced him only 96,000 men for
defence of Silesia and Saxony this year [1761]. Prince Henry
had to face Daun in Saxony; the king himself stood in Silesia
against Loudon and the Russians under Butterlin. Loudon opened
the campaign by advancing against Goltz, near Schweidnitz, in
April. Goltz had only 12,000 to his adversary's 30,000, but
posted himself so well that Loudon could not attack him.
Reinforcements came gradually to Loudon, raising his army to
72,000, but orders from Vienna obliged him to remain inactive
till he could be joined near Neisse by the Russians with
60,000. Goltz, manœuvring against the Russians, was taken
prisoner. The king himself delayed the junction of his enemies
for some time, but could not now offer battle. The junction
took place the 18th of August. He then struck at Loudon's
communications, but the thrust was well parried, and on the
20th of August, Frederick, for the first time, was reduced to
an attitude of pure defence. He formed an intrenched camp at
Bunzelwitz, and lay there, blocking the way to Schweidnitz.
Loudon's intreaties could not persuade the Russians to join
him in full force to attack the position, and on the 9th of
September Butterlin's army fell back across the Oder, leaving
20,000 of his men to act under Loudon. Frederick remained a
fortnight longer in the camp of Bunzelwitz, but was then
forced to go, as his army was eating up the magazines of
Schweidnitz. Again he moved against Loudon's magazines, but
the Austrian general boldly marched for Schweidnitz, and
captured the place by assault on the night of the 30th
September--1st October. No fight took place between London and
the king. They both went into winter quarters in
December--Prussians at Strehlen, Austrians at Kunzendorf, and
Russians about Glatz. ... In the western theatre Ferdinand
defeated Broglio and Soubise at Vellinghausen [or
Wellinghausen, or Kirch-Denkern, as the battle, fought July
15, is differently called], the English contingent again
behaving gloriously. ... Prince Henry and Daun manœuvred
skilfully throughout the campaign, but never came to serious
blows. Frederick is described as being very gloomy in mind
this winter. The end of the year left him with but 60,000 men
in Saxony, Silesia, and the north. Eugene of Wurtemburg had
5,000 to hold back the Swedes, Prince Henry 25,000 in Saxony,
the king himself 30,000. But the agony of France was
increasing; Maria Theresa had to discharge 20,000 men from
want of money, and Frederick's bitter enemy, 'cette infame
Catin du Nord' [the czarina Elizabeth], was failing fast in
health. A worse blow to the king than the loss of a battle had
been the fall of Pitt, in October, and with him all hope of
English subsidies. Still, the enemies of Prussia were almost
exhausted. One more year of brave and stubborn resistance, and
Prussia must be left in peace. By extraordinary exertions, and
a power of administrative organisation which was one of his
greatest qualities, Frederick not only kept up his 60, 000,
but doubled their number. In the spring he had 70,000 for his
Silesian army, 40,000 for Prince Henry in Saxony, and 10,000
for the Swedes or other purposes. Best news of all, the
czarina died on the 5th of January, 1762, and Peter, who
succeeded her--only for a short time, poor boy--was an ardent
admirer of the great king. Frederick at once released and sent
home his Russian prisoners, an act which brought back his
Prussians from Russia. On the 23rd February Peter declared his
intention to be at peace and amity with Frederick, concluded
peace on the 5th of May, and a treaty of alliance a month
later. The Swedes, following suit, declared peace on the 22nd
of May, and Frederick could now give his sole attention to the
Austrians." For a few weeks, only, the Prussian king had a
Russian contingent of 20,000 in alliance with him, but could
make no use of it.
{1502}
It was recalled in July, by the revolution at St. Petersburg,
which deposed the young czar, Peter, in favour of his
ambitious consort, Catherine. Frederick succeeded in
concealing the fact long enough to frighten Daun by a show of
preparations for attacking him, with the Russian troops
included in his army, and the Austrian general retired to
Glatz and Bohemia. Frederick then took Schweidnitz, and
marched on Dresden. "Daun followed heavily. Like a
prize-fighter knocked out of time, he had no more fight in
him. Prince Henry had two affairs with the Reich's army and
its Austrian contingent. Forced to retire from Freyburg on the
15th, he afterwards attacked them on the 29th of October and
defeated them by a turning movement. They had 40,000, he 30,
000. The Austrian contingent suffered most. In the western
theatre Ferdinand held his own and had his usual successes.
His part in the war was to defend only, and he never failed to
show high qualities as a general. Thus, nowhere had
Frederick's enemies succeeded in crushing his defences. For
seven years the little kingdom of Prussia had held her ground
against the three great military powers, France, Austria, and
Russia. All were now equally exhausted. The constancy,
courage, and ability of Frederick were rewarded at last; on
the 15th of February, 1763, the treaty of Hubertsburg was
signed, by which Austria once more agreed to the cession of
Silesia. Prussia was now a Great Power like the rest, her
greatness resting on no shams, as she had proved."
Colonel C. B. Brackenbury,
Frederick the Great,
chapter 18.
ALSO IN:
Sir E. Cust,
Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century,
volume 3, pages 57-87.
Frederick II.,
History of the Seven Years War
(Posthumous Works, volume 3), chapters 14-16.
GERMANY: A. D. 1763.
The end, results and costs of the Seven Years War.
The Peace of Hubertsburg and Peace of Paris.
See SEVEN YEARS WAR.
GERMANY: A. D. 1763-1790.
A period of peace and progress.
Intellectual cultivation.
Accession of the Emperor Joseph II.
His character and his reforms.
Accession of Leopold II.
"The peace of nearly thirty years which followed the
Seven-Years' War in Germany was a time of rich mental activity
and growth. Court life itself, if its vanities were not
abolished, still acquired a more enlightened and humane tone.
The fierce passions of the princes no longer exclusively
controlled it: there was something of regard for education,
for art and science, and for the public welfare. This is
particularly true of courts which were intimately connected
with Prussia; as that of Brunswick, where Duke Charles,
Frederick II.'s brother-in-law, though personally an
extravagant prince, founded an institution of learning which
brought together many of the best intellects of Germany (1740
to 1760), or that of Anhalt-Dessau, where the famous
'Philanthropinum' was established. Several princes imitated
Frederick's military administration, and that sometimes on a
scale so small as to be ludicrous. Prince William of
Lippe-Schaumburg founded in his little territory a fortress
and a school of war. But this school educated Scharnhorst, and
the prince himself won fame in distant lands. He invited
Herder to his little court at Bückeburg. Weimar, too, imitated
Frederick's example, where the Duchess Amalie, daughter of
Charles of Brunswick, and her intellectual son, Charles
Augustus, made their little cities Weimar and Jena places of
gathering for the greatest men of genius of the time. Among
the petty Thuringian princes of this period, there were others
of noble character. In 1764 the Saxon throne was ascended by
Frederick Augustus, grandson of Augustus III., but, being a
minor, he could not be elected king of Poland. This put an end
to the union of the two titles, which had been the cause of
immeasurable evil to Saxony and to Germany. When the young
elector attained his majority, the government of Saxony was
greatly improved, and a period of prosperity followed. Duke

Charles Eugene of Wirtemberg (1737-1793), during his early
years, rivaled Louis XV. in extravagance and immorality, but
in after-days was greatly changed. He founded the Charles
School, at which Schiller was educated. Baden enjoyed a high
degree of prosperity under Charles Frederick (1746-1811). Even
the spiritual lords, on the whole, threw their influence in
favor of enlightenment and progress. ... The prelates of
Cologne, Trèves, Mayence, and Salzburg, strange to say, agreed
at Ems in 1786 to renounce the supremacy of Rome, and to found
an independent German Catholic Church; but the plan was broken
down by the resistance of the inferior clergy and of the
Emperor Joseph II. Some of the German states were slow to take
part in the general progress. Bavaria was constantly retarded
by the influence of the Jesuits. ... The Palatinate, too, was
under luxurious and idle rulers, mostly in the pay of France.
In some territories the boundless extravagance of the princes
was a terrible burden upon their subjects. ... Men who
professed enlightenment and humanity were often shamefully
tyrannical. The courts of Cassel and Wirtemberg sold their
people by regiments to England, to fight against the
independence of the North American Colonies. ...
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1776 (JANUARY-JUNE).
Austria shared in the general intellectual awakening of
Germany. Maria Theresa was a firm, strong character, with a
clear mind and sincere desire for the people's welfare. She
found Austria in decay, and was able to introduce many
reforms. She alleviated the condition of the peasants, who
were still mostly serfs. The nobles had before lived mainly
for show, but she provided institutions for their education.
... It was a condition of the Peace of Hubertsburg that
Frederick II. should give his electoral vote for the eldest
son of Francis I. None of the other electors objected to the
choice, and on March 27, 1764, they performed the ceremony of
choosing Joseph 'King of the Romans,' but without power to
interfere with the government during his father's life.
Francis I. died August 18, 1765, and his son Joseph II.
(1765-1790) was then crowned emperor in the traditional
fashion. He was also associated with his mother in the
government of' Austria; but she retained the royal power
mainly in her own hands, assigning to her son the executive
control of military affairs. Joseph II. was an impetuous and
intellectual character, all aglow with the new ideas of
enlightenment and progress, and was perhaps more deeply
impressed by the example of Frederick II. than any other
prince of the age. ... At the same time, Joseph II. was eager
to aggrandize Austria, and at least to obtain an equivalent
for Silesia.
{1503}
For a long time Austria had been longing to acquire Bavaria,
and there now seemed to be some reason to hope for success,
The ancient line of electors of the house of Wittelsbach died
out in 1777 with Maximilian Joseph (December 30). The next
heir was the Elector Palatine, Charles Theodore, also Duke of
Jülich and Berg, who was not eager to obtain Bavaria, since,
by the Peace of Westphalia, he must then forfeit the
electorate of the Palatinate. ... Under these circumstances
Joseph II. made an unfounded claim to Lower Bavaria, under a
pretended grant of the Emperor Sigismund in 1426. A secret
treaty was made by him with Charles Theodore, by which he was
to pay that prince a large sum of money for Lower Bavaria; and
soon after Maximilian Joseph's death, Joseph II. occupied the
land with troops. Frederick II., who was ever jealous of the
growth of Austria, resolved to prevent this acquisition. ...
See BAVARIA: A. D. 1777-1779.
Thus the war of the Bavarian Succession broke out (1778-79).
... By the death of Maria Theresa, November 29, 1780, her son
Joseph II. became sole monarch of Austria. ... Joseph II. was
a man of large mind and noble aims. Like Frederick, he was
unwearying in labor, accessible to everyone, and eager to
assume his share of work or responsibility. The books and the
people's memory are full of anecdotes of him, though he was
far from popular during his life. But he lacked the strong
practical sense and calculating foresight of the veteran
Prussian king. In his zeal for reforms he hastened to heap one
upon another in confusion. Torture was abolished, and for a
time even the death penalty. Rigid equality before the law was
introduced, and slavery done away.
See SLAVERY, MEDIÆVAL: GERMANY.
His reforms in the Church were still more sweeping. He closed
more than half of the monasteries, and devoted their estates
to public instruction; he introduced German hymns of praise
and the German Bible. By his Edict of Toleration, June 22,
1781, he secured to all Protestants throughout the Austrian
states their civil rights and freedom of worship, 'in houses
of prayer without bells or towers.' ... He zealously followed
up Maria Theresa's policy of consolidating Austria into one
state; and it was this course which made him enemies. He
offended the powerful nobility of Hungary by abolishing
serfdom (November 1, 1781), and the whole people by the
measures he took to promote the use of the German language. In
the Netherlands, he alienated from him the powerful clergy by
his innovations; and they stirred up against him the people,
already aggrieved by the loss of some of their ancient
liberties. A revolution broke out among them in 1788, and was
threatening to extend to Hungary and Bohemia, when the emperor
suddenly died, still in the full vigor of manhood, at the age
of forty-nine, February 20, 1790. ... After his death, the
progress of reform was checked in Austria; but he had awakened
new and strong forces there, and a complete return to the
ancient system was impossible. ... Leopold II. (1790-1792),
who succeeded his brother Joseph II., both in Austria and as
emperor, was a self-indulgent but prudent ruler."
C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
book 5, chapter 24, sections 8-18.
GERMANY: A. D. 1772-1773.
The first Partition of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1763-1773.
GERMANY: A. D. 1787.
Prussian intervention in Holland.
Restoration of the expelled stadtholder.
See NETHERLANDS (HOLLAND): A. D. 1746-1787.
GERMANY: A. D. 1791.
The forming of the Coalition against French democracy.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1790-1791;
and 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1791-1792.
The question of war with France, and the question of the
Partition of Poland.
Motives and action of Prussia and Austria.
"After the acceptance of the Constitution by Louis XVI.
[September--see FRANCE: A. D. 1791 (JULY-SEPTEMBER)], the
Emperor indulged for a time a confident hope, that the French
question was solved, and that he was relieved from all fear of
trouble from that quarter. He had cares enough upon him to
make him heartily congratulate himself on this result. ... In
foreign affairs, the Polish question--the next in importance
to the French--was still unsettled, and daily presented fresh
difficulties. ... The fact that Russia began to show the
greatest favour to the Emigrés, and to preach at Berlin and
Vienna a crusade against the wicked Jacobins, only served to
confirm the Emperor in his peaceful sentiments. He rightly
concluded that Catharine wished to entangle the German Powers
in a struggle with France, that she might have her own way in
Poland; and he was not at all inclined to be the dupe of so
shallow an artifice. ... At the same time he set about
bringing his alliance with Prussia to a definite conclusion,
in order to secure to himself a firm support for every
emergency. On the 17th of November--a week after the
enactment of the first edict against the Emigrés--Prince Reuss
made a communication on this subject to the Prussian Ministry,
and on this occasion declared himself empowered to commence at
any moment the formal draft of an alliance. ... 'We are now
convinced,' wrote the Ministers to their ambassador at Vienna,
'that Austria will undertake nothing against France.' This
persuasion was soon afterwards fully confirmed by Kaunitz, who
descanted in the severest terms on the intrigues of the
Emigrés on the Rhine, which it was not in the interest of any
Power to support. It was ridiculous, he said, in the French
Princes, and in Russia and Spain, to declare the acceptance of
the constitution by the King compulsory, and therefore void;
and still more so to dispute the right of Louis XVI. to alter
the constitution at all. He said that they would vainly
endeavour to goad Austria into a war, which could only have
the very worst consequences for Louis and the present
predominance of the moderate party in France. ... Here, again,
we see that without the machinations of the Girondists, the
revolutionary war would never have been commenced. It is true,
indeed, that at this time a very perceptible change took place
in the opinions of the second German potentate--the King of
Prussia. Immediately after the Congress of Pillnitz, great
numbers of French Emigrés, who had been driven from Vienna by
the coldness of Leopold, had betaken themselves to Berlin. At
the Prussian Court they met with a hospitable reception, and
aroused in the King, by their graphic descriptions, a warm
interest for the victims of the Revolution. ... He loaded the
Emigrés with marks of favour of every kind, and thereby
excited in them the most exaggerated hopes.
{1504}
Yet the King was far from intending to risk any important
interest of the State for the sake of his protégés; he had no
idea of pursuing an aggressive policy towards France; and the
only point in which he differed from Leopold was in the
feeling with which he regarded the development of the warlike
tendencies of the French. His Ministers, moreover, were,
without exception, possessed by the same idea as Prince
Kaunitz; that a French war would be a misfortune to all
Europe." As the year 1791 drew towards its close,
"unfavourable news arrived from Paris. The attempts of the
Feuillants had failed; Lafayette had separated himself from
them and from the Court; and the zeal and confidence of
victory among the Democrats were greater than ever. The
Emigrés in Berlin were jubilant; they had always declared that
no impression was to be made upon the Jacobins except by the
edge of the sword, and that all hopes founded on the stability
of a moderate middle party were futile. The King of Prussia
agreed with them, and determined to begin the unavoidable
struggle as quickly as possible. He told his Ministers that
war was certain, and that Bischoffswerder ought to go once
more to the Emperor. ... Bischoffswerder, having received
instructions from the King himself, left Berlin, and arrived
in Vienna, after a speedy journey, on the 28th of February.
But he was not destined again to discuss the fate of Europe
with his Imperial patron; for on the 29th the smallpox showed
itself, of which Leopold died after three days sickness. The
greatest consternation and confusion reigned in Vienna. ... No
one knew to whom the young King Francis--he was as yet only
king of Hungary and Bohemia--would give his confidence, or
what course he would take; nay, his weakly and nervous
constitution rendered it doubtful whether he could bear--even
for a short period--the burdens of his office. For the present
he confirmed the Ministers in their places, and expressed to them
his wish to adhere to the political system of his father. ...
He ... ordered one of his most experienced Generals, Prince
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, to be summoned to Vienna, that he might
take council with Bischoffswerder respecting the warlike
measures to be adopted by both Powers, in case of a French
attack. At the same time, however, the Polish question was, if
possible, to be brought to a decision, and Leopold's plan in
all its details was to be categorically recommended for
adoption, both in Berlin and Petersburg. ... The Austrian
Minister, Spielmann, had prepared the memorial on Poland,
which Prince Reuss presented at Berlin, on the 10th of March.
It represented that Austria and Prussia had the same interest
in stopping a source of eternal embarrassment and discussion,
by strengthening the cause of peace and order in Poland. That
herein lay an especially powerful motive to make the crown of
that country hereditary; that for both Powers the Elector of
Saxony would be the most acceptable wearer of that crown. ...
The important point, the memorial went on to say, was this,
that Poland should no longer be dependent on the predominant
influence of any one neighbouring Power. ... When the King had
read this memorial, in which the Saxon-Polish union was
brought forward, not as an idea of the feeble Elector, but as
a proposal of powerful Austria; he cried out, 'We must never
give our consent to this.' He agreed with his Ministers in the
conclusion that nothing would be more dangerous to Prussia,
than the formation of such a Power as would result from the
proposed lasting union of Poland and Saxony--a Power, which,
in alliance with Austria, could immediately overrun Silesia,
and in alliance with Russia, might be fatal to East Prussia.
... In the midst of this angry and anxious excitement, which
for a moment alienated his heart from Austria, the King
received a fresh and no less important despatch from
Petersburg. Count Golz announced the first direct
communication of Russia respecting Poland. 'Should Poland'
[wrote the Russian Vice Chancellor] 'be firmly and lastingly
united to Saxony, a Power of the first rank will arise, and
one which will be able to exercise the most sensible pressure
upon each of its neighbours. We are greatly concerned in this,
in consequence of the extension of our Polish frontier; and
Prussia is no less so, from the inevitable increase which
would ensue of Saxon influence in the German Empire. We
therefore suggest, that Prussia, Austria, and Russia, should
come to an intimate understanding with one another on this
most important subject.' ... This communication sounded
differently in the ears of the King from that which he had
received from Austria. The fears which agitated his own mind
and those of the Russian chancellor were identical. While
Austria called upon him to commit a political suicide, Russia
offered her aid in averting the most harassing danger, and
even opened a prospect of a considerable territorial increase.
The King had no doubt to which of the two Powers he ought to
incline. He would have come to terms with Russia on the spot,
had not an insurmountable obstacle existed in the new path
which was opened to the aggrandizement of Prussia,--viz., the
Polish treaty of 1790; in which Prussia had expressly bound
herself to protect the independence and integrity of Poland.
... He decided that there was no middle course between the
Russian and Austrian plans. On the one side was his Polish
treaty of 1790, the immediate consequence of which would be a
new breach, and perhaps a war, with Russia, and the final
result such a strengthening of Poland, as would throw back the
Prussian State into that subordinate position, both in Germany
and Europe, which it had occupied in the seventeenth century.
On the other side there was, indeed, a manifest breach of
faith, but also the salvation of Prussia from a perilous
dilemma, and perhaps the extension of her boundaries by a
goodly Polish Province. If he wavered at all in this conflict
of feeling, the Parisian complications soon put an end to his
doubts. In quick succession came the announcements that
Delessart's peaceful Ministry had fallen; that King Louis had
suffered the deepest humiliation; and that the helm of the
State had passed into the hands of the Girondist war party. A
declaration of war on the part of France against Francis· II.
might be daily expected, and the Russian-Polish contest would
then only form the less important moiety of the European
catastrophe. Austria would now be occupied for a long time in
the West; there could be no more question of the formation of
a Polish-Saxon State; and Austria could no longer be reckoned
upon to protect the constitution of 1791, or even to repel a
Russian invasion of Poland. Prussia was bound to aid the
Austrians against France, and for many months the King had
cherished no more ardent wish than to fulfil this obligation
with all his power.
{1505}
Simultaneously to oppose the Empress Catharine, was out of the
question. ... The King wrote on the 12th of March to his
Ministers as follows: ... 'Russia is not far removed from
thoughts of a new partition; and this would indeed be the most
effectual means of limiting the power of a Polish King,
whether hereditary or elective. I doubt, however, whether in
this case a suitable compensation could be found for Austria;
and whether, after such a curtailment of the power of Poland,
the Elector of Saxony would accept the crown. Yet if Austria
could be compensated, the Russian plan would be the most
advantageous for Prussia,--always provided that Prussia
received the whole left bank of the Vistula, by the
acquisition of which that distant frontier--so hard to be
defended--would be well rounded off. This is my judgment
respecting Polish affairs.' This was Poland's sentence of
death. It was not, as we have seen, the result of a
long-existing greed, but a suddenly seized expedient, which
seemed to be accompanied with the least evil, in the midst of
an unexampled European crisis. ... On the 20th of April the
French National Assembly proclaimed war against the King of
Hungary and Bohemia. A fortnight later the Prince of
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg appeared in Berlin to settle some common
plan for the campaign; and at the same time Kaunitz directed
Prince Reuss to enter into negociations on the political
question of expenditure and compensation. Count Schulenburg
... immediately sent a reply to the Prince, to the effect that
Prussia--as it had uniformly declared since the previous
summer--could only engage in the war on condition of receiving
an adequate compensation. ... Both statesmen well knew with
what secret mistrust each of these Powers contemplated the
aggrandizement of the other; their deliberations were
therefore conducted with slow and anxious caution, and months
passed by before their respective demands were reduced to any
definite shape."
H. von Sybel,
History of the French Revolution,
book 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1792.
Accession of the Emperor Francis II.
GERMANY: A. D. 1792-1793.
War with Revolutionary France.
The Coalition.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1791-1792; 1792 (APRIL-.JULY),
and (SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER);
1792-1793 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY);
1793 (FEBRUARY-APRIL), (MARCH-SEPTEMBER),
and (JULY-DECEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1192-1796.
The second and third Partitions of Poland.
See POLAND: A. D. 1791-1792; and 1793-1796.
GERMANY: A. D. 1794.
Withdrawal of Prussia from the Coalition.
French conquest of the Austrian Netherlands and successes on
the Rhine.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794 (MARCH-JULY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1795.
Treaty of Basle between Prussia and France.
Crumbling of the Coalition.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1794-1795 (OCTOBER-MAY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1796-1797.
Expulsion of Austria from Italy.
Bonaparte's first campaigns.
Advance of Moreau and Jourdan beyond the Rhine.
Their retreat.
Peace preliminaries of Leoben.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1796 (APRIL-OCTOBER);
and 1796-1797 (OCTOBER-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1797 (October).
The Treaty of Campo Formio between Austria and France.
Austrian cession of the Netherlands and Lombardy and
acquisition of Venice.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1797 (MAY-OCTOBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1798.
The second Coalition against Revolutionary France.
Prussia and the Empire withheld from it.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1799.
The Congress at Rastadt.
Murder of French envoys.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1800 (May-December).
The disastrous campaigns of Marengo and Hohenlinden.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (MAY-FEBRUARY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803.
The Peace of Luneville.
Territorial cessions and changes.
The settlement of indemnities in the Empire.
Confiscation and secularization of the ecclesiastical
principalities.
Absorption of Free Cities.
Re-constitution of the Electoral College.
"By the treaty of Luneville, which the Emperor Francis was
obliged to subscribe, 'not only as Emperor of Austria, but in
the name of the German empire,' Belgium and all the left bank
of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was
erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the
boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with
all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was
guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau
in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine
republic; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the Emperor's brother,
gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of
the Spanish family [who was thereupon raised to royal rank by the
fiat of Bonaparte, who transformed the grand-duchy of Tuscany
into the kingdom of Etruria], on the promise of an indemnity
in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and
Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these forts should remain
in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes
dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were
promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the
independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine and Ligurian
republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared 'to
have the power of choosing whatever form of government they
preferred.' These conditions did not differ materially from
those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those
offered by Napoleon previous to the renewal of the war. ...
The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this
treaty as head of the empire, as well as Emperor of Austria,
gave rise in the sequel ... to the most painful internal
divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the
Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was
the head, without either their concurrence or express powers
to that effect previously conferred. ... The emperor hesitated
long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the
seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the
conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be
found. He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified
letter, dated 8th February 1801, the day before that when the
treaty was signed. ... The electors and princes of the empire
felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the
situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to
throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which
he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of
the empire, assembled after the treaty of Luneville was
signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on
the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then
placed.
{1506}
But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes
was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years
to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France
and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in
these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes
which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to
foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid
of that league to support separate interests which afterwards,
under the name of the Confederation of the Rhine, so well
served the purposes of French ambition, and broke up the
venerable fabric of the German empire."
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 32 (volume 7).
"Germany: lost by this treaty about 24,000 square miles of its
best territory and 3,500,000 of its people; while the princes
were indemnified by the plunder of their peers. But the
hardest task, the satisfactory distribution of this plunder,
remained. While the Diet at Regensburg, after much complaint
and management, assigned the arrangement of these affairs to a
committee, the princely bargainers were in Paris, employing
the most disgraceful means to obtain the favor of Talleyrand
and other influential diplomatists. On the 25th of February,
1803, the final decision of the delegation or committee of the
empire was adopted by the Diet, and promulgated with the approval
of the emperor, Francis II., and of Prussia and Bavaria. It
confiscated all the spiritual principalities in Germany,
except that the Elector of Mayence, Charles Theodore of
Dalberg, received Regensburg, Aschaffenburg, and Wetzlar, as
an indemnity, and retained a seat and a voice in the imperial
Diet. Of the 48 free cities of the empire, six only
remained--Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Frankfort, Nuremburg, and
Augsburg. Austria obtained the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen;
Prussia, as a compensation for the loss of 1,018 square miles
with 122,000 inhabitants west of the Rhine, received 4,875
square miles, with 580,000 inhabitants, including the
endowments of the religious houses of Hildesheim and
Paderborn, and most of Münster; also Erfurt and Eichsfeld, and
the free cities of Nordhausen, Mülhausen, and Goslar; Hanover
obtained Osnabruck; to Bavaria, in exchange for the
Palatinate, were assigned Würzburg, Bamberg, Freisingen,
Augsburg, and Passau, besides a number of cities of the
empire, in all about 6,150 square miles, to compensate for
4,240, vastly increasing its political importance. Wirtemberg,
too, was richly compensated for the loss of the Mömpelgard by
the confiscation of monastery endowments and free cities in
Suabia. But Baden made the best bargain of all, receiving
about 1,270 square miles of land, formerly belonging to
bishops or to the Palatinate, in exchange for 170. After this
acquisition, Baden extended, though in patches, from the
Neckar to the Swiss border. By building up these three South
German states, Napoleon sought to erect a barrier for himself
against Austria and Prussia. With the same design,
Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau were much enlarged. There were
multitudes of smaller changes, under the name of
'compensations and indemnities.' Four new lay electorates were
established in the place of the three secularized prelacies,
and were given to Baden, Wirtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, and
Salzburg. But they never had occasion to take part in the
election of an emperor."
C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
chapter 25, sections 26-27.
ALSO IN:
A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
books 7 and 15 (volume 1).
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 1, chapter 4 (volume 1).
GERMANY: A. D. 1803.
Bonaparte's seizure of Hanover in his war with England.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1802-1803.
GERMANY: A. D. 1805 (January-April).
The third Coalition against France.
Prussian Neutrality.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (JANUARY-APRIL).
GERMANY: A. D. 1805 (September-December).
Napoleon's overwhelming campaign.
The catastrophes at Ulm and Austerlitz.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1805 (MARCH-DECEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1805-1806.
The Peace of Presburg.
Territorial losses of Austria.
Aggrandizement of Bavaria and Würtemberg, which become
kingdoms, and Baden a grand duchy.
The Confederation of the Rhine.
End of the Holy Roman Empire.
"On the 6th of December, hostilities ceased, and the Russians
retired by way of Galicia, but in accordance with the terms of
the armistice, the French troops continued to occupy all the
lands they had invaded, Austria, Tyrol, Venetia, Carniola,
Carinthia, and Styria; within Bohemia they were to have the
circle of Tabor, together with Brno and Znoymo in Moravia and
Pozsony (Pressburg) in Hungary. The Morava (March) and the
Hungarian frontier formed the line of demarcation between the
two armies. A definitive peace was signed at Pressburg on the
26th of December, 1805. Austria recognized the conquests of
France in Holland and Switzerland and the annexation of Genoa,
and ceded to the kingdom of Italy Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia with
its islands, and the Bocche di Cattaro. A little later, by the
explanatory Act of Fontainebleau, she lost the last of her
possessions to the west of the Isonzo, when she exchanged
those portions of the counties of Gorico and Gradisca which
are situated on the right bank of that river for the county of
Montefalcone in Istria. The new kingdoms of Bavaria and
Würtemberg [brought into existence by this treaty, through the
recognition of them by the Emperor Francis] were aggrandized
at the expense of Austria. Bavaria obtained Vorarlberg, the
county of Hohenembs, the town of Lindau, and the whole of
Tyrol, with Brixen and Trent. Austrian Suabia was given to
Würtemberg, while Breisgau and the Ortenau were bestowed on
the new grand duke of Baden. One compensation alone, the duchy
of Salzburg, fell to Austria for all her sacrifices, and this
has remained in her possession ever since. The old bishopric
of Würzburg was created an electorate and granted to Ferdinand
III. of Tuscany and Salzburg. Altogether the monarchy lost
about 25,400 square miles and nearly 3,000,000 of inhabitants.
She lost Tyrol with its brave and loyal inhabitants and the
Vörlande which had assured Austrian influence in Germany;
every possession on the Rhine, in the Black Forest, and on the
Lower Danube; she no longer touched either Switzerland or
Italy, and she ceased to be a maritime power. Besides all
this, she had to pay forty millions for the expenses of the
war, while she was exhausted by contributions and
requisitions. Vienna had suffered much, and the French army
had carried off the 2,000 cannons and the 100,000 guns which
had been contained in her arsenals. On the 16th of January,
1806, the emperor Francis returned to his capital.
{1507}
He was enthusiastically received, and the Viennese returned to
the luxurious and easy way of life which has always
characterized them. ... Austria seemed no longer to have any
part to play in German politics. Bavaria, Würtemberg and Baden
had been formed into a separate league--the Confederation of
the Rhine--under French protection. On the 1st of August,
1806, these states announced to the Reichstag at Ratisbon that
they looked upon the empire as at an end, and on the 6th,
Francis II. formally resigned the empire altogether, and
released all the Imperial officials from their engagements to
him. Thus the sceptre of Charlemagne fell from the hands of
the dynasty which had held it without interruption from 1438."
L. Leger,
History of Austro-Hungary,
chapter 25.
"Every bond of union was dissolved with the diet of the empire
and with the imperial chamber. The barons and counts of the
empire and the petty princes were mediatised; the princes of
Hohenlohe, Oettingen, Schwarzenberg, Thurn, and Taxis, the
Truchsess von Waldburg, Fürstenberg, Fugger, Leiningen,
Löwenstein, Solms, Hesse-Homburg, Wied-Runkel, and
Orange-Fulda, became subject to the neighbouring Rhenish
confederated princes. Of the remaining six imperial free
cities, Augsburg and Nuremberg fell to Bavaria; Frankfurt,
under the title of grand-duchy, to the ancient elector of
Mayence, who was again transferred thither from Ratisbon. The
ancient Hanse-towns, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, alone
retained their freedom."
W. Menzel,
History of Germany,
chapter 253 (volume 3).
"A swift succession of triumphs had left only one thing still
preventing the full recognition of the Corsican warrior as
sovereign of Western Europe, and that one was the existence of
the old Romano-Germanic Empire. Napoleon had not long assumed
his new title when he began to mark a distinction between 'la
France' and 'l'Empire Française.' France had, since A. D.
1792, advanced to the Rhine, and, by the annexation of
Piedmont, had overstepped the Alps; the French Empire
included, besides the kingdom of Italy, a mass of dependent
states, Naples, Holland, Switzerland, and many German
principalities, the allies of France in the same sense in
which the 'socii populi Romani' were allies of Rome. When the
last of Pitt's coalitions had been destroyed at Austerlitz,
and Austria had made her submission by the peace of Presburg,
the conqueror felt that his hour was come. He had now overcome
two Emperors, those of Austria and Russia, claiming to
represent the old and new Rome respectively, and had in
eighteen months created more kings than the occupants of the
Germanic throne in as many centuries. It was time, he thought,
to sweep away obsolete pretensions, and claim the sole
inheritance of that Western Empire, of which the titles and
ceremonies of his court presented a grotesque imitation. The
task was an easy one after what had been already accomplished.
Previous wars and treaties had so redistributed the
territories and changed the constitution of the Germanic
Empire that it could hardly be said to exist in anything but
name. ... The Emperor Francis, partly foreboding the events
that were at hand, partly in order to meet Napoleon's
assumption of the imperial name by depriving that name of its
peculiar meaning, began in A. D. 1805 to style himself
'Hereditary Emperor of Austria,' while retaining at the same
time his former title. The next act of the drama was one in
which we may more readily pardon the ambition of a foreign
conqueror than the traitorous selfishness of the German
princes, who broke every tie of ancient friendship and duty to
grovel at his throne. By the Act of the Confederation of the
Rhine, signed at Paris, July 12th, 1806, Bavaria, Würtemberg,
Baden, and several other states, sixteen in all, withdrew from
the body and repudiated the laws of the Empire, while on
August 1st the French envoy at Regensburg announced to the
Diet that his master, who had consented to become Protector of
the Confederate princes, no longer recognized the existence of
the Empire. Francis II. resolved at once to anticipate this
new Odoacer, and by a declaration, dated August 6th, 1806,
resigned the imperial dignity. His deed states that finding it
impossible, in the altered state of things, to fulfil the
obligations imposed by his capitulation, he considers as
dissolved the bonds which attached him to the Germanic body,
releases from their allegiance the states who formed it, and
retires to the government of his hereditary dominions under
the title of 'Emperor of Austria.' Throughout, the term
'German Empire' (Deutsches Reich) is employed. But it was the
crown of Augustus, of Constantine, of Charles, of Maximilian,
that Francis of Hapsburg laid down, and a new era in the
world's history was marked by the fall of its most venerable
institution. One thousand and six years after Leo the Pope had
crowned the Frankish king, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight
years after Cæsar had conquered at Pharsalia, the Holy Roman
Empire came to its end."
J. Bryce,
The Holy Roman Empire,
chapter 20.
GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (January-August).
The Confederation of the Rhine.
Cession of Hanover to Prussia.
Double dealing and weakness of the latter.
Her submission to Napoleon's insults and wrongs.
Final goading of the nation to war.
"The object at which all French politicians had aimed since
the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the exclusion of both
Austria and Prussia from influence in Western Germany, was now
completely attained. The triumph of French statesmanship, the
consummation of two centuries of German discord, was seen in
the Act of Federation subscribed by the Western German
Sovereigns in the summer of 1806. By this Act the Kings of
Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Elector of Baden, and 13 minor
princes, united themselves, in the League known as the Rhenish
Confederacy, under the protection of the French Emperor, and
undertook to furnish contingents, amounting to 63,000 men, in
all wars in which the French Empire should engage. Their
connection with the ancient Germanic Body was completely
severed; the very town in which the Diet of the Empire had
held its meetings was annexed by one of the members of the
Confederacy. The Confederacy itself, with a population of
8,000,000, became for all purposes of war and foreign policy a
part of France. Its armies were organised by French officers;
its frontiers were fortified by French engineers; its treaties
were made for it at Paris. In the domestic changes which took
place within these States the work of consolidation begun in
1801 was carried forward with increased vigour. Scores of tiny
principalities which had escaped dissolution in the earlier
movement were now absorbed by their stronger neighbours. ...
{1508}
With the establishment of the Rhenish Confederacy and the
conquest of Naples, Napoleon's empire reached, but did not
overpass, the limits within which the sovereignty of France
might probably have been long maintained. ... If we may judge
from the feeling with which Napoleon was regarded in Germany
down to the middle of the year 1806, and in Italy down to a
much later date, the Empire then founded might have been
permanently upheld, if Napoleon had abstained from attacking
other States." During the winter of 1806, Count Haugwitz, the
Prussian minister, had visited Paris "for the purpose of
obtaining some modification in the treaty which he had signed
[at the palace of Schönbrunn, near Vienna] on behalf of
Prussia after the battle of Austerlitz. The principal feature
in that treaty had been the grant of Hanover to Prussia by the
French Emperor in return for its alliance. This was the point
which above all others excited King Frederick William's fears
and scruples; He desired to acquire Hanover, but he also
desired to derive his title rather from its English owner
[King George III., who was also Elector of Hanover] than from
its French invader. It was the object of Haugwitz' visit to
Paris to obtain an alteration in the terms of the treaty which
should make the Prussian occupation of Hanover appear to be
merely provisional, and reserve to the King of England at
least a nominal voice in its ultimate transfer. In full
confidence that Napoleon would agree to such a change, the
King of Prussia, on taking possession of Hanover in January,
1806, concealed the fact of its cession to himself by
Napoleon, and published an untruthful proclamation. ... The
bitter truth that the treaty between France and Prussia
contained no single word reserving the rights of the Elector,
and that the very idea of qualifying the absolute cession of
Hanover was an afterthought, lay hidden in the conscience of
the Prussian Government. Never had a Government more
completely placed itself at the mercy of a pitiless enemy.
Count Haugwitz, on reaching Paris, was received by Napoleon
with a storm of indignation and contempt. Napoleon declared
that the ill-faith of Prussia had made an end even of that
miserable pact which had been extorted after Austerlitz, and
insisted that Prussia should openly defy Great Britain by
closing the ports of Northern Germany to British vessels, and
by declaring itself endowed by Napoleon with Hanover in virtue
of Napoleon's own right of conquest. Haugwitz signed a second
and more humiliating treaty [February 15] embodying these
conditions; and the Prussian Government, now brought into the
depths of contempt, but unready for immediate war, executed
the orders of its master. ... A decree was published excluding
the ships of England from the ports of Prussia and from those
of Hanover itself (March 28, 1806). It was promptly followed
by the seizure of 400 Prussian vessels in British harbours,
and by the total extinction of Prussian maritime commerce by
British privateers. Scarcely was Prussia committed to this
ruinous conflict with Great Britain when Napoleon opened
negotiations for peace with Mr. Fox's Government. The first
condition required by Great Britain was the restitution of
Hanover to King George III. It was unhesitatingly granted by
Napoleon. Thus was Prussia to be mocked of its prey, after it
had been robbed of all its honour. ... There was scarcely a
courtier in Berlin who did not feel that the yoke of the
French had become past endurance; even Haugwitz himself now
considered war as a question of time. The patriotic party in
the capital and the younger officers of the army bitterly
denounced the dishonoured Government, and urged the King to
strike for the credit of his country. ... Brunswick was
summoned to the King's council to form plans of a campaign;
and appeals for help were sent to Vienna, to St. Petersburg,
and even to the hostile Court of London. The condition of
Prussia at this critical moment was one which filled with the
deepest alarm those few patriotic statesmen who were not
blinded by national vanity or by a slavery to routine. ...
Early in the year 1806 a paper was drawn up by Stein,
exposing, in language seldom used by a statesman, the
character of the men by whom Frederick William was surrounded,
and declaring that nothing but a speedy change of system could
save the Prussian State from utter downfall and ruin. Two
measures of immediate necessity were specified by Stein, the
establishment of a responsible council of Ministers, and the
removal of Haugwitz and all his friends from power. ... The
army of Prussia ... was nothing but the army of Frederick the
Great grown twenty years older. ... All Southern Germany was
still in Napoleon's hands. The appearance of a Russian force
in Dalmatia, after that country had been ceded by Austria to
the French Emperor, had given Napoleon an excuse for
maintaining his troops in their positions beyond the Rhine. As
the probability of a war with Prussia became greater and greater,
Napoleon tightened his grasp upon the Confederate States.
Publications originating among the patriotic circles of
Austria were beginning to appeal to the German people to unite
against a foreign oppressor. An anonymous pamphlet, entitled
'Germany in its Deep Humiliation,' was sold by various
booksellers in Bavaria, among others by Palm, a citizen of
Nuremberg. There is no evidence that Palm was even acquainted
with the contents of the pamphlet; but ... Napoleon ...
required a victim to terrify those who, among the German
people, might be inclined to listen to the call of patriotism.
Palm was not too obscure for the new Charlemagne. The innocent
and unoffending man, innocent even of the honourable crime of
attempting to save his country, was dragged before a tribunal
of French soldiers, and executed within twenty-four hours of
his trial, in pursuance of the imperative orders of Napoleon
(August 26). ... Several years later, ... the story of Palm's
death was one of those that kindled the bitterest sense of
wrong; at the time, it exercised no influence upon the course
of political events. Prussia had already resolved upon war."
C. A. Fyffe,
History of Modern Europe,
volume 1, chapters 6-7.
ALSO IN:
Sir W. Scott,
Life of Napoleon,
chapters 51-52.
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 2, chapters 4-5 (volume 1).
P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapter 15.
{1509}
GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (October).
Napoleon's sudden invasion of Prussia.
The decisive battle of Jena.
Prostration of the Prussian Kingdom.
"The Emperor of Russia ... visited Berlin, when the feelings
of Prussia, and indeed of all the neighbouring states, were in
this fever of excitement. He again urged Frederick William to
take up arms in the common cause, and offered to back him with
all the forces of his own great empire. The English
government, taking advantage of the same crisis, sent Lord
Morpeth to Berlin, with offers of pecuniary supplies--about
the acceptance of which, however, the anxiety of Prussia on
the subject of Hanover created some difficulty. Lastly,
Buonaparte, well informed of what was passing in Berlin, and
desirous, since war must be, to hurry Frederick into the field
ere the armies of the Czar could be joined with his, now
poured out in the 'Moniteur' such abuse on the persons and
characters of the Queen, Prince Louis, and every illustrious
patriot throughout Prussia, that the general wrath could no
longer be held in check. War-like preparations of every kind
filled the kingdom during August and September. On the 1st of
October the Prussian minister at Paris presented a note to
Talleyrand, demanding, among other things, that the formation
of a confederacy in the north of Germany should no longer be
thwarted by French interference, and that the French troops
within the territories of the Rhenish League should recross
the Rhine into France, by the 8th of the same month of
October. But Napoleon was already in person on the German side
of the Rhine; and his answer to the Prussian note was a
general order to his own troops, in which he called on them to
observe in what manner a German sovereign still dared to
insult the soldiers of Austerlitz. The conduct of Prussia, in
thus rushing into hostilities without waiting for the advance
of the Russians, was as rash as her holding back from Austria
during the campaign of Austerlitz had been cowardly. As if
determined to profit by no lesson, the Prussian council also
directed their army to advance towards the French, instead of
lying on their own frontier--a repetition of the great leading
blunder of the Austrians in the preceding year. The Prussian
army accordingly invaded the Saxon provinces, and the Elector
... was compelled to accept the alliance which the cabinet of
Berlin urged on him, and to join his troops with those of the
power by which he had been thus insulted and wronged. No
sooner did Napoleon know that the Prussians had advanced into
the heart of Saxony, than he formed the plan of his campaign;
and they, persisting in their advance, and taking up their
position finally on the Saale, afforded him, as if studiously,
the means of repeating, at their expense, the very manœvres which
had ruined the Austrians in the preceding campaign." The flank
of the Prussian position was turned,--the bridge across the
Saale, at Saalfield, having been secured, after a hot
engagement with the corps of Prince Louis of Prussia who fell
in the fight,--"the French army passed entirely round them;
Napoleon seized Naumburg and blew up the magazines
there,--announcing, for the first time, by this explosion, to
the King of Prussia and his generalissimo the Duke of
Brunswick, that he was in their rear. From this moment the
Prussians were isolated, and cut off from all their resources,
as completely as the army of Mack was at Ulm, when the French
had passed the Danube and overrun Suabia. The Duke of
Brunswick hastily endeavoured to concentrate his forces for
the purpose of cutting his way back again to the frontier
which he had so rashly abandoned. Napoleon, meantime, had
posted his divisions so as to watch the chief passages of the
Saale, and expected, in confidence, the assault of his
outwitted opponent. It was now that he found leisure to answer
the manifesto of Frederick William. ... His letter, dated at
Gera, is written in the most elaborate style of insult. ...
The Prussian King understood well, on learning the fall of
Naumburg, the imminent danger of his position; and his army
was forthwith set in motion, in two great masses; the former,
where he was in person present, advancing towards Naumburg;
the latter attempting, in like manner, to force their passage
through the French line in the neighbourhood of Jena. The
King's march was arrested at Auerstadt by Davoust, who, after
a severely contested action, at length repelled the assailant.
Napoleon himself, meanwhile, was engaged with the other great
body of the Prussians. Arriving on the evening of the 13th
October at Jena, he perceived that the enemy were ready to
attempt the advance next morning, while his own heavy train
was still six-and-thirty hours' march in his rear. Not
discouraged with this adverse circumstance, the Emperor
laboured all night in directing and encouraging his soldiery
to cut a road through the rocks, and draw up by that means
such light guns as he had at command to a position on a lofty
plateau in front of Jena, where no man could have expected
beforehand that any artillery whatever should be planted. ...
Lannes commanded the centre, Augereau the right, Soult the
left, and Murat the reserve and cavalry. Soult had to sustain
the first assault of the Prussians, which was violent--and
sudden; for the mist lay so thick on the field that the armies
were within half-gunshot of each other ere the sun and wind
rose and discovered them, and on that instant Mollendorf
charged. The battle was contested well for some time on this
point; but at length Ney appeared in the rear of the Emperor
with a fresh division; and then the French centre advanced to
a general charge, before which the Prussians were forced to
retire. They moved for some space in good order; but Murat now
poured his masses of cavalry on them, storm after storm, with
such rapidity and vehemence that their rout became inevitable.
It ended in the complete breaking up of the army--horse and
foot all flying together, in the confusion of panic, upon the
road to Weimar. At that point the fugitives met and mingled
with their brethren flying, as confusedly as themselves, from
Auerstadt. In the course of this disastrous day 20,000
Prussians were killed or taken, 300 guns, 20 generals, and 60
standards. The Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Brunswick,
being wounded in the face with a grape-shot, was carried early
off the field, never to recover. ... The various routed
divisions roamed about the country, seeking separately the
means of escape: they were in consequence destined to fall an
easy prey. ... The Prince of Hohenlohe at length drew together
not less than 50,000 of these wandering soldiers," and retreated
towards the Oder; but was forced, in the end, to lay down his
arms at Prentzlow. "His rear, consisting of about 10,000,
under the command of the celebrated General Blucher, was so
far behind as to render it possible for them to attempt
escape. Their heroic leader traversed the country with them
for some time unbroken, and sustained a variety of assaults,
from far superior numbers, with the most obstinate resolution.
{1510}
By degrees, however, the French, under Soult, hemmed him in on
one side, Murat on the other, and Bernadotte appeared close
behind him. He was thus forced to throw himself into Lubeck,
where a severe action was fought in the streets of the town,
on the 6th of November. The Prussian, in this battle, lost
4,000 prisoners, besides the slain and wounded: he retreated
to Schwerta, and there, it being impossible for him to go
farther without violating the neutrality of Denmark, on the
morning of the 7th, Blucher at length laid down his arms. ...
The strong fortresses of the Prussian monarchy made as
ineffectual resistance as the armies in the field. ...
Buonaparte, in person, entered Berlin on the 25th of October;
and before the end of November, except Konigsberg--where the
King himself had found refuge, and gathered round, him a few
thousand troops ... --and a few less important fortresses, the
whole of the German possessions of the house of Brandenburg
were in the hands of the conqueror. Louis Buonaparte, King of
Holland, meanwhile had advanced into Westphalia and occupied
that territory also, with great part of Hanover, East
Friesland, Embden, and the dominions of Hesse-Cassel."
J. G. Lockhart,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 20.
ALSO IN:
C. Adams,
Great Campaigns in Europe from 1796 to 1870,
chapter. 4.
Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 9 (volume 2),
Memoirs of Napoleon dictated at St. Helena,
volume 6, pages 60-72.
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 43 (volume 10).
Duke of Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 1, part 2, chapters 21-23.
GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (October-December).
Napoleon's ungenerous use of his victory.
His insults to the Queen of Prussia.
The kingdom governed as conquered territory.
The French advance into Poland, to meet the Russians.
Saxony made a kingdom.
"Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The
old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his
achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable
wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and
who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of
Jena, recommending his subjects to his generosity, was in an
especial manner the object of invective. His states were
overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile
tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge
his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the
total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the
language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence
inspired, that the wounded general was compelled, with great
personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon
after died. The Queen, whose spirit in prosperous and
constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her
subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was
pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms; and a
heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been
an excess of patriotic ardour, was compared to Helen, whose
faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities
consequent on the siege of Troy. The whole dominions of the
Elector of Hesse Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who
had not even combated at Jena, but merely permitted, when he
could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his
dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his possessions.
... The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of
Prussia, ... shared the same fate: while to the nobles of
Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering
to his own reputation than theirs,--'I will render that
noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their

bread.' ... Meanwhile the French armies, without any further
resistance, took possession of the whole country between the
Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands
appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the revolutionary
armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to
maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be
its theatre, Napoleon had taken only 24,000 francs in specie
across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon
appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the
day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation,
directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of
159,000,000 francs (£6,300,000) on the countries at war with
France, of which 100,000,000 was to be borne by the Prussian
states to the west of the Vistula, 25,000,000 by the Elector
of Saxony [who had already detached himself from his alliance
with Prussia], and the remainder by the lesser states in the
Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden ... was levied with
unrelenting severity. ... Nor was this all. The whole civil
authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were
compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French
Emperor,--an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the
intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great
nation. ... Early in November there appeared an elaborate
ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organisation
and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to
the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided
into four departments; those of Berlin, of Magdeburg, of
Stettin, and of Custrin; the military and civil government of
the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a
governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders
of provinces into which it was divided. ... The same system of
government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states
of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenburg, and the Hanse
towns, including Hamburg, which was speedily oppressed by
grievous contributions. ... The Emperor openly announced his
determination to retain possession of all these states till
England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty
of the seas. ... Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of
a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed. ...
The severity of the terms demanded, as well as ... express
assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead
to a separate accommodation, as Napoleon was resolved to
retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might
have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations.
Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, ... the King ...
declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of
Russia [who was vigorously preparing to fulfil his promise of
help to the stricken nation]. This refusal was anticipated by
Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on
his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter
vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.
{1511}
To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree
[see FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810] of the 21st November against the
commerce of Great Britain. ... Napoleon ... at Posen, in
Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy
kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its
once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite
hopes which his subsequent conduct never realised. ... While
the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid
strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious
to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile
bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the
flanks of the invading force. ... The whole of the north of
Germany was overrun by French troops, while 100,000 were
assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the
heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such
prodigious efforts, over so great an extent of surface,
rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The senate at Paris was
ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor
80,000 were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the
military age in 1807. ... A treaty, offensive and defensive,
between Saxony and France, was the natural result of these
successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed
at Posen, on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector
of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was
admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his
contingent fixed at 20,000 men. By a separate article, it was
provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom
of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign:
a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military
outpost of the great nation--while, by a subsidiary treaty,
signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes
of the House of Saxony were also admitted into the
Confederacy."
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 43, sections 87-99 (volume 10).
ALSO IN:
P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapter 16.
Mrs. S. Austin,
Germany from 1760 to 1814,
page 294, and after.
E. H. Hudson,
Life and Times of Louisa,
Queen of Prussia, volume 2, chapters 8-9.
GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1807.
Opening of Napoleon's campaign against the Russians.
The deluding of the Poles.
indecisive battle of Eylau.
The campaign against the Russians "opened early in the winter.
The 1st of November, the Russians and French marched towards
the Vistula, the former from the Memel, the latter from the
Oder. Fifty thousand Russians pressed forward under General
Benningsen; a second and equal army followed at a distance
with a reserve force. Some of the Russian forces on the
Turkish frontier were recalled, but were still remote. The
first two Russian armies, with the remaining Prussians,
numbered about 120,000. England made many promises and kept
few of them, thinking more of conquering Spanish and Dutch
colonies than of helping her allies. Her aid was limited to a
small reinforcement of the Swedes guarding Swedish Pomerania,
the only portion of Northern Germany not yet in French power.
Gustavus II., the young King of Sweden, weak and impulsive,
rushed headlong, without a motive, into the ... alliance
[against Napoleon], destined to be so fatal to Sweden. ...
Eighty thousand men under Murat crossed the Oder and entered
Prussian Poland, and an equal number stood ready to sustain
them. November 9, Davout's division entered Posen, the
principal town of the Polish provinces still preserving the
national sentiment, and whose people detested Prussian rule
and resented the treachery with which Prussia dismembered
Poland after swearing alliance with her. All along the road,
the peasants hastened to meet the French; and at Posen, Davout
was hailed with an enthusiasm which moved even him, cold and
severe as he was, and he urged Napoleon to justify the hopes
of Poland, who looked to him as her savior. The Russian
vanguard reached Warsaw before the French, but made no effort
to remain there, and recrossed the Vistula. November 28,
Davout and Murat entered the town, and public delight knew no
bounds. It would be a mere illusion to fancy that sentiments
of right and justice had any share in Napoleon's resolve, and
that he was stirred by a desire to repair great wrongs. His
only question was whether the resurrection of Poland would
increase his greatness or not; and if he told the Sultan that
he meant to restore Poland, it was because he thought Turkey
would assist him the more willingly against Russia. He also
offered part of Silesia to Austria, if she would aid him in
the restoration of Poland by the cession of her Polish
provinces; but it was not a sufficient offer, and therefore
not serious. The truth was that he wanted promises from the
Poles before he made any to them. ... Thousands of Poles
enlisted under the French flag and joined the Polish legions
left from the Italian war. Napoleon established a provisional
government of well-known Poles in Warsaw, and required nothing
but volunteers of the country. He had seized without a blow
that line of the Vistula which the Prussian king would not
barter for a truce, and might have gone into winter-quarters
there; but the Russians were close at hand on the opposite
shore, in two great divisions 100,000 strong, in a wooded and
marshy country forming a sort of triangle, whose point touches
the union of the Narew and Ukra rivers with the Vistula, a few
leagues below Warsaw. The Russians communicated with the sea
by a Prussian corps stationed between them and Dantzic.
Napoleon would not permit them to hold this post, and resolved
to strike a blow, before going into winter-quarters, which
should cut them off from the sea and drive them back towards
the Memel and Lithuania. He crossed the Vistula, December 23,
and attacked the Russians between the Narew and the Ukra. A
series of bloody battles followed [the most important being at
Pultusk and Golymin, December 26] in the dense forests and deep
bogs of the thawing land. Napoleon said that he had discovered
a fifth element in Poland,--mud. Men and horses stuck in the
swamp and the cannons could not be extricated. Luckily the
Russians were in the incompetent hands of General Kamenski,
and both parties fought in the dark, the labyrinth of swamps
and woods preventing either army from guessing the other's
movements. The Russians were finally driven, with great loss,
beyond the Narew towards the forests of Belostok, and a
Prussian corps striving to assist them was driven back to the
sea. ... The grand army did not long enjoy the rest it so much
needed; for the Russians, whose losses were more than made up
by the arrival of their reserves, suddenly resumed the
offensive.
{1512}
General Benningsen, who gave a fearful proof of his sinister
energy by the murder of Paul I., had been put in command in
Kamenski's place. Marching round the forests and traversing
the line of lakes which divide the basin of the Narew from
those watercourses flowing directly to the sea, he reached the
maritime part of old Prussia, intending to cross the Vistula
and drive the French from their position in Poland. He had
hoped to surprise the French left wing, lying between the
Passarge and Lower Vistula, but arrived too late. Ney and
Bernadotte rapidly concentrated their forces and fought with a
bravery which arrested the Russians (January 25 and 27).
Napoleon came to the rescue, and having once driven the enemy
into the woods and marshes of the interior, now strove to turn
those who meant to turn him, by an inverse action forcing them
to the sea-coast. ... Benningsen then halted beyond Eylau, and
massed his forces to receive battle next day [February 8]. He
had about 70,000 men, twice the artillery of Napoleon (400
guns against 200), and hoped to be joined betimes by a
Prussian corps. Napoleon could only dispose of 60,000 out of
his 300,000 men,--Ney being some leagues away and Bernadotte
out of reach. ... The battlefield was a fearful sight next
day. Twelve thousand Russians and 10,000 French lay dying and
dead on the vast fields of snow reddened with blood. The
Russians, besides, carried off 15,000 wounded. 'What an
ineffectual massacre" cried Ney, as he traversed the scene of
carnage. This was too true; for although Napoleon drove the
Russians to the sea, it was not in the way he desired.
Benningsen succeeded in reaching Konigsberg, where he could
rest and reinforce his army, and Napoleon was not strong
enough to drive him from this last shelter."
H. Martin,
Popular History of France from 1789,
volume 2, chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 10 (volume 2).
C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 1, chapter 8.
J. C. Ropes,
The First Napoleon,
lecture 3.
Baron de Marbot,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 29-30.
GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1810.
Commercial blockade by the English Orders in Council and
Napoleon's Decrees.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.
GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (February-June).
Closer alliance of Prussia and Russia.
Treaty of Bartenstein.
Napoleon's victory at Friedland.
End of the campaign.
The effect produced in Europe by the doubtful battle of Eylau
"was unlucky for France; in Paris the Funds fell. Bennigsen
boldly ordered the Te Deum to be sung. In order to confirm his
victory, re-organise his army, reassure France, re-establish
the opinion of Europe, encourage the Polish insurrection, and
to curb the ill-will of Germany and Austria, Napoleon remained
a week at Eylau. He negotiated: on one side he caused
Talleyrand to write to Zastrow, the Prussian foreign minister,
to propose peace and his alliance; he sent Bertrand to Memel
to offer to re-establish the King of Prussia, on the condition
of no foreign intervention. He also tried to negotiate with
Bennigsen; to which the latter made answer, 'that his master
had charged him to fight, and not negotiate.' After some
hesitation, Prussia ended by joining her fortunes to those of
Russia. By the convention of Bartenstein (25th April, 1807)
the two sovereigns came to terms on the following points:
1. The re-establishment of Prussia within the limits of 1805.
2. The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine.
3. The restitution to Austria of the Tyrol and Venice.
4. The accession of England to the coalition, and the
aggrandisement of Hanover.
5. The co-operation of Sweden.
6. The restoration of the house of Orange, and indemnities to
the kings of Naples and Sardinia.
This document is important; it nearly reproduces the
conditions offered to Napoleon at the Congress of Prague, in
1813. Russia and Prussia proposed then to make a more pressing
appeal to Austria, Sweden, and England; but the Emperor
Francis was naturally undecided, and the Archduke Charles,
alleging the state of the finances and the army, strongly
advised him against any new intervention. Sweden was too weak;
and notwithstanding his fury against Napoleon, Gustavus III.
had just been forced to treat with Mortier. The English
minister showed a remarkable inability to conceive the
situation; he refused to guarantee the new Russian loan of a
hundred and fifty millions, and would lend himself to no
maritime diversion. Napoleon showed the greatest diplomatic
activity. The Sultan Selim III. declared war against Russia;
General Sebastiani, the envoy at Constantinople, put the
Bosphorus in a state of defence, and repulsed the English
fleet [see TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807]; General Gardane left for
Ispahan, with a mission to cause a Persian outbreak in the
Caucasus. Dantzig had capitulated [May 24, after a long
siege], and Lefèbvre's 40,000 men were therefore ready for
service. Masséna took 36,000 of them into Italy, In the
spring, Bennigsen, who had been reinforced by 10,000 regular
troops, 6,000 Cossacks, and the Imperial Guard, being now at
the head of 100,000 men, took the offensive; Gortchakof
commanding the right and Bagration the left. He tried, as in
the preceding year, to seize Ney's division; but the latter
fought, as he retired, two bloody fights, at Gutstadt and
Ankendorff. Bennigsen, again in danger of being surrounded,
retired on Heilsberg. He defended himself bravely (June 10);
but the French, extending their line on his right, marched on
Eylau, so as to cut him off from Konigsberg. The Russian
generalissimo retreated; but being pressed, he had to draw up
at Friedland, on the Alle. The position he had taken up was
most dangerous. All his army was enclosed in an angle of the
Alle, with the steep bed of the river at their backs, which in
case of misfortune left them only one means of retreat, over
the three bridges of Friedland. ... 'Where are the Russians
concealed?' asked Napoleon when he came up. When he had noted
their situation, he exclaimed, 'It is not every day that one
surprises the enemy in such a fault.' He put Lannes and Victor
in reserve, ordered Mortier to oppose Gortchakof on the left
and to remain still, as the movement which 'would be made by
the right would pivot on the left.' As to Ney, he was to cope
on the right with Bagration, who was shut in by the angle of
the river; he was to meet them 'with his head down,' without
taking any care of his own safety. Ney led the charge with
irresistible fury; the Russians were riddled by his artillery
at 150 paces: he successively crushed the chasseurs of the
Russian Guard, the Ismaïlovski, and the Horse Guards, burnt
Friedland by shells, and cannonaded the bridges which were the
only means of retreat. ... The Russian left wing was almost
thrown into the river; Bagration, with the Semenovski and
other troops, was hardly able to cover the defeat.
{1513}
On the Russian right, Gortchakof, who had advanced to attack
the immovable Mortier, had only time to ford the Alle. Count
Lambert retired with 29 guns by the left bank; the rest fled
by the right bank, closely pursued by the cavalry. Meanwhile
Murat, Davoust, and Soult, who had taken no part in the
battle, arrived before Konigsberg. Lestocq, with 25,000 men,
tried to defend it, but on learning the disaster of Friedland
he hastily evacuated it. Only one fortress now remained to
Frederick William--the little town of Memel. The Russians had
lost at Friedland from 15,000 to 20,000 men, besides 80 guns
(June 14, 1807). ... Alexander had no longer an army. Only one
man, Barclay de Tolly, proposed to continue the war; but in
order to do this it would be necessary to re-enter Russia, to
penetrate into the very heart of the empire, to burn
everything on the way, and only present a desert to the enemy.
Alexander hoped to get off more cheaply. He wrote a severe
letter to Bennigsen, and gave him powers to treat."
A. Rambaud,
History of Russia,
volume 2, chapter 12.
ALSO IN:
Duke de Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 2, part 1, chapters 4-6.
GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (June-July).
The Treaty of Tilsit.
Its known and its unknown agreements.
"Alexander I. now determined to negotiate in person with the
rival emperor, and on the 25th of June the two sovereigns met
at Tilsit, on a raft which was moored in the middle of the
Niemen. The details of the conference are a secret, as
Napoleon's subsequent account of it is untrustworthy, and no
witnesses were present. All that is certain is that Alexander
I., whose character was a curious mixture of nobility and
weakness, was completely won over by his conqueror. ...
Napoleon, ... instead of attempting to impose extreme terms
upon a country which it was impossible to conquer, ... offered
to share with Russia the supremacy in Europe which had been
won by French arms. The only conditions were the abandonment
of the cause of the old monarchies, which seemed hopeless, and
an alliance with France against England. Alexander had several
grievances against the English government, especially the
lukewarm support that had been given in recent operations, and
made no objection to resume the policy of his predecessors in
this respect. Two interviews sufficed to arrange the basis of
an agreement. Both sovereigns abandoned their allies without
scruple. Alexander gave up Prussia and Sweden, while Napoleon
deserted the cause of the Poles, who had trusted to his zeal
for their independence, and of the Turks, whom his envoy had
recently induced to make war upon Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit
was speedily drawn up; on the 7th of July peace was signed
between France and Russia, on the 9th between France and
Prussia. Frederick William III. had to resign the whole of his
kingdom west of the Elbe, together with all the acquisitions
which Prussia had made in the second and third partitions of
Poland. The provinces that were left, amounting to barely half
of what he had inherited, were burthened with the payment of
an enormous sum as compensation to France. The district west
of the Elbe was united with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, and
ultimately with Hanover, to form the kingdom of Westphalia,
which was given to Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome. Of
Polish Prussia, one province, Bialystock, was added to Russia,
and the rest was made into the grand duchy of Warsaw, and
transferred to Saxony. Danzig, with the surrounding territory,
was declared a free state under Prussian and Saxon protection,
but it was really subject to France, and remained a centre of
French power on the Baltic. All trade between Prussia and
England was cut off. Alexander I., on his side, recognised all
Napoleon's new creations in Europe--the Confederation of the
Rhine, the kingdoms of Italy, Naples, Holland, and Westphalia,
and undertook to mediate between France and England. But the
really important agreement between France and Russia was to be
found, not in the formal treaties, but in the secret
conventions which were arranged by the two emperors. The exact
text of these has never been made public, and it is probable
that some of the terms rested upon verbal rather than on
written understandings, but the general drift of them is
unquestionable. The bribe offered to Alexander was the
aggrandisement of Russia in the East. To make him an
accomplice in the acts of Napoleon, he was to be allowed to
annex Finland from Sweden, and Moldavia and Wallachia from
Turkey. With regard to England, Russia undertook to adopt
Napoleon's blockade-system, and to obtain the adhesion of
those states which still remained open to English
trade--Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal."
H. Lodge,
History of Modern Europe,
chapter 24, section 25.
"'I thought,' said Napoleon at St. Helena, 'it would benefit
the world to drive these brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But
when I reflected what power it would give to Russia, from the
number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions who may be
considered Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as
Alexander wanted Constantinople, which would have destroyed
the equilibrium of power in Europe. France would gain Egypt,
Syria, and the islands; but those were nothing to what Russia
would have obtained.' This coincides with Savary's [Duke de
Rovigo's] statement, that Alexander told him Napoleon said he
was under no engagements to the new Sultan, and that changes
in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to one
another; and again, Alexander said that, in their
conversations at Tilsit, Napoleon often told him he did not
require the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; he would
place things in a train to dispense with it, and it was not
possible to suffer longer the presence of the Turks in Europe.
'He even left me,' said Alexander, 'to entertain the project
of driving them back into Asia. It is only since that he has
returned to the idea of leaving Constantinople to them, and
some surrounding provinces.' Due day, when Napoleon was
talking to Alexander, he asked his secretary, M. Meneval, for
the map of Turkey, opened it, then renewed the conversation;
and placing his finger on Constantinople said several times to
the secretary, though not loud enough to be heard by
Alexander, 'Constantinople, Constantinople, never. It is the
capital of the world.' ... It is very evident in their
conversations that Napoleon agreed to his [Alexander's]
possessing himself of the Turkish Empire up to the Balkan, if
not beyond; though Bignon denies that any plan for the actual
partition of Turkey was embodied in the treaty of Tilsit.
Hardenberg, not always well informed, asserts that it was.
{1514}
Savary says he could not believe that Napoleon would have
abandoned the Turks without a compensation in some other
quarter; and he felt certain Alexander had agreed in return to
Napoleon's project for the conquest of Spain, 'which the
Emperor had very much at heart'"
C. Joyneville,
Life and Times of Alexander I.,
volume 1, chapter 8.
ALSO IN:
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 46 (volume 10).
Count Miot de Melito,
Memoirs,
chapter 24.
P. Lanfrey,
History of Napoleon,
chapters 3-4.
Prince de Talleyrand,
Memoirs,
part 3 (volume 1).
A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
book 27 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (July).
The collapse of Prussia and its Causes.
"For the five years that followed, Prussia is to be conceived,
in addition to all her other humiliations, as in the hands of
a remorseless creditor whose claims are decided by himself
without appeal, and who wants more than all he can get. She is
to be thought of as supporting for more than a year after the
conclusion of the Treaty a French army of more than 150,000
men, then as supporting a French garrison in three principal
fortresses, and finally, just before the period ends, as
having to support the huge Russian expedition in its passage
through the country. ... It was not in fact from the Treaty of
Tilsit, but from the systematic breach of it, that the
sufferings of Prussia between 1807 and 1813 arose. It is
indeed hardly too much to say that the advantage of the Treaty
was received only by France, and that the only object Napoleon
can have had in signing it was to inflict more harm on Prussia
than he could inflict by simply continuing the war. Such was
the downfall of Prussia. The tremendousness of the catastrophe
strikes us less because we know that it was soon retrieved,
and that Prussia rose again and became greater than ever. But
could this recovery be anticipated? A great nation, we say,
cannot be dissolved by a few disasters; patriotism and energy
will retrieve everything. But precisely these seemed wanting.
The State seemed to have fallen in pieces because it had no
principle of cohesion, and was only held together by an
artificial bureaucracy. It had been created by the energy of
its government and the efficiency of its soldiers, and now it
appeared to come to an end because its government had ceased
to be energetic and its soldiers to be efficient. The
catastrophe could not but seem as irremediable as it was
sudden and complete." There may be discerned "three distinct
causes for it. First, the undecided and pusillanimous policy
pursued by the Prussian government since 1803 had an evident
influence upon the result by making the great Powers,
particularly England and Austria, slow to render it
assistance, and also by making the commanders, especially
Brunswick, irresolute in action because they could not, even
at the last moment, believe the war to be serious. This
indecision we have observed to have been connected with a
mal-organisation of the Foreign Department. Secondly, the
corruption of the military system, which led to the surrender
of the fortresses. Thirdly, a misfortune for which Prussia was
not responsible, its desertion by Russia at a critical moment,
and the formation of a close alliance between Russia and
France."
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 2, chapter 5 (volume 1).
GERMANY: A. D. 1807-1808.
The great Revolutionary Reforms of Hardenberg, Stein and
Scharnhorst.
Edict of Emancipation.
Military reorganization.
Beginning of local self-government.
Seeds of a new national life.
"The work of those who resisted Napoleon--even if no one of
them should ever be placed in the highest class of the
benefactors of mankind--has in some cases proved enduring, and
nowhere so much as in Germany. They began two great works--the
reorganisation of Prussia and the revival of the German
nationality, and time has deliberately ratified their views.
Without retrogression, without mistake, except the mistake
which in such matters is the most venial that can be
committed, that, namely, of over-caution, of excessive
hesitation, the edifice which was then founded has been raised
higher and higher till it is near completion. ... Because
Frederick-William III. remains quietly seated on the throne
through the whole period, we remain totally unaware that a
Prussian revolution took place then--a revolution so
comprehensive that the old reign and glories of Frederick may
fairly be said to belong to another world--to an 'ancien
regime' that has utterly passed away. It was a revolution
which, though it did not touch the actual framework of
government in such a way as to substitute one of Aristotle's
forms of government for another, yet went so far beyond
government, and made such a transformation both in industry
and culture, that it deserves the name of revolution far more,
for instance, than our English Revolution of the 17th century.
... In Prussia few of the most distinguished statesmen, few even
of those who took the lead in her liberation from Napoleon,
were Prussians. Blücher himself began life in the service of
Sweden, Scharnhorst was a Hanoverian, so was Hardenberg, and
Stein came from Nassau. Niebuhr was enticed to Berlin from the
Bank of Copenhagen. Hardenberg served George III. and
afterwards the Duke of Brunswick before he entered the service
of Frederick-William II.; and when Stein was dismissed by
Frederick-William III. in the midst of the war of 1806, though
he was a man of property and rank, he took measures to
ascertain whether they were in want of a Finance Minister at
St. Petersburg. ... We misapprehend the nature of what took
place when we say, as we usually do, that some important and
useful reforms were introduced by Stein, Hardenberg, and
Scharnhorst. In the first place, such a word as reform is not
properly applied to changes so vast, and in the second place.
the changes then made or at least commenced, went far beyond
legislation. We want some word stronger than reform which
shall convey that one of the greatest events of modern history
now took place in Prussia. Revolution would convey this, but
unfortunately we appropriate that word to changes in the form
of government, or even mere changes of dynasty, provided they
are violent, though such changes are commonly quite
insignificant compared to what now took place in Prussia. ...
The form of government indeed was not changed. Not merely did
the king continue to reign, but no Parliament was created even
with powers ever so restricted. Another generation had to pass
away before this innovation, which to us seems the beginning
of political life, took place. But a nation must be made
before it can be made free, and, as we have said, in Prussia
there was an administration (in great disorder) and an army,
but no nation.
{1515}
When Stein was placed at the head of affairs in the autumn of
1807, he seems, at first, hardly to have been aware that
anything was called for beyond the reform of the
administration, and the removal of some abuses in the army.
Accordingly he did reform the administration from the top to
the bottom, remodelling the whole machinery both of central
and local government which had come down from the father of
Frederick the Great. But the other work also was forced upon
him, and he began to create the nation by emancipating the
peasantry, while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were brooding over
the ideas which, five years later, took shape in the Landwehr
of East Prussia. Besides emancipating the peasant he
emancipated industry,--everywhere abolishing that strange
caste system which divided the population rigidly into nobles,
citizens, and peasants, and even stamped every acre of land in
the country with its own unalterable rank as noble, or
citizen, or peasant land. Emancipation, so to speak, had to be
given before enfranchisement. The peasant must have something
to live for; freewill must be awakened in the citizen; and he
must be taught to fight for something before he could receive
political liberty. Of such liberty Stein only provided one
modest germ. By his Städteordnung he introduced popular
election into the towns. Thus Prussia and France set out
towards political liberty by different roads. Prussia began
modestly with local liberties, but did not for a long time
attempt a Parliament. France with her charte, and in imitation
of France many of the small German States, had grand popular
Parliaments, but no local liberties. And so for a long time
Prussia was regarded as a backward State. ... It was only by
accident that Stein stopped short at municipal liberties and
created no Parliament. He would have gone further, and in the
last years of the wartime Hardenberg did summon deliberative
assemblies, which, however, fell into disuse again after the
peace. ... In spite however of all reaction, the change
irrevocably made by the legislation of that time was similar
to that made in France by the Revolution, and caused the age
before Jena to be regarded as an 'ancien regime.' But in
addition to this, a change had been made in men's minds and
thoughts by the shocks of the time, which prepared the way for
legislative changes which have taken place since. How
unprecedented in Prussia, for instance, was the dictatorial
authority wielded by Hardenberg early in 1807, by Stein in the
latter part of that year and in 1808, and by Hardenberg again
from 1810 onwards! Before that time in the history of Prussia
we find no subject eclipsing or even approaching the King in
importance. Prussia had been made what she was almost entirely
by her electors and kings. In war and organisation alike all
had been done by the Great Elector or Frederick-William I., or
Frederick the Great. But now this is suddenly changed. Everything
now turns on the minister. Weak ministers are expelled by
pressure put upon the king, strong ones are forced upon him.
He is compelled to create a new ministerial power much greater
than that of an English Prime Minister, and more like that of
a Grand Vizier, and by these dictators the most comprehensive
innovations are made. The loyalty of the people was not
impaired by this; on the contrary, Stein and Hardenberg saved
the Monarchy; but it evidently transferred the Monarchy,
though safely, to a lower pedestal."
J. R. Seeley,
Prussian History (Macmillan's Magazine,
volume 36, pages 342-351).
ALSO IN:
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
parts 3-5 (volumes 1-2).
R. B. D. Morier,
Agrarian Legislation of Prussia
(Systems of Land Tenure: Cobden Club Essays,
chapter 5).
GERMANY: A. D. 1808.
The Awakening of the national spirit.
Effects of the Spanish rising, and of Fichte's Addresses.
The beginnings of the great rising in Spain against Napoleon
(see SPAIN: A. D. 1808, and after) "were watched by Stein from
Berlin while he was engaged in negotiating with Daru; we can
imagine with what feelings! His cause had been, since his
ministry began, substantially the same as that of Spain; but
he had perhaps understood it himself but dimly, at any rate
hoped but faintly to see it prosper. But now he ripens at once
into a great nationality statesman; the reforms of Prussia
begin at once to take a more military stamp, and to point more
decisively to a great uprising of the German race against the
foreign oppressor. The change of feeling which took place in
Prussia after the beginning of the Spanish troubles is very
clearly marked in Stein's autobiography. After describing the
negotiations at Paris and Berlin, ... he begins a new
paragraph thus: 'The popular war which had broken out in Spain
and was attended with good success, had heightened the
irritation of the inhabitants of the Prussian State caused by
the humiliation they had suffered. All thirsted for revenge;
plans of insurrection, which aimed at exterminating the French
scattered about the country, were arranged; among others, one
was to be carried out at Berlin, and I had the greatest
trouble to keep the leaders, who confided their intentions to
me, from a premature outbreak. We all watched the progress of
the Spanish war and the commencement of the Austrian, for the
preparations of that Power had not remained a secret;
expectation was strained to the highest point; pains were
necessary to moderate the excited eagerness for resistance in
order to profit by it in more favourable circumstances. ...
Fichte's Addresses to the Germans, delivered during the French
occupation of Berlin and printed under the censorship of M.
Bignon, the Intendant, had a great effect upon the feelings of
the cultivated class.' ... That in the midst of such weighty
matters he should remember to mention Fichte's Addresses is a
remarkable testimony to the effect produced by them on the
public mind, and at the same time it leads us to conjecture
that they must have strongly influenced his own. They had been
delivered in the winter at Berlin and of course could not be
heard by Stein, who was then with the King, but they were not
published till April. As affecting public opinion therefore,
and also as known to Stein, the book was almost exactly of the
same date as the Spanish Rebellion, and it is not unnatural
that he should mention the two influences together. ... When
the lectures were delivered at Berlin a rising in Spain was
not dreamed of, and even when they were published it had not
taken place, nor could clearly be foreseen. And yet they teach
the same lesson. That doctrine of nationality which was taught
affirmatively by Spain had been suggested to Fichte's mind by
the reductio ad absurdum which events had given to the
negation of it in Germany.
{1516}
Nothing could be more convincing than the concurrence of the
two methods of proof at the same moment, and the prophetic
elevation of these discourses (which may have furnished a
model to Carlyle) was well fitted to drive the lesson home,
particularly to a mind like Stein's, which was quite capable
of being impressed by large principles. ... Fichte's Addresses
do not profess to have in the first instance nationality for
their subject. They profess to inquire whether there exists
any grand comprehensive remedy for the evils with which
Germany is afflicted. They find such a remedy where Turgot
long before had looked for deliverance from the selfishness to
which he traced all the abuses of the old regime, that is, in
a grand system of national education. Fichte reiterates the
favourite doctrine of modern Liberalism, that education as
hitherto conducted by the Church has aimed only at securing
for men happiness in another life, and that this is not
enough, inasmuch as they need also to be taught how to bear
themselves in the present life so as to do their duty to the
state, to others and themselves. He is as sure as Turgot that
a system of national education will work so powerfully upon
the nation that in a few years they will not be recognisable,
and he explains at great length what should be the nature of
this system, dwelling principally upon the importance of
instilling a love of duty for its own sake rather than for
reward. The method to be adopted is that of Pestalozzi. Out of
fourteen lectures the first three are entirely occupied with
this. But then the subject is changed, and we find ourselves
plunged into a long discussion of the peculiar characteristics
which distinguish Germany from other nations and particularly
other nations of German origin. At the present day this
discussion, which occupies four lectures, seems hardly
satisfactory; but it is a striking deviation from the fashion
of that age. ... But up to this point we perceive only that
the subject of German nationality occupies Fichte's mind very
much, and that there was more significance than we first
remarked in the title, Addresses to the German Nation;
otherwise we have met with nothing likely to seem of great
importance to a statesman. But the eighth Lecture propounds
the question, 'What is a Nation in the higher signification of
the word, and what is patriotism? It is here that he delivers
what might seem a commentary on the Spanish Revolution, which
had not yet taken place. ... Fichte proclaims the Nation not
only to be different from the State, but to be something far
higher and greater. ... Applied to Germany this doctrine would
lead to the practical conclusion that a united German State
ought to be set up in which the separate German States should
be absorbed. ... In the lecture before us he contents himself
with advising that patriotism as distinguished from loyalty to
the State should be carefully inculcated in the new education,
and should influence the individual German Governments. It
would not indeed have been safe for Fichte to propose a
political reform, but it rather appears that he thought it an
advantage rather than a disadvantage that the Nation and the
State should be distinct. ... I should not have lingered so
long over this book if it did not strike me as the prophetical
or canonical book which announces and explains a great
transition in Modern Europe, and the prophecies of which began
to be fulfilled immediately after its publication by the
rising in Spain. ... It is this Spanish Revolution which when
it has extended to the other countries we call the
Anti-Napoleonic Revolution of Europe. It gave Europe years of
unparalleled bloodshed, but at the same time years over which
there broods a light of poetry; for no conception can be more
profoundly poetical than that which now woke up in every part
of Europe, the conception of the Nation. Those years also led
the way to the great movements which have filled so much of
the nineteenth century, and have rearranged the whole central
part of the map of Europe on a more natural system."
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).
GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (January).
Kehl, Cassel and Wesel annexed to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1807-1808 (NOVEMBER-FEBRUARY).
GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (April-December).
The Tugendbund, and Stein's relations to it.
"English people think of Stein almost exclusively in connexion
with land laws. But the second and more warlike period of his
Ministry has also left a faint impression in the minds of many
among us, who are in the habit of regarding him as the founder
of the Tugendbund. In August and September [1808], the very
months in which Stein was taking up his new position, this
society was attracting general attention, and accordingly this
is the place to consider Stein's relation to it. That he was
secretly animating and urging it on must have seemed at the
time more than probable, almost self-evident. It aimed at the
very objects which he had at heart, it spoke of him with warm
admiration, and in general it used language which seemed an
echo of his own. ... Whatever his connexion with the
Tugendbund may have been, it cannot have commenced till April,
1808, for it was in that month that the Tugendbund began its
existence, and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to
represent Stein as beginning to revolutionise the country with
the help of the Tugendbund, for his revolutionary edict had
been promulgated in the October before. ... In his
autobiography ... Stein [says]: 'An effect and not the cause
of this passionate national indignation at the despotism of
Napoleon was the Tugendbund, of which I was no more the
founder than I was a member, as I can assert on my honour and
as is well known to its originators. About July, 1808, there
was formed at Königsberg a society consisting of several
officers, for example, Colonel Gneisenau, Grolmann, &c., and
learned men, such as Professor Krug, in order to combat
selfishness and to rouse the nobler moral feelings; and
according to the requirements of the existing laws they
communicated their statutes and the list of their members to
the King's Majesty, who sanctioned the former without any
action on my part, it being my belief in general that there
was no need of any other institute but to put new life into
the spirit of Christian patriotism, the germ of which lay
already in the existing institutions of State and Church. The
new Society held its meetings, but of the proceedings I knew
nothing, and when later it proposed to exert an indirect
influence upon educational and military institutions I
rejected the proposal as encroaching on the department of the
civil and ecclesiastical governing bodies. As I was driven
soon afterwards out of the public service, I know nothing
of the further operations of this Society.' ...
{1517}
He certainly seems to intend his readers to understand that he
had not even any indirect or underhand connexion with it, but
from first to last stood entirely aloof, except in one case
when he interfered to restrain its action. It is even possible
that by telling us that he had nothing to do with the step
taken by the King when he sanctioned the statutes of the
society he means to hint that; had his advice been taken, the
society would not have been even allowed to exist. ... The
principal fact affirmed by Stein is indeed now beyond
controversy; Stein was certainly not either the founder or a
member of the Tugendbund. The society commonly known by that
name, which however designated itself as the Moral and
Scientific Union, was founded by a number of persons, of whom
many were Freemasons, at Konigsberg in the month of April.
Professor Krug, mentioned by Stein, was one of them; Gneisenau
and Grolmann, whom he also mentions, were not among the first
members, and Gneisenau, it seems, was never a member. The
statutes were drawn by Krug, Bardeleben and Baersch, and if
anyone person can be called the Founder of the Tugendbund, the
second of these, Bardeleben, seems best to deserve the title.
The Order of Cabinet by which the society was licensed is
dated Konigsberg, June 30th, and runs as follows: 'The revival
of morality, religion, serious taste and public spirit, is
assuredly most commendable; and, so far as the society now
being formed under the name of a Virtue Union (Tugendverein)
is occupied with this within the limits of the laws of the
country and without any interference in politics or public
administration, His Majesty the King of Prussia approves the
object and constitution of the society.' ... From Konigsberg
missionaries went forth who established branch associations,
called Chambers, in other towns, first those of the Province
of Prussia, Braunsberg, Elbing, Graudenz, Eylau, Hohenstein,
Memel, Stallupöhnen; then in August and September Bardeleben
spread the movement with great success through Silesia. The
spirit which animated the new society could not but be
approved by every patriot. They had been deeply struck with
the decay of the nation, as shown in the occurrences of the
war, and their views of the way in which it might be revived
were much the same as those of Stein and Fichte. The only
question was whether they were wise in organising a society in
order to promulgate these views, whether such a society was
likely to do much good, and also whether it might not by
possibility do much harm. Stein's view, as he has given it,
was that it was not likely to do much good, and that such an
organisation was unnecessary. ... It did not follow because he
desired Estates or Parliaments that he was prepared to
sanction a political club. ... It may well have seemed to him
that to suffer a political club to come into existence was to
allow the guidance of the Revolution which he had begun to
pass out of his hands. There appears, then, when we consider
it closely, nothing unnatural in the course which Stein
declares himself to have taken."
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 4, chapter 3 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
T. Frost,
Secret Societies of the European Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 4.
GERMANY: A. D. 1808 (September-October).
Imperial conference and Treaty of Erfurt.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1808 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (January-June).
Outburst of Austrian feeling against France.
Reopening of war.
Napoleon's advance to Vienna.
His defeat at Aspern and perilous situation.
Austrian reverses in Italy and Hungary.
"The one man of all the Austrians who felt the least amount of
hatred against France, was, perhaps, the Emperor. All his
family and all his people--nobles and priests, the middle
classes and the peasantry--evinced a feeling full of anger
against the nation which had upset Europe. ... By reason of
the French, the disturbers and spoilers, the enemies of the
human race, despisers of morality and religion alike, Princes
were suffering in their palaces, workmen in their shops,
business men in their offices, priests in their churches,
soldiers in their camps, peasants in their huts. The movement
of exasperation was irresistible. Everyone said that it was a
mistake to have laid down their arms; that they ought against
France to have fought on to the bitter end, and to have
sacrificed the last man and the last florin; that they had
been wrong in not having gone to the assistance of Prussia
after the Jena Campaign; and that the moment had arrived for
all the Powers to coalesce against the common enemy and crush
him. ... All Europe had arrived at a paroxysm of indignation.
What was she waiting for before rising? A signal. That signal
Austria was about to give. And this time with what chances of
success! The motto was to be 'victory or death.' But they were
sure of victory. The French army, scattered from the Oder to
the Tagus, from the mountains of Bohemia to the Sierra Morena,
would not be able to resist the onslaught of so many nations
eager to break their bonds. ... Vienna, in 1809, indulged in
the same language, and felt the same passions, that Berlin did
in 1806. ... The Landwehr, then only organized a few months,
were impatiently awaiting the hour when they should measure
themselves against the Veterans of the French army. Volunteers
flocked in crowds to the colours. Patriotic subscriptions
flowed in. ... Boys wanted to leave school to fight. All
classes of society vied with each other in zeal, courage, and
a spirit of sacrifice. When the news was made public that the
Archduke Charles had, on the 20th of February, 1809, been
appointed Generalissimo, there was an outburst of joy and
confidence from one end of the Empire to the other."
Imbert de Saint-Amand,
Memoirs of the Empress Marie Louise,
part 1, chapter 2.
"On receiving decisive intelligence of these hostile
preparations, Napoleon returned with extraordinary expedition
from Spain to Paris, in January, 1809, and gave orders to
concentrate his forces in Germany, and call out the full
contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine. Some further
time was consumed by the preparations on either side. At last,
on the 8th of April, the Austrian troops crossed the frontiers
at once on the Inn, in Bohemia, in the Tyrol and in Italy. The
whole burthen of the war rested on Austria alone, for Prussia
remained neutral, and Russia, now allied to France, was even
bound to make a show at least, though it were no more, of
hostility to Austria. On the same day on which the Austrian
forces crossed the frontiers, the Tyrol rose in insurrection
[see below: A. D. 1809-1810 (APRIL-FEBRUARY)], and was swept
clear of the enemy in four days, with the exception of a
Bavarian garrison, that still held out in Kufstein.
{1518}
The French army was at this time dispersed over a line of
forty leagues in extent, with numerous undefended apertures
between the corps; so that the fairest possible opportunity
presented itself to the Austrians for cutting to pieces the
scattered forces of the French, and marching in triumph to the
Rhine. As usual, however, the archduke's early movements were
subjected to most impolitic delays by the Aulic Council; and
time was allowed Napoleon to arrive on the theatre of war
(April 17), and repair the faults committed by his
adjutant-general, Berthier. He instantly extricated his army
from its perilous position--almost cut in two by the advance
of the Austrians--and, beginning on the 19th, he beat the
latter in five battles on five successive days, at Thaun,
Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmühl, and Ratisbon. The Archduke
Charles retired into Bohemia to collect reinforcements, but
General Hiller was, in consequence of the delay in repairing
the fortifications of Linz, unable to maintain that place, the
possession of which was important, on account of its forming a
connecting point between Bohemia and the Austrian Oberland.
Hiller, however, at least saved his honour by pushing forward
to the Traun, and in a fearfully bloody encounter at
Ebersberg, captured three French eagles, one of his colours
alone falling into the enemy's hands. He was, nevertheless,
compelled to retire before the superior forces of the French,
and crossing over at Krems to the left bank of the Danube, he
formed a junction with the Archduke Charles. The way was now
clear to Vienna, which, after a slight show of defence,
capitulated to Napoleon on the 12th of May. The Archduke
Charles had hoped to reach the capital before the French, and
to give battle to them beneath its walls; but as he had to
make a circuit whilst the French pushed forward in a direct
line, his plan was frustrated, and he arrived, when too late,
from Bohemia. Both armies, separated by the Danube, stood
opposed to one another in the vicinity of the imperial city.
Both commanders were desirous of coming to a decisive
engagement. The French had secured the island of Lobau, to
serve as a mustering place, and point of transit across the
Danube. The archduke allowed them to establish a bridge of
boats, being resolved to await them on the Marchfeld. There it
was that Rudolph of Habsburg, in the battle against Ottakar,
had laid the foundation of the greatness of the house of
Austria; and there the political existence of that house and
the fate of the monarchy were now to be decided. Having
crossed the river, Napoleon was received on the opposite bank,
near Aspern and Esslingen, by his opponent, and, after a
dreadful battle [in which Marshal Lannes was killed], that was
carried on with unwearied animosity for two days, May 21st and
22nd, 1809, he was completely beaten, and compelled to fly for
refuge to the island of Lobau. The rising stream had,
meanwhile, carried away the bridge, Napoleon's sole chance of
escape to the opposite bank. For two days he remained on the
island with his defeated troops, without provisions, and in
hourly expectation of being cut to pieces; the Austrians,
however, neglected to turn the opportunity to advantage, and
allowed the French leisure to rebuild the bridge, a work of
extreme difficulty. During six weeks afterwards, the two
armies continued to occupy their former positions under the
walls of Vienna, on the right and left banks of the Danube,
narrowly watching each other's movements, and preparing for a
final struggle. Whilst these events were in progress, the
Archduke John had successfully penetrated into Italy, where he
had totally defeated the Viceroy Eugene at Salice, on the 16th
of April. Favoured by the simultaneous revolt of the Tyrolese,
he might have obtained the most decisive results from this
victory, but the extraordinary progress of Napoleon down the
valley of the Danube rendered necessary the concentration of
the whole forces of the monarchy for the defence of the

capital. Having begun a retreat, he was pursued by Eugene, and
defeated on the Piave, with great loss, on the 8th of May.
Escaping thence, without further molestation, to Villach, in
Carinthia, he received intelligence of the fall of Vienna,
together with a letter from the Archduke Charles, of the 15th
of May, directing him to move with all his forces upon Lintz,
to act on the rear and communications of Napoleon. Instead of
obeying these orders, he thought proper to march into Hungary,
abandoning the Tyrol and the whole projected operations on the
Upper Danube to their fate. His disobedience was disastrous to
the fortunes of his house, for it caused the fruits of the
victory at Aspern to be lost. He might have arrived, with
50,000 men, on the 24th or 25th, at Lintz, where no one
remained but Bernadotte and the Saxons, who were incapable of
offering any serious resistance. Such a force, concentrated on
the direct line of Napoleon's communications, immediately
after his defeat at Aspern, on the 22nd, would have deprived
him of all means of extricating himself from the most perilous
situation in which he had yet been placed since ascending the
consular throne. After totally defeating Jellachich in the
valley of the Muhr, Eugene desisted from his pursuit of the
army of Italy, and joined Napoleon at Vienna. The Archduke
John united his forces at Raab with those of the Hungarian
insurrection, under his brother, the Palatine. The viceroy
again marched against him, and defeated him at Raab on the
14th of June. The Palatine remained with the Hungarian
insurrection in Komorn; Archduke John moved on to Presburg. In
the north, the Archduke Ferdinand, who had advanced as far as
Warsaw, had been driven back by the Poles: under Poniatowsky,
and by a Russian force sent by the Emperor Alexander to their
aid, which, on this success, invaded Galicia."
W. K. Kelly,
History of the House of Austria (Continuation of Coxe),
chapter 4.
ALSO IN:
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 56-57 (volume 12).
Duke de Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 2, part 2, chapters 3-12.
Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 14 (volume 3).
Baron de Marbot,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 42-48.
GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (April-July).
Risings against the French in the North.
"A general revolt against the French had nearly taken place in
Saxony and Westphalia, where the enormous burdens imposed on
the people, and the insolence of the French troops, had
kindled a deadly spirit of hostility against the oppressors.
Everywhere the Tugendbund were in activity; and the advance of
the Austrians towards Franconia and Saxony, at the beginning
of the war, blew up the flame. The two first attempts at
insurrection, headed respectively by Katt, a Prussian officer
(April 3), and Dornberg, a Westphalian colonel (April 23),
proved abortive; but the enterprise of the celebrated Schill
was of a more formidable character.
{1519}
This enthusiastic patriot, then a colonel in the Prussian
army, had been compromised in the revolt of Dornberg; and
finding himself discovered, he boldly raised the standard
(April 29) at the head of 600 soldiers. His force speedily
received accessions, but failing in his attempts on Wittenberg
and Magdeburg, he moved towards the Baltic, in hope of succour
from the British cruisers, and at last threw himself into
Stralsund. Here he was speedily invested; the place was
stormed (May 31), and the gallant Schill slain in the assault,
a few hours only before the appearance of the British vessels
--the timely arrival of which might have secured the place,
and spread the rising over all Northern Germany. The Duke of
Brunswick-Oels, with his 'black band' of volunteers, had at
the same time invaded Saxony from Bohemia; and though then
obliged to retreat, he made a second incursion in June,
occupied Dresden and Leipsic, and drove the King of Westphalia
into France. After the battle of Wagram he made his way across
all Northern Germany, and was eventually conveyed, with his
gallant followers, still 2,000 strong, to England."
Epitome of Alison's History of Europe,
sections 525-526.
GERMANY: A. D. 1809 (July-September).
Napoleon's victory at Wagram.
The Peace of Schonbrunn.
Immense surrender of Austrian territory.
"The operation of establishing the bridges between the French
camp and the left bank of the Danube commenced on the night of
the 30th of June; and during the night of the 4th of July the
whole French army, passing between the villages of Enzersdorf
and Muhlleuten, debouched on the Marchfeld, wheeling to their
left. Napoleon was on horseback in the midst of them by
daylight; all the Austrian fortifications erected to defend
the former bridge were turned, the villages occupied by their
army taken, and the Archduke Charles was menaced both in flank
and rear, the French line of battle appuyed on Enzersdorf
being at a right angle to his left wing. Under these
circumstances the Archduke, retiring his left, attempted to
outflank the French right, while Napoleon bore down upon his
centre at Wagram. This village became the scene of a
sanguinary struggle, and one house only remained standing when
night closed in. The Archduke sent courier after courier to
hasten the advance of his brother, between whom and himself
was Napoleon, whose line on the night of the 5th extended from
Loibersdorf on the right to some two miles beyond Wagram on
the left. Napoleon passed the night in massing his centre,
still determining to manœuvre by his left in order to throw
back the Archduke Charles on that side before the Archduke
John could come up on the other. At six o'clock on the morning
of the 6th of July he commanded the attack in person.
Disregarding all risk, he appeared throughout the day in the
hottest of the fire, mounted on a snow-white charger,
Euphrates, a present from the Shah of Persia. The Archduke
Charles as usual committed the error which Napoleon's enemies
had not even yet learned was invariably fatal to them:
extending his line too greatly he weakened his centre, at the
same time opening tremendous assaults on the French wings,
which suffered dreadfully. Napoleon ordered Lauriston to
advance upon the Austrian centre with a hundred guns,
supported by two whole divisions of infantry in column. The
artillery, when within half cannon-shot, opened a terrific
fire: nothing could withstand such a shock. The infantry, led
by Macdonald, charged; the Austrian line was broken and the
centre driven back in confusion. The right, in a panic,
retrograded; the French cavalry then bore down upon them and
decided the battle, the Archduke still fighting to secure his
retreat, which he at length effected in tolerably good order.
By noon the whole Austrian army was abandoning the contest.
Their defeat so demoralized them that the Archduke John, who
came up on Napoleon's right before the battle was over, was
glad to retire with the rest, unnoticed by the enemy. That
evening the Marchfeld and Wagram were in possession of the
French. The population of Vienna had watched the battle from
the roofs and ramparts of the city, and saw the retreat of
their army with fear and gloom. Between 300,000 and 400,000
men were engaged, and the loss on both sides was nearly equal.
About 20,000 dead and 30,000 wounded strewed the ground; the
latter were conveyed to the hospitals of Vienna. ... Twenty
thousand Austrians were taken prisoners, but the number would
have been greater had the French cavalry acted with their
usual spirit. Bernadotte, issuing a bulletin, almost assuming
to himself the sole merit of the victory, was removed from his
command. Macdonald was created a marshal of the empire on the
morning after the battle. ... The battle of Wagram was won
more by good fortune than skill. Napoleon's strategy was at
fault, and had the Austrians fought as stoutly as they did at
Aspern, Napoleon would have been signally defeated. Had the
Archduke John acted promptly and vigorously, he might have
united with his brother's left--which was intact--and
overwhelmed the French. ... The defeated army retired to
Znaim, followed by the French; but further resistance was
abandoned by the Emperor of Austria. The Archduke Charles
solicited an armistice on the 9th; hostilities ceased, and
Napoleon returned to the palace of Schonbrunn while the
plenipotentiaries settled the terms of peace. ... English
Ministers displayed another instance of their customary spirit
of procrastination. Exactly eight days after the armistice of
Znaim, which assured them that Austria was no longer in a
position to profit by or co-operate with their proceedings,
they sent more than 80,000 fighting men, under the command of
Lord Chatham, to besiege Antwerp. ...
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1809 (JULY-DECEMBER).
Operations against Naples proved equally abortive. ... In
Spain alone English arms were successful. Sir Arthur Wellesley
won the battle of Talavera on the 28th of July. ...
See SPAIN: A. D. 1809 (FEBRUARY-JULY).
A treaty of peace, between France and Austria was signed on
the 14th of October at Vienna [sometimes called the Treaty of
Vienna, but more commonly the Peace of Schonbrunn]. The
Emperor of Austria ceded Salzburg and a part of Upper Austria
to the Confederation of the Rhine; part of Bohemia, Cracow,
and Western Galicia to the King of Saxony as Grand Duke of
Warsaw; part of Eastern Galicia to the Emperor of Russia; and
Trieste, Carniola, Friuli, Villach, and some part of Croatia
and Dalmatia to France: thus connecting the kingdom of Italy
with Napoleon's Illyrian possessions, making him master of the
entire coast of the Adriatic, and depriving Austria of its
last seaport. It was computed that the Emperor Francis gave up
territory to the amount of 45,000 square miles, with a
population of nearly 4,000,000. He also paid a large
contribution in money."
R. H. Horne,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 32.
{1520}
"The cessions made directly to Napoleon were the county of
Görtz, or Goricia, and that of Montefalcone, forming the
Austrian Friuli; the town and government of Trieste, Carniola,
the circle of Villach in Carinthia, part of Croatia and
Dalmatia, and the lordship of Räzuns in the Grison territory.
All these provinces, with the exception of Räzuns, were
incorporated by a decree of Napoleon, with Dalmatia and its
islands, into a single state with the name of the Illyrian
Provinces. They were never united with France, but always
governed by Napoleon as an independent state. A few districts
before possessed by Napoleon were also incorporated with them:
as Venetian Istria and Dalmatia with the Bocca di Cattaro,
Ragusa, and part of the Tyrol. ... The only other articles of
the treaty of much importance are the recognition by Austria
of any changes made, or to be made, in Spain, Portugal, and
Italy; the adherence of the Emperor to the prohibitive system
adopted by France and Russia, and his engaging to cease all
correspondence and relationship with Great Britain. By a
decree made at Ratisbon, April 24th, 1809, Napoleon had
suppressed the Teutonic Order in all the States belonging to
the Rhenish Confederation, reannexed its possessions to the
domains of the prince in which they were situated, and
incorporated Mergentheim, with the rights, domains, and
revenues attached to the Grand Mastership of the Order, with
the Kingdom of Würtemberg. These dispositions were confirmed
by the Treaty of Schönbrunn. The effect aimed at by the Treaty
of Schönbrunn was to surround Austria with powerful states,
and thus to paralyse all her military efforts. ... The Emperor
of Russia ... was very ill satisfied with the small portion of
the spoils assigned to him, and the augmentation awarded to
the duchy of Warsaw. Hence the first occasion of coldness
between him and Napoleon, whom he suspected of a design to
reestablish the Kingdom of Poland."
T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
book 7, chapter 14 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapters 59-60 (volume 13).
General Count M. Dumas,
Memoirs,
chapter 13 (volume 2).
E. Baines,
History of the Wars of the French Revolution,
book 4, chapter 9 (volume 3).
J. C. Ropes,
The First Napoleon,
lecture 4.
GERMANY: A. D. 1809-1810.
Humboldt's reform of Public Instruction in Prussia.
See EDUCATION, MODERN:
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.-PRUSSIA: A. D. 1809.
GERMANY: A. D. 1809-1810 (April-February).
The revolt in the Tyrol.
Heroic struggle of Andrew Hofer and his countrymen.
"The Tyrol, for centuries a possession of Austria, was ceded
to Bavaria by the Peace of Presburg in 1805. The Bavarians
made many innovations, in the French style, some good and some
bad; but the mountaineers, clinging to their ancient ways,
resisted them all alike. They hated the Bavarians as foreign
masters forced upon them; and especially detested the military
conscription, to which Austria had never subjected them. The
priests had an almost unlimited influence over these faithful
Catholics, and the Bavarians, who treated them rudely, were
regarded as innovators and allies of revolutionary France.
Thus the country submitted restlessly to the yoke of the Rhine
League until the spring of 1809. A secret understanding was
maintained with Austria and the Archduke John, and the people
never abandoned the hope of returning to their Austrian
allegiance. When the great war of 1809 began, the Emperor
Francis summoned all his people to arms. The Tyrolese answered
the call. ... They are a people trained in early life to the
use of arms, and to activity, courage, and ready devices in
hunting, and in traveling on their mountain paths. Austria
could be sure of the faithfulness of the Tyrol, and made haste
to occupy the country. When the first troops were seen entering
the passes, the people arose and drove away the Bavarian
garrisons. The alarm was soon sounded through the deepest
ravines of the land. Never was there a more united people, and
each troop or company chose its own officers, in the ancient
German style, from among their strongest and best men. Their
commanders were hunters, shepherds, priests: the former
gamekeeper, Speckbacher; the innkeeper, Martin Teimer; the
fiery Capuchin monk, Haspinger, whose sole weapon in the field
was a huge ebony crucifix, and many more of like peaceful
occupations. At the head of the whole army was a man who, like
Saul, towered by a head above all others, while his handsome
black beard fell to his girdle--Andrew Hofer, formerly an
innkeeper at Passeyr--a man of humble piety and simple
faithfulness, who fairly represented the people he led. He
regarded the war as dutiful service to his religion, his
emperor, and his country. The whole land soon swarmed with
little bands of men, making their way to Innsprück (April,
1809), whence the Bavarian garrison fled. Meanwhile a small
French corps came from Italy to relieve them. Though fired
upon by the peasants from every ravine and hill, they passed
the Brenner, and reached the Iselberg, near Innsprück. But
here they were surrounded on every side, and forced to
surrender. The first Austrian soldiers, under General
Chasteler, then reached the capital, and their welcome was a
popular festival. The liberators, as the Tyrolese soldiers
regarded themselves, committed no cruelties, but carried on
their enterprise in the spirit of a national jubilee. The
tidings of the disasters at Regensburg [Ratisbon] now came
upon them like a thunderbolt. The withdrawal of the Austrian
army then left the Tyrol without protection. Napoleon treated
the war as a mutiny, and set a price upon Chasteler's head.
Neither Chasteler nor any of the Austrian officers with him
understood the warfare of the peasantry. The Tyrolese were
left almost wholly to themselves, but they resolved to defend
their mountains. On May 11 the Bavarians under Wrede again set
out, from Salzburg, captured the pass of the Strub after a
bloody fight, and then climbed into the valley of the Inn.
They practiced frightful cruelties in their way. A fierce
struggle took place at the little village of Schwatz; the
Bavarians burned the place, and marched to Innsprück.
Chasteler withdrew, and the Bavarians and French, under Wrede
and Lefevre, entered the capital. The country again appeared
to be subdued. But cruelty had embittered the people. Wrede
was recalled, with his corps, by Napoleon; and now Hofer, with
his South Tyrolese, recrossed the Brenner Pass. Again the
general alarm was given, the leaders called to arms, and again
every pass, every wall of rock, every narrow road was seized.
The struggle took place at the Iselberg.
{1521}
The Bavarians, 7,000 in number, were defeated with heavy loss.
The Tyrol now remained for several months undisturbed, during
the campaign around Vienna. After the battle of Aspern, an
imperial proclamation formally assured the Tyrolese that they
should never be severed from the Austrian Empire; and that no
peace should be signed unless their indissoluble union with
the monarchy were recognized. The Tyrolese quietly trusted the
emperor's promise, until the armistice of Znaim. But in this
the Tyrol was not mentioned, and the French and their allies
prepared to chastise the loyal and abandoned country."
C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
chapter 28.
"In the mouth of July, an army of 40,000 French and Bavarians
attacked the Tyrol from the German side; while from Italy,
General Rusca, with 18,000 men, entered from Clagenfurth, on
the southern side of the Tyrolese Alps. Undismayed by this
double and formidable invasion, they assailed the invaders as
they penetrated into their fastnesses, defeated and destroyed
them. The fate of a division of 10,000 men, belonging to the
French and Bavarian army, which entered the Upper Innthal, or
Valley of the Inn, will explain in part the means by which
these victories were obtained. The invading troops advanced in
a long column up a road bordered on the one side by the river
Inn, there a deep and rapid torrent, where cliffs of immense
height overhang both road and river. The vanguard was
permitted to advance unopposed as far as Prutz, the object of
their expedition. The rest of the army were therefore induced
to trust themselves still deeper in this tremendous pass,
where the precipices, becoming more and more narrow as they
advanced, seemed about to close above their heads. No sound
but of the screaming of the eagles disturbed from, their
eyries, and the roar of the river, reached the ears of the
soldier, and on the precipices, partly enveloped in a hazy
mist, no human forms showed themselves. At length the voice of
a man was heard calling across the ravine, 'Shall we
begin?'--'No,' was returned in an authoritative tone of voice,
by one who, like the first speaker, seemed the inhabitant of
some upper region. The Bavarian detachment halted, and sent to
the general for orders;' when presently was heard the terrible
signal, 'In the name of the Holy Trinity, cut all loose!' Huge
rocks, and trunks of trees, long prepared and laid in heaps
for the purpose, began now to descend rapidly in every
direction, while the deadly fire of the Tyrolese, who never
throw away a shot, opened from every bush, crag, or corner of
rock, which would afford the shooter cover. As this dreadful
attack was made on the whole line at once, two-thirds of the
enemy were instantly destroyed; while the Tyrolese, rushing
from their shelter, with swords, spears, axes, scythes, clubs
and all other rustic instruments which could be converted into
weapons, beat down and routed the shattered remainder. As the
vanguard, which had reached Prutz, was obliged to surrender,
very few of the 10,000 invaders are computed to have
extricated themselves from the fatal pass. But not all the
courage of the Tyrolese, not all the strength of their
country, could possibly enable them to defend themselves, when
the peace with Austria had permitted Buonaparte to engage his
whole immense means for the acquisition of these mountains.
Austria too--Austria herself, in whose cause they had
incurred all the dangers of war, instead of securing their
indemnity by some stipulations in the treaty, sent them a cold
exhortation to lay down their arms. Resistance, therefore, was
abandoned as fruitless; Hofer, chief commander of the
Tyrolese, resigned his command, and the Bavarians regained the
possession of a country which they could never have won back
by their own efforts. Hofer, and about thirty chiefs of these
valiant defenders of their country, were put to death
[February, 1810], in poor revenge for the loss their bravery
had occasioned. But their fame, as their immortal spirit, was
beyond the power of the judge alike and executioner; and the
place where their blood was shed, becomes sacred to the
thoughts of freedom, as the precincts of a temple to those of
religion."
Sir W. Scott,
Life of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapter 7.
ALSO IN:
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 58 (volume 12).
History of Hofer
(Quarterly Review, July, 1817).
C. H. Hall,
Life of Andrew Hofer.
GERMANY: A. D. 1810.
Annexation of the Hanse Towns and territory on the North Sea
to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (FEBRUARY-DECEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1810-1812.
Marriage of the Archduchess Marie Louise
of Austria to Napoleon.
Alliance of German powers with Napoleon against Russia.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1810-1812.
GERMANY: A. D. 1812.
The Russian campaign of Napoleon and its disastrous ending.
See RUSSIA: A. D. 1812 (JUNE-SEPTEMBER),
(SEPTEMBER), and (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813.
The Teutonic uprising against Napoleon.
Beginning of the War of Liberation.
Alliance of Prussia and Russia.
"During Napoleon's march on Moscow and his fatal return,
Macdonald remained on the Lower Dwina, before Riga, with an
observation corps of Prussians and Poles, nor had he ever
received an order to retreat from Napoleon. Learning of the
misfortunes of the grand army, he went from the Dwina towards
the Niemen. As he passed through Courland, General York,
commander of the Prussian troops, allowed him to lead the way
with the Poles, and then signed an agreement of neutrality
with the Russians (December 30, 1812). The Prussian troops,
from a military spirit of honor, had fought the Russians
bravely; they retained some scruples relative to the worthy
marshal under whom they served, and forsook without betraying
him, that is, they left him time to escape. This was a most
important event and the beginning of the inevitable defection
of Germany. The attitude of Czar Alexander decided General
York; the former was completely dazzled by his triumphs, and
aspired to nothing less than to destroy Napoleon and liberate
Europe, even France! With mingled enthusiasm and calculation,
he promised all things to all men; on returning to Wilna, he
granted an amnesty for all acts committed in Poland against
Russian authority. On the one hand, he circulated a rumor that
he was about to make himself King of Poland, and, on the other
hand, he announced to the Prussians that he was ready to
restore the Polish provinces taken from them by Napoleon. He
authorized ex-Minister Stein to take possession, as we may
say, of Old Prussia, just evacuated by the French, and to
promise the speedy enfranchisement of Germany, protesting, at
the same time, that he would not dispute 'the legitimate
greatness' of France.
{1522}
The French army, on hearing of York's defection, left
Königsberg with ten or twelve thousand sick men and eight or
ten thousand armed troops, withdrawing to the Vistula and
thence to Warta and Posen. General Rapp had succeeded in
gathering at Dantzic, the great French depot of stores and
reserves, 25,000 men, few of whom had gone through the Russian
campaign, and a division of almost equal numbers occupied
Berlin. The French had in all barely 80,000 men, from Dantzic
to the Rhine, not including their Austrian and Saxon allies,
who had fallen back on Warsaw and seemed disposed to fight no
more. Murat, to whom Napoleon confided the remains of the
grand army, followed the Emperor's example and set out to
defend his Neapolitan kingdom, leaving the chief command to
Prince Eugene. Great agitation prevailed around the feeble
French forces still occupying Germany. The Russians
themselves, worn out, did not press the French very hotly; but
York and Stein, masters of Königsberg, organized and armed Old
Prussia without awaiting authorization from the king, who was
not considered as a free agent, being under foreign rule.
Pamphlets, proclamations, and popular songs were circulated
everywhere, provoking the people to rebellion. The idea of
German union ran like wildfire from the Niemen to the Rhine;
federal union, not unity in a single body or state, which was
not thought of then."
H. Martin,
Popular History of France from 1789,
volume 2, chapter 16.
"The king of Prussia had suddenly abandoned Berlin [January,
1813], which was still in the hands of the French, for
Breslau, whence he declared war against France. A conference
also took place between him and the emperor Alexander at
Calisch [Kalisch], and, on the 28th of February, 1813, an
offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between them.
The hour for vengeance had at length arrived. The whole
Prussian nation, eager to throw off the hated yoke of the
foreigner, to obliterate their disgrace in 1806, to regain
their ancient name, cheerfully hastened to place their lives
and property at the service of the impoverished government.
The whole of the able-bodied population was put under arms.
The standing army was increased: to each regiment were
appended troops of volunteers, Jaegers, composed of young' men
belonging to the higher classes, who furnished their own
equipments: a numerous Landwehr, a sort of militia, was, as in
Austria, raised besides the standing army, and measures were
even taken to call out, in case of necessity, the heads of
families and elderly men remaining at home, under the name of
the Landsturm. The enthusiastic people, besides furnishing the
customary supplies and paying the taxes, contributed to the
full extent of their means towards defraying the immense
expense of this general arming. Every heart throbbed high with
pride and hope. ... More loudly than even in 1809 in Austria
was the German cause now discussed, the great name of the
German empire now invoked in Prussia, for in that name alone
could all the races of Germany be united against their
hereditary foe. The celebrated proclamation, promising
external and internal liberty to Germany, was, with this view,
published at Calisch by Prussia and Russia. Nor was the appeal
vain. It found an echo in every German heart, and such plain
demonstrations of the state of the popular feeling on this
side the Rhine were made, that Davoust sent serious warning to
Napoleon, who contemptuously replied, 'Pah! Germans never can
become Spaniards!' With his customary rapidity he levied in
France a fresh army 300,000 strong, with which he so
completely awed the Rhenish confederation as to compel it once
more to take the field with thousands of Germans against their
brother Germans. The troops, however, reluctantly obeyed, and
even the traitors were but lukewarm, for they doubted of
success. Mecklenburg alone sided with Prussia. Austria
remained neutral. A Russian corps under General Tettenborn had
preceded the rest of the troops and reached the coasts of the
Baltic. As early as the 24th of March, 1813, it appeared in
Hamburg and expelled the French authorities from the city. The
heavily oppressed people of Hamburg, whose commerce had been
totally annihilated by the continental system, gave way to the
utmost demonstrations of delight, received their deliverers
with open arms, revived their ancient rights, and immediately
raised a Hanseatic corps destined to take the field against
Napoleon. Dörnberg, the ancient foe to France, with another
flying squadron took the French division under Morand
prisoner, and the Prussian, Major Hellwig (the same who, in
1806, liberated the garrison of Erfurt), dispersed, with
merely 120 hussars, a Bavarian regiment 1,300 strong and
captured five pieces of artillery. In January, the peasantry
of the upper country had already revolted against the
conscription, and, in February, patriotic proclamations had
been disseminated throughout Westphalia under the signature of
the Baron von Stein. In this month, also, Captain Maas and two
other patriots, who had attempted to raise a rebellion, were
executed. As the army advanced, Stein was nominated chief of
the provisional government of the still unconquered provinces
of Western Germany. The first Russian army, 17,000 strong,
under Wittgenstein, pushed forward to Magdeburg, and, at
Mökern, repulsed 40,000 French who were advancing upon Berlin.
The Prussians, under their veteran general, Blücher, entered
Saxony and garrisoned Dresden, on the 27th of March, 1813,
after an arch of the fine bridge across the Elbe [had] been
uselessly blown up by the French. Blücher, whose gallantry in
the former wars had gained for him the general esteem and
whose kind and generous disposition had won the affection of
the soldiery, was nominated generalissimo of the Prussian
forces, but subordinate in command to Wittgenstein, who
replaced Kutusow as generalissimo of the united forces of
Russia and Prussia. The Emperor of Russia and the King of
Prussia accompanied the army and were received with loud
acclamations by the people of Dresden and Leipzig."
W. Menzel,
History of Germany,
chapter 260 (volume 3).
Bernadotte, the adopted Crown Prince and expectant King of
Sweden, had been finally thrown into the arms of the new
Coalition against Napoleon, by the refusal of the latter to
take Norway from Denmark and give it to Sweden. "The
disastrous retreat of the French from Moscow ... led to the
signature of the Treaty of Stockholm on the 2d of March, 1813,
by which England acceded to the union of Norway to Sweden, and a
Swedish force was sent to Pomerania under General Sandels. On
the 18th of May, 1813, Bernadotte landed at Stralsund."
Lady Bloomfield,
Biographical Sketch of Bernadotte
(Memoir of Lord Bloomfield, volume 1, page 31).
ALSO IN:
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 7 (volume 3).
A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
book 47 (volume 4).
{1523}
GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (April-May).
Battle of Lützen.
Humiliation of the King of Saxony.
"On the 14th April, Napoleon left Paris to assume the command
of the army. Previous to his departure, with a view, perhaps,
of paying a compliment to the Emperor of Austria, the Empress
Marie Louise was appointed regent in his absence; but Prince
Schwarzenberg, who had arrived on a special mission from
Vienna, was treated only as the commander of an auxiliary
corps, to which orders would immediately be transmitted. On
the 16th he reached Mayence, where, for the last time, vassal
princes assembled courtier-like around him; and on the 20th he
was already at Erfurt, in the midst of his newly-raised army.
The roads were everywhere crowded with troops and artillery,
closing in towards the banks of the Saale. From Italy, Marshal
Bertrand joined with 40,000 men, old trained soldiers; the
Viceroy brought an equal number from the vicinity of
Magdeburg; and Marshal Macdonald having, on the 29th, taken
Merseburg by assault, the whole army, which Bade, the ablest
and most accurate of the authors who have written on this
campaign, estimates at 140,000 men, was assembled for action.
With this mighty force Napoleon determined to seek out the
enemy, and bring them quickly to battle. The Russian and
Prussian armies were no sooner united, after the alliance
concluded between the sovereigns, than they crossed the Elbe,
occupied Dresden, which the King of Saxony had abandoned, and
advanced to the banks of the Saale. General Blücher commanded
the Prussians, and Count Wittgenstein the Russian corps; and,
death having closed the career of old Marshal Kutusoff, ...
the command of both armies devolved upon the last mentioned
officer. Informed of the rapid advance of the French, the
allied monarchs joined their forces, which were drawn together
in the plains between the Saale and the Elbe; their numerous
cavalry giving them perfect command of this wide and open
country. Napoleon, always anxious for battle, determined to
press on towards Leipzig, behind which he expected to find the
Allied army, who, as it proved, were much nearer than he
anticipated. At the passage of the Rippach, a small stream
that borders the wide plain of Lützen, he already encountered
a body of Russian cavalry and artillery under Count
Winzingerode; and as the French were weak in horse, they had
to bring the whole of Marshal Ney's corps into action before
they could oblige the Russians to retire. Marshal Bessieres,
the commander of the Imperial Guard, was killed. ... On the
evening of the 1st of May, Napoleon established his quarters
in the small town of Lützen. The Allies, conscious of the vast
numerical superiority of the French, did not intend to risk a
general action on the left bank of the Elbe; but the length of
the hostile column of march, which extended from beyond
Naumberg almost to the gates of Leipzig, induced Scharnhorst
to propose an advance from the direction of Borna and Pegau
against the right flank of the enemy, and a sudden attack on
the centre of their line in the plain of Lützen. It was
expected that a decisive blow might be struck against this
centre, and the hostile army broken before the distant wings
could close up and take an effective part in the battle. The
open nature of the country, well adapted to the action of
cavalry, which formed the principal strength of the Allies,
spoke in favour of the plan. ... The bold attempt was
immediately resolved upon, and the onset fixed for the
following morning. The annals of war can hardly offer a plan
of battle more skilfully conceived than the one of which we
have here spoken; but unfortunately the execution fell far
short of the admirable conception. Napoleon, with his Guards
and the corps of Lauriston, was already at the gates of
Leipzig, preparing for an attack on the city, when about one
o'clock [May 2] the roar of artillery burst suddenly on the
ear, and gathering thicker and thicker as it rolled along,
proclaimed that a general action was engaged in the plain of
Lützen,--proclaimed that the army was taken completely at
fault, and placed in the most imminent peril. ... The Allies,
who, by means of their numerous cavalry, could easily mask
their movement, had advanced unobserved into the plain of
Lützen," and the action was begun by a brigade of Blücher's
corps attacking the French in the village of Great-Görschen
(Gross-Görschen). "Reinforcements ... poured in from both
sides, and the narrow and intersected ground between the
villages became the scene of a most murderous and
closely-contested combat of infantry. ... But no attempt was
made to employ the numerous and splendid cavalry, that stood
idly exposed, on open plain, to the shot of the French
artillery. ... When night put an end to the combat,
Great-Görschen was the sole trophy of the murderous fight that
remained in the hands of the Allies. ... On the side of the
Allies, 2,000 Russians and 8,000 Prussians had been killed or
wounded: among the slain was Prince Leopold of Hessen-Homburg;
among the wounded was the admirable Scharnhorst, who died a
few weeks afterwards. ... The loss sustained by the French is
not exactly known; but ... Jomini tells us that the 3d corps,
to which he was attached as chief of the staff, had alone 500
officers and 12,000 men 'hors de combat.' Both parties laid
claim to the victory: the French, because the Allies retired
on the day after the action; the Allies, because they remained
masters of part of the captured battlefield, had taken two
pieces of artillery, and 800 prisoners. ... The Allies
alleged, or pretended perhaps, that it was their intention to
renew the action on the following morning: in the Prussian
army every man, from the king to the humblest soldier, was
anxious indeed to continue the fray; and the wrath of Blücher,
who deemed victory certain, was altogether boundless when he
found the retreat determined upon. But ... opinion has, by
degrees, justified Count Wittgenstein's resolution to recross
the Elbe and fall back on the reinforcements advancing to join
the army. ... On the 8th of May, Napoleon held his triumphal
entrance into Dresden. ... On the advance of the Allies, the
Saxon monarch had retired to Ratisbon, and from thence to
Prague, intending, as he informed Napoleon, to join his
efforts to the mediation of Austria. Orders had, at the same
time, been given to General Thielman, commanding the Saxon
troops at Torgau, to maintain the most perfect neutrality, and
to admit neither of the contending parties within the walls of
the fortress. Exasperated by this show of independence,
Napoleon caused the following demands to be submitted to the
King, allowing him only six hours to determine on their
acceptance or refusal;
{1524}
1. 'General Thielman and the Saxon troops instantly evacuate
Torgau, and form the 7th corps under General Réynier; and all
the resources of the country to be at the disposal of the
Emperor, in conformity with the principles of the
Confederation of the Rhine.'
2. 'The Saxon Cavalry'--some regiments had accompanied the
King--'return immediately to Dresden.'
3. 'The King declares, in a letter to the Emperor, that he is
still a member of the Confederation of the Rhine, and ready to
fulfil all the obligations which it imposes upon him.'
'If these conditions are not immediately complied with,' says
Napoleon in the instructions to his messenger, 'you will cause
his Majesty to be informed that he is guilty of felony, has
forfeited the Imperial protection, and has ceased to reign.'
... Frederick Augustus, finding himself threatened with the
loss of his crown by an overbearing conqueror already in
possession of his capital, ... yielded in an evil hour to
those imperious demands, and returned to Dresden. ... Fortune
appeared again to smile upon her spoiled and favoured child;
and he resolved, on his part, to leave no expedient untried to
make the most of her returning aid. The mediation of Austria,
which from the first had been galling to his pride, became
more hateful every day, as it gradually assumed the appearance
of an armed interference, ready to enforce its demands by
military means. ... Tidings having arrived that the allied
army, instead of continuing their retreat, had halted and
taken post at Bautzen, he immediately resolved to strike a
decisive blow in the field, as the best means of thwarting the
pacific efforts of his father-in-law."
Lieutenant Colonel J. Mitchell,
The Fall of Napoleon,
book 2, chapter 1 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe, 1789-1815,
chapter 75 (volume 13).
Duchess d'Abrantes,
Memoirs of Napoleon,
volume 2, chapter 44.
GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (May-August).
Battle of Bautzen.
Armistice of Pleswitz.
Accession of Austria and Great Britain to the Coalition
against Napoleon.
"While the Emperor paused at Dresden, Ney made various
demonstrations in the direction of Berlin, with the view of
inducing the Allies to quit Bautzen; but it soon became
manifest that they had resolved to sacrifice the Prussian
capital, if it were necessary, rather than forego their
position. ... Having replaced by wood-work some arches of the
magnificent bridge over the Elbe at Dresden, which the Allies
had blown up on their retreat, Napoleon now moved towards
Bautzen, and came in sight of the position on the morning of
the 21st of May. Its strength was obviously great. In their
front was the river Spree: wooded hills supported their right,
and eminences well fortified their left. The action began with
an attempt to turn their right, but Barclay de Tolly
anticipated this movement, and repelled it with such vigour
that a whole column of 7,000 dispersed and fled into the hills
of Bohemia for safety. The Emperor then determined to pass the
Spree in front of the enemy, and they permitted him to do so,
rather than come down from their position. He took up his
quarters in the town of Bautzen, and his whole army bivouacked
in presence of the Allies. The battle was resumed at daybreak
on the 22d; when Ney on the right, and Oudinot on the left;
attempted simultaneously to turn the flanks of the position;
while Soult and Napoleon himself directed charge after charge
on the centre. During four hours the struggle was maintained
with unflinching obstinacy; the wooded heights, where Blucher
commanded, had been taken and retaken several times--the
bloodshed on either side had been terrible--ere ... the Allies
perceived the necessity either of retiring, or of continuing
the fight against superior numbers on disadvantageous ground.
They withdrew accordingly; but still with all the deliberate
coolness of a parade, halting at every favourable spot and
renewing their cannonade. 'What,' exclaimed Napoleon, 'no
results! not a gun! not a prisoner!--these people will not
leave me so much as a nail.' During the whole day he urged the
pursuit with impetuous rage, reproaching even his chosen
generals as 'creeping scoundrels,' and exposing his own person
in the very hottest of the fire." His closest friend, Duroc,
Grand Master of the Palace, was mortally wounded by his side,
before he gave up the pursuit. "The Allies, being strongly
posted during most of the day, had suffered less than the
French; the latter had lost 15,000, the former 10,000 men.
They continued their retreat into Upper Silesia; and
Buonaparte advanced to Breslau, and released the garrison of
Glogau. Meanwhile the Austrian, having watched these
indecisive though bloody fields, once more renewed his offers
of mediation. The sovereigns of Russia and Prussia expressed
great willingness to accept it; and Napoleon also appears to
have been sincerely desirous for the moment of bringing his
disputes to a peaceful termination. He agreed to an armistice
[of six weeks], and in arranging its conditions agreed to fall
back out of Silesia; thus enabling the allied princes to
reopen communications with Berlin. The lines of country to be
occupied by the armies, respectively, during the truce, were
at length settled, and it was signed on the 1st of June [at
Poischwitz, though the negotiations were mostly carried on at
Pleswitz, whence the Armistice is usually named]. The French
Emperor then returned to Dresden, and a general congress of
diplomatists prepared to meet at Prague. England alone refused
to send any representative to Prague, alleging that Buonaparte
had as yet signified no disposition to recede from his
pretensions on Spain, and that he had consented to the
armistice with the sole view of gaining time for political
intrigue and further military preparation. It may be doubted
whether any of the allied powers who took part in the Congress
did so with much hope that the disputes with Napoleon could
find a peaceful end. ... But it was of the utmost importance
to gain time for the advance of Bernadotte; for the arrival of
new reinforcements from Russia; for the completion of the
Prussian organization; and, above all, for determining the
policy of Vienna. Metternich, the Austrian minister, repaired
in person to Dresden, and while inferior diplomatists wasted
time in endless discussions at Prague, one interview between
him and Napoleon brought the whole question to a definite
issue. The Emperor ... assumed at once that Austria had no
wish but to drive a good bargain for herself, and asked
broadly, 'What is your price? Will Illyria satisfy you? I only
wish you to be neutral--I can deal with these Russians and
Prussians single-handed.'
{1525}
Metternich stated plainly that the time in which Austria could
be neutral was past; that the situation of Europe at large
must be considered; ... that events had proved the
impossibility of a steadfast peace unless the sovereigns of
the Continent were restored to the rank of independence; in a
word, that the Rhenish Confederacy must be broken up; that
France must be contented with the boundary of the Rhine, and
pretend no longer to maintain her usurped and unnatural
influence in Germany. Napoleon replied by a gross personal
insult: 'Come, Metternich,' said he, 'tell me honestly how
much the English have given you to take their part against
me.' The Austrian court at length sent a formal document,
containing its ultimatum, the tenor of which Metternich had
sufficiently indicated in this conversation. Talleyrand and
Fouché, who had now arrived from Paris, urged the Emperor to
accede to the proffered terms. They represented to him the
madness of rousing all Europe to conspire for his destruction,
and insinuated that the progress of discontent was rapid in
France itself. Their arguments were backed by intelligence of
the most disastrous character from Spain. ...
See SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814.
Napoleon was urged by his military as well as political
advisers, to appreciate duly the crisis which his affairs had
reached. ... He proceeded to insult both ministers and
generals ... and ended by announcing that he did not wish for
any plans of theirs, but their service in the execution of
his. Thus blinded by arrogance and self-confidence, and
incapable of weighing any other considerations against what he
considered as the essence of his personal glory, Napoleon
refused to abate one iota of his pretensions--until it was too
late. Then, indeed, ... he did show some symptoms of
concession. A courier arrived at Prague with a note, in which
he signified his willingness to accede to a considerable
number of the Austrian stipulations. But this was on the 11th
of August. The day preceding was that on which, by the
agreement, the armistice was to end. On that day Austria had
to sign an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Russia and
Prussia. On the night between the 10th and 11th, rockets
answering rockets, from height to height along the frontiers
of Bohemia and Silesia, had announced to all the armies of the
Allies this accession of strength, and the immediate
recommencement of hostilities."
J. G. Lockhart,
Life of Napoleon Buonaparte,
chapters 32-33.
"On the 14th of June Great Britain had become a party to the
treaty concluded between Russia and Prussia. She had promised
assistance in this great struggle; but no aid could have been
more effectual than that which she was rendering in the
Peninsula."
C. Knight,
Popular History of England,
chapter 32 (volume 7).
ALSO IN:
G. R. Gleig,
The Leipsic Campaign,
chapters 7-16.
A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
book 48-49 (volume 4).
Prince Metternich,
Memoirs, 1773-1815,
book 1, chapter 8 (volume 1).
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 7, chapters 4-5 (volume 3).
J. Philippart,
Northern Campaign, 1812-1813,
volume 2.
GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (August).
Great battle and victory of Napoleon at Dresden.
French defeats at Kulm, Gross-Beeren and the Katzbach.
"Dresden, during the armistice, had been converted by Napoleon
into such a place of strength that it might be called one
citadel. All the trees in the neighbourhood, as well as those
which had formed the ornament of the public gardens and walks
of that beautiful capital, were cut down and converted into
abattis and palisades; redoubts, field-works, and fosses had
been constructed. The chain of fortresses garrisoned by French
troops secured to Napoleon the rich valley of the Elbe.
Hamburg, Dantzic, and many strong places on the Oder and
Vistula were in his possession. ... His army assembled at the
seat of war amounted to nearly 300,000 men, including the
Bavarian reserve of 25,000 under General Wrede, and he had
greatly increased his cavalry. This powerful force was divided
into eleven army corps, commanded by Vandamme, Victor, Bertrand,
Ney, Lauriston, Marmont, Reynier, Poniatowski, Macdonald,
Oudinot, and St. Cyr. Murat, who, roused by the news of the
victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, had left his capital, was
made commander-in-chief of all the cavalry. ... Davoust held
Hamburg with 20,000 men. Augereau with 24,000 occupied
Bavaria. The armies of the allies were computed at nearly
400,000 men, including the divisions destined to invade Italy.
Those ready for action at the seat of war in Germany were
divided into three great masses,--the army of Bohemia,
consisting mainly of Austrians commanded by Prince
Schwartzenburg; the army of Silesia, commanded by Blucher; and
the troops under the command of Bernadotte, stationed near
Berlin. These immense hosts were strong in cavalry and
artillery, and in discipline and experience far exceeded the
French soldiers, who were nearly all young conscripts. Two
Frenchmen of eminence were leaders in the ranks of the enemies
of France,--Bernadotte and Moreau; Jomini, late chief of the
engineer department in Napoleon's army, was a Swiss. These
three men, well instructed by the great master of the art of
war, directed the counsels of the allied Sovereigns and taught
them how to conquer. Bernadotte pointed out that Napoleon lay
in Dresden with his guard of five-and-twenty thousand men,
while his marshals were stationed in various strong positions
on the frontiers of Saxony. The moment a French corps d'armée
was attacked Napoleon would spring from his central point upon
the flank of the assailants, and as such a blow would be
irresistible he would thus beat the allied armies in detail.
To obviate this danger Bernadotte recommended that the first
general who attacked a French division and brought Napoleon
into the field should retreat, luring the Emperor onward in
pursuit, when the other bodies of allied troops,
simultaneously closing upon his rear, should surround him and
cut him off from his, base. This plan was followed: Blucher
advanced from Silesia, menacing the armies of Macdonald and
Ney, and Napoleon, with the activity expected, issued from
Dresden on the 15th of August, rapidly reached the point of
danger, and assumed the offensive. But he was unable to bring
the Prussian general to a decisive action, for Blucher,
continuing to retreat before him, the pursuit was only
arrested by an estafette reporting on the 23rd that the main
body of the allies threatened Dresden. On the 25th, at 4 in
the afternoon, 200,000 allied troops led by Schwartzenburg
appeared before that city. St. Cyr, who had been left to
observe the passes of the Bohemian mountains with 20,000 men,
retreated before the irresistible torrent and threw himself
into the Saxon capital, which he prepared to defend with his
own forces and the garrison left by the Emperor.
{1526}
It was a service of the last importance. With Dresden Napoleon
would lose his recruiting depot and supplies of every kind.
... The Austrian commander-in-chief deferred the attack till
the following day, replying to the expostulations of Jomini
that Napoleon was engaged in the Silesian passes. Early on the
morning of the 26th the allies advanced to the assault in six
columns, under cover of a tremendous artillery fire. They
carried one great redoubt, then another, and closed with the
defenders of the city at every point, shells and balls falling
thick on the houses, many of which were on fire. St. Cyr
conducted the defence with heroism; but before midday a
surrender was talked of. ... Suddenly, from the opposite bank
of the Elbe columns of soldiers were seen hastening towards
the city. They pressed across the bridges, swept through the
streets, and with loud shouts demanded to be led into battle,
although they had made forced marches from the frontiers of
Silesia. Napoleon, with the Old Guard and cuirassiers, was in
the midst of them. His enemies had calculated on only half his
energy and rapidity, and had forgotten that he could return as
quickly as he left. The Prussians had penetrated the Grosse
Garten on the French left, and so close was the Russian fire
that Witgenstein's guns enfiladed the road by which Napoleon
had to pass; consequently, to reach the city in safety, he was
compelled to dismount at the most exposed part, and, according
to Baron Odeleben (one of his aides-de-camp), creep along on his
hands and knees (ventre à terre). Napoleon halted at the
palace to reassure the King of Saxony, and then joined his
troops who were already at the gates. Sallies were made by Ney
and Mortier under his direction. The astonished assailants
were driven back. The Young Guard recaptured the redoubts, and
the French army deployed on the plateau lately in possession
of their enemies. ... The fury of the fight gradually
slackened, and the armies took up their positions for the
night. The French wings bivouacked to the right and left of
the city, which itself formed Napoleon's centre. The allies
were ranged in a semicircle cresting the heights. ... They had
not greatly the advantage in numbers, for Klenau's division
never came up; and Napoleon, now that Victor and Marmont's
corps had arrived, concentrated nearly 200,000 men. ... The
next day broke in a tempest of wind and rain. At six o'clock
Napoleon was on horseback, and ordered his columns to advance.
Their order of battle has been aptly compared to 'a fan when
it expands.' Their position could scarcely have been worse.
... Knowing that in case of disaster retreat would be almost
an impossibility, Napoleon began an attack on both flanks of
the allied army, certain that their defeat would demoralize
the centre, which he could overwhelm by a simultaneous
concentric attack, supported by the fire of 100 guns. The
stormy weather which concealed their movements favoured them;
and Murat turning and breaking the Austrian left, and Ney
completely rolling up the Austrian right, the result was a
decisive victory. By three in the afternoon of the 27th the
battle was concluded, and the allies were in full retreat,
pursued by the French. The roads to Bohemia and those to the
south were barred by Murat's and Vandamme's corps, and the
allied Sovereigns were obliged to take such country paths and

byways as they could find--which had been rendered almost
impassable by the heavy rain. They lost 25,000 prisoners, 40
standards, 60 pieces of cannon, and many waggons. The killed
and wounded amounted on each side to seven or eight thousand.
The first cannon-shot fired by the guard under the
direction of Napoleon mortally wounded Moreau while talking to
the Emperor Alexander. ... The French left wing, composed of
the three corps of Vandamme, St. Cyr, and Marmont, were
ordered to march by their left along the Pirna road in pursuit
of the foe, who was retreating into Bohemia in three columns,
and had traversed the gorges of the Hartz Mountains in safety,
though much baggage, several ammunition waggons, and 2,000
prisoners, fell into the hands of the French. The Russians,
under Ostermann, halted on the plain of Culm [or Kulm] for the
arrival of Kleist's Prussians; the Austrians hurried along the
Prague route. Vandamme marched boldly on, neglecting even the
precaution of guarding the defile of Peterswald in his rear.
Trusting to the rapid advance of the other French corps, he
was lured on by the hope of capturing the allied Sovereigns in
their headquarters at Toplitz. Barclay de Tolly, having
executed a rapid detour from left to right, brought the bulk
of his Russian forces to bear on Vandamme, who, on reaching
Culm, was attacked in front and rear [August 29-30], surprised
and taken, losing the whole of his artillery and between 7,000
and 8,000 prisoners; the rest of his corps escaped and
rejoined the army. This disaster totally deranged Napoleon's
plans, which would have led him to follow up the pursuit
towards Bohemia in person. Oudinot was ordered to march
against Bülow's corps at Berlin and the Swedes commanded by
Bernadotte, taking with him the divisions of Bertrand and
Reynier--a force of 80,000 men. Reynier, who marched in
advance, fell in with the allies at Gross-Beeren, attacked
them precipitately and suffered severely, his division,
chiefly composed of Saxons, taking flight. Oudinot also
sustained considerable losses, and retreated to Torgau on the
Elbe. Girard, sallying out of Magdeburg with 5,000 or 6,000
men, was defeated near Leibnitz, with the loss of 1,000 men,
and some cannon and baggage. Macdonald encountered Blucher in
the plains between Wahlstadt and the Katzbach under
disadvantageous circumstances [August 26], and was obliged to
retire in disorder."
R. H. Horne,
History of Napoleon,
chapter 37.
"The great battle of the Katzbach, the counterpart to that of
Hohenlinden, [was] one of the most glorious ever gained in the
annals of European fame. Its trophies were immense. ...
Eighteen thousand prisoners, 103 pieces of cannon, and 230
caissons, besides 7,000 killed and wounded, presented a total
loss to the French of 25,000 men."
Sir A. Alison,
History of Europe,
chapter 80, section 68 (volume 17).
"Of the battle of Kulm it is not too much to say that it was
the most critical in the whole war of German liberation. The
fate of the coalition was determined absolutely by its
results. Had Vandamme been strong enough to keep his hold of
Bohemia, and to block up from them the mouths of the passes,
the allied columns, forced back into the exhausted mountain
district through which they were retreating, must have
perished for lack of food, or dissolved themselves."
G. R. Gleig,
The Leipzig Campaign,
chapter 27.
{1527}
ALSO IN:
Baron Jomini,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 20 (volume 4).
Major C. Adams,
Great Campaigns in Europe,
1796 to 1870, chapter 5.
GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (September-October).
French reverse at Dennewitz.
Napoleon's evacuation of Dresden.
Allied concentration at Leipsic.
Preparations for the decisive battle.
"The [allied] Army of the North had been nearly idle since the
battle of Grossbeeren. The Prussian generals were extremely
indignant against Bernadotte, whose slowness and inaction were
intolerable to them. It took them, under his orders, a
fortnight to advance as far as a good footman could march in a
day. They then unexpectedly met a new French army advancing
against them from a fortified camp at Wittenberg. Napoleon had
now assigned to Marshal Ney--the bravest of the brave'--the
work of beating 'the Cossack hordes and the poor militia,' and
taking Berlin. Under him were Oudinot, Regnier, Bertrand, and
Arrighi, with 70,000 men. On September 6 Tauenzien met their
superior forces at Jüterbogk, but sustained himself valiantly
through a perilous fight. Bernadotte was but two hours' march
away, but as usual disregarded Bülow's request to bring aid.
But Bülow himself brought up his corps on the right, and took
the brunt of the battle, extending it through the villages
south of Jüterbogk, of which Dennewitz was the centre. The
Prussians took these villages by storm, and when evening came
their victory was complete, though Bernadotte had not
stretched out a hand to help them. ... Bülow bore the name of
Dennewitz afterward in honor of his victory. Ney reported to
his master that he was entirely defeated. Napoleon unwisely
ascribed his defeat entirely to the Saxons, who fought well
that day for him, but for the last time. By his reproaches he
entirely alienated the people from him. The French loss in
this battle was 10,000 killed and wounded, and 10,000
prisoners, besides 80 guns. The Prussians lost in killed and
wounded more than 5,000. Thus five victories had been won by
the Allies in a fortnight, compensating fully for the loss of
the battle of Dresden. The way to the Elbe lay open to the
Army of the North. But Bernadotte continued to move with
extreme slowness. Bülow and Tauenzien seriously proposed to
Blücher to leave the Swedish prince, whom they openly
denounced as a traitor. Blücher approached the Elbe across the
Lausitz from Bohemia, and it would have been easy to cross the
river and unite the two armies, threatening Napoleon's rear,
and making Dresden untenable for him. Napoleon advanced in
vain against Blücher to Bausitz. The Prussian general wisely
avoided a battle. Then the emperor turned against the Army of
Bohemia, but it was too strong in its position in the valley
of Teplitz, with the mountains in its rear, to be attacked.
Then again he moved toward Blücher, but again failed to bring
about an action. At this time public opinion throughout Europe
was undergoing a rapid change, and Napoleon's name was losing
its magic. The near prospect of his fall made the nations he
had oppressed eager and impatient for it, and his German
allies and subjects lost all regard and hope for his cause. On
October 8 the Bavarian plenipotentiary, General Wrede,
concluded a treaty with Austria at Ried, by the terms of which
Bavaria left Napoleon and joined the allies. This important
defection, though it had been for some weeks expected, was
felt by the French emperor as a severe blow to his prospects.
Napoleon's circle of movement around Dresden began to be
narrowed. The Russian reserves under Benningsen, 57,000
strong, were also advancing through Silesia toward Bohemia.
Blücher was therefore not needed in Bohemia, and he pressed
forward vigorously to cross the Elbe. His army advanced along
the right bank of the Black Elster to its mouth above
Wittenberg. On the opposite bank of the Elbe, in the bend of
the stream, stands the village of Wartenburg, and just at the
bend Blücher built two bridges of boats without opposition. On
October 3 York's corps crossed the river. But now on the west
side, among the thickets and swamps before the village, arose
a furious struggle with a body of 20,000 French, Italians, and
Germans of the Rhine League under Bertrand. York displayed
eminent patience, coolness, and judgment, and won a decided
victory out of a great danger. Bernadotte, though with much
hesitation, also crossed the Elbe at the mouth of the Mulde,
and the army of the North and of Silesia were thus united in
Napoleon's rear. It was now evident that the successes of
these armies had brought the French into extreme danger, and
the allied sovereigns resolved upon a concerted attack.
Leipsic was designated as the point at which the armies should
combine. Napoleon could no longer hold Dresden, lest he should
be cut off from France by a vastly superior force. The
partisan corps of the allies were also growing bolder and more
active far in Napoleon's rear, and on October 1 Czernicheff
drove Jerome out of Cassel and proclaimed the kingdom of
Westphalia dissolved. This was the work of a handful of
Cossacks, without infantry and artillery; but though Jerome
soon returned, the moral effect of this sudden and easy
overthrow of one of Napoleon's military kingdoms was immense.
On October 7 Napoleon left Dresden, and marched to the Mulde.
Blücher's forces were arrayed along both sides of this stream,
below Düben. But he quietly and successfully retired, on
perceiving Napoleon's purpose to attack him, and moved
westward to the Saale, in order to draw after him Bernadotte
and the Northern army. The plan was successful, and the united
armies took up a position behind the Saale, extending from
Merseburg to Alsleben, Bernadotte occupying the northern end
of the line next to the Elbe. Napoleon, disappointed in his
first effort, now formed a plan whose boldness astonished both
friend and foe. He resolved to cross the Elbe, to seize Berlin
and the Marches, now uncovered, and thus, supported by his
fortresses of Magdeburg, Stettin, Dantzic, and Hamburg, where
he still had bodies of troops and magazines, to give the war
an entirely new aspect. But the murmurs of his worn-out
troops, and even of his generals, compelled him to abandon
this plan, which was desperate, but might have been effectual.
The suggestion of it terrified Bernadotte, whose province of
Lower Pomerania would be threatened, and he would have
withdrawn in headlong haste across the Elbe had not Blücher
persisted in detaining him. Napoleon now resolved to march
against the Bohemian army at Leipsic. On October 14, on
approaching the city from the north, he heard cannon-shots on
the opposite side. It was the advanced guard of the main army,
which was descending from the Erz-Gebirge range, after a sharp
but indecisive cavalry battle with Murat at the village of
Liebertwolkwitz, south of Dresden.
{1528}
In the broad, thickly settled plains around Leipsic, the
armies of Europe now assembled for the final and decisive
conflict. Napoleon's command included Portuguese, Spaniards,
Neapolitans, and large contingents of Germans from the Rhine
League, as well as the flower of the French youth; while the
allies brought against him Cossacks and Calmucks, Swedes and
Magyars, besides all the resources of Prussian patriotism and
Austrian discipline. Never since the awful struggle at
Chalons, which saved Western civilization from Attila, had
there been a strife so well deserving the name of 'the battle
of the nations.' West of the city of Leipsic runs the Pleisse,
and flows into the Elster on the northwest side. Above their
junction, the two streams run for some distance near one
another, inclosing a sharp angle of swampy land. The great
highway to Lindenau from Leipsic crosses the Elster, and then
runs southwesterly to Lützen and Weissenfels. South of the
city and east of the Pleisse lie a number of villages, of
which Wachau, Liebertwolkwitz, and Probstheida, nearer the
city, were important points during the battle. The little
river Partha approaches the city on the east, and then runs
north, reaching the Elster at Gohlis. Napoleon occupied the
villages north, east and south of the city, in a small circle
around it."
C. T. Lewis,
History of Germany,
chapter 30, sections 7-11.
ALSO IN:
E. Baines,
History of the Wars of the French Revolution,
book 4, chapter 23 (volume 3).
GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (October).
"The Battle of the Nations."
"The town of Leipsic has four sides and four gates. ... On the
south is the rising ground called the Swedish Camp; and
another called the Sheep-walk, bordering on the banks of the
Pleisse. To this quarter the Grand Army of the Allies was seen
advancing on the 15th of October. Buonaparte made his
arrangements accordingly. Bertrand and Poniatowski defended
Lindenau and the east side of the city, by which the French
must retreat. Augereau was posted farther to the left, on the
elevated plain of Wachau, and on the south, Victor, Lauriston,
and Macdonald confronted the advance of the Allies with the
Imperial Guards placed as a reserve. On the north, Marmont was
placed between Mœckern and Euterist, to make head against
Blücher, should he arrive in time to take part in the battle.
On the opposite quarter, the sentinels of the two armies were
within musket-shot of each other, when evening fell. ... The
number of men who engaged the next morning was estimated at
136,000 French, and 230,000 on the part of the Allies. ...
Napoleon remained all night in the rear of his own Guards,
behind the central position, facing a village called Gossa,
occupied by the Austrians. At daybreak on the 16th of October
the battle began, The French position was assailed along all
the southern front with the greatest fury. ... The Allies
having made six desperate attempts, ... all of them
unsuccessful, Napoleon in turn assumed the offensive. ... This
was about noon. The village of Gossa was carried by the
bayonet. Macdonald made himself master of the Swedish Camp;
and the eminence called the Sheep-walk was near being taken in
the same manner. The impetuosity of the French had fairly
broken through the centre of the Allies, and Napoleon sent the
tidings of his success to the King of Saxony, who ordered all
the bells in the city to be rung. ... The King of Naples, with
Latour-Maubourg and Kellermann, poured through the gap in the
enemy's centre at the head of the whole body of cavalry, and
thundered forward as far as Magdeburg, a village in the rear
of the Allies, bearing down General Rayefskoi with the
Grenadiers of the Russian reserve. At this moment, while the
French were disordered by their own success, Alexander, who
was present, ordered forward the Cossacks of his Guard, who,
with their long lances, bore back the dense body of cavalry
that had so nearly carried the day. Meantime, as had been
apprehended, Blücher arrived before the city, and suddenly
came into action with Marmont, being three times his numbers.
He in consequence obtained great and decided advantages; and
before night-fall had taken the village of Mœckern, together
with 20 pieces of artillery and 2,000 prisoners. But on the
south side the contest continued doubtful. Gossa was still
disputed. ... General Mehrfeldt fell into the hands of the
French. The battle raged till night-fall, when it ceased by
mutual consent. ... The armies slept on the ground they had
occupied during the day. The French on the southern side had
not relinquished one foot of their original position, though
attacked by such superior numbers. Marmont had indeed been
forced back by Blücher, and compelled to crowd his line of
defence nearer the walls of Leipsic. Thus pressed on all sides
with doubtful issues, Buonaparte availed himself of the
capture of General Mehrfeldt to demand an armistice and to
signify his acceptance of the terms proposed by the Allies,
but which were now found to be too moderate. ... Napoleon
received no answer till his troops had recrossed the Rhine;
and the reason assigned is, that the Allies had pledged
themselves solemnly to each other to enter into no treaty with
him 'while a single individual of the French army remained in
Germany.' ... The 17th was spent in preparations on both
sides, without any actual hostilities. At eight o'clock on the
morning of the 18th they were renewed with tenfold fury.
Napoleon had considerably contracted his circuit of defence,
and the French were posted on an inner line, nearer to
Leipsic, of which Probtsheyda was the central point. ...
Barclay, Wittgenstein, and Kleist advanced on Probtsheyda,
where they were opposed by Murat, Victor, Augereau, and
Lauriston, under the eye of Napoleon himself. On the left
Macdonald had drawn back his division to a village called
Stoetteritz. Along this whole line the contest was maintained
furiously on both sides; nor could the terrified spectators,
from the walls and steeples of Leipsic, perceive that it
either receded or advanced. About two o'clock the Allies
forced their way ... into Probtsheyda; the camp-followers
began to fly; the tumult was excessive. Napoleon ... placed
the reserve of the Old Guard in order, led them in person to
recover the village, and saw them force their entrance ere he
withdrew to the eminence from whence he watched the battle.
... The Allies, at length, felt themselves obliged to desist
from the murderous attacks on the villages which cost them so
dear; and, withdrawing their troops, kept up a dreadful fire
with their artillery.
{1529}
The French replied with equal spirit, though they had fewer
guns; and, besides, their ammunition was falling short. Still,
however, Napoleon completely maintained the day on the south
of Leipsic, where he commanded in person. On the northern
side, the yet greater superiority of numbers placed Ney in a
precarious situation; and, pressed hard both by Blücher and
the Crown-Prince, he was compelled to draw nearer the town,
and had made a stand on an eminence called Heiterblick, when
on a sudden the Saxons, who were stationed in that part of the
field, deserted from the French and went over to the enemy. In
consequence of this unexpected disaster, Ney was unable any
longer to defend himself. It was in vain that Buonaparte
dispatched his reserves of cavalry to·fill up the chasm that
had been made; and Ney drew up the remainder of his forces
close under the walls of Leipsic. The battle once more ceased
at all points. ... Although the French army had thus kept its
ground up to the last moment on these two days, yet there was
no prospect of their being able to hold out much longer at
Leipsic. ... All things counselled a retreat, which was
destined (like the rest of late) to be unfortunate. ... The
retreat was commenced in the night-time; and Napoleon spent a
third harassing night in giving the necessary orders for the
march. He appointed Macdonald and Poniatowski ... to defend
the rear. ... A temporary bridge which had been erected had
given way, and the old bridge on the road to Lindenau was the
only one that remained for the passage of the whole French
army. But the defence of the suburbs had been so gallant and
obstinate that time was allowed for this purpose. At length
the rear-guard itself was about to retreat, when, as they
approached the banks of the river, the bridge blew up by the
mistake of a sergeant of a company of sappers who ... set fire
to the mine of which he had charge before the proper moment.
This catastrophe effectually barred the escape of all those
who still remained on the Leipsic side of the river, except a
few who succeeded in swimming across, among whom was Marshal
Macdonald. Poniatowski ... was drowned in making the same
attempt. In him, it might be said, perished the last of the
Poles. About 25,000 French were made prisoners of war, with a
great quantity of artillery and baggage."
W. Hazlitt,
Life of Napoleon,
chapter 50 (volume 3).
"The battle of Leipsic was over. Already had the allied
sovereigns entered the town, and forcing, not without
difficulty, their way through the crowd, passed on to the
market-place. Here, the house in which the King of Saxony had
lodged was at once made known to them by the appearance of the
Saxon troops whom Napoleon had left to guard their master. ...
Moreover, the King himself ... stood bare-headed on the steps
of the stairs. But the Emperor of Russia, who appears at once
to have assumed the chief direction of affairs, took no notice
of the suppliants. ... The battle of Leipsic constitutes one
of those great hinges on which the fortunes of the world may
be said from time to time to turn. The importance of its
political consequence cannot be overestimated. ... As a great
military operation, the one feature which forces itself
prominently upon our notice is the enormous extent of the
means employed on both sides to accomplish an end. Never since
the days when Persia poured her millions into Greece had armies
so numerous been marshalled against each other. Nor does
history tell of trains of artillery so vast having been at any
time brought into action with more murderous effect. ... About
1,300 pieces, on the one side, were answered, during two days,
by little short of 1,000 on the other. ... We look in vain for
any manifestations of genius or military skill, either in the
combinations which rendered the battle of Leipsic inevitable,
or in the arrangements according to which the attack and
defence of the field were conducted. ... It was the triumph,
not of military skill, but of numbers."
G. R. Gleig,
The Leipsic Campaign,
chapter 41.
"No more here than at Moscow must we seek in the failure of
the leader's talents the cause of such deplorable results,--
for he was never more fruitful in resource, more bold, more
resolute, nor more a soldier,--but in the illusions of pride,
in the wish to regain at a blow an immense fortune which he
had lost, in the difficulty of acknowledging to himself his
defeat in time, in a word, in all those errors which we may
discern in miniature and caricature in an ordinary gambler,
who madly risks riches acquired by folly; errors which are
found on a large and terrible scale in this gigantic gambler,
who plays with human blood as others play with money. As
gamblers lose their fortunes twice,--once from not knowing
where to stop, and a second time from wishing to restore it at
a single cast,--so Napoleon endangered his at Moscow by wishing
to make it exorbitantly large, and in the Dresden campaign by
seeking to restore it in its full extent. The cause was always
the same, the alteration not in the genius, but in the
character, by the deteriorating influence of unlimited power
and success."
A. Thiers,
History of the Consulate and the Empire,
book 50 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
Duke de Rovigo,
Memoirs,
volume 3, part 2, chapter 17.
J. C. Ropes,
The First Napoleon.
Baron de Marbot,
Memoirs,
volume 2, chapter 38-39.
GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (October-December).
Retreat of Napoleon beyond the Rhine.
Battle of Hanau.
Fall of the kingdom of Westphalia.
Surrender of French garrisons and forces.
Liberation achieved.
"Blucher, with Langeron and Sacken, moved in pursuit of the
French army, which, disorganised and dejected, was wending its
way towards the Rhine. At the passage of the Unstrutt, at
Freyberg, 1,000 prisoners and 18 guns were captured by the
Prussian hussars; but on the 23d the French reached Erfurth,
the citadels and magazines of which afforded them at once
security and relief from their privations. Here Napoleon
halted two days, employed in reorganising his army, the
thirteen corps of which were now formed into six, commanded by
Victor, Ney, Bertrand, Augereau, Marmont, and Macdonald, and
amounting in all to less than 90,000 men; while twice that
number were left blockaded in the fortresses on the Elbe, the
Oder, and the Vistula. On the 25th, after parting for the last
time with Murat, who here quitted him and returned to Naples,
he resumed his march, retreating with such rapidity through
the Thuringian forest, that the Cossacks alone of the pursuing
army could keep up with the retiring columns--while the men
dropped, exhausted by fatigue and hunger, or deserted their
ranks by hundreds; so that when the fugitive host approached
the Maine, not more than 50,000 remained effective round their
colours--10,000 had fallen or been made prisoners, and at
least 30,000 were straggling in the rear. But here fresh
dangers awaited them.
{1530}
After the treaty of the 8th October, by which Bavaria had
acceded to the grand alliance, an Austro-Bavarian force under
Marshal Wrede had moved in the direction of Frankfort, and was
posted, to the number of 45,000 men, in the oak forest near
Hanau across the great road to Mayence, and blocking up
entirely the French line of retreat. The battle commenced at
11 A. M. on the 30th; but the French van, under Victor and
Macdonald, after fighting its way through the forest, was
arrested, when attempting to issue from its skirts, by the
concentric fire of 70 pieces of cannon, and for four hours the
combat continued, till the arrival of the guards and main body
changed the aspect of affairs. Under cover of the terrible
fire of Drouot's artillery, Sebastiani and Nansouty charged
with the cavalry of the guard, and overthrew everything
opposed to them, and Wrede at length drew off his shattered
army behind the Kinzig. Hanau was bombarded and taken, and
Mortier and Marmont, with the rear divisions, cut their way
through on the following day, with considerable loss to their
opponents. The total losses of the Allies amounted to 10,900
men, of whom 4,000 were prisoners; and the victory threw a
parting ray of glory over the long career of the revolutionary
arms in Germany. On the 2d of November the French reached
Mayence, and Napoleon, after remaining there six days to
collect the remains of his army, set out for Paris, where he
arrived on the 9th; and thus the French eagles bade a final
adieu to the German plains. In the mean time, the Allied
troops, following closely on the footsteps of the retreating
French, poured in prodigious strength down the valley of the
Maine. On the 5th of November the Emperor Alexander entered
Frankfort in triumph, at the head of 20,000 horse; and on the
9th the fortified post of Hochheim, in advance of the
tête-du-pont of Mayence at Cassel, was stormed by Giulay. From
the heights beyond the town the victorious armies of Germany
beheld the winding stream of the Rhine; a shout of enthusiasm
ran from rank to rank as they saw the mighty river of the
Fatherland, which their arms had liberated; those in the rear
hurried to the front, and soon a hundred thousand voices
joined in the cheers which told the world that the war of
independence was ended and Germany delivered. Nothing now
remained but to reap the fruits of this mighty victory; yet so
vast was the ruin that even this was a task of time and
difficulty. The rickety kingdom of Westphalia fell at once,
never more to rise; the revolutionary dynasty in Berg followed
its fate; and the authority of the King of Britain was
re-established by acclamation in Hanover, at the first
appearance of Bernadotte and Benningsen. The reduction of
Davoust, who had been left in Hamburg with 25,000 French and
10,000 Danes, was an undertaking of more difficulty; and
against him Walmoden and Bernadotte moved with 40,000 men. The
French marshal had taken up a position on the Stecknitz; but,
fearful of being cut off from Hamburg, he retired behind the
Bille on the advance of the Allies, separating himself from
the Danes, who were compelled to capitulate. The operations of
the Crown-Prince against Denmark, the ancient rival of Sweden,
were now pushed with a vigour and activity strongly
contrasting with his luke-warmness in the general campaign;
and the court of Copenhagen, seeing its dominions on the point
of being overrun, signed an armistice on the 15th December, on
which was soon after based a permanent treaty [of Kiel]. ...
See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1813-1814.
When Napoleon (Oct. 7) marched northwards from Dresden, he had
left St. Cyr in that city with 30,000 men, opposed only by a
newly-raised Russian corps under Tolstoi, which St. Cyr, by a
sudden attack, routed with the loss of 3,000 men and 10 guns.
But no sooner was the battle of Leipsic decided, than Dresden
was again blockaded by 50.000 men under Klenau and Tolstoi;
and St. Cyr, who was encumbered with a vast number of sick and
wounded, and was almost without provisions, was obliged, after
a fruitless sortie on the 6th November, to surrender on the
11th, on condition of being sent with his troops to France.
The capitulation, however, was disallowed by Schwartzenberg,
and the whole were made prisoners of war--a proceeding which
the French, not without some justice, declaim against as a
gross breach of faith--and thus no less than 32 generals,
1,795 officers, and 33,000 rank and file, with 240 pieces of
cannon, fell into the power of the Allies. The fall of Dresden
was soon followed by that of the other fortresses on the
Vistula and the Oder. Stettin, with 8,000 men and 350 guns,
surrendered on the 21st November; and Torgau, which contained
the military hospitals and reserve parks of artillery left by
the grand army on its retreat from the Elbe, yielded at
discretion to Tauenzein (December 26), after a siege of two
months. But such was the dreadful state of the garrison, from
the ravages of typhus fever, that the Allies dared not enter
this great pest-house till the 10th January; and the terrible
epidemic which issued, from its walls made the circuit, during
the four following years, of every country in Europe. Dantzic,
with its motley garrison of 35,000 men, had been blockaded
ever since the Moscow retreat; but the blockading corps, which
was not of greater strength, could not confine the French
within the walls; and Rapp made several sorties in force
during the spring and summer, by which he procured abundance
of provisions. It was not till after the termination of the
armistice of Pleswitz that the siege was commenced in form;
and after sustaining a severe bombardment, Rapp, deprived of
all hope by the battle of Leipsic, capitulated (November 29)
with his garrison, now reduced by the sword, sickness, and
desertion, to 16,000 men. Zamosc, with 3,000 men, surrendered
on the 22d December, and Modlin, with 1,200, on the 25th; and
at the close of the year, France retained beyond the Rhine
only Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Wittenberg, on the Elbe; Custrin
and Glogau on the Oder; and the citadels of Erfurth and
Würtzburg, which held out after the capitulation of the
towns."
Epitome of Alison's History of Europe,
sections 737-742
(chapter 82, volume 17, in complete work).
"The princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, with the
exception of the captive King of Saxony, and one or two minor
princes, deserted Napoleon, and entered into treaties with the
Allies."
T. H. Dyer,
History of Modern Europe,
volume 4, page 538.
ALSO IN:
M. Bourrienne,
Private Memoirs of Napoleon,
volume 4, chapter 16.
The Year of Liberation: Journal of the Defence of Hamburgh.
J. Philippart,
Campaign in Germany and France, 1813,
volume 1, pages 230-278.
GERMANY: A. D. 1814.
The Allies in France and in possession of Paris.
Fall of Napoleon.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (JANUARY-MARCH),
and (MARCH-APRIL).
{1531}
GERMANY: A. D. 1814 (May).
Readjustment of French boundaries by the Treaty of Paris.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1814 (APRIL-JUNE).
GERMANY: A. D. 1814-1815.
The Congress of Vienna.
Its territorial and political readjustments.
See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.
GERMANY: A. D. 1814-1820.
Reconstruction of Germany.
The Germanic Confederation and its constitution.
"Germany was now utterly disintegrated. The Holy Roman Empire
had ceased to exist; the Confederation of the Rhine had
followed it; and from the Black Forest to the Russian frontier
there was nothing but angry ambitions, vengeances, and fears.
If there was ever to be peace again in all these wide regions,
it was clearly necessary to create something new. What was to
be created was a far more difficult question; but already, on
the 30th of May 1814, the powers had come to some sort of
understanding, if not with regard to the means to be pursued,
at least with regard to the end to be attained. In the Treaty
of Paris we find these words: 'Les états de l'Allemagne seront
indépendants et unis par un lien fédératif.' But how was this to
be effected? There were some who wished the Holy Roman Empire
to be restored. ... Of course neither Prussia, Bavaria, nor
Wurtemberg, could look kindly upon a plan so obviously
unfavourable to them; but not even Austria really wished it,
and indeed it had few powerful friends. Then there was a
project of a North and South Germany, with the Maine for
boundary; but this was very much the reverse of acceptable to
the minor princes, who had no idea of being grouped like so
many satellites, some around Austria and some around Prussia.
Next came a plan of reconstruction by circles, the effect of
which would have been to have thrown all the power of Germany
into the hands of a few of the larger states. To this all the
smaller independent states were bitterly opposed, and it broke
down, although supported by the great authority of Stein, as
well as by Gagern. If Germany had been in a later phase of
political development, public opinion would perhaps have
forced the sovereigns to consent to the formation of a really
united Fatherland with a powerful executive and a national
parliament--but the time for that had not arrived. What was
the opposition of a few hundred clear-sighted men with their
few thousand followers, that it should prevail over the
masters of so many legions? What these potentates cared most
about were their sovereign rights, and the dream of German
unity was very readily sacrificed to the determination of each
of them to be, as far as he possibly could, absolute master in
his own dominions. Therefore it was that it soon became
evident that the results of the deliberation on the future of
Germany would be, not a federative state, but a confederation
of states--a Staaten-Bund, not a Bundes-Staat. There is no
doubt, however, that much mischief might have been avoided if
all the stronger powers had worked conscientiously together to
give this Staaten-Bund as national a character as possible.
... Prussia was really honestly desirous to effect something
of this kind, and Stein, Hardenberg, William von Humboldt,
Count Münster, and other statesmen, laboured hard to bring it
about. Austria, on the other hand, aided by Bavaria,
Wurtemberg, and Baden, did all she could to oppose such
projects. Things would perhaps have been settled better than
they ultimately were, if the return of Napoleon from Elba had
not frightened all Europe from its propriety, and turned the
attention of the sovereigns towards warlike preparations. ...
The document by which the Germanic Confederation is created is
of so much importance that we may say a word about the various
stages through which it passed. First, then, it appears as a
paper drawn up by Stein in March 1814, and submitted to
Hardenberg, Count Münster, and the Emperor Alexander. Next, in
the month of September, it took the form of an official plan,
handed by Hardenberg to Metternich, and consisting of
forty-one articles. This plan contemplated the creation of a
confederation which should have the character rather of a
Bundes-Staat than of a Staaten-Bund; but it went to pieces in
consequence of the difficulties which we have noticed above,
and out of it, and of ten other official proposals, twelve
articles were sublimated by the rival chemistry of Hardenberg
and Metternich. Upon these twelve articles the representatives
of Austria, Prussia, Hanover, and Wurtemberg, deliberated.
Their sittings were cut short partly by the ominous appearance
which was presented in the autumn of 1814 by the Saxon and Polish
questions, and partly by the difficulties from the side of
Bavaria and Wurtemberg, which we have already noticed. The
spring brought a project of the Austrian statesman Wessenberg,
who proposed a Staaten-Bund rather than a Bundes-Staat; and
out of this and a new Prussian project drawn up by W. von
Humboldt, grew the last sketch, which was submitted on the 23d
of May 1815 to the general conference of the plenipotentiaries
of all Germany. They made short work of it at the last, and
the Federal-Act (Bundes-Acte) bears date June 8th, 1815. This
is the document which is incorporated in the principal act of
the Congress of Vienna, and placed under the guarantee of
eight European powers, including France and England.
Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Homburg, did not form part of the
Confederation for some little time--the latter not till 1817;
but after they were added to the powers at first consenting,
the number of the sovereign states in the Confederation was
altogether thirty-nine. ... The following are the chief
stipulations of the Federal Act. The object of the
Confederation is the external and internal security of
Germany, and the independence and inviolability of the
confederate states. A diète fédérative (Bundes-Versammlung) is
to be created, and its attributions are sketched. The Diet is,
as soon as possible, to draw up the fundamental laws of the
Confederation. No state is to make war with another on any
pretence. All federal territories are mutually guaranteed.
There is to be in each state a 'Landständische
Verfassung'--'il y aura des assemblées d'états dans tous les
pays de la Confedération.' Art. 14 reserves many rights to the
mediatised princes. Equal civil and political rights are
guaranteed to all Christians in all German States, and
stipulations are made in favour of the Jews. The Diet did not
actually assemble before the 5th of November 1816. Its first
measures, and, above all, its first words, were not unpopular.
The Holy Allies, however, pressed with each succeeding month
more heavily upon Germany, and got at last the control of the
Confederation entirely into their hands.
{1532}
The chief epochs in this sad history were the Congress of
Carlsbad, 1819--the resolutions of which against the freedom
of the press were pronounced by Gentz to be a victory more
glorious than Leipzig; the ministerial conferences which
immediately succeeded it at Vienna; and the adoption by the
Diet of the Final Act (Sehluss Acte) of the Confederation on
the 8th of June 1820. The following are the chief stipulations
of the Final Act:--The Confederation is indissoluble. No new
member can be admitted without the unanimous consent of all
the states, and no federal territory can be ceded to a foreign
power without their permission. The regulations for the
conduct of business by the Diet are amplified and more
carefully defined. All quarrels between members of the
Confederation are to be stopped before recourse is had to
violence. The Diet may interfere to keep order in a state
where the government of that state is notoriously incapable of
doing so. Federal execution is provided for in case any
government resists the authority of the Diet. Other articles
declare the right of the Confederation to make war and peace
as a body, to guard the rights of each separate state from
injury, to take into consideration the differences between its
members and foreign nations, to mediate between them, to
maintain the neutrality of its territory, to make war when a
state belonging to the Confederation is attacked in its
non-federal territory if the attack seems likely to endanger
Germany."
M. E. G. Duff,
Studies in European Politics,
chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
J. R. Seeley,
Life and Times of Stein,
part 8 (volume 3).
E. Hertslet,
The Map of Europe by Treaty,
volume 1, number 26
(Text of Federative Constitution).
See, also, VIENNA: CONGRESS OF.
GERMANY: A. D. 1815.
Napoleon's return from Elba.
The Quadruple Alliance.
The Waterloo campaign and its results.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1814-1815.
GERMANY: A. D. 1815.
Final Overthrow of Napoleon.
The Allies again in Paris.
Second treaty with France.
Restitutions and indemnities.
French frontier of 1790 re-established.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JUNE),
(JULY-NOVEMBER).
GERMANY: A. D. 1815.
The Holy Alliance.
See HOLY ALLIANCE.
GERMANY: A. D. 1817-1820.
The Burschenschaft.
Assassination of Kotzebue.
The Karlsbad Conference.
"In 1817, the students of several Universities assembled at
the Wartburg in order to celebrate the tercentenary of the
Reformation. In the evening, a small number of them, the
majority having already left, were carried away by
enthusiastic zeal, and, in imitation of Luther, burnt a number
of writings recently published against German freedom,
together with other emblems of what was considered hateful in
the institutions of some of the German States. These youthful
excesses were viewed by the Governments as symptoms of grave
peril. At the same time, a large number of students united to
form one great German Burschenschaft [association of
students], whose aim was the cultivation of a love of country,
a love of freedom, and the moral sense. Thereupon increased
anxiety on the part of the Governments, followed by vexatious
police interference. Matters grew worse in consequence of the
rash act of a fanatical student, named Sand. It became known
that the Russian Government was using all its powerful
influence to have liberal ideas suppressed in Germany, and
that the play-wright Kotzebue had secretly sent to Russia
slanderous and libellous reports on German patriots. Sand
travelled to Mannheim and thrust a dagger into Kotzebue's
heart. The consequences were most disastrous to the cause of
freedom in Germany. The distrust of the Governments reached
its height: it was held that this bloody deed must needs be
the result of a wide-spread conspiracy: the authorities
suspected demagogues everywhere. Ministers, of course at the
instigation of Metternich, met at Karlsbad, and determined on
repressive measures. These were afterwards adopted by the
Federal Diet at Frankfort, which henceforth became an
instrument in the hands of the Emperor Francis and his
Minister for guiding the internal policy of the German States.
Accordingly, the cession of state-constitutions was opposed,
and prosecutions were instituted throughout Germany against
all who identified themselves with the popular movement; many
young men were thrown into prison; gymnastic and other
societies were arbitrarily suppressed; a rigid censorship of
the press was established, and the freedom of the Universities
restrained; various professors, among them Arndt, whose songs had
helped to fire the enthusiasm of the Freiheitskämpfer--the
soldiers of Freedom--in the recent war, were deprived of their
offices; the Burschenschaft was dissolved, and the wearing of
their colours, the future colours of the German Empire, black,
red, and gold, was forbidden. ... The Universities continued
to uphold the national idea; the Burschenschaft soon secretly
revived as a private association, and as early as 1820 there
again existed at most German Universities, Burschenschaften,
which, though their aims were not sharply defined, bore a
political colouring and placed the demand for German Unity in
the foreground."
G. Krause,
The Growth of German Unity,
chapter 8.
GERMANY: A. D. 1819-1847.
Arbitrary rulers and discontented subjects.
The ferment before revolution.
Formation of the Zollverein.
"The history of Germany during the thirty years of peace which
followed [the Congress of Carlsbad] is marked by very few
events of importance. It was a season of gradual reaction on
the part of the rulers; and of increasing impatience and
enmity on the part of the people. Instead of becoming loving
families, as the Holy Alliance designed, the States (except
some of the little principalities) were divided into two
hostile classes. There was material growth everywhere; the
wounds left by war and foreign occupation were gradually
healed; there was order, security for all who abstained from
politics, and a comfortable repose for such as were
indifferent to the future. But it was a sad and disheartening
period for the men who were able to see clearly how Germany,
with all the elements of a freer and stronger life existing in
her people, was falling behind the political development of
other countries. The three days' Revolution of 1830, which
placed Louis Philippe on the throne of France, was followed by
popular uprisings in some parts of Germany. Prussia and
Austria were too strong, and their people too well held in
check, to be affected; but in Brunswick the despotic Duke,
Karl, was deposed, Saxony and Hesse-Cassel were obliged to
accept co-rulers (out of their reigning families) and the
English Duke, Ernest Augustus, was made viceroy of Hannover.
{1533}
These four States also adopted a constitutional form of
government. The German Diet, as a matter of course, used what
power it possessed to counteract these movements, but its
influence was limited by its own laws of action. The hopes and
aspirations of the people were kept alive, in spite of the
system of repression, and some of the smaller States took
advantage of their independence to introduce various measures
of reform. As industry, commerce and travel increased, the
existence of so many boundaries, with their custom-houses,
taxes and other hindrances, became an unendurable burden.
Bavaria and Würtemberg formed a customs union in 1828, Prussia
followed, and by 1836 all of Germany except Austria was united
in the Zollverein (Tariff Union) [see TARIFF LEGISLATION
(GERMANY): A. D. 1833], which was not only a great material
advantage, but helped to inculcate the idea of a closer
political union. On the other hand, however, the monarchical
reaction against liberal government was stronger than ever.
Ernest Augustus of Hannover arbitrarily overthrew the
constitution he had accepted, and Ludwig I. of Bavaria,
renouncing all his former professions, made his land a very
nest of absolutism and Jesuitism. In Prussia, such men as
Stein, Gneisenau, and Wilhelm von Humboldt had long lost their
influence, while others of less personal renown, but of
similar political sentiments, were subjected to contemptible
forms of persecution. In March, 1835, Francis II. of Austria
died, and was succeeded by his son, Ferdinand I., a man of
such weak intellect that he was in some respects idiotic. On
the 7th of June, 1840, Frederick William III. of Prussia died,
and was also succeeded by his son, Frederick William IV., a
man of great wit and intelligence, who had made himself
popular as Crown-prince, and whose accession the people hailed
with joy, in the enthusiastic belief that better days were
coming. The two dead monarchs, each of whom had reigned 43
years, left behind them a better memory among their people
than they actually deserved. They were both weak, unstable and
narrow-minded; had they not been controlled by others, they
would have ruined Germany; but they were alike of excellent
personal character, amiable, and very kindly disposed towards
their subjects so long as the latter were perfectly obedient
and reverential. There was no change in the condition of
Austria, for Metternich remained the real ruler, as before. In
Prussia a few unimportant concessions were made, an amnesty
for political offences was declared, Alexander von Humboldt
became the king's chosen associate, and much was done for
science and art; but in their main hope of a liberal
reorganization of the government, the people were bitterly
deceived. Frederick William IV. took no steps towards the
adoption of a Constitution; he made the censorship and the
supervision of the police more severe; he interfered in the
most arbitrary and bigoted manner in the system of religious
instruction in the schools; and all his acts showed that his
policy was to strengthen his throne by the support of the
nobility and the civil service, without regard to the just
claims of the people. Thus, in spite of the external quiet and
order, the political atmosphere gradually became more sultry
and disturbed. ... There were signs of impatience in all
quarters; various local outbreaks occurred, and the aspects
were so threatening that in February, 1847, Frederick William
IV. endeavored to silence the growing opposition by ordering
the formation of a Legislative Assembly. But the provinces
were represented, not the people, and the measure only
emboldened the latter to clamor for a direct representation.
Thereupon, the king closed the Assembly, after a short
session, and the attempt was probably productive of more harm
than good. In most of the other German States, the situation
was very similar; everywhere there were elements of
opposition, all the more violent and dangerous, because they
had been kept down with a strong hand for so many years."
B. Taylor,
History of Germany,
chapter 37.
ALSO IN:
C. A. Fyffe,
History of Modern Europe,
volume 2, chapters 5 and 7.
See, also, AUSTRIA: A. D.1815-1835.
GERMANY: A. D. 1820-1822.
The Congresses of Troppau, Laybach and Verona.
See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.
GERMANY: A. D. 1835-1846.
Death of the Emperor Francis I. of Austria.
Accession of Ferdinand I.
Extinction of the Polish republic of Cracow.
Its annexation to Austria.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1815-1846.
GERMANY: A. D. 1839-1840.
The Turko-Egyptian question and its settlement.
Quadruple Alliance.
See TURKS: A. D. 1831-1840.
GERMANY: A. D. 1848 (March).
Revolutionary outbreaks.
The King of Prussia heads a national movement.
Mistaken battle of soldiers and citizens at Berlin.
"The French revolution of February, the flight of Louis
Philippe and the fall of the throne of the barricades, and the
proclamation of a republic, had kindled from one end to the
other of Europe the enthusiasm of the republican party. The
conflagration rapidly extended itself. The Rhenish provinces
of Prussia, whose near neighbourhood and former connexion with
France made them more peculiarly combustible, broke out with a
cry for the most extensive reforms; that is to say, for
representative institutions, the passion for which had spread
over the whole of Germany. ... The reform fever which had
attacked the Rhenish provinces quickly spread to the rest of
the body politic. The urban populace--a class in all countries
rarely incited to agitation--took the lead. They were headed
by the students. Breslau, Königsberg, and Berlin, were in
violent commotion. In the month of March, a great open air
meeting was held at Berlin: it ended in a riot. The troops
were called out to act against the mob. For near a week,
Berlin was in a state of chronic disturbance. The troops acted
with great firmness. The mob gathered together, but did not
show much fight; but they were dispersed with difficulty, and
continued to offer a passive resistance to the soldiers. On
the 15th, ten persons were said to have been killed, and over
100 wounded. At the same time, similar scenes were, being
enacted at Breslau and Königsberg, where several persons lost
their lives. A deputation from the Rhenish provinces arrived
at Berlin on the 18th, bearing a petition from Cologne to the
king for reform. He promised to grant it. ... Finding he could
not keep the movement in check, he resolved to put himself at
the head of it. It was probably the only course open to him,
if he would preserve his crown. ...
{1534}
The king must have previously had the questions which were
agitating Germany under careful consideration; for he at once
published a proclamation embodying the whole of them: the
unity of Germany, by forming it into a federal state, with a
federal representation; representative institutions for the
separate states; a general military system for all Germany,
under one federal banner; a German fleet; a tribunal for
settling disputes between the states, and a right for all
Germans to settle and trade in any part of Germany they
thought fit; the whole of Germany formed into one customs
union, and included in the Zollverein; one system of money,
weights, and measures; and the freedom of the press. These
were the subjects touched upon. ... The popularity of the
proclamation with the mob-leaders was unbounded, and the mob
shouted. Every line of it contained their own ideas,
vigorously expressed. Their delight was proportionate to their
astonishment. A crowd got together at the palace to express
their gratitude; the king came out of a window, and was loudly
cheered. Two regiments of dragoons unluckily mistook the
cheering for an attack, and began pushing them back by forcing
their horses forward. ... Unfortunately, as the conflict (if
conflict it could be called, which was only a bout of which
could push hardest) was going forward, two musket-shots were
fired by a regiment of infantry. It appears that the muskets
went off accidentally. No one was injured by them. It is not
clear they were not blank cartridges; but the people took
fright. They imagined that there was a design to slaughter
them. At once they rushed to arms; barricades were thrown up
in every street. ... Sharpshooters placed themselves in the
windows and behind the barricades, and opened a fire on the
soldiery. These, exasperated by what they thought an unfair
species of fighting, were by no means unwilling for the fray.
... The troops carried barricade after barricade, and gave no
quarter even to the unresisting. As they took the houses, they
slaughtered all the sharpshooters they found in them, not very
accurately discriminating those engaged in hostilities from
those who were not. Horrible cruelties were committed on both
sides. ... The flight raged for fifteen hours. Either the king
lost his head when it began, or the troops, having their blood
up, would not stop. ... The firing began at two o'clock on the
18th of March, and the authorities succeeded in withdrawing
the troops and stopping it the next morning at five o'clock,
they having been during that time successful at all points.
... The king put out a manifesto at seven o'clock, declaring
that the whole business arose from an unlucky misunderstanding
between the troops and the people, as it unquestionably did,
and the people appear to have been aware of the fact and
ashamed of themselves. ... A general amnesty was proclaimed
for all parties concerned, and orders were given to form at
once a burgher guard to supply the place of the military, who
were to be withdrawn. A new ministry was appointed, of a
liberal character. ... The troops were marched out of the