History for ready reference, Volume 3, Greece to Nibelungen

by J. N. Larned

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History For Ready Reference, Volume 3 of 6
From The Best
Historians, Biographers, And Specialists
Their Own Words In A Complete
System Of History
For All Uses, Extending To All Countries And Subjects,
And Representing For Both Readers And Students The Better
And Newer Literature Of History In The English Language.
BY J. N. LARNED
With Numerous Historical Maps From Original Studies
And Drawings By Alan C. Reiley
In Five Volumes
Volume III—Greece To Nibelungen Lied
Springfield, Mass.
The C. A. Nichols Co., Publishers
MDCCCXCV
Copyright, 1894.
By J. N. Larned.
The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A.
Printed by H. O. Houghton & Company.
List Of Maps.
Map of India, about the close of the Sixteenth Century,
and map of the growth of the Anglo-Indian Empire,
To follow page 1708.
Two maps of Italy, at the beginning of the Seventh Century,
and A. D. 1492, To follow page 1804.
TWO maps of Italy, A. D. 1815 to 1859, and 1861,
To follow page 1864.
Four maps of the Empire of Alexander the Great
and his successors, To follow page 2061.
Map of the Mongol Empire, A. D. 1300, On page 2223.
Logical Outline, In Colors.
Irish History, To follow page 1754
Chronological Tables.
The Seventh Century, On page 2073
The Eighth Century, On page 2074
{1565}
----------GREECE: Start----------
[Footnote: An important part of Greek history is treated
more fully under the heading "ATHENS" (in Volume 1), to
which the reader is referred.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65306]
GREECE:
The Land.
Its geographical characteristics, and their influence upon the
People.
"The considerable part played by the people of Greece during
many ages must undoubtedly be ascribed to the geographical
position of their country. Other tribes having the same
origin, but inhabiting countries less happily situated—such,
for instance, as the Pelasgians of Illyria, who are believed
to be the ancestors of the Albanians—have never risen above a
state of barbarism, whilst the Hellenes placed themselves at
the head of civilised nations, and opened fresh paths to their
enterprise. If Greece had remained for ever what it was during
the tertiary geological epoch—a vast plain attached to the
deserts of Libya, and run over by lions and the
rhinoceros—would it have become the native country of a
Phidias, an Æschylos, or a Demosthenes? Certainly not. It
would have shared the fate of Africa, and, far from taking the
initiative in civilisation, would have waited for an impulse
to be given to it from beyond. Greece, a sub-peninsula of the
peninsula of the Balkans, was even more completely protected
by transverse mountain barriers in the north than was Thracia
or Macedonia. Greek culture was thus able to develop itself
without fear of being stifled at its birth by successive
invasions of barbarians. Mounts Olympus, Pelion, and Ossa,
towards the north and east of Thessaly, constituted the first
line of formidable obstacles towards Macedonia. A second
barrier, the steep range of the Othrys, runs along what is the
present political boundary of Greece. To the south of the Gulf
of Lamia a fresh obstacle awaits us, for the range of the Œta
closes the passage, and there is but the narrow pass of the
Thermopylæ between it and the sea. Having crossed the
mountains of the Locri and descended into the basin of Thebæ,
there still remain to be crossed the Parnes or the spurs of
the Cithæron before we reach the plains of Attica. The
'isthmus' beyond these is again defended by transverse
barriers, outlying ramparts, as it were, of the mountain
citadel of the Peloponnesus, that acropolis of all Greece.
Hellas has frequently been compared to a series of chambers,
the doors of which were strongly bolted; it was difficult to
get in, but more difficult to get out again, owing to their
stout defenders. Michelet likens Greece to a trap having three
compartments. You entered, and found yourself taken first in
Macedonia, then in Thessaly, then between the Thermopylæ and
the isthmus. But the difficulties increase beyond the isthmus,
and Lacedæmonia remained impregnable for a long time. At an
epoch when the navigation even of a land-locked sea like the
Ægean was attended with danger, Greece found herself
sufficiently protected against the invasions of oriental
nations; but, at the same time, no other country held out such
inducements to the pacific expeditions of merchants. Gulfs and
harbours facilitated access to her Ægean coasts, and the
numerous outlying islands were available as stations or as
places of refuge. Greece, therefore, was favourably placed for
entering into commercial intercourse with the more highly
civilised peoples who dwelt on the opposite coasts of Asia
Minor. The colonists and voyagers of Eastern Ionia not only
supplied their Achæan and Pelasgian kinsmen with foreign
commodities and merchandise, but they also imparted to them
the myths, the poetry, the sciences, and the arts of their
native country. Indeed, the geographical configuration of
Greece points towards the east, whence she has received her
first enlightenment. Her peninsulas and outlying islands
extend in that direction; the harbours on her eastern coasts
are most commodious, and afford the best shelter; and the
mountain-surrounded plains there offer the best sites for
populous cities. … The most distinctive feature of Hellas,
as far as concerns the relief of the ground, consists in the
large number of small basins, separated one from the other by
rocks or mountain ramparts. The features of the ground thus
favoured the division of the Greek people into a multitude of
independent republics. Every town had its river, its
amphitheatre of hills or mountains, its acropolis, its fields,
pastures, and forests, and nearly all of them had, likewise,
access to the sea. All the elements required by a free
community were thus to be found within each of these small
districts, and the neighbourhood of other towns, equally
favoured, kept alive perpetual emulation, too frequently
degenerating into strife and battle. The islands of the Ægean
Sea, likewise, had constituted themselves into miniature
republics. Local institutions thus developed themselves
freely, and even the smallest island of the Archipelago has
its great representatives in history. But whilst there thus
exists the greatest diversity, owing to the configuration of
the ground and the multitude of islands, the sea acts as a
binding element, washes every coast, and penetrates far
inland. These gulfs and numerous harbours have made the
maritime inhabitants of Greece a nation of sailors—amphibiæ,
as Strabo called them. From the most remote times the passion
for travel has always been strong amongst them. When the
inhabitants of a town grew too numerous to support themselves
upon the produce of their land, they swarmed out like bees,
explored the coasts of the Mediterranean, and, when they had
found a site which recalled their native home, they built
themselves a new city. … The Greeks held the same position
relatively to the world of the ancients which is occupied at
the present time by the Anglo-Saxons with reference to the
entire earth. There exists, indeed, a remarkable analogy
between Greece, with its archipelago, and the British Islands,
at the other extremity of the continent. Similar geographical
advantages have brought about similar results, as far as
commerce is concerned, and between the Ægean and the British
seas time and space have effected a sort of harmony."
E. Reclus,
The Earth and its Inhabitants: Europe,
volume 1, pages 36-38.
"The independence of each city was a doctrine stamped deep on
the Greek political mind by the very nature of the Greek land.
How truly this is so is hardly fully understood till we see
that land with our own eyes. The map may do something; but no
map can bring home to us the true nature of the Greek land
till we have stood on a Greek hill-top, on the akropolis of
Athens or the loftier akropolis of Corinth, and have seen how
thoroughly the land was a land of valleys cut off by hills, of
islands and peninsulas cut off by arms of sea, from their
neighbours on either side.
{1566}
Or we might more truly say that, while the hills fenced them
off from their neighbours, the arms of the sea laid them open
to their neighbours. Their waters might bring either friends
or enemies; but they brought both from one wholly distinct and
isolated piece of land to another. Every island, every valley,
every promontory, became the seat of a separate city; that is,
according to Greek notions, the seat of an independent power,
owning indeed many ties of brotherhood to each of the other
cities which helped to make up the whole Greek nation, but
each of which claimed the right of war and peace and separate
diplomatic intercourse, alike with every other Greek city and
with powers beyond the bounds of the Greek world. Corinth
could treat with Athens and Athens with Corinth, and Corinth
and Athens could each equally treat with the King of the
Macedonians and with the Great King of Persia. … How close
the Greek states are to one another, and yet how physically
distinct they are from one another, it needs, for me at least,
a journey to Greece fully to take in."
E. A. Freeman,
The Practical Bearings of European History
(Lectures to American Audiences),
pages 243-244.
GREECE: Ancient inhabitants.
Tribal divisions.
See PELASGIANS; HELLENES; ACHAIA; ÆOLIANS;
and DORIANS AND IONIANS.
GREECE: The Heroes and their Age.
"The period included between the first appearance of the
Hellenes in Thessaly and the return of the Greeks from Troy,
is commonly known by the name of the heroic age, or ages. The
real limits of this period cannot be exactly defined. The date
of the siege of Troy is only the result of a doubtful
calculation [ending B. C. 1183, as reckoned by Eratosthenes,
but fixed at dates ranging from 33 to 63 years later by
Isocrates, Callimachus and other Greek writers]; and … the
reader will see that it must be scarcely possible to ascertain
the precise beginning of the period: but still, so far as its
traditions admit of anything like a chronological connexion,
its duration may be estimated at six generations, or about 200
years [say from some time in the 14th to some time in the 12th
century before Christ]. … The history of the heroic age is
the history of the most celebrated persons belonging to this
class, who, in the language of poetry, are called 'heroes.'
The term 'hero' is of doubtful origin, though it was clearly a
title of honour; but, in the poems of Homer, it is applied not
only to the chiefs, but also to their followers, the freemen
of lower rank, without, however, being contrasted with any
other, so as to determine its precise meaning. In later times
its use was narrowed, and in some degree altered: it was
restricted to persons, whether of the heroic or of after ages,
who were believed to be endowed with a superhuman, though not
a divine, nature, and who were honoured with sacred rites, and
were imagined to have the power of dispensing good or evil to
their worshippers; and it was gradually combined with the
notion of prodigious strength and gigantic stature. Here,
however, we have only to do with the heroes as men. The
history of their age is filled with their wars, expeditions,
and adventures, and this is the great mine from which the
materials of the Greek poetry were almost entirely drawn."
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 5 (volume 1).
The legendary heroes whose exploits and adventures became the
favorite subjects of Greek tragedy and song were Perseus,
Hercules, Theseus, the Argonauts, and the heroes of the Siege
of Troy.
GREECE:
The Migrations of the Hellenic tribes in the Peninsula.
"If there is any point in the annals of Greece at which we can
draw the line between the days of myth and legend and the
beginnings of authentic history, it is at the moment of the
great migrations. Just as the irruption of the Teutonic tribes
into the Roman empire in the 5th century after Christ marks
the commencement of an entirely new era in modern Europe, so
does the invasion of Southern and Central Greece by the
Dorians, and the other tribes whom they set in motion, form
the first landmark in a new period of Hellenic history. Before
these migrations we are still in an atmosphere which we cannot
recognize as that of the historical Greece that we know. The
states have different boundaries, some of the most famous
cities have not yet been founded, tribes who are destined to
vanish occupy prominent places in the land, royal houses of a
foreign stock are established everywhere, the distinction
between Hellene and Barbarian is yet unknown. We cannot
realize a Greece where Athens is not yet counted as a great
city, while Mycenae is a seat of empire; where the Achaian
element is everywhere predominant, and the Dorian element is
as yet unknown. When, however, the migrations are ended, we at
once find ourselves in a land which we recognize as the Greece
of history. The tribes have settled into the districts which
are to be their permanent abodes, and have assumed their
distinctive characters. … The original impetus which set the
Greek tribes in motion came from the north, and the whole
movement rolled southward and eastward. It started with the
invasion of the valley of the Peneus by the Thessalians, a
warlike but hitherto obscure tribe, who had dwelt about Dodona
in the uplands of Epirus. They crossed the passes of Pindus,
and flooded down into the great plain to which they were to
give their name. The tribes which had previously held it were
either crushed and enslaved, or pushed forward into Central
Greece by the wave of invasion. Two of the displaced races
found new homes for themselves by conquest. The Arnaeans, who
had dwelt in the southern lowlands along the courses of
Apidanus and Enipeus, came through Thermopylae, pushed the
Locriams aside to right and left, and descended into the
valley of the Cephissus, where they subdued the Minyae of
Orchomenus [see MINYI], and then, passing south, utterly
expelled the Cadmeians of Thebes. The plain country which they
had conquered received a single name. Boeotia became the
common title of the basins of the Cephissus and the Asopus,
which had previously been in the hands of distinct races. Two
generations later the Boeotians endeavoured to cross
Cithaeron, and add Attica to their conquests; but their king
Xanthus fell in single combat with Melanthus, who fought in
behalf of Athens, and his host gave up the enterprise. In
their new country the Boeotians retained their national unity
under the form of a league, in which no one city had authority
over another, though in process of time Thebes grew so much
greater than her neighbours that she exercised a marked
preponderance over the other thirteen members of the
confederation. Orchomenus, whose Minyan inhabitants had been
subdued but not exterminated by the invaders, remained
dependent on the league without being
at first amalgamated with it.
{1567}
A second tribe who were expelled by the irruption of the
Thessalians were the Dorians, a race whose name is hardly
heard in Homer, and whose early history had been obscure and
insignificant. They had till now dwelt along the western slope
of Pindus. Swept on by the invaders, they crossed Mount
Othrys, and dwelt for a time in the valley of the Spercheius
and on the shoulders of Oeta. But the land was too narrow for
them, and, after a generation had passed, the bulk of the
nation moved southward to seek a wider home, while a small
fraction only remained in the valleys of Oeta. Legends tell us
that their first advance was made by the Isthmus of Corinth,
and was repulsed by the allied states of Peloponnesus, Hyllus
the Dorian leader having fallen in the fight by the hand of
Echemus, King of Tegea. But the grandsons of Hyllus resumed
his enterprise, and met with greater success. Their invasion
was made, as we are told, in conjunction with their neighbours
the Aetolians, and took the Aetolian port of Naupactus as its
base. Pushing across the narrow strait at the mouth of the
Corinthian Gulf, the allied hordes landed in Peloponnesus, and
forced their way down the level country on its western coast,
then the land of the Epeians, but afterwards to be known as
Elis and Pisatis. This the Aetolians took as their share,
while the Dorians pressed further south and east, and
successively conquered Messenia, Laconia, and Argolis,
destroying the Cauconian kingdom of Pylos and the Achaian
states of Sparta and Argos. There can be little doubt that the
legends of the Dorians pressed into a single generation the
conquests of a long series of years. … It is highly probable
that Messenia was the first seized of the three regions, and
Argos the latest … but of the details or dates of the Dorian
conquests we know absolutely nothing. Of the tribes whom the
Dorians supplanted, some remained in the land as subjects to
their newly found masters, while others took ship and fled
over sea. The stoutest-hearted of the Achaians of Argolis,
under Tisamenus, a grandson of Agamemnon, retired northward
when the contest became hopeless, and threw themselves on the
coast cities of the Corinthian Gulf, where up to this time the
Ionic tribe of the Aegialeans had dwelt. The Ionians were
worsted, and fled for refuge to their kindred in Attica, while
the conquerors created a new Achaia between the Arcadian
Mountains and the sea, and dwelt in the twelve cities which
their predecessors had built. The rugged mountains of Arcadia
were the only part of Peloponnesus which were to escape a
change of masters resulting from the Dorian invasion. A
generation after the fall of Argos, new war-bands thirsting
for land pushed on to the north and west, led by descendants
of Temenus. The Ionic towns of Sicyon and Phlius, Epidaurus
and Troezen, all fell before them. Even the inaccessible
Acropolis which protected the Aeolian settlement of Corinth
could not preserve it from the hands of the enterprising
Aletes. Nor was it long before the conquerors pressed on from
Corinth beyond the isthmus, and attacked Attica. Foiled in
their endeavour to subdue the land, they at least succeeded in
tearing from it its western districts, where the town of
Megara was made the capital of a new Dorian state, and served
for many generations to curb the power of Athens. From
Epidaurus a short voyage of fifteen miles took the Dorians to
Aegina, where they formed a settlement which, first as a
vassal to Epidaurus, and then as an independent community,
enjoyed a high degree of commercial prosperity. It is not the
least curious feature of the Dorian invasion that the leaders
of the victorious tribe, who, like most other royal houses,
claimed to descend from the gods and boasted that Heracles was
their ancestor, should have asserted that they were not
Dorians by race, but Achaians. Whether the rude northern
invaders were in truth guided by princes of a different blood
and higher civilization than themselves, it is impossible to
say. … In all probability the Dorian invasion was to a
considerable extent a check in the history of the development
of Greek civilization, a supplanting of a richer and more
cultured by a poorer and wilder race. The ruins of the
prehistoric cities, which were supplanted by new Dorian
foundations, point to a state of wealth to which the country
did not again attain for many generations. On the other hand,
the invasion brought about an increase in vigour and moral
earnestness. The Dorians throughout their history were the
sturdiest and most manly of the Greeks. The god to whose
worship they were especially devoted was Apollo, the purest,
the noblest, the most Hellenic member of the Olympian family.
By their peculiar reverence for this noble conception of
divinity, the Dorians marked themselves out as the most moral
of the Greeks."
C. W. C. Oman,
History of Greece,
chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
M. Duncker,
History of Greece,
book 2 (volume 1).
C. O. Müller,
History and Antiquity of the Doric Race,
introduction, and book 1, chapters 1-5.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapters 3-8 (volume 2).
See, also, DORIANS AND IONIANS;
ACHAIA; ÆOLIANS; THESSALY;
and BŒOTIA.
GREECE:
The Migrations to Asia Minor and the Islands of the Ægean.
Æolian, Ionian and Dorian colonies.
See ASIA MINOR: THE GREEK COLONIES.
GREECE:
Mycenæ and its kings.
The unburied memorials.
"Thucydides says that before the Dorian conquest, the date of
which is traditionally fixed at B. C. 1104, Mycenae was the
only city whence ruled a wealthy race of kings. Archaeology
produces the bodies of kings ruling at Mycenae about the
twelfth century and spreads their wealth under our eyes.
Thucydides says that this wealth was brought in the form of
gold from Phrygia by the founder of the line, Pelops.
Archaeology tells us that the gold found at Mycenae may very
probably have come from the opposite coast of Asia Minor which
abounded in gold; and further that the patterns impressed on
the gold work at Mycenae bear a very marked resemblance to the
decorative patterns found on graves in Phrygia. Thucydides
tells us that though Mycenae was small, yet its rulers had the
hegemony over a great part of Greece. Archæology shews us that
the kings of Mycenae were wealthy and important quite out of
proportion to the small city which they ruled, and that the
civilisation which centred at Mycenae spread over south Greece
and the Aegean, and lasted for some centuries at least. It
seems to me that the simplest way of meeting the facts of the
case is to suppose that we have recovered at Mycenae the
graves of the Pelopid race of monarchs. It will not of course
do to go too far. … It would be too much to suppose that we
have recovered the bodies of the Agamemnon who seems in the
Iliad to be as familiar to us as Caesar or Alexander, or of
his father Atreus, or of his charioteer and the rest.
{1568}
We cannot of course prove the Iliad to be history; and if we
could, the world would be poorer than before. But we can
insist upon it that the legends of heroic Greece have more of
the historic element in them than anyone supposed a few years
ago. … Assuming then that we may fairly class the Pelopidae
as Achaean, and may regard the remains at Mycenae as
characteristic of the Achaean civilisation of Greece, is it
possible to trace with bolder hand the history of Achaean
Greece? Certainly we gain assistance in our endeavour to
realize what the pre-Dorian state of Peloponnesus was like. We
secure a hold upon history which is thoroughly objective,
while all the history which before existed was so vague and
imaginative that the clear mind of Grote refused to rely upon
it at all. But the precise dates are more than we can venture
to lay down, in the present condition of our knowledge. …
The Achaean civilisation was contemporary with the eighteenth
Egyptian dynasty (B. C. 1700-1400). It lasted during the
invasions of Egypt from the north (1300-1100). When it ceased
we cannot say with certainty. There is every historical
probability that it was brought to a violent end in the Dorian
invasion. The traditional date of that invasion is B. C. 1104.
But it is obvious that this date cannot be relied upon."
P. Gardner,
New Chapters in Greek History,
chapters 2-3.
ALSO IN:
R. Schliemann,
Mycenæ.
C. Schuchhardt,
Schliemann's Excavations,
chapter 4.
GREECE:
Ancient political and geographical divisions.
"Greece was not a single country. … It was broken up into
little districts, each with its own government. Any little
city might be a complete state in itself, and independent of
its neighbours. It might possess only a few miles of land and
a few hundred inhabitants, and yet have its own laws, its own
government, and its own army. … In a space smaller than an
English county there might be several independent cities,
sometimes at war, sometimes at peace with one another.
Therefore when we say that the west coast of Asia Minor was
part of Greece, we do not mean that this coast-land and
European Greece were under one law and one government, for
both were broken up into a number of little independent
States: but we mean that the people who lived on the west
coast of Asia Minor were just as much Greeks as the people who
lived in European Greece. They spoke the same language, and
had much the same customs, and they called one another
Hellenes, in contrast to all other nations of the world, whom
they called barbarians … , that is, 'the unintelligible
folk,' because they could not understand their tongue."
C. A. Fyffe,
History of Greece (History Primers),
chapter 1.
"The nature of the country had … a powerful effect on the
development of Greek politics. The whole land was broken up by
mountains into a number of valleys more or less isolated;
there was no central point from which a powerful monarch could
control it. Hence Greece was, above all other countries, the
home of independence and freedom. Each valley, and even the
various hamlets of a valley, felt themselves possessed of a
separate life, which they were jealous to preserve."
E. Abbott,
History of Greece,
part 1, chapter 1.
See AKARNANIANS; ACHAIA;
ÆGINA; ÆTOLIA; ARCADIA; ARGOS; ATHENS;
ATTICA; BŒOTIA; CORINTH; DORIS AND
DRYOPIS; ELIS; EPIRUS; EUBŒA; KORKYRA;
LOCRI; MACEDONIA; MANTINEA; MEGALOPOLIS;
MEGARA; MESSENE; OLYNTHUS; PHOKIANS;
PLATÆA; SICYON; SPARTA; THEBES;
and THESSALY.
GREECE:
Political evolution of the leading States.
Variety in the forms of Government.
Rise of democracy at Athens.
"The Hellenes followed no common political aim. …
Independent and self-centred, they created, in a constant
struggle of citizen with citizen and state with state, the
groundwork of those forms of government which have been
established in the world at large. We see monarchy,
aristocracy, democracy, rising side by side and one after
another, the changes being regulated in each community by its
past experience and its special interests in the immediate
present. These forms of government did not appear in their
normal simplicity or in conformity with a distinct ideal, but
under the modifications necessary to give them vitality. An
example of this is Lakedæmon. If one of the families of the
Heracleidæ [the two royal families-see SPARTA: THE
CONSTITUTION] aimed at a tyranny, whilst another entered into
relations with the native and subject population, fatal to the
prerogatives of the conquerors, we can understand that in the
third case, that, of the Spartan community, the aristocratic
principle was maintained with the greatest strictness.
Independently of this, the divisions of the Lakedæmonian
monarchy between two lines, neither of which was to have
precedence, was intended to guard against the repetition in
Sparta of that which had happened in Argos. Above all, the
members of the Gerusia, in which the two kings had only equal
rights with the rest, held a position which would have been
unattainable to the elders of the Homeric age. But even the
Gerusia was not independent. There existed in addition to it a
general assembly, which, whilst very aristocratic as regards
the native and subject population, assumed a democratic aspect
in contrast with the king and the elders. The internal life of
the Spartan constitution depended upon the relations between
the Gerusia and the aristocratic demos. … The Spartan
aristocracy dominated the Peloponnesus. But the constitution
contained a democratic clement working through the Ephors, by
means of which the conduct of affairs might be concentrated in
a succession of powerful hands. Alongside of this system, the
purely aristocratic constitutions, which were without such a
centre, could nowhere hold their ground. The Bacchiadæ in
Corinth, two hundred in number, with a prytanis at their head,
and inter-marrying only among themselves, were one of the most
distinguished of these families. They were deprived of their
exclusive supremacy by Kypselus, a man of humble birth on his
father's side, but connected with the Bacchiadæ through his
mother. … As the Kypselidæ rose in Corinth, the metropolis
of the colonies towards the west, so in the corresponding
eastern metropolis, Miletus, Thrasybulus raised himself from
the dignity of prytanis to that of tyrant; in Ephesus,
Pythagoras rose to power, and overthrew the Basilidæ; in
Samos, Polycrates, who was master also of the Kyklades, and of
whom it is recorded that he confiscated the property of the
citizens and then made them a present of it again. By
concentrating the forces of their several communities the
tyrants obtained the means of surrounding themselves with a
certain splendor, and above all of liberally encouraging
poetry and art.
{1569}
To these Polycrates opened his citadel, and in it we find
Anacreon and Ibycus; Kypselus dedicated a famous statue to
Zeus, at Olympia. The school of art at Sikyon was without a
rival, and at the court of Periander were gathered the seven
sages—men in whom a distinguished political position was
combined with the prudential wisdom derived from the
experience of life. This is the epoch of the legislator of
Athens, Solon, who more than the rest has attracted to himself
the notice of posterity.
See ATHENS: B. C. 594.
He is the founder of the Athenian democracy. … His proverb
'Nothing in excess' indicates his character. He was a man who
knew exactly what the time has a right to call for, and who
utilized existing complications to bring about the needful
changes. It is impossible adequately to express what he was to
the people of Athens, and what services he rendered them. That
removal of their pecuniary burdens, the seisachtheia, made
life for the first time endurable to the humbler classes.
See DEBT, LAWS CONCERNING: ANCIENT GREEK.
Solon cannot be said to have introduced democracy, but, in
making the share of the upper classes in the government
dependent upon the good pleasure of the community at large, he
laid its foundations. The people were invested by him with
attributes which they afterwards endeavored to extend. …
Solon himself lived long enough to see the order which he
established serve as the basis of the tyranny which he wished
to avoid; it was the Four Hundred themselves who lent a hand
to the change. The radical cause of failure was that the
democratic element was too feebly constituted to control or to
repress the violence of the families. To elevate the democracy
into a true power in the state other events were necessary,
which not only rendered possible, but actually brought about,
its further development. The conflicts of the principal
families, hushed for a moment, were revived under the eyes of
Solon himself with redoubled violence. The Alemæonidæ
[banished about 595 B. C.—see ATHENS: B. C. 612-595] were
recalled, and Æthelred around them a party consisting mainly
of the inhabitants of the seacoast, who, favored by trade, had
the money in their hands; the genuine aristocrats, described
as the inhabitants of the plains, who were in possession of
the fruitful soil, were in perpetual antagonism to the
Alemæonidæ; and, whilst these two parties were bickering, a
third was formed from the inhabitants of the mountain
districts, inferior to the two others in wealth, but of
superior weight to either in the popular assemblies. At its
head stood Peisistratus, a man distinguished by warlike
exploits, and at an earlier date a friend of Solon. It was
because his adherents did not feel themselves strong enough to
protect their leader that they were induced to vote him a
body-guard chosen from their own ranks. … As soon, however,
as the first two parties combined, the third was at a
disadvantage, so that after some time sentence of banishment
was passed upon Peisistratus. … Peisistratus … found means
to gather around him a troop of brave mercenaries, with whom,
and with the support of his old adherents, he then invaded
Attica. His opponents made but a feeble resistance, and he
became without much trouble master both of the city and of the
country.
See ATHENS: B. C. 560-510.
He thus attained to power; it is true, with the approbation of
the people, but nevertheless by armed force. … We have
almost to stretch a point in order to call Peisistratus a
tyrant—a word which carries with it the invidious sense of a
selfish exercise of power. No authority could have been more
rightly placed than his; it combined Athenian with
Panhellenist tendencies. But for him Athens would not have
been what she afterwards became to the world. …
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Peisistratus governed
Athens absolutely, and even took steps to establish a
permanent tyranny. He did, in fact, succeed in leaving the
power he possessed to his sons, Hippias and Hipparchus. … Of
the two brothers it was the one who had rendered most service
to culture, Hipparchus, who was murdered at the festival of
the Panathenæa. It was an act of revenge for a personal
insult. … In his dread lest he should be visited by a
similar doom, Hippias actually became an odious tyrant and
excited universal discontent. One effect, however, of the loss
of stability which the authority of the dominant family
experienced was that the leading exiles ejected by
Peisistratus combined in the enterprise which was a necessary
condition of their return, the overthrow of Hippias. The
Alcmæonidæ took the principal part. … The revolution to
which this opened the way could, it might seem, have but one
result, the establishment of an oligarchical government. …
But the matter had a very different issue," resulting in the
constitution of Cleisthenes and the establishment of democracy
at Athens, despite the hostile opposition and interference of
Sparta.
L. von Ranke,
Universal History:
The oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks,
chapter 5.
See, also,
ATHENS: B. C. 510-507,
and 509-506.
GREECE: B. C. 752.
The Archonship at Athens thrown open to the whole body of the
people.
See ATHENS: FROM THE DORIAN MIGRATION TO B. C. 683.
GREECE: B. C. 624.
The Draconian legislation at Athens.
See ATHENS: B. C. 624.
GREECE: B. C. 610-600.
War of Athens and Megara for Salamis.
Spartan Arbitration.
See ATHENS: B. C. 610-586.
GREECE: B. C. 595-586.
The Cirrhæan or first Sacred War.
See ATHENS: B.C. 610-586; and DELPHI.
GREECE: B. C. 500-493.
Rising of the Ionians of Asia Minor against the Persians.
Aid rendered to them by the Athenians.
Provocation to Darius.
The Ionic Greek cities, or states, of Asia Minor, first
subjugated by Crœsus, King of Lydia, in the sixth century B.
C., were swallowed up, in the same century, with all other
parts of the dominion of Crœsus, in the conquests of Cyrus,
and formed part of the great Persian Empire, to the
sovereignty of which Cambyses and Darius succeeded. In the
reign of Darius there occurred a revolt of the Ionians (about
502 B. C.), led by the city of Miletus, under the influence of
its governor, Aristagoras. Aristagoras, coming over to Greece
in person, sought aid against the Persians, first at Sparta,
where it was denied to him, and then, with better success, at
Athens. Presenting himself to the citizens, just after they
had expelled the Pisistratidæ, Aristagoras said to them "that
the Milesians were colonists from Athens, and that it was just
that the Athenians, being so mighty, should deliver them from
slavery.
{1570}
And because his need was great, there was nothing that he did
not promise, till at the last he persuaded them. For it is
easier, it seems, to deceive a multitude than to deceive one
man. Cleomenes the Spartan, being but one man, Aristagoras
could not deceive; but he brought over to his purpose the
people of Athens, being thirty thousand. So the Athenians,
being persuaded, made a decree to send twenty ships to help
the men of Ionia, and appointed one Melanthius, a man of
reputation among them, to be captain. These ships were the
beginning of trouble both to the Greeks and the barbarians.
… When the twenty ships of the Athenians were arrived, and
with them five ships of the Eretrians, which came, not for any
love of the Athenians, but because the Milesians had helped
them in the old time against the men of Chalcis, Aristagoras
sent an army against Sardis, but he himself abode in Miletus.
This army, crossing Mount Tmolus, took the city of Sardis
without any hindrance; but the citadel they took not, for
Artaphernes held it with a great force of soldiers. But though
they took the city they had not the plunder of it, and for
this reason. The houses in Sardis were for the most part built
of reeds, and such as were built of bricks had their roofs of
reeds; and when a certain soldier set fire to one of these
houses, the fire ran quickly from house to house till the
whole city was consumed. And while the city was burning, such
Lydians and Persians as were in it, seeing they were cut off
from escape (for the fire was in an the outskirts of the
city), gathered together in haste to the market-place. Through
this market-place flows the river Pactolus, which comes down
from Mount Tmolus, having gold in its sands, and when it has
passed out of the city it flows into the Hermus, which flows
into the sea. Here then the Lydians and Persians were gathered
together, being constrained to defend themselves. And when the
men of Ionia saw their enemies how many they were, and that
these were preparing to give battle, they were stricken with
fear, and fled out of the city to Mount Tmolus, and thence,
when it was night, they went back to the sea. In this manner
was burnt the city of Sardis, and in it the great temple of
the goddess Cybele, the burning of which temple was the cause,
as said the Persians, for which afterwards they burnt the
temples in Greece. Not long after came a host of Persians from
beyond the river Halys; and when they found that the men of
Ionia had departed from Sardis, they followed hard upon their
track, and came up with them at Ephesus. And when the battle
was joined, the men of Ionia fled before them. Many indeed
were slain, and such as escaped were scattered, every man to
his own city. After this the ships of the Athenians departed,
and would not help the men of Ionia any more, though
Aristagoras besought them to stay. Nevertheless the Ionians
ceased not from making preparations of war against the King,
making to themselves allies, some by force and some by
persuasion, as the cities of the Hellespont and many of the
Carians and the island of Cyprus. For all Cyprus, save Amathus
only, revolted from the King under Onesilus, brother of King
Gorgus. When King Darius heard that Sardis had been taken and
burned with fire by the Ionians and the Athenians, with
Aristagoras for leader, at the first he took no heed of the
Ionians, as knowing that they would surely suffer for their
deed, but he asked, 'Who are these Athenians?' And when they
told him he took a bow and shot an arrow into the air, saying,
'O Zeus, grant that I may avenge myself on these Athenians.'
And he commanded his servant that every day, when his dinner
was served, he should say three times, 'Master, remember the
Athenians.' … Meanwhile the Persians took not a few cities
of the Ionians and Æolians. But while they were busy about
these, the Carians revolted from the King; whereupon the
captains of the Persians led their army into Caria, and the
men of Caria came out to meet them; and they met them at a
certain place which is called the White Pillars, near to the
river Mæander. Then there were many counsels among the
Carians, whereof the best was this, that they should cross the
river and so contend with the Persians, having the river
behind them, that so there being no escape for them if they
fled, they might surpass themselves in courage. But this
counsel did not prevail. Nevertheless, when the Persians had
crossed the Meander, the Carians fought against them, and the
battle was exceeding long and fierce. But at the last the
Carians were vanquished, being overborne by numbers, so that
there fell of them ten thousand. And when they that
escaped—for many had fled to Labranda, where there is a great
temple of Zeus and a grove of plane trees—were doubting
whether they should yield themselves to the King or depart
altogether from Asia, there came to their help the men of
Miletus with their allies. Thereupon the Carians, putting away
their doubts altogether, fought with the Persians a second
time, and were vanquished yet more grievously than before. But
on this day the men of Miletus suffered the chief damage. And
the Carians fought with the Persians yet again a third time;
for, hearing that these were about to attack their cities one
by one, they laid an ambush for them on the road to Pedasus.
And the Persians, marching by night, fell into the ambush, and
were utterly destroyed, they and their captains. After these
things, Aristagoras, seeing the power of the Persians, and
having no more any hope to prevail over them—and indeed, for
all that he had brought about so much trouble, he was of a
poor spirit—called together his friends and said to them, 'We
must needs have some place of refuge, if we be driven out of
Miletus. Shall we therefore go to Sardinia, or to Myrcinus on
the river Strymon; which King Darius gave to Histiæus?' To
this Hecateus, the writer of chronicles, made answer, 'Let
Aristagoras build a fort in Leros (this Leros is an island
thirty miles distant from Miletus) and dwell there quietly, if
he be driven from Miletus. And hereafter he can come from
Leros and set himself up again in Miletus.' But Aristagoras
went to Myrcinus, and not long afterwards was slain while he
besieged a certain city of the Thracians."
Herodotus,
The Story of the Persian War
(version of A. J. Church, chapter 2).
See, also,
PERSIA: B. C. 521-493;
and ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.
GREECE: B. C. 496.
War of Sparta with Argos.
Overwhelming reverse of the Argives.
See ARGOS: B. C. 496-421.
GREECE: B. C. 492-491.
Wrath of the Persian king against Athens.
Failure of his first expedition of invasion.
Submission of 'Medizing' Greek states.
Coercion of Ægina.
Enforced union of Hellas.
Headship of Sparta recognized.
{1571}
The assistance given by Athens to the Ionian revolt stirred
the wrath of the Persian monarch very deeply, and when he had
put down the rebellion he prepared to chastise the audacious
and insolent Greeks. "A great fleet started from the
Hellespont, with orders to sail round the peninsula of Mt.
Athos to the Gulf of Therma, while Mardonius advanced by land.
His march was so harassed by the Thracians that when he had
effected the conquest of Macedonia his force was too weak for
any further attempt. The fleet was overtaken by a storm off
Mt. Athos, on whose rocks 300 ships were dashed to pieces, and
20,000 men perished. Mardonius returned in disgrace to Asia
with the remnant of his fleet and army. This failure only
added fury to the resolution of Darius. While preparing all
the resources of his empire for a second expedition, he sent
round heralds to the chief cities of Greece, to demand the
tribute of earth and water as signs of his being their
rightful lord. Most of them submitted: Athens and Sparta alone
ventured on defiance. Both treated the demand as an outrage
which annulled the sanctity of the herald's person. At Athens
the envoy was plunged into the loathsome Barathrum, a pit into
which the most odious public criminals were cast. At Sparta
the herald was hurled into a well, and bidden to seek his
earth and water there. The submission of Ægina, the chief
maritime state of Greece, and the great enemy of Athens,
entailed the most important results. The act was denounced by
Athens as treason against Greece, and the design was imputed
to Ægina of calling in the Persians to secure vengeance on her
rival. The Athenians made a formal complaint to Sparta against
the 'Medism' of the Æginetans; a charge which is henceforth
often repeated both against individuals and states. The
Spartans had recently concluded a successful war with Argos,
the only power that could dispute her supremacy in
Peloponnesus; and now this appeal from Athens, the second city
of Greece, at once recognized and established Sparta as the
leading Hellenic state. In that character, her king Cleomenes
undertook to punish the Medizing party in Ægina 'for the
common good of Greece'; but he was met by proofs of the
intrigues of his colleague Demaratus in their favour. …
Cleomenes obtained his deposition on a charge of illegitimacy,
and a public insult from his successor Leotychides drove
Demaratus from Sparta. Hotly pursued as a 'Medist,' he
effected his escape to Darius, whose designs against Athens
and Sparta were now stimulated by the councils of their exiled
sovereigns, Hippias and Demaratus. Meanwhile, Cleomenes and
his new colleague returned to Ægina, which no longer resisted,
and having seized ten of her leading citizens, placed them as
hostages in the hands of the Athenians. Ægina was thus
effectually disabled from throwing the weight of her fleet
into the scale of Persia: Athens and Sparta, suspending their
political jealousies, were united when their disunion would
have been fatal; their conjunction drew after them most of the
lesser states: and so the Greeks stood forth for the first
time as a nation prepared to act in unison, under the
leadership of Sparta (B. C. 491). That city retained her proud
position till it was forfeited by the misconduct of her
statesmen."
P. Smith,
History of the World: Ancient,
chapter 13 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
G. W. Cox,
The Greeks and the Persians,
chapter 6.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
chapter 36 (volume 4.)
See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 501-490.
GREECE: B. C. 490.
The Persian Wars: Marathon.
The second and greater expedition launched by Darius against
the Greeks sailed from the Cilician coast in the summer of the
year 490 B. C. It was under the command of two generals,—a
Mede, named Datis, and the king's nephew, Artaphernes. It made
the passage safely, destroying Naxos on the way, but sparing
the sacred island and temple of Delos. Its landing was on the
shores of Eubœa, where the city of Eretria was easily taken,
its inhabitants dragged into slavery, and the first act of
Persian vengeance accomplished. The expedition then sailed to
the coast of Attica and came to land on the plain of Marathon,
which spreads along the bay of that name. "Marathon, situated
near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a
direction E. N. E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge
of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated
by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that
mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the
shortest and the most difficult, is 22 miles in length. …
[The plain] 'is in length about six miles, in breadth never
less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the
extremities of the plain; the southern is not very large and
is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the
northern, which generally covers considerably more than a
square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons
impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm sandy beach
between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the
plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre
of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest
of Attica."
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 36 (volume 4).
The Athenians waited for no nearer approach of the enemy to
their city, but met them at their landing-place. They were few
in number—only 10,000, with 1,000 more from the grateful city
of Platæa, which Athens had protected against Thebes. They had
sent to Sparta for aid, but a superstition delayed the march
of the Spartans and they came the day after the battle. Of all
the nearer Greeks none came to the help of Athens in that hour
of extreme need; and so much the greater to her was the glory
of Marathon. The ten thousand Athenian hoplites and the one
thousand brave Platæans confronted the great host of Persia,
of the numbers in which there is no account. Ten generals had
the right of command on successive days, but Miltiades was
known to be the superior captain and his colleagues gave place
to him. "On the morning of the seventeenth day of the month of
Metagitnion (September 12th), when the supreme command
according to the original order of succession fell to
Miltiades, he ordered the army to draw itself up according to
the ten tribes. … The troops had advanced with perfect
steadiness across the trenches and palisadings of their camp,
as they had doubtless already done on previous days. But as
soon as they had approached the enemy within a distance of
5,000 feet they changed their march to a double-quick pace,
which gradually rose to the rapidity of a charge, while at the
same time they raised the war-cry with a loud voice.
{1572}
When the Persians saw these men rushing down from the heights,
they thought they beheld madmen: they quickly placed
themselves in order of battle, but before they had time for an
orderly discharge of arrows the Athenians were upon them,
ready in their excitement to begin a closer contest, man
against man in hand-to-hand fight, which is decided by
personal courage and gymnastic agility, by the momentum of
heavy-armed warriors, and by the use of lance and sword. Thus
the well-managed and bold attack of the Athenians had
succeeded in bringing into play the whole capability of
victory which belonged to the Athenians. Yet the result was
not generally successful. The enemy's centre stood firm. …
But meanwhile both wings had thrown themselves upon the enemy;
and after they had effected a victorious advance, the one on
the way to Rhamnus, the other towards the coast, Miltiades …
issued orders at the right moment for the wings to return from
the pursuit, and to make a combined attack upon the Persian
centre in its rear. Hereupon the rout speedily became general,
and in their flight the troubles of the Persians increased;
… they were driven into the morasses and there slain in
numbers."
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2).
The Athenian dead, when gathered for the solemn obsequies,
numbered 192; the loss of the Persians was estimated by
Herodotus at 6,400.
Herodotus,
History,
book 6.
ALSO IN:
E. S. Creasy,
Fifteen Decisive Battles,
chapter 1.
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 14 (volume 2).
G. W. Cox,
The Greeks and Persians,
chapter 6.
Sir E. Bulwer Lytton,
Athens: Its Rise and Fall,
book 2, chapter 5.
GREECE: B. C. 489-480.
The Æginetan War.
Naval power of Athens created by Themistocles.
SEE ATHENS: B. C. 489-480.
GREECE: B. C. 481-479.
Congress at Corinth.
Hellenic union against Persia.
Headship of Sparta.
"When it was known in Greece that Xerxes was on his march into
Europe, it became necessary to take measures for the defence
of the country. At the instigation of the Athenians, the
Spartans, as the acknowledged leaders of Hellas and head of
the Peloponnesian confederacy, called on those cities which
had resolved to uphold the independence of their country to
send plenipotentiaries to a congress at the Isthmus of
Corinth. When the envoys assembled, a kind of Hellenic
alliance was formed under the presidency of Sparta, and its
unity was confirmed by an oath, binding the members to visit
with severe penalties those Greeks who, without compulsion,
had given earth and water to the envoys of Xerxes. This
alliance was the nearest approach to a Hellenic union ever
seen in Greece; but though it comprised most of the
inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achæa, the
Megarians, Athenians, and two cities of Bœotia, Thespiæ and
Platæa, were the only patriots north of the Isthmus. Others,
who would willingly have been on that side, such as the common
people of Thessaly, the Phocians and Locrians, were compelled
by the force of circumstances to 'medize.' From the time at
which it met in the autumn or summer of 481 to the autumn of
480 B. C., the congress at the Isthmus directed the military
affairs of Greece. It fixed the plan of operations. Spies were
sent to Sardis to ascertain the extent of the forces of

Xerxes; envoys visited Argos, Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse, in
the hope, which proved vain, of obtaining assistance in the
impending struggle. As soon as Xerxes was known to be in
Europe, an army of 10,000 men was sent to hold the pass of
Tempe, but afterwards, on the advice of Alexander of Macedon,
this barrier was abandoned; and it was finally resolved to
await the approaching forces at Thermopylæ and Artemisium. The
supreme authority, both by land and sea, was in the hands of
the Spartans; they were the natural leaders of any army which
the Greeks could put into the field, and the allies refused to
follow unless the ships also were under their charge. … When
hostilities were suspended, the congress re-appears, and the
Greeks once more meet at the Isthmus to apportion the spoil
and adjudge the prizes of valour. In the next year we hear of
no common plan of operations, the fleet and army seeming to
act independently of each other; yet we observe that the
chiefs of the medizing Thebans were taken to the Isthmus
(Corinth) to be tried, after the battle of Platæa. It appears
then that, under the stress of the great Persian invasion, the
Greeks were brought into an alliance or confederation; and for
the two years from midsummer 481 to midsummer 479 a congress
continued to meet, with more or less interruption, at the
Isthmus, consisting of plenipotentiaries from the various
cities. This congress directed the affairs of the nation, so
far as they were in any way connected with the Persian
invasion. When the Barbarians were finally defeated, and there
was no longer any alarm from that source, the congress seems
to have discontinued its meetings. But the alliance remained;
the cities continued to act in common, at any rate, so far as
naval operations were concerned, and Sparta was still the
leading power."
E. Abbott,
Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens,
chapter 3.
ALSO IN:
C. O. Müller,
History and Antiquity of the Doric Race,
volume 1, appendix 4.
GREECE: B. C. 480.
The Persian War: Thermopylæ.
"Now when tidings of the battle that had been fought at
Marathon [B. C. 490] reached the ears of King Darius, the son
of Hystaspes, his anger against the Athenians," says
Herodotus, "which had been already roused by their attack on
Sardis, waxed still fiercer, and he became more than ever
eager to lead an army against Greece. Instantly he sent off
messengers to make proclamation through the several states
that fresh levies were to be raised, and these at an increased
rate; while ships, horses, provisions and transports were
likewise to be furnished. So the men published his commands;
and now all Asia was in commotion by the space of three
years." But before his preparations were completed Darius
died. His son Xerxes, who ascended the Persian throne, was
cold to the Greek undertaking and required long persuasion
before he took it up. When he did so, however, his
preparations were on a scale more stupendous than those of his
father, and consumed nearly five years. It was not until ten
years after Marathon that Xerxes led from Sardis a host which,
Herodotus computes at 1,700,000 men, besides half a million
more which manned the fleet he had assembled. "Was there a
nation in all Asia," cries the Greek historian, "which Xerxes
did not bring with him against Greece? Or was there a river,
except those of unusual size, which sufficed for his troops to
drink?" By a bridge of boats at Abydos the army crossed the
Hellespont, and moved slowly through Thrace, Macedonia and
Thessaly; while the fleet, moving on the
coast circuit of the same countries, avoided the perilous
promontory of Mount Athos by cutting a canal.
{1573}
The Greeks had determined at first to make their stand against
the invaders in Thessaly, at the vale of Tempe; but they found
the post untenable and were persuaded, instead, to guard the
narrower Pass of Thermopylæ. It was there that the Persians,
arriving at Trachis, near the Malian gulf, found themselves
faced by a small body of Greeks. The spot is thus described by
Herodotus: "As for the entrance into Greece by Trachis, it is,
at its narrowest point, about fifty feet wide. This, however,
is not the place where the passage is most contracted; for it
is still narrower a little above and a little below
Thermopylae. At Alpeni, which is lower down than that place,
it is only wide enough for a single carriage; and up above, at
the river Phœnix, near the town called Anthela, it is the
same. West of Thermopylæ rises a lofty and precipitous hill,
impossible to climb, which runs up into the chain of Œta;
while to the east the road is shut in by the sea and by
marshes. In this place are the warm springs, which the natives
call 'The Cauldrons'; and above them stands an altar sacred to
Hercules. A wall had once been carried across the opening; and
in this there had of old times been a gateway. … King Xerxes
pitched his camp in the region of Malis called Trachinia,
while on their side the Greeks occupied the straits. These
straits the Greeks in general call Thermopylæ (the Hot Gates);
but the natives and those who dwell in the neighbourhood call
them Pylæ (the Gates). … The Greeks who at this spot awaited
the coming of Xerxes were the following:—From Sparta, 300
men-at-arms; from Arcadia, 1,000 Tegeans and Mantineans, 500
of each people; 120 Orchomenians, from the Arcadian
Orchomenus; and 1,000 from other cities; from Corinth, 400
men; from Phlius, 200; and from Mycenæ 80. Such was the number
from the Peloponnese. There were also present, from Bœotia,
700 Thespians and 400 Thebans. Besides these troops, the
Locrians of Opus and the Phocians had obeyed the call of their
countrymen, and sent, the former all the force they had, the
latter 1,000 men. … The various nations had each captains of
their own under whom they served; but the one to whom all
especially looked up, and who had the command of the entire
force, was the Lacedæmonian, Leonidas. … The force with
Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their
main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies
to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as it
was likely they might have done had they seen Sparta backward.
They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian
festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a
garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army.
The rest of the allies also intended to act similarly; for it
happened that the Olympic festival fell exactly at this same
period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylæ
decided so speedily." For two days Leonidas and his little
army held the pass against the Persians. Then, there was found
a traitor, a man of Malis, who betrayed to Xerxes the secret
of a pathway across the mountains, by which he might steal
into the rear of the post held by the Greeks. A thousand
Phocians had been stationed on the mountain to guard this
path; but they took fright when the Persians came upon them in
the early dawn, and fled without a blow. When Leonidas learned
that the way across the mountain was open to the enemy he knew
that his defense was hopeless, and he ordered his allies to
retreat while there was yet time. But he and his Spartans
remained, thinking it "unseemly" to quit the post they had
been specially sent to guard. The Thespians remained with
them, and the Thebans—known partisans at heart of the
Persians—were forced to stay. The latter deserted when the
enemy approached; the Spartans and the Thespians fought and
perished to the last man.
Herodotus,
History
(translated by Rawlinson), book 7.
ALSO IN:
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 40 (volume 4).
See, also,
ATHENS: B. C. 480-479.
GREECE: B. C. 480.
The Persian Wars: Artemisium.
On the approach of the great invading army and fleet of
Xerxes, the Greeks resolved to meet the one at the pass of
Thermopylæ and the other at the northern entrance of the
Eubœan channel. "The northern side of Eubœa afforded a
commodious and advantageous station: it was a long beach,
called, from a temple at its eastern extremity, Artemisium,
capable of receiving the galleys, if it should be necessary to
draw them upon the shore, and commanding a view of the open
sea and the coast of Magnesia, and consequently an opportunity
of watching the enemy's movements as he advanced towards the
south; while, on the other hand, its short distance from
Thermopylæ enabled the fleet to keep up a quick and easy
communication with the land force."
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 15 (volume 1).
The Persian fleet, after suffering heavily from a destructive
storm on the Magnesian coast, reached Aphetæ, opposite
Artemisium, at the mouth of the Pagasæan gulf. Notwithstanding
its losses, it still vastly outnumbered the armament of the
Greeks, and feared nothing but the escape of the latter. But,
in the series of conflicts which ensued, the Greeks were
generally victorious and proved their superior naval genius.
They could not, however, afford the heavy losses which they
sustained, and, upon hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ and
the Persian possession of the all-important pass, they deemed it
necessary to retreat.
W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 8, section 4 (volume 2).
GREECE: B. C. 480.
The Persian Wars: Salamis.
Leonidas and his Spartan band having perished vainly at
Thermopylæ, in their heroic attempt to hold the pass against
the host of Xerxes, and the Greek ships at Artemisium having
vainly beaten their overwhelming enemies, the whole of Greece
north of the isthmus of Corinth lay completely at the mercy of
the invader. The Thebans and other false-hearted Greeks joined
his ranks, and saved their own cities by helping to destroy
their neighbors. The Platæans, the Thespians and the Athenians
abandoned their homes in haste, conducted their families, and
such property as they might snatch away, to the nearer islands
and to places of refuge in Peloponnesus. The Greeks of
Peloponnesus rallied in force to the isthmus and began there
the building of a defensive wall. Their fleet, retiring from
Artemisium, was drawn together, with some re-enforcements,
behind the island of Salamis, which stretches across the
entrance to the bay of Eleusis, off the inner coast of Attica,
near Athens.
{1574}
Meantime the Persians had advanced through Attica, entered the
deserted city of Athens, taken the Acropolis, which a small
body of desperate patriots resolved to hold, had slain its
defenders and burned its temples. Their fleet had also been
assembled in the bay of Phalerum, which was the more easterly
of the three harbors of Athens. At Salamis the Greeks were in
dispute. The Corinthians and the Peloponnesians were bent upon
falling back with the fleet to the isthmus; the Athenians, the
Eginetans and the Megarians looked upon all as lost if the
present combination of the whole naval power of Hellas in the
narrow strait of Salamis was permitted to be broken up. At
length Themistocles, the Athenian leader, a man of fertile
brain and overbearing resolution, determined the question by
sending a secret message to Xerxes that the Greek ships had
prepared to escape from him. This brought down the Persian
fleet upon them at once and left them no chance for retreat.
Of the memorable fight which ensued (September 20 B. C. 480)
the following is a part of the description given by Herodotus:
"Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the
line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phœnicians; against the
Lacedæmonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piræus,
the Ionians. Of these last, a few only followed the advice of
Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far
otherwise. … Far the greater number of the Persian ships
engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians
or by the Eginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and
kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and
had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle
could scarce be other than it was. Yet the Persians fought far
more bravely here than at Eubœa, and indeed surpassed
themselves; each did his utmost through fear of Xerxes, for
each thought that the king's eye was upon himself. … During
the whole time of the battle Xerxes sat at the base of the
hill called Ægaleos, over against Salamis; and whenever he saw
any of his own captains perform any worthy exploit he inquired
concerning him; and the man's name was taken down by his
scribes, together with the names of his father and his city.
… When the rout of the barbarians began, and they sought to
make their escape to Phalêrum, the Eginetans, awaiting them in
the channel, performed exploits worthy to be recorded. Through
the whole of the confused struggle the Athenians employed
themselves in destroying such ships as either made resistance
or fled to shore; while the Eginetans dealt with those which
endeavoured to escape down the straits; so that the Persian
vessels were no sooner clear of the Athenians than straightway
they fell into the hands of the Eginetan squadron. … Such of
the barbarian vessels as escaped from the battle fled to
Phalêrum, and there sheltered themselves under the protection
of the land army. … Xerxes, when he saw the extent of his
loss, began to be afraid lest the Greeks might be counselled
by the Ionians, or without their advice might determine, to
sail straight to the Hellespont and break down the bridges
there; in which case he would be blocked up in Europe and run
great risk of perishing. He therefore made up his mind to
fly."
Herodotus,
History
(edited and translated by Rawlinson),
book 8, sections 85—97 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2).
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 4 (volume 4).
W. W. Goodwin,
The Battle of Salamis
(Papers of the American School at Athens, volume 1).
GREECE: B. C. 479.
The Persian Wars: Platæa.
When Xerxes, after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis, fled
back to Asia with part of his disordered host, he left his
lieutenant, Mardonius, with a still formidable army, to repair
the disaster and accomplish, if possible, the conquest of the
Greeks. Mardonius retired to Thessaly for the winter, but
returned to Attica in the spring and drove the Athenians once
more from their shattered city, which they were endeavoring to
repair. He made overtures to them which they rejected with
scorn, and thereupon he destroyed everything in city and
country which could be destroyed, reducing Athens to ruins and
Attica to a desert. The Spartans and other Peloponnesians who
had promised support to the Athenians were slow in coming, but
they came in strong force at last. Mardonius fell back into
Bœotia, where he took up a favorable position in a plain on
the left bank of the Asopus, near Platæa. This was in
September, B. C. 479. According to Herodotus, he had 300,000
"barbarian" troops and 50,000 Greek allies. The opposing
Greeks, who followed him to the Asopus, were 110,000 in
number. The two armies watched one another for more than ten
days, unwilling to offer battle because the omens were on both
sides discouraging. At length the Greeks undertook a change of
position and Mardonius, mistaking this for a movement of
retreat, led his Persians on a run to attack them. It was a
fatal mistake. The Spartans, who bore the brunt of the Persian
assault, soon convinced the deluded Mardonius that they were
not in flight, while the Athenians dealt roughly with his
Theban allies. "The barbarians," says Herodotus, "many times
seized hold of the Greek spears and brake them; for in
boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit
inferior to the Greeks; but they were without bucklers,
untrained, and far below the enemy in respect of skill in
arms. Sometimes singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer
and now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan
ranks, and so perished. … After Mardonius fell, and the
troops with him, which were the main strength of the army,
perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedæmonians and took
to flight. Their light clothing and want of bucklers were of
the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men
heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such
defence." Artabazus, who was second in command of the
Persians, and who had 40,000 immediately under him, did not
strike a blow in the battle, but quitted the field as soon as
he saw the turn events had taken, and led his men in a retreat
which had no pause until they reached and crossed the
Hellespont. Of the remainder of the 300,000 of Mardonius'
host, only 3,000, according to Herodotus, outlived the battle.
It was the end of the Persian invasions of Greece.
Herodotus,
History
(translated by Rawlinson), book 9.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5).
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 16 (volume 1).
G. W. Cox,
History of Greece,
book 2, chapter 7 (volume 1).
{1575}
In celebration of the victory an altar to Zeus was erected and
consecrated by the united Greeks with solemn ceremonies, a
quintennial festival, called the Feast of Liberty, was
instituted at Platæa, and the territory of the Platæans was
declared sacred and inviolable, so long as they should
maintain the appointed sacrifices and funeral honors to the
dead. But these agreements did not avail to protect the
Platæans when the subsequent Peloponnesian War broke out, and
they stood faithfully among the allies of Athens. "The last
act of the assembled army was the expedition against Thebes,
in order, according to the obligation incumbent upon them, to
take revenge on the most obstinate ally of the national enemy.
Eleven days after the battle Pausanias appeared before the
city and demanded the surrender of the party-leaders,
responsible for the policy of Thebes. Not until the siege had
lasted twenty days was the surrender obtained. … Timagenidas
and the other leaders of the Thebans were executed as traitors
against the nation, by order of Pausanias, after he had
dismissed the confederate army."
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2).
GREECE: B. C. 479.
The Persian Wars: Mycale.
The same day, in September, B. C. 479, on which the Greeks at
Platæa destroyed the army of Mardonius, witnessed an almost
equal victory won by their compatriots of the fleet, on the
coast of Asia Minor. The Persian fleet, to avoid a battle with
them, had retreated to Mycale on the narrow strait between the
island of Samos and the mainland, where a land army of 60,000
men was stationed at the time. Here they drew their ships on
shore and surrounded them with a rampart. The Greeks, under
Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, landed and attacked the whole
combined force. The Ionians in the Persian army turned against
their masters and helped to destroy them. The rout was
complete and only a small remnant escaped to reach Sardis,
where Xerxes was still lingering.
Herodotus,
History
(translated by Rawlinson),
book 9.
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 16 (volume 1).
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5).
GREECE: B. C. 479-478.
Athens assumes the protection of Ionia.
Siege and capture of Sestus.
Rebuilding and enlargement of Athens and its walls.
Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.
See ATHENS: B. C. 479-478.
GREECE: B. C. 478-477.
Reduction of Byzantium.
Mad conduct of Pausanias.
His recall.
Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta.
Their closer union with Athens.
Withdrawal of the Spartans from the war.
Formation of the Delian Confederacy.
"Sestos had fallen: but Byzantion and the Thrakian Doriskos,
with Eion on the Strymon and many other places on the northern
shores of the Egean, were still held by Persian garrisons,
when, in the year after the battle of Plataiai, Pausanias, as
commander of the confederate fleet, sailed with 20
Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships to Kypros (Cyprus) and
thence, having recovered the greater part of the island, to
Byzantion. The resistance here was as obstinate perhaps as at
Sestos; but the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood
for the moment at the head of a triumphant confederacy. It was
now in her power to weld the isolated units, which made up the
Hellenic world, into something like an organised society, and
to kindle in it something like national life. … But she had
no statesman capable, like Themistokles, of seizing on a
golden opportunity, while in her own generals she found her
greatest enemies." Pausanias "was, it would seem, dazzled by
Persian wealth and enamoured of Persian pleasures. He had
roused the indignation of his own people by having his name
inscribed, as leader of all the Greek forces, on the tripod
which was to commemorate the victory of Plataiai: and now his
arrogance and tyranny were to excite at Byzantion a discontent
and impatience destined to be followed by more serious
consequences to his country as well as to himself. On the fall
of Byzantion he sent to the Persian king the prisoners taken
in the city, and spread the report that they had escaped. He
forwarded at the same time, it is said, … a letter in which
he informed Xerxes that he wished to marry his daughter and to
make him lord of all Hellas." Xerxes opened negotiations with
him, and "the head of this miserable man was now fairly
turned. Clad in Persian garb, he aped the privacy of Asiatic
despots; and when he came forth from his palace it was to make
a royal progress through Thrace, surrounded by Median and
Egyptian life guards, and to show his insolence to men who
were at least his equals. The reports of this significant
change in the behaviour of Pausanias led to his recall. He was
put on his trial; but his accusers failed to establish the
personal charges brought against him, while his Medism also
was dismissed as not fully proved. The suspicion, however, was
so strong that he was deprived of his command. … All these
events were tending to alienate the Asiatic Greeks and the
islanders of the Egean from a state which showed itself
incapable of maintaining its authority over its own servants."
Even before the recall of Pausanius, "the Asiatic Greeks
intreated Aristeides the Athenian commander to admit them into
direct relations with Athens; and the same change of feeling
had passed over all the non-medising Greek states with the
exception of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. In short, it
had become clear that all Hellas was divided into two great
sections, the one gravitating as naturally to Sparta, the
great land power, as the other gravitated to Athens with her
maritime preponderance. When therefore a Spartan commission
headed by Dorkis arrived with a small force to take the place
of Pausanias, they were met by passive resistance where they
had looked for submission; and their retirement from the field
in which they were unable to compel obedience left the
confederacy an accomplished fact."
G. W. Cox,
History of Greece,
book 2, chapter 8 (volume 2).
This confederacy of the Asiatic Greeks with Athens, now
definitely organized, is known as the Confederacy of Delos, or
the Delian League. "To Athens, as decidedly the preponderant
power, both morally and materially, was of necessity, and also
with free good-will, consigned the headship and chief control
of the affairs and conduct of the alliance; a position that
carried with it the responsibility of the collection and
administration of a common fund, and the presidency of the
assemblies of delegates. As time went on and circumstances
altered, the terms of confederation were modified in various
instances; but at first the general rule was the contribution,
not only of money or ships, but of actual personal service.
… We have no precise enumeration of the allies of Athens at
this early time, but the course of the history brings up the
mention of many.
{1576}
… Crete was never directly affected by these events, and
Cyprus was also soon to be left aside; but otherwise all the
Greek islands of the Aegean northwards—except Melos, Thera,
Aegina, and Cythera—were contributory, including Euboea; as
were the cities on the coasts of Thrace and the Chalcidic
peninsula from the Macedonian boundary to the Hellespont;
Byzantium and various cities on the coasts of the Propontis,
and less certainly of the Euxine; the important series of
cities on the western coast of Asia Minor—though apparently
with considerable exceptions—Aeolian, Ionian, Dorian, and
Carian, as far as Caunus at least on the borders of Lycia, if
not even round to the Chelidonian isles. The sacred island of
Delos was chosen as the depository of the common treasure and
the place of meeting of the contributors. Apart from its
central convenience and defensibleness as an island, and the
sanctity of the temple, … it was a traditional centre for
solemn reunions of Ionians from either side the Aegean. … At
the distinct request of the allies the Athenians appointed
Aristides to superintend the difficult process of assessing
the various forms and amounts of contribution. … The total
annual amount of the assessment was the large sum of 460
talents (£112,125), and this perhaps not inclusive of, but
only supplementary to, the costly supply of equipped ships."
W. W. Lloyd,
The Age of Pericles,
chapter 14 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
E. Abbott,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapters 6 and 8.
GREECE: B. C. 477-462.
Advancing democracy of Athens.
Sustentation of the Commons from the Confederate Treasury.
The stripping of power from the Areopagus.
See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462.
GREECE: B. C. 477-461.
Athens as the head of the Delian League.
Triumph of Anti-Spartan policy at Athens and approach of war.
Ostracism of Cimon.
"Between the end of the Persian war and the year 464 B. C.,
Sparta had sunk from the champion of the whole of Hellas to
the half-discredited leader of the Peloponnese only. Athens,
on the contrary, had risen from a subordinate member of the
league controlled by Sparta to be the leader and almost the
mistress of a league more dangerous than that over which
Sparta held sway. Sparta unquestionably entertained towards
Athens the jealous hatred of a defeated rival. By what steps
Athens was increasing her control over the Delian League, and
changing her position from that of a president to that of an
absolute ruler will be explained. …
See ATHENS: B. C. 466-454.
She was at the same time prosecuting the war against Persia
with conspicuous success. Her leader in this task was Cimon.
In the domain of practice Athens produced no nobler son than
this man. He was the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon,
and by heredity and inclination took his stand with the
conservative party in Athens.
See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462, to 460-449.
He succeeded here to the leading position of Aristides, and he
possessed all that statesman's purity of character. … It was
as a naval commander, and as a supporter of a forward policy
against Persia, that Cimon won his greatest renown. But he had
also a keen interest in the domestic development of Athens and
her attitude to the other states of Greece. To maintain
friendship with Sparta was the root of all his policy. His
perfect honesty in supporting this policy was never
questioned, and Sparta recognised his good will to them by
appointing him Proxenus in Athens. It was his duty in this
capacity to protect any Spartan resident in or visiting
Athens. His character and personality were eminently
attractive. … Under his guidance the Athenian fleet struck
Persia blow on blow. … In 466, near the mouth of the
Eurymedon in Pamphylia [see ATHENS: B. C. 470-466], the
Persian fleet was destroyed, and after a fierce struggle her
land forces also were defeated with very great slaughter. It
was long before Persian influence counted for anything again
on the waters of the Mediterranean. Cimon, with the personal
qualities of Aristides, had obtained the successes of
Themistocles. Opposition to Cimon was not wanting. The
Athenian democracy had entered on a path that seemed blocked
by his personal supremacy. And now the party of advancing
democracy possessed a leader, the ablest and greatest that it
was ever to possess. Pericles was about thirty years of age.
… He was related to great families through both father and
mother, and to great families that had championed the
democratic side. His father Zanthippus had prosecuted
Miltiades, the father of Cimon. … To lead the party of
advanced democracy was to attack Cimon, against whom he had
hereditary hostility. … When in 465 Thasos rebelled from
Athens, defeat was certain unless she found allies. She
applied to Sparta for assistance. Athens and Sparta were still
nominally allies, for the creation of the Delian League had
not openly destroyed the alliance that had subsisted between
them since the days of the Persian war. But the Thasians hoped
that Sparta's jealousy of Athens might induce her to disregard
the alliance. And they reckoned rightly. The Spartan fleet was
so weak that no interference upon the sea could be thought of,
but if Attica were attacked by land the Athenians would be
forced to draw off some part of their armament from Thasos.
Sparta gave a secret promise that this attack should be made.
But before they could fulfil their promise their own city was
overwhelmed by a terrible earthquake. … Only five houses
were left standing, and twenty thousand of the inhabitants
lost their lives. King Archidamus saved the state from even
more appalling ruin. While the inhabitants were dazed with the
catastrophe, he ordered the alarm-trumpet to be blown; the
military instincts of the Spartans answered to the call, and
all that were left assembled outside of the city safe from the
falling ruins. Archidamus's presence of mind saved them from
even greater danger than that of earthquake. The disaster
seemed to the masses of Helots that surrounded Sparta clear
evidence of the wrath of the god Poseidon. … The Helots
seized arms, therefore, and from all sides rushed upon Sparta.
Thanks to Archidamus's action, they found the Spartans
collected and ready for battle. They fell back upon Messenia,
and concentrated their strength round Mount Ithome, the
natural Acropolis of that district. … All the efforts of
their opponents, never very successful in sieges, failed to
dislodge them. At last, in 464, Sparta had to appeal to her
allies for help against her own slaves; and, as Athens was her
ally, she appealed to Athens. Should the help be granted? …
Cimon advocated the granting of Sparta's demand with all his
strength. … But there was much to be said on the other side,
and it was said by Ephialtes and Pericles.
{1577}
The whole of Pericles's foreign policy is founded on the
assumption that union between Athens and Sparta was
undesirable and impossible. In everything they stood at
opposite poles of thought. …. Cimon gained the vote of the
people. He went at once with a force of four thousand
heavy-armed soldiers to Ithome. Athenian soldiers enjoyed a
great reputation for their ability in the conduct of sieges;
but, despite their arrival, the Helots in Ithome still held
out. And soon the Spartans grew suspicious of the Athenian
contingent. The failure of Sparta was so clearly to the
interest of Athens that the Spartans could not believe that
the Athenians were in earnest in trying to prevent it; and at
last Cimon was told that Sparta no longer had need of the
Athenian force. The insult was all the more evident because
none of the other allies were dismissed. Cimon at once
returned to Athens. …
See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD.
On his return he still opposed those complete democratic
changes that Pericles and Ephialtes were at this time
introducing into the state. A vote of ostracism was demanded.
The requisite number of votes fell to Cimon, and he had to
retire into exile (461). … His ostracism doubtless allowed
the democratic changes, in any case inevitable, to be
accomplished without much opposition or obstruction, but it
also deprived Athens of her best soldier at a time when she
needed all her military talent. For Athens could not forget
Sparta's insult. In 461 she renounced the alliance with her
that had existed since the Persian wars; and that this rupture
did not mean neutrality was made clear when, immediately
afterwards, Athens contracted an alliance with Argos, always
the enemy and now the dangerous enemy of Sparta, and with the
Thessalians, who also had grounds of hostility to Sparta.
Under such circumstances war could not be long in coming."
A. J. Grant,
Greece in the Age of Pericles,
chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
Plutarch,
Cimon; Pericles.
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 17 (volume 3).
E. Abbott,
Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens,
chapters 5-6.
GREECE: B. C. 460-449.
Disastrous Athenian expedition to Egypt.
Cimon's last enterprise against the Persians.
The disputed Peace of Cimon, or Callias.
Five years truce between Athens and Sparta.
See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.
GREECE: B. C. 458-456.
Alliance of Corinth and Ægina against Athens and Megara.
Athenian victories.
Siege and conquest of Ægina.
The Spartans in Bœotia.
Defeat of Athens at Tanagra.
Her success at Œnophyta.
Humiliation of Thebes.
Athenian ascendancy restored.
Crippled by the great earthquake of 464 B. C., and harassed by
the succeeding Messenian War, "nothing could be done, on the
part of Sparta, to oppose the establishment and extension of
the separate alliance between Athens and Argos; and
accordingly the states of Northern Peloponnesus commenced
their armaments against Athens on their own account, in order
to obtain by force what formerly they had achieved by secret
intrigues and by pushing forward Sparta. To stop the progress
of the Attic power was a necessary condition of their own
existence; and thus a new warlike group of states formed
itself among the members of the disrupted confederation. The
Corinthians entered into a secret alliance with Ægina and
Epidaurus, and endeavored to extend their territory and obtain
strong positions beyond the Isthmus at the expense of Megara.
This they considered of special importance to them, inasmuch
as they knew the Megareans, whose small country lay in the
midst between the two hostile alliances, to be allies little
deserving of trust. … The fears of the Corinthians were
realized sooner than they had anticipated. The Megareans,
under the pressure of events, renounced their treaty
obligations to Sparta, and joined the Attico-Argive alliance.
… The passes of the Geranea, the inlets and outlets of the
Doric peninsula, now fell into the hands of the Athenians;
Megara became an outwork of Athens; Attic troops occupied its
towns; Attic ships cruised in the Gulf of Corinth, where
harbors stood open to them at Pegæ and Ægosthena. The
Athenians were eager to unite Megara as closely as possible to
themselves, and for this reason immediately built two lines of
walls, which connected Megara with its port Nisæa, eight
stadia off, and rendered both places impregnable to the
Peloponnesians. This extension of the hostile power to the
boundaries of the Isthmus, and into the waters of the western
gulf, seemed to the maritime cities of Peloponnesus to force
them into action. Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina commenced an
offensive war against Athens—a war which opened without
having been formally declared; and Athens unhesitatingly
accepted the challenge thrown out with sufficient distinctness
in the armaments of her adversaries. Myronides, an experienced
general and statesman, … landed with an Attic squadron near
Halieis (where the frontiers of the Epidaurians and Argives
met), and here found a united force of Corinthians,
Epidaurians, and Æginetans awaiting him. Myronides was
unsuccessful in his campaign. A few months later the hostile
fleets met off the island of Cecryphalea, between Ægina and
the coast of Epidaurus. The Athenians were victorious, and the
struggle now closed round Ægina itself. Immediately opposite
the island ensued a second great naval battle. Seventy of the
enemy's ships fell into the hands of the Athenians, whose
victorious fleet without delay surrounded Ægina. The
Peloponnesians were fully aware of the importance of Ægina to
them. Three hundred hoplites came to the relief of the island,
and the Corinthians marched across the Geranea into Megaris to
the relief of Ægina. It seemed impossible that, while the
fleet of the Athenians was fighting in the land of the Nile,
and another was lying before Ægina, they should have a third
army in readiness for Megara. But the Peloponnesians had no
conception of the capabilities of action belonging to the
Athenians. True, the whole military levy was absent from the
country, and only enough men were left at home for the mere
defence of the walls. Yet all were notwithstanding agreed that
neither should Ægina be given up nor the new allies be left in
the lurch. Myronides advanced to meet the Corinthians with
troops composed of those who had passed the age of military
service or not yet reached it. In the first fight he held his
ground: when the hostile forces returned for the second time,
they were routed with tremendous loss. Megara was saved, and
the energy of the Athenians had been most splendidly
established.
{1578}
In attestation of it the sepulchral pillars were erected in
the Ceramicus, on which were inscribed the names of the
Athenian soldiers who had fallen in one and the same year (Ol.
lxxx 3; B. C. 458-7) off Cyprus, in Egypt, Phœicia, Halieis,
Ægina, and Megara. A fragment of this remarkable historical
document is preserved to this day. While thus many years'
accumulation of combustible materials had suddenly broken out
into a flame of the fiercest war in Central Greece, new
complications also arose in the north. The Thebans, who had
suffered so deep a humiliation, believed the time to have
arrived when the events of the past were forgotten, and when
they could attain to new importance and power. In opposition
to them the Phocians put forth their strength. … After the
dissolution of the Hellenic Confederation, and the calamities
which had befallen the Spartans, the Phocians thought they
might venture an attack upon the Dorian tetrapolis, in order
to extend their frontiers in this direction. … For Sparta it
was a point of honor not to desert the primitive communities
of the Dorian race. She roused herself to a vigorous effort,
and, notwithstanding all her losses and the continuance of the
war in Messenia, was able to send 11,500 men of her own troops
and those of the confederates across the Isthmus before the
Athenians had time to place any obstacles in their way [B. C.
457]. The Phocians were forced to relinquish their conquests.
But when the Spartan troops were about to return home across
the Isthmus they found the mountain-passes occupied by Athens,
and the Gulf of Corinth made equally insecure by the presence
of hostile ships. Nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians but
to march into Bœotia, where their presence was welcome to
Thebes. They entered the valley of the Asopus, and encamped in
the territory of Tanagra, not far from the frontiers of
Attica. Without calculating the consequences, the Athenians
had brought themselves into an extremely dangerous situation.
… Their difficulties increased when, contemporaneously, evil
signs of treasonable plots made their appearance in the
interior of the city. …
See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.
Thus, then, it was now necessary to contend simultaneously
against foes within and foes without, to defend the
constitution as well as the independence of the state. Nor was
the question merely as to an isolated attack and a transitory
danger; for the conduct of the Spartans in Bœotia clearly
showed that it was now their intention to restore to power
Thebes … because they were anxious to have in the rear of
Athens a state able to stop the extension of the Attic power
in Central Greece. This intention could be best fulfilled by
supporting Thebes in the subjugation of the other Bœotian
cities. For this purpose the Peloponnesians had busily
strengthened the Theban, i. e. the oligarchical party, in the
whole of the country, and encircled Thebes itself with new
fortifications. Thebes was from a country town to become a
great city, an independent fortified position, and a base for
the Peloponnesian cause in Central Greece. Hence Athens could
not have found herself threatened by a more dangerous
complication. The whole civic army accordingly took the field,
amounting, together with the Argives, and other allies, to
14,000 men, besides a body of Thessalian cavalry. In the low
ground by the Asopus below Tanagra the armies met. An arduous
and sanguinary struggle ensued, in which for the first time
Athens and Sparta mutually tested their powers in a regular
battle. For a long time the result was doubtful; till in the
very thick of the battle the cavalry went over to the enemy,
probably at the instigation of the Laconian party. This act of
treason decided the day in favor of Sparta, although patriotic
Athenians would never consent to count this among the battles
lost by Athens. The Spartans were far from fulfilling the
expectations of the party of the Oligarchs. As soon as they
knew that the passes of the Isthmus were once more open, they
took their departure, towards the fall of the year, through
Megara, making this little country suffer for its defection by
the devastation of its territory. … They reckoned upon
Thebes being for the present strong enough to maintain herself
against her neighbors; for ulterior offensive operations
against Athens, Tanagra was to serve as a base. The plan was
good, and the conjuncture of affairs favorable. But whatever
the Spartans did, they did only by halves: they concluded a
truce for four months, and quitted the ground. The Athenians,
on the other hand, had no intention of allowing a menacing
power to establish itself on the frontiers of their country.
Without waiting for the return of the fair season, they
crossed Mount Parnes two months after the battle, before any
thoughts of war were entertained in Bœotia; Myronides, who was
in command, defeated the Theban army which was to defend the
valley of the Asopus, near Œnophyta. This battle with one blow
put an end to all the plans of Thebes; the walls of Tanagra
were razed. Myronides continued his march from town to town;
everywhere the existing governments were overthrown, and
democratic constitutions established with the help of Attic
partisans. … Thus, after a passing humiliation, Athens was
soon more powerful than ever, and her sway extended as far as
the frontiers of the Phocians. Nay, during the same campaign
she extended her military dominion as far as Locris. …
Meanwhile the Æginetans also were gradually losing their power
of resistance. For nine months they had resisted the Attic
squadron. … Now their strength was exhausted; and the proud
island of the Æacidæ, which Pindar had sung as the mother of
the men who in the glorious rivalry of the festive games shone
out before all other Hellenes, had to bow down before the
irresistible good fortune of the Athenians, and was forced to
pull down her walls, to deliver up her vessels of war, and
bind herself to the payment of tribute. Contemporaneously with
this event, the two arms of walls [at ATHENS] … between the
upper and lower town were completed. Athens was now placed
beyond the fear of any attack. … The Peloponnesian
confederation was shaken to its very foundations; and Sparta
was still let and hindered by the Messenian revolt, while the
Athenians were able freely to dispose of their military and
naval forces."
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
G. W. Cox,
History of Greece,
book 2, chapter 9 (volume 2).
Thucydides,
Peloponnesian War
(translated by Jowett),
book 1, sections 107-108.
{1579}
GREECE: B. C. 449-445.
Quarrel of Delphians and Phocians.
Interference of Sparta and Athens.
Bœotian revolution.
Defeat of Athenians at Coroneia.
Revolt of Eubœa and Megara.
The Thirty Years Truce.
In 449 B. C. "on occasion of a dispute between the Delphians
and the Phocians as to which should have the care of the
temple and its treasures, the Lacedæmonians sent an army, and
gave them to the former; but as soon as they were gone,
Pericles led thither an Athenian army, and put the Phocians in
possession. Of this the Lacedæmonians took no notice. The
right of Promanty, or first consulting the oracle, which had
been given to Sparta by the Delphians, was now assigned to
Athens by the Phocians; and this honor was probably the cause
of the interference of both states. As the Athenians had given
the upper hand to the democratic party in Bœotia, there was of
course a large number of the opposite party in exile. These
had made themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some
other places, and if not checked in time, might greatly
endanger the Athenian influence. Tolmidas, therefore, led an
army and took and garrisoned Chæroneia; but, as he was
returning, he was attacked at Coroneia by the exiles from
Orchomenus, joined by those of Eubœa and their other friends.
Tolmidas fell, and his troops were all slain or made
prisoners. (Ol. 83, 2.) [B. C. 447.] The Athenians, fearing a
general war, agreed to a treaty, by which, on their prisoners
being restored, they evacuated Bœotia. The exiles returned to
their several towns, and things were placed on their old
footing. … Eubœa was now (Ol. 83, 3) [B. C. 446] in revolt:
and while Pericles was at the head of an army reducing it, the
party in Megara adverse to Athens rose and massacred all the
Athenian garrisons except that of Nisæa. Corinthians,
Sicyonians, and Epidaurians came to their aid: and the
Peloponnesians, led by one of the Spartan kings, entered and
wasted the plain of Eleusis. Pericles led back his army from
Eubœa, but the enemy was gone; he then returned and reduced
that island, and having expelled the people of Hestiæa, gave
their lands to Athenian colonists; and the Athenians, being
unwilling to risk the chance of war with the Dorian
confederacy, gladly formed (Ol. 83, 4) [B. C. 445] a truce for
thirty years, surrendering Nisæa and Pegæ, and withdrawing a
garrison which they had in Trœzen, and ceasing to interfere in
Achaia."
T. Keightley,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 1.
"The Athenians saw themselves compelled to give up their
possessions in Peloponnesus, especially Achaia, as well as
Trœzene and Pagæ, an important position for their
communication with the peninsula. Even Nisæa was abandoned.
Yet these losses, sensibly as they affected their influence
upon the Grecian continent, were counterbalanced by a
concession still more significant, the acknowledgment of the
Delian League. It was left open to states and cities which
were members of neither confederacy to join either at
pleasure. These events happened in Ol. 83,3 (B. C. 445)—the
revolt of Megara and Eubœa, the invasion of Pleistoanax, the
re-conquest of Eubœa, and the conclusion of the treaty, which
assumed the form of an armistice for thirty years. Great
importance must be attributed to this settlement, as involving
an acknowledgment which satisfied both parties and did justice
to the great interests at stake on either side. If Athens
renounced some of her possessions, the sacrifice was
compensated by the fact that Sparta recognized the existence
of the naval supremacy of Athens, and the basis on which it
rested. We may perhaps assume that the compromise between
Pericles and Pleistoanax was the result of the conviction felt
by both these leading men that a fundamental dissociation of
the Peloponnesian from the Delian league was a matter of
necessity. The Spartans wished to be absolutely supreme in the
one, and resigned the other to the Athenians."
L. von Ranke,
Universal History:
The Oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks,
chapter 7, section 2.
ALSO IN:
Sir E. B. Lytton,
Athens: Its Rise and Fall,
book 5, chapter 1.
GREECE: B. C. 445-431.
Splendor of Athens and greatness of the Athenian Empire under
the rule of Pericles.
See ATHENS: B. C. 445-431.
GREECE: B. C. 440.
Subjugation of revolted Samos by the Athenians.
Spartan interference prevented by Corinth.
See ATHENS: B. C. 440-437.
GREECE: B. C. 435-432.
Causes of the Peloponnesian War.
"In B. C. 431 the war broke out between Athens and the
Peloponnesian League, which, after twenty-seven years, ended
in the ruin of the Athenian empire. It began through a quarrel
between Corinth and Kerkyra [or Korkyra, or Corcyru], in which
Athens assisted Kerkyra. A congress was held at Sparta;
Corinth and other States complained of the conduct of Athens,
and war was decided on. The real cause of the war was that
Sparta and its allies were jealous of the great power that
Athens had gained. A far greater number of Greek States were
engaged in this war than had ever been engaged in a single
undertaking before. States that had taken no part in the
Persian war were now fighting on one side or the other. Sparta
was an oligarchy, and the friend of the nobles everywhere;
Athens was a democracy, and the friend of the common people;
so that the war was to some extent a struggle between these
classes all over Greece."
C. A. Fyffe,
History of Greece (History Primer),
chapter 5.
"The Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended
by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like
period of time. Never were so many cities captured and
depopulated—some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves
fighting against one another; and several of them after their
capture were re-peopled by strangers. Never were exile and
slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about
by civil strife. … There were earthquakes unparalleled in
their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous
than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there
were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and
lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers
of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas
simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians
and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded
by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and
what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that
in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the
origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I
believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which
terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war."
Thucydides,
History
(translated by Jowett),
book 1, section 23.
The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, out of which, as an
immediate excitement, the Peloponnesian War grew, concerned
"the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times,
as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo—a colony founded by
the Korkyreans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf,
considerably to the north of their own island."
{1580}
The oligarchy of Epidamnus, driven out by the people, had
allied themselves with the neighboring Illyrians and were
harassing the city. Korkyra refused aid to the latter when
appealed to, but Corinth (of which Korkyra was itself a
colony) promptly rendered help. This involved Corinth and
Korkyra in hostilities, and Athens gave support to the latter.
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
volume 3, book 4.
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapters 19-30.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapters 47-48 (volume 5).
GREECE: B. C. 432.
Great Sea-fight of the Corinthians
with the Korkyrians and Athenians.
Revolt of Potidæa.
"Although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to
her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the
express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no
aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received
precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the
Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on
Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements. The Corinthians lost
no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of
150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they
sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which
the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty
miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra.
The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which
the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt.
After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of
the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost
time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly
they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian

fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to
flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open
interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight
without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the
Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their
advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships,
they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but
of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own
people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they
conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and,
still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was
now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already
rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty
Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians,
supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force,
hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of
this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness
was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own
ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had
thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own
kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to
Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service,
supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians,
far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were
anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the
Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they
were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their
homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what
they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and
decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the
Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did
not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to
her. … Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the
hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to
Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like
the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard
to their own interests. Their object was to send these
prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a
heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted
to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance
of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up
the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic
city.
G. W. Cox,
General History of Greece,
book 3, chapter 1.
"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians
began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian
alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a
Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its
walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received
from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct.
Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a
colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which
occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of
universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states
around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated;
the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt;
and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been
at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the
opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the
malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to
Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them;
but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent
messengers to Sparta entreating support, where they met
deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general
complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy
against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly
afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of
Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong
force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an
army under Phormion to lay siege to it.
Early History of Greece
(Enc. Metropolitana),
page 283.
GREECE: B. C. 432-431.
Charges brought by Corinth against Athens.
The hearing and the Congress at Sparta.
Decision for war.
Theban attack on Platæa.
The Peloponnesian War begun.
The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the
confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the
Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the
rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to
receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the
question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded
by several other members of the confederacy, who had also
wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans
for redress. … It happened that at this time Athenian
envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in
Sparta.
{1581}
They desired permission to attend and address the assembly.
… When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired
to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling
against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for
instant war. … The deputies of the allies were then informed
of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a
general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned
to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if
decided on, might be decreed by common consent. … The
congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally
unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the
necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously
prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring
an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to
Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double
purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace,
and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not,
perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular
dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the
Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the
gods, to banish all who remained among them of that
blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand,
they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's
side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not
expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a
pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the
author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the
Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned
the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who
had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of
Pausanias. … Still, war had been only threatened, not
declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free
from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the
two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C.
431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an
event took place which closed all prospects of peace,
precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity
of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most
tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night
the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans,
commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They
had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of
the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid
themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the
relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and
transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that
a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in
strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might
be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded,
as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to
the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the
marketplace. … The Platæans, who were not in the plot,
imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to
be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile
treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered
into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these
conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the
enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. … Having
barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other
preparations as they thought necessary, a little before
daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band
made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the
assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and
were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and
tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time,
raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the
confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their
presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to
find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several
were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet.
… The main body, which had kept together, entered a large
building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which
they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The
Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but
at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans,
who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered
at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been
concerted that as large a force as could be raised should
march the same night to support them. The distance between the
two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were
expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but
the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the
rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise
retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they
heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not
know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that
some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first
inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find
without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. … The
Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise,
confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring
from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released;
and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The
Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the
lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on
the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely
that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans
would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is
certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as
soon as they had transported their movable property out of the
country into the town, put to death all the prisoners—
amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal
author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the
greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the
Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens
with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid
all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another
messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the
Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would
reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The
herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the
Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of
defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it
with provisions, and removed the women and children and all
persons unfit for service in a siege.
{1582}
After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only
be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with
Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made
on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for
immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to
all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed
day for the invasion of Attica."
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 19 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
Thucydides,
History,
books 1-2.
GREECE: B. C. 431-429.
The Peloponnesian War: How Hellas was divided.
The opposing camps.
Peloponnesian invasions of Attica.
The Plague at Athens.
Death of Pericles.
Surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians.
"All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two
chief cities. … The feeling of mankind was strongly on the
side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the
liberators of Hellas. … The general indignation against the
Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from
them, others fearful of falling under their sway. … The
Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with
the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both
neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the
Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined
them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians,
Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and
Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians,
Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and
Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and
Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry.
The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the
Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania,
Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which
were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of
Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the
Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the
line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades
with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos and
Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money.
Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character
of their respective forces. Immediately after the affair at
Plataea the Lacedaemonians determined to invade Attica, and
sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies,
bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for
a foreign expedition. The various states made their
preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time,
with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each,
met at the Isthmus." Then followed the invasion of Attica, the
siege of Athens, the plague in the city, the death of
Pericles, and the success won by the indomitable Athenians, at
Potidaea, in the midst of their sore distress.
Thucydides,
History
(translated by Jowett),
book 2, sections 8-70 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
E. Abbott,
Pericles,
chapters 13-15.
See ATHENS: 431 B. C. 431 and 430-429.
GREECE: B. C. 429-427.
The Peloponnesian War:
Siege, capture and destruction of Platæa.
"In the third spring of the war, the Peloponnesians changed
their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica
for two following summers, tho much injury had been done to
the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the
booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the
enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle,
and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The
Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval
operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies
of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so
completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by
its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they
wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was
determined to direct the principal effort. … Under the
command still of Archidamus, the confederate army accordingly
entered the Platæid, and ravage was immediately begun. … The
town was small, as may be judged from the very small force
which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only 400 Platæans,
with 80 Athenians. There were besides in the place 110 women
to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The
besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian
youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the
town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress;
the neighboring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then,
in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern
phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the
town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a
force sufficient for assault might ascend. … Such was at
that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides
appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the
science of his age. … To oppose this mode of attack, the
first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of
their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong
wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and,
within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the
neighboring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept
it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides
protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged
against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still
rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this
superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing
height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing
defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other
opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of
their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in
the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of
loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in
baskets. This requiring more labor to remove, the besieged
undermined the mound; and thus, for a long time unperceived,
prevented it from gaining height. Still, however, fearing that
the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the
multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had
recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built,
in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first
at the extremities. These extended, on either side, beyond the
mound; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the
outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less
favorable situation. … A ram, advanced upon the
Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the
Platæan rampart, and shook it violently; to the great alarm of
the garrison, but with little farther effect.
{1583}
Other machines of the same kind were employed against
different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose.
… No means however were neglected by the besiegers that
either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could
devise, to promote their purpose; yet, after much of the
summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous
forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and
resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair
of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to
the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one
more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring
woods of Cithæron, gave them more than ordinary facility.
Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with
them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and
disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever
ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the
faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire.
The conflagration was such as was never before known, says
Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands or
men. … But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain,
brought on by a thunderstorm without wind, extinguished the
fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable
than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing,
the Peloponnesians determined immediately to reduce the siege
to a blockade. … To the palisade, which already surrounded
the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch,
one without, and one within. A sufficient body of troops being
then appointed to the guard of these works, the Bœotians
undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments
drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy,
and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the
army was dismissed for the winter."
W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 15, section 1 (volume 2).
When the blockade had endured for more than a year, and food
in the city grew scarce, about half of the defending force
made a bold dash for liberty, one stormy night, scaled the
walls of circumvallation, and escaped. The remainder held out
until some time in the next year, when they surrendered and
were all put to death, the city being destroyed. The families
of the Platæans had been sheltered at Athens before the siege
began.
Thucydides,
History,
books 2-3.
GREECE: B. C. 429-427.
The Peloponnesian War:
Phormio's sea-fights.
Revolt of Lesbos.
Siege and capture of Mitylene.
The ferocious decree of Cleon reversed.
"At the same time that Archidamus laid siege to Plataea, a
small Peloponnesian expedition, under a Spartan officer named
Cnemus, had crossed the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, and
joined the land forces of the Leucadians and Ambraciots. They
were bent on conquering the Acarnanians and the Messenians of
Naupactus, the only continental allies whom Athens possessed
in Western Greece. … When Cnemus had been joined by the
troops of Leucas and the other Corinthian towns, and had
further strengthened himself by summoning to his standard a
number of the predatory barbarian tribes of Epirus, he
advanced on Stratus, the chief city of Acarnania. At the same
time a squadron of Peloponnesian ships collected at Corinth,
and set sail down the gulf towards Naupactus. The only
Athenian force in these waters consisted of twenty galleys
under an able officer named Phormio, who was cruising off the
straits of Rhium, to protect Naupactus and blockade the
Corinthian Gulf. Both by land and by sea the operations of the
Peloponnesians miscarried miserably. Cnemus collected a very
considerable army, but as he sent his men forward to attack
Stratus by three separate roads, he exposed them to defeat in
detail. … By sea the defeat of the Peloponnesians was even
more disgraceful; the Corinthian admirals Machaon and
Isocrates were so scared, when they came across the squadron
of Phormio at the mouth of the gulf, that, although they
mustered 47 ships to his 20, they took up the defensive.
Huddling together in a circle, they shrank from his attack,
and allowed themselves to be hustled and worried into the
Achaian harbour of Patrae, losing several ships in their
flight. Presently reinforcements arrived; the Peloponnesian
fleet was raised to no less than 77 vessels, and three Spartan
officers were sent on board, to compel the Corinthian
admirals, who had behaved so badly, to do their best in
future. The whole squadron then set out to hunt down Phormio.
They found him with his 20 ships coasting along the Aetolian
shore towards Naupactus, and at once set out in pursuit. The
long chase separated the larger fleet into scattered knots,
and gave the fighting a disconnected and irregular character.
While the rear ships of Phormio's squadron were compelled to
run on shore a few miles outside Naupactus, the 11 leading
vessels reached the harbour in safety. Finding that he was now
only pursued by about a score of the enemy—the rest having
stayed behind to take possession of the stranded Athenian
vessels—Phormio came boldly out of port again. His 11
vessels took 6, and sunk one of their pursuers; and then,
pushing on westward, actually succeeded in recapturing most of
the 9 ships which had been lost in the morning. This
engagement, though it had no great results, was considered the
most daring feat performed by the Athenian navy during the
whole war. … The winter passed uneventfully, and the war
seemed as far as ever from showing any signs of producing a
definite result. But although the Spartan invasion of 428 B.
C. had no more effect than those of the preceding years, yet
in the late summer there occurred an event so fraught with
evil omens for Athens, as to threaten the whole fabric of her
empire. For the first time since the commencement of
hostilities, an important subject state made an endeavour to
free itself by the aid of the Spartan fleet. Lesbos was one of
the two Aegean islands which still remained free from tribute,
and possessed a considerable war-navy. Among its five towns
Mitylene was the chief, and far exceeded the others in wealth
and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, who had long
been yearning to revolt, and had made careful preparation by
accumulating war-like stores and enlisting foreign
mercenaries. … The whole island except Methymna, where a
democracy ruled, rose in arms, and determined to send for aid
to Sparta. The Athenians at once despatched against Mitylene a
squadron of 40 ships under Cleïppides, which had just been
equipped for a cruise in Peloponnesian waters. This force had
an engagement with the Lesbian fleet, and drove it back into
the harbour of Mitylene.
{1584}
To gain time for assistance from across the Aegean to arrive,
the Lesbians now pretended to be anxious to surrender, and
engaged Cleïppides in a long and fruitless negotiation, while
they were repeating their demands at Sparta. But at last the
Athenian grew suspicious, established a close blockade of
Mitylene by sea, and landed a small force of hoplites to hold
a fortified camp on shore. … Believing the revolt of the
Lesbians to be the earnest of a general rising of all the
vassals of Athens, the Peloponnesians determined to make a
vigorous effort in their favour. The land contingents of the
various states were summoned to the Isthmus—though the
harvest was now ripe, and the allies were loath to leave their
reaping—while it was also determined to haul over the
Corinthian Isthmus the fleet which had fought against Phormio,
and then to despatch it to relieve Mitylene. … The Athenians
were furious at the idea that their vassals were now about to
be stirred up to revolt, and strained every nerve to defend
themselves. While the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, and
100 galleys cruised in the Aegean to intercept any succours
sent to Lesbos, another squadron of 100 ships sailed round
Peloponnesus and harried the coastland with a systematic
ferocity that surpassed any of their previous doings. To
complete the crews of the 250 ships now afloat and in active
service proved so great a drain on the military force of
Athens, that not only the Thetes but citizens of the higher
classes were drafted on shipboard. Nevertheless the effect
which they designed by this display of power was fully
produced. To defend their own harvests the confederates who
had met at the Isthmus went homewards, while the dismay at the
strength of the Athenian fleet was so great that the plan of
sending naval aid to Lesbos was put off for the present. …
All through the winter of 428-7 B. C. the blockade of Mitylene
was kept up, though its maintenance proved a great drain on
the resources of Athens. On the land side a considerable force
of hoplites under Paches strengthened the troops already on
the spot, and made it possible to wall the city in with lines
of circumvallation. … When the spring of 427 B. C. arrived,
the Spartans determined to make a serious attempt to send aid
to Lesbos; but the fear of imperiling all their naval
resources in a single expedition kept them from despatching a
fleet of sufficient size. Only 42 galleys, under an admiral
named Alcidas, were sent forth from Corinth. This squadron
managed to cross the Aegean without meeting the Athenians, by
steering a cautious and circuitous course among the islands.
But so much time was lost on the way, that on arriving off
Embatum in Ionia, Ælia found that Mitylene had surrendered
just seven days before. … Learning the fall of Mitylene, he
made off southward, and, after intercepting many merchant
vessels off the Ionian coast and brutally slaying their crews,
returned to Corinth without having struck a single blow for
the cause of Sparta. Paches soon reduced Antissa, Eresus, and
Pyrrha, the three Lesbian towns which had joined in the revolt
of Mitylene, and was then able to sail home, taking with him
the Laconian general Salaethus, who had been caught in hiding
at Mitylene, together with the other leaders of the revolt.
When the prisoners arrived at Athens Salaethus was at once put
to death without a trial. But the fate of the Lesbians was the
subject of an important and characteristic debate in the
Ecclesia. Led by the demagogue Cleon, the Athenians at first
passed the monstrous resolution that the whole of the
Mitylenaeans, not merely the prisoners at Athens, but every
adult male in the city, should be put to death, and their
wives and families sold as slaves. It is some explanation but
no excuse for this horrible decree that Lesbos had been an
especially favoured ally, and that its revolt had for a moment
put Athens in deadly fear of a general rising of Ionia and
Aeolis. Cleon the leather-seller, the author of this infamous
decree, was one of the statesmen of a coarse and inferior
stamp, whose rise had been rendered possible by the democratic
changes which Pericles had introduced into the state. … On
the eve of the first day of debate the motion of Cleon had
been passed, and a galley sent off to Paches at Mitylene,
bidding him slay all the Lesbians; but on the next morning …
the decree of Cleon was rescinded by a small majority, and a
second galley sent off to stay Paches from the massacre. …
By extraordinary exertions the bearers of the reprieve
contrived to reach Lesbos only a few hours after Paches had
received the first despatch, and before he had time to put it
into execution. Thus the majority of the Mitylenaeans were
saved; but all their leaders and prominent men, not less than
1,000 in number, were put to death. … The land of the
Lesbians was divided into 3,000 lots, of which a tenth was
consecrated to the gods, while the rest were granted out to
Athenian cleruchs, who became the landlords of the old
owners."
C. W. C. Oman,
History of Greece,
chapter 28.
ALSO IN:
Thucydides,
History,
book 2, sections 80-92,
and book 3, sections 1-50.
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 425.
The Peloponnesian War:
Spartan catastrophe at Sphacteria.
Peace pleaded for and refused by Athens.
In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 425), the
enterprising Athenian general, Demosthenes, obtained
permission to seize and fortify a harbor on the west coast of
Messenia, with a view to harassing the adjacent Spartan
territory and stirring up revolt among the subjugated
Messenians. The position he secured was the promontory of
Pylus, overlooking the basin now called the Bay of Navarino,
which latter was protected from the sea by the small island of
Sphacteria, stretching across its front. The seizure of Pylus
created alarm in Sparta at once, and vigorous measures were
taken to expel the intruders. The small force of Demosthenes
was assailed, front and rear, by a strong land army and a
powerful Peloponnesian fleet; but he had fortified himself
with skill and stoutly held his ground, waiting for help from
Athens. Meantime his assailants had landed 420 men on the
island of Sphacteria, and these were mostly hoplites, or
heavy-armed soldiers, from the best citizenship of Sparta. In
this situation an Athenian fleet made its sudden and
unexpected appearance, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet
completely, took possession of the harbor and surrounded the
Spartans on Sphacteria with a ring from which there was no
escape. To obtain the release of these citizens the Spartans
were reduced to plead for peace on almost any terms, and
Athens had her opportunity to end the war at that moment with
great advantage to herself. But Cleon, the demagogue,
persuaded the people to refuse peace. The beleaguered hoplites
on Sphacteria were made prisoners by force, and little came of
it in the end.
{1585}
Thucydides,
History,
book 4, sections 2-38.
Pylus remained in the possession of the Athenians until
B. C. 408, when it was retaken by the Spartans.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 52.
ALSO IN:
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 424-421.
The Peloponnesian War:
Brasidas in Chalcidice.
Athenian defeat at Delium.
A year's Truce.
Renewed hostilities.
Death of Brasidas and Cleon at Amphipolis.
The Peace of Nikias (Nicias).
"About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what
Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes
had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict
on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas
understood that the most effective method of assailing the
Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all
means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a
sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he
resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the
Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia; especially since
Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike,
and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought
the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the
undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did
she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only
700 Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded,
through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about
1,000 men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of
1,700 hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this
adventurous and important expedition. He started in the spring
of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and
Thessaly. He effected the march with great daring and wisdom,
and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme
danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting
forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians
many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they
suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance
on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military
experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he
became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all
the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides,
to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was
at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the
assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time
to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear
that human prudence and activity could have accomplished
anything more under the same circumstances; yet his
unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under
which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he
composed his history. … The revolution of the allied cities
in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same
time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of
Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the
endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424,
to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some
malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down
and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking,
however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a
ruinous defeat. A force of 7,000 hoplites [among them,
Socrates, the philosopher—see DELIUM], several hundred
horsemen, and 25,000 light-armed under command of Hippokrates,
took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated,
overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very
near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still
occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly
startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found
themselves attacked by an army of 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse,
and 500 peltasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat,
and were driven away with great loss. Such was the change of
affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding
year they could have ended the war in a manner most
advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were
now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt
spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom
Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was
necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet
undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the
terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other
cities of Macedonia, they were still masters of Pylos, of
Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in
Sphakteria; so that there was now an equality of advantages
and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to
lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the
oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with
pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused
to send him any assistance whatever: The opportunity,
therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace, …
Such were the arguments by which Nikias and his party finally
gained the ascendency over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423
B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of
one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to
the destructive war by a lasting peace. Unfortunately, the
armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities
there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians.
Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected
in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his
promises of assistance. The war-like party at Athens, taking
advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite
conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians,
seeing that the war was continued, sent an ample force to
Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because
the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the meantime become
angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose
the Lacedæmonians in their passage. The year of the armistice
passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the
incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in
Chalkidike. … The Athenians decided to forward a new force,
and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August,
422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with 1,200 hoplites, 300
horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty
triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against
Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was
killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but
glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The
way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of
the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic world.
{1586}
All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him
at the public expense, in front of the market-place of
Amphipolis. … Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of
the war—its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The
party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general
soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of
Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued
during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of
Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side.
Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace
of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of
this peace, known in history as the 'peace of Nikias,' were as
follows:
1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore
Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were
further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus,
Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the
exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain
independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of
the time of Aristeides.
2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians
Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all
the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies.
3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in
the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right
to adopt such measures as they pleased.
4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum
to the Athenians.
When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration
of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The
Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily
refused their consent. The Peloponnesian war was now
considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its
beginning; Both the combatants came out from it terribly
maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object—the
emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the
Athenians—but even officially recognized this tyranny, by
consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as
they choose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained
an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the
Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and
because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal
allies. … Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her
supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This,
however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude
of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the
increase of the common hatred."
T. T. Timayenis,
History of Greece,
part 5, chapter 4 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 23 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 421-418.
The Peloponnesian War:
New combinations.
The Argive League against Sparta.
Conflicting alliances of Athens with both.
Rising influence of Alcibiades.
War in Argos.
Spartan victory at Mantinea.
Revolution in Argos.
"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians
refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter
concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days … ,
probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the
contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of
ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of
the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was
the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of
Sparta. … The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of
infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter
feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the
Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were
honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance
between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This
treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. … The
consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted
by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced
her, because they found themselves given over to the
Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the
Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition
of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the
Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a
policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not
ventured to think of, and … became the centre of an alliance
with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the
Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis,
and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their
union, the three people of the country had separated
themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it
happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos.
Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to
remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly
exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times
entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests
drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's
dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more
and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to
Athens, and when it became evident that this was the
consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation
subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece,
and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. … After much
delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of
taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the
singular agreement (Olympiad 89, 4), that the Athenians should
retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian
troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain
there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans,
Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The
Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton
to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This
was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but
the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans
delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The
Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest
restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back
to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not
appear to have had honest intentions in any way. … While
thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of
the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become
an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed
between Athens and Argos (Olympiad 89, 4) through the
influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an
hereditary proxenus to Argos.
{1587}
A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and
by it the Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other
Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a
decisive influence upon the fate of his country. … We
generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his
ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing,
and we forget that part of his character which history reveals
to us. … Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been
particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises
the fact, that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that,
if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native
city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own
accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his
personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different
direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour
of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all
antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who
does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the
moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak
of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among
the great statesmen of antiquity. … Alcibiades is quite a
peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of
ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have
sometimes thought of Caesar. … Alcibiades was opposed to the
peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean,
motives. … It was on his advice that Athens concluded the
alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances
which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each
other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with
Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the
Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the
Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act
quickly, before it should be too late. The alliance with
Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens,
for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them,
whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more
closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore,
the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the
former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the
Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace
with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still
no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta. … King Agis had
set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the
Argives (Olympiad 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at
Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were
censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon
afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian
auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The
occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the
sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in
Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation
to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had
Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle
was fought (Olympiad 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea,
between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans,
and part of the Arcadians ('the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct
of the Argives, had abandoned their cause'), on the one hand,
and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans
gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not
follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded
peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution
took place, in which an oligarchical government was
instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of
Sparta (Olympiad 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not
last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of
government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a
later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and
deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."
B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
lecture 49 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
Plutarch,
Alcibiades.
W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapter 17 (volume 3).
GREECE: B. C. 416.
Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians.
Massacre of the inhabitants.
"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the
Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian
island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except
Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos
and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom
they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined
the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with
Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken
part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground
of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth
year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending
against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and
Tisias."
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 56.
"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any
attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the
omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth
at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all
further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the
Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city.
The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in
breaking through part of the wall built round them by the
enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived;
and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian
famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery;
and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender
unconditionally. … There was no question of quarter. All the
islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the
hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the
women and children to slavery."
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 4 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
Thucydides,
History,
book 5, sections 84-116.
GREECE: B. C. 415.
The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.
See ATHENS: B. C. 415.
GREECE: B. C. 415-413.
The Peloponnesian War:
Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse.
Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta.
His enmity to Athens.
See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.
{1588}
GREECE: B. C. 413.
The Peloponnesian War:
Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition.
Prostration of Athens.
Strengthening of Sparta.
Negotiations with the Persians against Athens.
Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.
The Decelian War.
"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to
this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of
horror. … Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass,
that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on
the other all was won. … When the Athenians recovered from
the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the
causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury
turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who
had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or
soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the
phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater
and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every
day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians
appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless
city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had
arrived. … Athens had risked all her military and naval
resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than
200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been
lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive
occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary
troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron
still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in
danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had

equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were
empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous
booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been
spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted.
… But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships,
and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens,
and which was more dangerous in her case than in that of any
other state, because her whole power was based on the fear
inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets
of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had
now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states
which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence
seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica,
—in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical
parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious
dominion of Athens. … Sparta, on the other hand, had in the
course of a few months, without sending out an army or
incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the
greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from
the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the
value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the
greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of
the most important and momentous transaction of the entire
war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of
Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which
the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the
exception of Argos and Elis, all her allies were on amicable
terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who
had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the
Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become
the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. …
Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all
living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man
was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the
slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he
who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most
accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities.
Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike
king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of
Archidamus. … Nothing was now required, except pecuniary
means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to
the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the
meantime occurred in the Persian empire. … Everywhere [in
that empire] sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia
Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several
previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs, rose in
revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command
of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the
latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son,
Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria. After
the fall of Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in
Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King.
Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime
provinces. He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens
to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King
(possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the
destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes
long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as
subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied.
Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate
at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia;
and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced
to pursue a war policy. … Everything now depended for the
satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He
found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all
the more important cities of which a Persian party existed.
… The most important and only independent power in Ionia was
Chios. Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity
contrived to retain the government. … It was their
government which now became the focus of the conspiracy
against Athens, in the first instance establishing a
connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon
Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in
conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus
charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at
the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time
promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian
forces. The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of
Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern
province. … Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in
his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors
for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their
alliance. … While thus the most dangerous combinations were
on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already
broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to
commence direct hostilities. … A Peloponnesian army under
Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B. C.
413 (Olympiad xci. 3); at which date it was already to be
anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years
Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of
former wars had been effaced.
{1589}
The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while
at the same time it was now impossible to take vengeance upon
the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the
worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved,
instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the
war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a
fortified position on Attic soil." The invaders seized a
strong position at Decelea, only fourteen miles northward from
Athens, on a rocky peak of Mount Parnes, and fortified
themselves so strongly that the Athenians ventured on no
attempt to dislodge them. From this secure station they
ravaged the surrounding country at pleasure. "This success was
of such importance that even in ancient times it gave the name
of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the
Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the
connecting link between the Sicilian War and the
Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. … Its
immediate object … it failed to effect; inasmuch as the
Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a
fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was
lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden
imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea. The city was
cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the
enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. …
One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and
even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was
unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor
and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were
forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping
watch."
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapters 4-5 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
chapter 61 (volume 7).
GREECE: B. C. 413-412.
The Peloponnesian War:
Revolt of Chios, Miletus, Lesbos, and Rhodes from Athens.
Revolution at Samos.
Intrigues of Alcibiades for a revolution at Athens and for his
own recall.
"Alkibiades … persuaded the Spartans to build a fleet, and
send it over to Asia to assist the Ionians in revolting. He
himself crossed at once to Chios with a few ships, in order to
begin the revolt. The government of Chios was in the hands of
the nobles; but they had hitherto served Athens so well that
the Athenians had not altered the government to a democracy.
Now, however, they revolted (B. C. 413). This was a heavy blow
to Athens, for Chios was the most powerful of the Ionian
States, and others would be sure to follow its example.
Miletus and Lesbos revolted in B. C. 412. The nobles of Samos
prepared to revolt, but the people were in favour of Athens,
and rose against the nobles, killing 200 of them, and
banishing 400 more. Athens now made Samos its free and equal
ally, instead of its subject, and Samos became the
head-quarters of the Athenian fleet and army. … The
Athenians … had now manned a fresh navy. They defeated the
Peloponnesian and Persian fleets together at Miletus, and were
only kept from besieging Miletus by the arrival of a fleet
from Syracuse. [This reinforcement of the enemy held them
powerless to prevent a revolt in Rhodes, carried out by the
oligarchs though opposed by the people.] Alkibiades had made
enemies among the Spartans, and when he had been some time in
Asia Minor an order came over from Sparta to put him to death.
He escaped to Tissaphernes, and now made up his mind to win
back the favour of Athens by breaking up the alliance between
Tissaphernes and the Spartans. He contrived to make a quarrel
between them about the rate of pay, and persuaded Tissaphernes
that it would be the best thing for Persia to let the Spartans
and Athenians wear one another out, without giving help to
either. Tissaphernes therefore kept the Spartans idle for
months, always pretending that he was on the point of bringing
up his fleet to help them. Alkibiades now sent a lying message
to the generals of the Athenian army at Samos that he could
get Athens the help of Tissaphernes, if the Athenians would
allow him to return from his exile: but he said that he could
never return while there was a democracy; so that if they
wished for the help of Persia they must change the government
to an oligarchy (B. C. 412). In the army at Samos there were
many rich men willing to see an oligarchy established at
Athens, and peace made with Sparta. … Therefore, though the
great mass of the army at Samos was democratical, a certain
number of powerful men agreed to the plan of Alkibiades for
changing the government. One of the conspirators, named
Pisander, was sent to Athens to instruct the clubs of nobles
and rich men to work secretly for this object. In these clubs
the overthrow of the democracy was planned. Citizens known to
be zealous for the constitution were secretly murdered. Terror
fell over the city, for no one except the conspirators knew
who did, and who did not, belong to the plot; and at last,
partly by force, the assembly was brought to abolish the
popular government."
C. A. Fyffe,
History of Greece
(History Primer),
chapter 5, sections 36-39.
ALSO IN:
G. W. Cox,
The Athenian Empire,
chapter 6.
Thucydides,
History,
book 8, chapters 4-51.
GREECE: B. C. 411-407.
The Peloponnesian War:
Athenian victories at Cynossema and Abydos.
Exploits of Alcibiades.
His return to Athens and to supreme command.
His second deposition and exile.
While Athens was in the throes of its revolution, "the war was
prosecuted with vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus,
who now commanded the Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length
by the often-broken promises of Tissaphernes, and the scanty
and irregular pay which he furnished, set sail from Miletus
and proceeded to the Hellespont, with the intention of
assisting the satrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if
possible, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies in that
quarter. Hither he was pursued by the Athenian fleet under
Thrasyllus. In a few days an engagement ensued (in August, 411
B. C.), in the famous straits between Sestos and Abydos, in
which the Athenians, though with a smaller force, gained the
victory, and erected a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema
[see CYNOSSEMA] near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan queen
Hecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the
reduction of Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or
two afterward, another obstinate engagement took place between
the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets near Abydos, which
lasted a whole day, and was at length decided in favour of the
Athenians by the arrival of Alcibiades with his squadron of 18
ships from Samos."
W. Smith,
Smaller History of Greece,
chapter 13.
{1590}
Alcibiades, although recalled, had "resolved to delay his
return until he had performed such exploits as might throw
fresh lustre over his name, and endear him to all classes of
his fellow-citizens. With this ambition he sailed with a small
squadron from Samos, and having gained information that
Mindarus, with the Peloponnesian fleet, had gone in pursuit of
the Athenian navy, he hastened to afford his countrymen
succour. Happily he arrived at the scene of action, near
Abydos, at a most critical moment; when, after a severe
engagement, the Spartans had on one side obtained an
advantage, and were pursuing the broken lines of the
Athenians. … He speedily decided the fortune of the day,
completely routed the Spartans, … broke many of their ships
in pieces, and took 30 from them. … His vanity after this
signal success had, however, nearly destroyed him; for, being
desirous of appearing to Tissaphernes as a conqueror instead
of a fugitive, he hastened with a splendid retinue to visit
him, when the crafty barbarian, thinking he should thus
appease the suspicions of the Spartans, caused him to be
arrested and confined in prison at Sardis. Hence, however, he
found means to escape. … He sailed immediately for the
Athenian camp to diffuse fresh animation among the soldiers,
and induce them hastily to embark on an expedition against
Mindarus and Pharnabazus, who were then with the residue of
the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicum" (Cyzicus). Mindarus was
defeated and killed and Pharnabazus driven to flight (B. C.
410). "Alcibiades pursued his victory, took Cyzicum without
difficulty, and, staining his conquest with a cruelty with
which he was not generally chargeable, put to death all the
Peloponnesians whom he found within the city. A very short
space of time elapsed after this brilliant success before
Alcibiades found another occasion to deserve the gratitude of
Athens," by defeating Pharnabazus, who had attacked the troops
of Thrasyllus while they were wasting the territory of Abydos.
He next reduced Chalcedon, bringing it back into the Athenian
alliance, and once more defeating Pharnabazus, when the
Persian satrap attempted to relieve the town. He also
recovered Selymbria, and took Byzantium (which had revolted)
after a severe fight (B. C. 408). "Alcibiades having raised
the fortunes of his country from the lowest state of
depression, not only by his brilliant victories, but his
conciliating policy, prepared to return and enjoy the praise
of his successes. He entered the Piræus [B. C. 407] in a
galley adorned with the spoils of numerous victories, followed
by a long line of ships which he had taken from the foe. …
The whole city came down to the harbour to see and welcome
him, and took no notice of Thrasybulus or Theramenes, his
fellow-commanders. … An assembly of the people being
convened, he addressed them in a gentle and modest speech,
imputing his calamities not to their envy, but to some evil
genius which pursued him. He exhorted them to take courage,
bade them oppose their enemies with all the fresh inspiration
of their zeal, and taught them to hope for happier days.
Delighted with these assurances, they presented him with a
crown of brass and gold, which never was before given to any
but the Olympic victors, invested him with absolute control
over their naval and military affairs, restored to him his
confiscated wealth, and ordered the ministers of religion to
absolve him from the curses which they had denounced against
him. Theodorus, however, the high-priest, evaded the last part
of the decree, by alleging that he had never cast any
imprecation on him, if he had committed no offence against the
republic. The tablets on which the curses against him had been
inscribed were taken to the shore, and thrown with eagerness
into the sea. His next measure heightened, if possible, the
brief lustre of his triumph. In consequence of the
fortification of Decelea by the Lacedæmonians, and their
having possession of the passes of the country, the procession
to Eleusis, in honour of Athene, had been long unable to take
its usual course, and being conducted by sea, had lost many of
its solemn and august ceremonials. He now, therefore, offered
to conduct the solemnity by land. … His proposal being
gladly accepted, he placed sentinels on the hills; and,
surrounding the consecrated band with his soldiers, conducted
the whole to Eleusis and back to Athens, without the slightest
opposition, or breach of that order and profound stillness
which he had exhorted the troops to maintain. After this
graceful act of homage to the religion he was once accused of
destroying, he was regarded by the common people as something
more than human; they looked on him as destined never to know
defeat, and believed their triumph was certain so long as he
was their commander. But, in the very height of his
popularity, causes of a second exile were maturing. The great
envied him in proportion to the people's confidence, and that
confidence itself became the means of his ruin: for, as the
people really thought the spell of invincibility was upon him,
they were prepared to attribute the least pause in his career
of glory to a treacherous design. He departed with a hundred
vessels, manned under his inspection, with colleagues of his
own choice, to reduce the isle of Chios to obedience. At
Andros he once more gained a victory over both the natives and
the Spartans, who attempted to assist them. But, on his
arrival at the chief scene of action, he found that he would
be unable to keep the soldiers from deserting, unless he could
raise money to pay them sums more nearly equal to those which
the Lacedæmonians offered, than the pay he was able to bestow.
He was compelled, therefore, to leave the fleet [at Notium]
and go into Caria in order to obtain supplies. While absent on
this occasion, he left Antiochus in the command. … To this
officer Alcibiades gave express directions that he should
refrain from coming to an engagement, whatever provocations he
might receive. Anxious, however, to display his bravery,
Antiochus took the first occasion to sail out in front of the
Lacedæmonian fleet, which lay near Ephesus, under the command
of Lysander, and attempt, by insults, to incite them to attack
him. Lysander accordingly pursued him; the fleets came to the
support of their respective admirals, and a general engagement
ensued, in which Antiochus was slain, and the Athenians
completely defeated. On receiving intelligence of this unhappy
reverse, Alcibiades hastened to the fleet, and eager to repair
the misfortune, offered battle to the Spartans; Lysander,
however, did not choose to risk the loss of his advantage by
accepting the challenge, and the Athenians were compelled to
retire. This event, for which no blame really attached to
Alcibiades, completed the ruin of his influence at Athens.
{1591}
It was believed that this, the first instance of his failure,
must have arisen from corruption, or, at least, from a want of
inclination to serve his country. He was also accused of
leaving the navy under the direction of those who had no other
recommendation to the charge but having been sharers in his
luxurious banquets, and of having wandered about to indulge in
profligate excesses. … On these grounds, the people in his
absence took from him his command, and confided it to other
generals. As soon as he heard of this new act of ingratitude,
he resolved not to return home, but withdrew into Thrace, and
fortified three castles … near to Perinthus. Here, having
collected a formidable band, as an independent captain, he
made incursions on the territories of those of the Thracians
who acknowledged no settled form of government, and acquired
considerable spoils."
Sir T. N. Talfourd,
Early History of Greece (Encyclopedia Metropolitana),
chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 29 (volume 4).
Plutarch,
Alcibiades.
Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 1, chapters 1-4.
GREECE: B. C. 406.
The Peloponnesian War:
Battle of Arginusæ.
Trial and execution of the generals at Athens.
Alcibiades was succeeded by Conon and nine colleagues in
command of the Athenian fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. The
Athenians, soon afterwards, were driven into the harbor of
Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, by a superior Peloponnesian
fleet, commanded by Callicratidas, and were blockaded there
with small chance of escape. Conon contrived to send news of
their desperate situation to Athens, and vigorous measures
were promptly taken to rescue the fleet and to save Mitylene.
Within thirty days, a fleet of 110 triremes was fitted out at
the Piræus, and manned with a crew which took nearly the last
able-bodied Athenian to make it complete. At Samos these were
joined by 40 more triremes, making 150 in all, against which
Callicratidas was able to bring out only 120 ships from
Mitylene, when the relieving armament approached. The two
fleets encountered one another near the islands of Arginusæ,
off Cape Malea, the southern promontory of Lesbos. In the
battle that ensued, which was the greatest naval conflict of
the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were completely
victorious; Callicratidas was drowned and no less than 77 of
the Peloponnesian ships were destroyed, while the Athenians
themselves lost 25. As the result of this battle Sparta again
made overtures of peace, as she had done after the battle of
Cyzicus, and Athens, led by her demagogues, again rejected
them. But the Athenian demagogues and populace did worse. They
summoned home the eight generals who had won the battle of
Arginusæ, to answer to a charge of having neglected, after the
victory, to pick up the floating bodies of the Athenian dead
and to rescue the drowning from the wrecked ships of their
fleet. Six of the accused generals came home to meet the
charge; but two thought it prudent to go into voluntary exile.
The six were brought to trial; the forms of legality were
violated to their prejudice and all means were unscrupulously
employed to work up the popular passion against them. One man,
only, among the prytanes—senators, that is, of the tribe then
presiding, and who were the presidents of the popular
assembly—stood out, without flinching, against the lawless
rage of his fellow citizens, and refused, in calm scorn of all
fierce threats against himself, to join in taking the
unconstitutional vote. That one was the philosopher Socrates.
The generals were condemned to death and received the fatal
draught of hemlock from the same populace which pressed it a
little later to the lips of the philosopher. "Thus died the
son of Pericles and Aspasia [one of the generals, who bore his
father's name], to whom his father had made a fatal gift in
obtaining for him the Attic citizenship, and with him
Erasinides, Thrasylus, Lysias, Aristocrates, and Diomedon. The
last-named, the most innocent of all, who had wished that the
whole fleet should immediately be employed in search of the
wrecked, addressed the people once more; he expressed a wish
that the decree dooming him to death might be beneficial to
the state, and called upon his fellow-citizens to perform the
thanksgiving offerings to the saving gods which they, the
generals, had vowed on account of their victory. These words
may have sunk deep into the hearts of many of his hearers; but
their only effect has been to cast a yet brighter halo in the
eyes of subsequent generations around the memory of these
martyrs. Their innocence is best proved by the series of
glaring infractions of law and morality which were needed to
ensure their destruction, as well as by the shame and
repugnance which seized upon the citizens, when they had
recognized how fearfully, they had been led astray by a
traitorous faction.
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 4, chapter 5 (volume 3).
Mr. Grote attempts to uphold a view more unfavorable to the
generals and less severe upon the Athenian people.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 64.
ALSO IN:
Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 1, chapters 5-7.
See, also,
ATHENS: B. C. 424-406.
GREECE: B. C. 405.
The Peloponnesian War
Decisive battle of Aigospotamoi.
Defeat of the Athenians.
After the execution of the generals, "no long time passed
before the Athenians repented of their madness and their
crimes: but, yielding still to their old besetting sin, they
insisted, as they had done in the days of Miltiades and after
the catastrophe at Syracuse, on throwing the blame not on
themselves but on their advisers. This great crime began at
once to produce its natural fruits. The people were losing
confidence in their officers, who, in their turn, felt that no
services to the state could secure them against illegal
prosecutions and arbitrary penalties. Corruption was eating
its way into the heart of the state, and treason was losing
its ugliness in the eyes of many who thought themselves none
the worse for dallying with it. … The Athenian fleet had
fallen back upon Samos; and with this island as a base, the
generals were occupying themselves with movements, not for
crushing the enemy, but for obtaining money. … The Spartans,
whether at home or on the Asiatic coast, were now well aware
that one more battle would decide the issue of the war; for
with another defeat the subsidies of the Persians would be
withdrawn from them as from men doomed to failure, and perhaps
be transferred to the Athenians. In the army and fleet the cry
was raised that Lysandros was the only man equal to the
emergency. Spartan custom could not appoint the same man twice
to the office of admiral; but when Arakos was sent out with
Lysandros [Lysander] as his secretary, it was understood that
the latter was really the man in power."
{1592}
In the summer of 405 B. C. Lysandros made a sudden movement
from the southern Ægean to the Hellespont, and laid siege to
the rich town of Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side. The Athenians
followed him, but not promptly enough to save Lampsacus, which
they found in his possession when they arrived. They took
their station, thereupon, at the mouth of the little stream
called the Aigospotamoi (the Goat's Stream), directly opposite
to Lampsacus, and endeavored for four successive days to
provoke Lysandros to fight. He refused, watching his
opportunity for the surprise which he effected on the fifth
day, when he dashed across the narrow channel and caught the
Athenian ships unprepared, their crews mostly scattered on
shore. One only, of the six Athenian generals, Conon, had
foreseen danger and was alert. Conon, with twelve triremes,
escaped. The remaining ships, about one hundred and seventy in
number, were captured almost without the loss of a man on the
Peloponnesian side. Of the crews, some three or four thousand
Athenians were pursued on shore and taken prisoners, to be
afterwards slaughtered in cold blood. Two of the incapable
generals shared their fate. Of the other generals who escaped,
some at least were believed to have been bribed by Lysandros
to betray the fleet into his hands. The blow to Athens was
deadly. She had no power of resistance left, and when her
enemies closed around her, a little later, she starved within
her walls until resistance seemed no longer heroic, and then
gave herself up to their mercy.
G. W. Cox,
The Athenian Empire,
chapter 7.
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 30 (volume 4).
Plutarch,
Lysander.
Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 2, chapter 1.
GREECE: B. C. 404.
End of the Peloponnesian War.
Fall of Athens.
See ATHENS: B. C. 404.
GREECE: B. C. 404-403.
The Year of Anarchy at Athens.
Reign of the Thirty.
See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.
GREECE: B. C. 401-400.
The expedition of Cyrus, and the Retreat of the Ten Thousand
Greeks.
See PERSIA: B. C.,401-400.
GREECE: B. C. 399-387.
Spartan war with Persia.
Greek confederacy against Sparta.
The Corinthian War.
Peace of Antalcidas.
The successful retreat of the Ten Thousand from Cunaxa,
through the length of the Persian dominions (B. C. 401-400),
and the account which they brought of the essential hollowness
of the power of the Great King, produced an important change
among the Greeks in their estimate of the Persian monarchy as
an enemy to be feared. Sparta became ashamed of having
abandoned the Greek cities of Asia Minor to their old
oppressors, as she did after breaking the strength of their
protector, Athens, in the Peloponnesian War. When, therefore,
the Persians began to lay siege to the coast cities which
resisted them, Sparta found spirit enough to interfere (B. C.
399) and sent over a small army, into which the surviving
Cyreans were also enlisted. The only immediate result was a
truce with the Persian satrap. But, meantime, the Athenian
general Conon—he who escaped with a few triremes from
Ægospotami and fled to Cyprus—had there established relations
with the Persian court at Susa and had acquired a great
influence, which he used to bring about the creation of a
powerful Persian armament against Sparta, himself in command.
The news of this armament, reaching Sparta, provoked the
latter to a more vigorous prosecution of the war in Asia
Minor. King Agesilaus took the field in Ionia with a strong
army and conducted two brilliant campaigns (B. C. 396-395),
pointing the way, as it were, to the expedition of Alexander a
couple of generations later. The most important victory won
was on the Pactolus, not far from Sardis. But, in the midst of
his successes, Agesilaus was called home by troubles which
arose in Greece. Sparta, by her arrogance and oppressive
policy, had already alienated all the Greek states which
helped her to break down Athens in the Peloponnesian War.
Persian agents, with money, had assisted her enemies to
organize a league against her. Thebes and Athens, first, then
Argos and Corinth, with several of the lesser states, became
confederated in an agreement to overthrow her domination. In
an attempt to crush Thebes, the Spartans were badly beaten at
Haliartus (B. C. 395), where their famous Lysander, conqueror
of Athens, was killed. Their power in central and northern
Greece was virtually annihilated, and then followed a struggle
with their leagued enemies for the control or the Corinthian
isthmus, whence came the name of the Corinthian War. It was
this situation of things at home which called back King
Agesilaus from his campaigns in Asia Minor. He had scarcely
crossed the Hellespont on his return, in July B. C. 394,
before all his work in Asia was undone by an overwhelming
naval victory achieved at Cnydus by the Athenian Conon,
commanding the Persian-Phœnician fleet. With his veteran army,
including the old Cyreans, now returning home after seven
years of incredible adventures and hardships, he made his way
through all enemies into Bœotia and fought a battle with the
league at Coronea, in which he so far gained a victory that he
held the field, although the fruits of it were doubtful. The
Spartans on the isthmus had also just gained a considerable
success near Corinth, on the banks of the Nemea. On the whole,
the results of the war were in their favor, until Conon and
the Persian satrap, Pharnabazus, came over with the victorious
fleet from Cnydus and lent its aid to the league. The most
important proceeding of Conon was to rebuild (B. C. 393), with
the help of his Persian friends, the Long Walls of Athens,
which the Peloponnesians had required to be thrown down eleven
years before. By this means he restored to Athens her
independence and secured for her a new career of commercial
prosperity. During six years more the war was tediously
prolonged, without important or decisive events, while Sparta
intrigued to detach the Persian king from his Athenian allies
and the latter intrigued to retain his friendship. In the end,
all parties were exhausted—Sparta, perhaps, least so—and
accepted a shameful peace which was practically dictated by
the Persian and had the form of an edict or mandate from Susa,
in the following terms: "The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just
that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and
Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic
cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and
great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which
three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the
parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will
war against him or them with those who share my views.
{1593}
This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money."
By this, called the Peace of Antalcidas (B. C. 387) from the
Lacedæmonian who was instrumental in bringing it about, the
Ionian Greeks were once more abandoned to the Persian king and
his satraps, while Sparta, which assumed to be the
administrator and executor of the treaty, was confirmed in her
supremacy over the other Grecian states.
Xenophon,
Hellenica (translated by Dakyns),
books 3-5 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
C. Sankey,
The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,
chapters 7-9.
W. Mitford,
History of Greece,
chapters 24-25 (volume 4).
G. Rawlinson,
The Five Great Monarchies,
volume 3; Persia, chapter 7.
GREECE: B. C. 385.
Destruction of Mantinea by the Spartans.
The Mantineians, having displayed unfriendliness to Sparta
during the Corinthian War, were required by the latter, after
the Peace of Antalcidas, to demolish their walls. On their
refusal, king Agesipolis was sent to subdue them. By damming
up the waters of the river Ophis he flooded the city and
brought it to terms. "The city of Mantineia was now broken up,
and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five
constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population
each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in
the village near to which his property lay. The remaining
fifth continued to occupy Mantineia as a village. Each village
was placed under oligarchical government and left
unfortified."
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9).
ALSO IN:
Xenophon,
Hellenica,
book 5, chapter 2.
GREECE: B. C. 383.
The betrayal of Thebes to the Spartans.
When the Spartans sent their expedition against Olynthus, in
383 B. C., it marched in two divisions, the last of which,
under Phoebidas, halted at Thebes, on the way, probably having
secret orders to do so. "On reaching Thebes the troops
encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium. Faction was
rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias
and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, being the
respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was
that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the
Lacedaemonians, would not come anywhere near the Spartan
general, Leontiades, on the other hand, was assiduous in
courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was established
between them, he made a proposal as follows: 'You have it in
your power,' he said, addressing Phoebidas, 'this very day to
confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your
hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel.'"
Xenophon,
Hellenica
(translated by Dakyns),
book 5, chapter 2 (volume 2).
"On the day of the Thesmophoria, a religious festival
celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the
acropolis, or Kadmeia, was consecrated to their exclusive use,
Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in
march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the
walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was
actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat
of a summer's noon had driven everyone out of the streets,
when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on
horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and
conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the
gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened to
his order as Polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the
streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being
permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that
Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without
the smallest opposition. … The news of the seizure of the
Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes [was] … received at
Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a mixed
feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout
Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any
event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognised
public law of Greece, it was a flagitions iniquity, for which
Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. … It stood
condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece,
unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon
himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to
Spartan power. … Phœbidas might well claim to have struck
for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving
her from one of her two really formidable enemies."
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 76.
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 37 (volume 5).
GREECE: B. C. 383-379.
Overthrow of the Olynthian confederacy by Sparta.
Among the Greek cities which were founded at an early day in
that peninsula of Macedonia called Chalcidice, from Chalcis,
in Eubœa, which colonized the greater number of them, Olynthus
became the most important. It long maintained its independence
against the Macedonian kings, on one hand, and against Athens,
when Athens ruled the Ægean and its coasts, on the other. As
it grew in power, it took under its protection the lesser
towns of the peninsula and adjacent Macedonia, and formed a
confederacy among them, which gradually extended to the larger
cities and acquired a formidable character. But two of the
Chalcidian cities watched this growth of Olynthus with
jealousy and refused to be confederated with her. More than
that, they joined the Macedonians in sending an embassy (B. C.
383) to Sparta, then all-powerful in Greece, after the Peace
of Antalcidas, and invoked her intervention, to suppress the
rising Olynthian confederacy. The response of Sparta was
prompt, and although the Olynthians defended themselves with
valor, inflicting one severe defeat upon the Lacedæmonian
allies, they were forced at last (B. C. 379) to submit and the
confederacy was dissolved. "By the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta
had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; by crushing the
Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the Thracian
Greeks to the Macedonian princes. … She gave the victory to
Amyntas [king of Macedonia], and prepared the indispensable
basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not
only Olynthus, but … the major part of the Grecian world, to
one common level of subjection."
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9).
ALSO IN:
E. A. Freeman,
History of Federal Government,
chapter 4, section 3.
GREECE: B. C. 379-371.
The liberation of Thebes and her rise to supremacy.
The humbling of Sparta.
For three years after the betrayal of the Acropolis, or
Cadmea, of Thebes to the Spartans, the city groaned under the
tyranny of the oligarchical party of Leontiades, whom the
Spartans supported. Several hundreds of the more prominent of
the democratic and patriotic party found a refuge at Athens,
and the deliverance of Thebes was effected at last, about
December, B. C. 379, by a daring enterprise on the part of
some of these exiles.
{1594}
Their plans were concerted with friends at Thebes, especially
with one Phyllidas, who had retained the confidence of the
party in power, being secretary to the polemarchs. The leader
of the undertaking was Melon. "After a certain interval Melon,
accompanied by six of the trustiest comrades he could find
among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They were armed
with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the
neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day
they lay concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the
city gates in the guise of labourers returning home with the
latest comers from the fields. Having got safely within the
city, they spent the whole of that night at the house of a man
named Charon, and again the next day in the same fashion.
Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns of
the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on
going out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was
to take this opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking,
which was the introduction of certain women to the polemarchs.
They were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be
found in Thebes. … Supper was over, and, thanks to the zeal
with which the master of the ceremonies responded to their
mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated
orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and fetched
Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the
rest as their attendant maidens. … It was preconcerted that
as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside their
veils and strike home. That is one version of the death of the
polemarchs. According to another, Melon and his friends came
in as revellers, and so despatched their victims."
Xenophon,
Hellenica,
(translated by Dakyns),
book 5, chapter 4.
Having thus made way with the polemarchs, the conspirators
surprised Leontiades in his own house and slew him. They then
liberated and armed the prisoners whom they found in
confinement and sent heralds through the city to proclaim the
freedom of Thebes. A general rally of the citizens followed
promptly. The party of the oppression was totally crushed and
its prominent members put to death. The Spartan garrison in
the Cadmea capitulated and was suffered to march out without
molestation. The government of Thebes was reorganized on a
more popular basis, and with a view to restoring the Bœotian
League, in a perfected state, with Thebes for its head.
See THEBES: B. C. 378.
In the war with Sparta which followed, Athens was soon
involved, and the Spartans were driven from all their
footholds in the Bœotian towns. Then Athens and Thebes
quarreled afresh, and the Spartans, to take advantage of the
isolation of the latter, invaded her territory once more. But
Thebes, under the training of her great statesman and soldier,
Epaminondas, had become strong enough to face her Lacedæmonian
enemy without help, and in the momentous battle of Leuctra,
fought July 6, B. C. 371, on a plain not far from Platæa, the
domineering power of Sparta was broken forever. "It was the
most important of all the battles ever fought between Greeks.
On this day Thebes became an independent power in Greece, and
a return of Spartan despotism was henceforth impossible for
all times."
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 6, chapter 1 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
Plutarch,
Pelopidas.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapters 77-78.
C. Sankey,
The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,
chapters 10-11.
GREECE: B. C. 378-357.
The new Athenian Confederacy.
The Social War.
See ATHENS: B. C. 378-357.
GREECE: B. C. 371.
The Arcadian union.
Restoration of Mantinea.
Building of Megalopolis.
One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra (B. C. 371),
which ended the domination of Sparta in Greek affairs, was to
emancipate the Arcadians and to work great changes among them.
Mantinea, which the Spartans had destroyed, was rebuilt the
same year. Then "the chiefs of the parties opposed to the
Spartan interest in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a
plan for securing the independence of Arcadia, and for raising
it to a higher rank than it had hitherto held in the political
system of Greece. With a territory more extensive than any
other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud
of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land,
and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek
Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of
the nation; the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile
armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of
foreign powers. … The object was to unite the Arcadian
people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence
of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed
to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which
should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs,
particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a
military force for the protection of the public safety. …
Within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of
Arcadians from all the principal towns was held to deliberate
on the measure; and under its decree a body of colonists,
collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new
city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and
was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City). The
site chosen was on the banks of the Helisson, a small stream
tributary to the Alpheus. … The city was designed on a very
large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings
corresponded to its extent; the theatre was the most spacious
in Greece. … The population was to be drawn … from a great
number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a
list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The
greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by
their inhabitants."
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 39 (volume 5).
"The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis
had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never
attained that preeminence or power which its founders
contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on
a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it."
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 78.
GREECE: B. C. 371-362.
Popular fury in Argos.
Arcadian union and disunion.
Restoration of Mantinea.
Expeditions of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus.
His attempts against Sparta.
His victory and death at Mantinea.
"In many of the Peloponnesian cities, when the power of Sparta
seemed visibly on the wane, internal commotions had arisen, and
much blood had been shed on both sides. But now Argos
displayed the most fearful example of popular fury recorded in
Greek annals, red as they are with tales of civil bloodshed.
{1595}
The democratic populace detected a conspiracy among the
oligarchs, and thirty of the chief citizens were at once put
to death. The excitement of the people was inflamed by the
harangues of demagogues, and the mob, arming itself with
cudgels, commenced a general massacre. When 1,200 citizens had
fallen, the popular orators interfered to check the
atrocities, but met with the same fate; and, sated at length
with bloodshed, the multitude stayed the deadly work. But
where the pressure of Spartan interference had been heaviest
and most constant, there the reaction was naturally most
striking. The popular impulses which were at work in Arkadia
[see above] found their first outlet in the rebuilding of
Mantineia." But there was far from unanimity in the Arkadian
national movement. "In Tegea … public opinion was divided.
The city had been treated by Sparta with special
consideration, and had for centuries been her faithful ally;
hence the oligarchical government looked with disfavour upon
the project of union. But the democratical party was powerful
and unscrupulous; and, with the help of the Mantineians, they
effected a revolution, in which many were killed, and 800
exiles fled to Sparta." The Spartans, under Agesilaos, avenged
them by ravaging the plain in front of Mantineia. "This
invasion of Arkadia is chiefly important for the pretext which
it furnished for Theban intervention. The Mantineians applied
for help at first to Athens, and, meeting with a refusal, went
on to Thebes. For this request Epameinondas must have been
thoroughly prepared beforehand, and he was soon on the march
with a powerful army. … On his arrival in the Peloponnese
[B. C. 370], he found that Agesilaos had already retired; and
some of the Theban generals, considering the season of the
year, wished at once to return." But Epameinondas was
persuaded by the allies of Thebes to make an attempt upon
Sparta itself. "In four divisions the invading host streamed
into the land which, according to the proudest boast of its
inhabitants, had felt no hostile tread for 600 years. At
Sellasia, not ten miles distant from Sparta, the army
reunited; and, having plundered and burnt the town, swept down
into the valley of the Eurotas, and marched along the left
bank till it reached the bridge opposite the city. Within
Sparta itself, though a universal terror prevailed, one man
rose equal to the emergency. While the men fainted in spirit
as they thought how few they were, and how wide their unwalled
city, … Agesilaos accepted, not without mistrust, the
services of 6,000 helots, collected reinforcements, preserved
order, suppressed conspiracy, stamped out mutiny, posted
guards on every vantage-ground, and refused to be tempted to a
battle by the taunts of foes or the clamours of over-eager
friends. … After one unsuccessful cavalry skirmish, the
Theban general, who, in a campaign undertaken on his sole
responsibility, dared not risk the chance of defeat, decided
to leave the 'wasps'-nest' untaken. He completed his work of
devastation by ravaging the whole of southern Lakonia, … and
then turned back into Arkadia to devote himself to the more
permanent objects of his expedition." Messene was now rebuilt
(see MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD), and "the descendants of the
old Messenian stock were gathered to form a new nation from
Rhegion and Messene [Sicily], and from the parts of Lybia
round Kyrene. … By thus restoring the Messenians to their
ancient territory, Epameinondas deprived Sparta at one blow of
nearly half her possessions. … At last Epameinondas had done
his work; and, leaving Pammenes with a garrison in Tegea, he
hastened to lead his soldiers home. At the Isthmus he found a
hostile army from Athens," which had been persuaded to send
succor to Sparta; but the Athenians did not care to give
battle to the conquering Thebans, and the latter passed
unopposed. On the arrival of Epameinondas at Thebes, "the
leaders of a petty faction threatened to bring him and his
colleagues to trial for retaining their command for four
months beyond the legal term of office. But Epameinondas stood
up in the assembly, and told his simple tale of victorious
generalship and still more triumphant statesmanship; and the
invidious cavils of snarling intriguers were at once
forgotten." Sparta and Athens now formed an alliance, with the
senseless agreement that command of the common forces "should
be given alternately to each state for five days. … The
first aim of the confederates was to occupy the passes of the
isthmus," but Epameinondas forced a passage for his army,
captured Sikyon, ravaged the territory of Epidauros, and made
a bold but unsuccessful attempt to surprise Corinth. Then, on
the arrival of reinforcements to the Spartans from Syracuse,
he drew back to Thebes (B. C. 368). For a time the Thebans
were occupied with troubles in Thessaly, and their Arkadian
proteges in Peloponnese were carrying on war against Sparta
independently, with so much momentary success that they became
over-confident and rash. They paid for their foolhardiness by
a frightful defeat, which cost them 10,000 men, whilst no
Spartan is said to have fallen; hence the fight was known in
Sparta as the Tearless Battle. "This defeat probably caused
little grief at Thebes, for it would prove to the arrogant
Arkadians that they could not yet dispense with Theban aid;
and it decided Epameinondas to make a third expedition into
the Peloponnese." The result of his third expedition was the
enrolment of a number of Achaian cities as Theban allies,
which gave to Thebes "the control of the coast-line of the
Corinthian gulf." But the broad and statesmanlike terms on
which Epameinondas arranged these alliances were set aside by
his narrow-minded fellow citizens, and a policy adopted by
which Achaia was "converted from a lukewarm neutral into an
enthusiastic supporter of Sparta. In this unsettled state of
Greek politics the Thebans resolved to have recourse, like the
Spartans before them, to the authority of the Great King.
Existing treaties, for which they were not responsible,
acknowledged his right to interfere in the internal affairs of
Greece." Pelopidas and other envoys were accordingly sent to
Susa (E. C. 366), where they procured from Artaxerxes a
rescript "which recognised the independence of Messene and
ordered the Athenians to dismantle their fleet." But the
mandate of the Great King proved void of effect. "After this
the confusion in Greece grew infinitely worse. An accident
transferred the town of Oropos … from the hands of Athens to
those of Thebes; and as the Peloponnesian allies of the
Athenians refused to help them to regain it, they broke with
them, and, in spite of the efforts of Epameinondas, formed an
alliance with Arkadia. …
{1596}
The Athenians made soon after a vain attempt to seize the

friendly city of Corinth, and the disgusted Corinthians,
together with the citizens of Epidauros and Phlious, …
obtained the grudging consent of Sparta, and made a separate
peace with Thebes. As soon as tranquillity was restored in one
quarter, in another the flame of war would again burst forth."
Its next outbreak (B. C. 365) was between Elis and Arkadia,
the former being assisted by Sparta, and its principal event
was a desperate battle fought for the possession of Olympia.
The Arkadians held part of the city and acquired possession of
the sacred treasures in the Olympian temple, which they
determined to apply to the expenses of the war. "Raising the
cry of sacrilege, the Mantineians, who were jealous both of
Tegea and Megalopolis, at once broke loose and shut their
gates." Soon afterwards, Mantineia separated herself wholly
from the Arkadian confederacy and entered the Spartan
alliance. This was among the causes which drew Epameinondas
once more, and for the last time, into the Peloponnese (B. C.
362). "The armies of Greece were now gathering from all
quarters for the great struggle. On the one side stood Sparta,
Athens, Elis, Achaia, and a part of Arkadia, led by Mantineia;
on the other side were ranged Boiotia [Thebes], Argos,
Messenia, and the rest of Arkadia, while a few of the smaller
states—as Phokis, Phlious, and Corinth—remained neutral."
At the outset of his campaign, Epameinondas made a bold
attempt, by a rapid night march, to surprise Sparta; but a
traitorous warning had been given, the Spartans were
barricaded and prepared for defence, and the undertaking
failed. Then he marched quickly to Mantineia, and failed in
his design there, likewise. A pitched battle was necessary to
decide the issue, and it was fought on the plain between
Mantineia and Tegea, on the 3d day of July, B. C. 362. The
fine discipline of the Theban troops and the skilful tactics
of Epameinondas had given the victory into his hands, when,
"suddenly, the aspect of the battle changed. Except among the
light troops on the extreme right, the advance was everywhere
stayed. The Spartan hoplites were in full flight, but the
conquerors did not stir a step in the pursuit. … The fury of
the battle had instantly ceased. … Epameinondas had fallen
wounded to death, and this was the result. … Every heart was
broken, every arm paralysed. … Both sides claimed the
victory in the battle, and erected the usual trophies, but the
real advantage remained with the Thebans. … By the peace
that ensued, the independence of Messenia was secured, and
Megalopolis and the Pan-Arkadian constitution were preserved
from destruction. The work of Epameinondas, though cut short,
was thus not thrown away; and the power of Sparta was confined
within the limits which he had assigned."
C. Sankey,
The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,
chapter 12.
ALSO IN:
Xenophon,
Hellenica,
books 5-6.
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 6, chapter 2.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 80 (volume 10).
GREECE: B. C. 359-358.
First proceedings of Philip of Macedonia.
His acquisition of Amphipolis.
The famous Philip of Macedon succeeded to the Macedonian
throne in 359 B. C., at the age of 23. In his youth he had
been delivered to the Thebans as one of the hostages given
upon the conclusion of a treaty of peace in 368. "His
residence at Thebes gave him some tincture of Grecian
philosophy and literature; but the most important lesson which
he learned at that city was the art of war, with all the
improved tactics introduced by Epaminondas. Philip …
displayed at the beginning of his reign his extraordinary
energy and abilities. After defeating the Illyrians he
established a standing army, in which discipline was preserved
by the severest punishments. He introduced the far-famed
Macedonian phalanx, which was 16 men deep, armed with long
projecting spears. Philip's views were first turned towards
the eastern frontiers of his dominions, where his interests
clashed with those of the Athenians. A few years before the
Athenians had made various unavailing attempts to obtain
possession of Amphipolis, once the jewel of their empire, but
which they had never recovered since its capture by Brasidas
in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war."
W. Smith,
Smaller History of Greece,
chapter 19.
The importance of Amphipolis to the Athenians arose chiefly
from its vicinity to "the vast forests which clothed the
mountains that enclose the basin of the Strymon, and afforded
an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber." For the same reason
that the Athenians desired ardently to regain possession of
Amphipolis their enemies were strong in the wish to keep it
out of their hands. Moreover, as the Macedonian kingdom became
well-knitted in the strong hands of the ambitious Philip, the
city of "the Nine Ways" assumed importance to that rising
power, and Philip resolved to possess it. It was at this point
that his ambitions first came into conflict with Athens. But
the Athenians were not aware of his aims until too late. He
deceived them completely, in fact, by a bargain to give help
in acquiring Amphipolis for them, and to receive help in
gaining Pydna for himself. But when his preparations were
complete, he suddenly laid siege to Amphipolis and made
himself master of the city (B. C. 358), besides taking Pydna
as well. At Athens, "Philip was henceforth viewed as an open
enemy, and this was the beginning—though without any formal
declaration—of a state of hostility between the two powers,
which was called, from its origin, the Amphipolitan War."
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 42 (volume 5).
GREECE: B. C. 357-336.
Advancement of Philip of Macedonia to supremacy.
The Sacred Wars and their consequences.
The fatal field of Chæronea.
Philip's preparations for the invasion of Asia.
His assassination.
A war between the Thebans and their neighbors, the Phocians,
which broke out in 357 or 356 B. C., assumed great importance
in Greek history and was called the Sacred War,—as two
earlier contests, in which Delphi was concerned, had been
likewise named. It is sometimes called the Ten Years Sacred
War. Thebes, controlling the shadowy Amphictyonic Council, had
brought a charge of sacrilege against the Phocians and
procured a decree imposing upon them a heavy fine. The
Phocians resisted the decree with unexpected energy, and, by a
bold and sudden movement, gained possession of Delphi, where
they destroyed the records of the Amphictyonic judgment
against them. Having the vast accumulation of the sacred
treasures of the Delphic temple in their hands, they did not
scruple to appropriate them, and were able to maintain a
powerful army of mercenaries, gathered from every part of
Greece, with which they ravaged the territories of Bœotia and
Locris, and acquired control of the pass of Thermopylæ.
{1597}
In the midst of their successes they were called upon for help
by the tyrant of Pheræ in Thessaly, then being attacked by
Philip of Macedon (B. C. 353). The Phocians opposed Philip
with such success, at first, that he retreated from Thessaly;
but it was only to recruit and reanimate his army. Returning
presently he overthrew the Phocian army, with great
slaughter—Onomarchus, its leader, being slain—and made
himself master of all Thessaly. Both Athens and Sparta were
now alarmed by this rapid advance into Central Greece of the
conquering arms of the ambitious Macedonian, and both sent
forces to the help of the Phocians. The former was so
energetic that an army of 5,000 Athenian foot-soldiers and 400
horse reached Thermopylæ (May 352 B. C.) before Philip had
been able to push forward from Thessaly. When he did advance,
proclaiming his purpose to rescue the Delphian temple from
sacrilegious robbers, he was repulsed at the pass and drew
back. It was the beginning of the struggle for Greek
independence against Macedonian energy and ambition. A few
months later Demosthenes delivered the first of his immortal
orations, called afterwards Philippics, in which he strove to
keep the already languishing energy of the Athenians alive, in
unfaltering resistance to the designs of Philip. For six years
there was a state of war between Philip and the Athenians with
their allies, but the conquests of the former in Thrace and
the Chalcidian peninsula were steadily pressed. At length (B.
C. 346) Athens was treacherously persuaded into a treaty of
peace with Philip (the Peace of Philocrates) which excluded
the Phocians from its terms. No sooner had he thus isolated
the latter than he marched quickly to Thermopylæ, secured
possession of the pass and declared himself the supporter of
Thebes. The Sacred War was ended, Delphi rescued, Phocis
punished without mercy, and Greece was under the feet of a
master. This being accomplished, the Peace of Philocrates was
doubtfully maintained for about six years. Then quarrels broke
out which led up to still another Sacred War, and which gave
Philip another opportunity to trample on the liberties of
Greece. Curiously, the provoking causes of this outbreak were
an inheritance from that more ancient Sacred War which brought
ruin upon the town of Cirrha and a lasting curse upon its
soil. The Locrians of Amphissa, dwelling near to the accursed
territory, had ventured in the course of years to encroach
upon it with brick-kilns, and to make use of its harbor. At a
meeting of the Amphictyonic Council, in the spring of B. C.
339, this violation of the Sacred Law was brought to notice,
by way of retaliation for some offence which the deputies of
Amphissa had given to those of Athens. Hostilities ensued
between the citizens of Delphi, pushed on by the Amphictyons,
on one side, and the Amphissians on the other. The influence
of Philip in the Amphictyonic Council was controlling, and his
partisans had no difficulty in summoning him to act for the
federation in settling this portentous affair. He marched into
Bœotia, took possession of the strong city of Elatea, and very
soon made it manifest that he contemplated something more than
mere dealing with the refractory trespassers of Amphissa.
Athens watched his movements with terror, and even Thebes, his
former ally, took alarm. Through the exertions of Demosthenes,
Thebes and Athens, once more, but too late, gave up their
ancient enmity and united their strength and resources in a
firm league. Megara, Corinth and other states were joined to
them and common cause was made with the Locrians of Amphissa.
These movements consumed a winter, and war opened in the
spring. Philip gained successes from the beginning. He took
Amphissa by surprise and carried Naupactus by storm. But it
was not until August—the first day of August, B. C. 338—that
the two combatants came together in force. This occurred in
the Bœotian valley of the Cephisus, near the town of Chæronea,
which gave its name to the battle. The Sacred Band of Thebes
and the hoplites of Athens, with their allies, fought
obstinately and well; but they were no match for the veterans
of the Macedonian phalanx and most of them perished on the
field. It was the last struggle for Grecian independence.
Henceforth, practically at least, Hellas was swallowed up in
Macedonia. We can see very plainly that Philip's "conduct
towards Athens after the victory, under the appearance of
generosity, was extremely prudent. His object was, to separate
the Thebans from the Athenians, and he at once advanced
against the former. The Athenian prisoners he sent home, free
and clothed, accompanied by Antipater; he ordered the dead
bodies to be burned, and their ashes to be conveyed to Athens,
while the Thebans had to purchase their dead from him. He then
entered Thebes, which he seems to have taken without any
resistance, placed a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, and,
with the same policy which Sparta had followed at Athens after
the Peloponnesian war, he established an oligarchy of 300 of
his partizans, who were for the most part returned exiles, and
who now, under the protection of the garrison in the Cadmea,
ruled like tyrants, and raged in a fearful manner. … Philip
accepted all the terms which were agreeable to the Athenians;
no investigations were to be instituted against his enemies,
and none of them was to be sent into exile. Athens was not
only to remain a perfectly sovereign city, but retain Lemnos,
Imbros, and Scyros, nay even Samos and Chersonnesus, though he
might have taken the latter without any difficulty, and though
the Athenians had most cleruchiae in Samos. Thus he bought
over the Athenians through this peace, against which
Demosthenes and others, who saw farther, could not venture to
protest, because Philip offered more than they could give him
in return. … The only thing which the Athenians conceded to
Philip, was, that they concluded a symmachia with him, and
conferred upon him the supreme command in the Persian war. For
with great cunning Philip summoned an assembly of the Greeks
whom he called his allies, to Corinth, to deliberate upon the
war against Persia. The war of revenge against the Persians
had already become a popular idea in Greece. … Philip now
entered Peloponnesus with his whole army, and went to the diet
at Corinth, where the Greek deputies received his orders. In
Peloponnesus he acted as mediator, for he was invited as such
by the Arcadians, Messenians, and Argives, to decide their
disputes with Lacedaemon, and they demanded that he should
restore to them their ancient territories.
{1598}
The Arcadians had formerly possessed many places on the
Eurotas, and the Messenians were still very far from having
recovered all their ancient territories. He accordingly fixed
the boundaries, and greatly diminished the extent of Laconia.
… The Spartans, on that occasion, behaved in a dignified
manner; they were the only ones who refused to acknowledge
Philip as generalissimo against Persia. … Even the ancients
regarded the day of Chaeronea as the death-day of Greece;
every principle of life was cut off; the Greeks, indeed,
continued to exist, but in spirit, and politically, they were
dead. … Philip was now at the height of his power.
Byzantium, and the other allied cities, had submitted to the
conqueror, when he sent his army against them, and he was
already trying to establish himself in Asia. 'A detachment of
troops, under Attalus, had been sent across, to keep open the
road for the great expedition, and had encamped on mount Ida.'
Philip was thus enabled to commence his passage across the
Hellespont whenever he pleased. But the close of his career
was already at hand." He was assassinated in August, B. C.
336, by a certain Pausanias, at the instigation, it is said,
of Olympias, one of Philip's several wives—and the mother of
his famous son Alexander—whom he had repudiated to please a
younger bride. "Philip was unquestionably an uncommon and
extraordinary man, and the opinion of several among the
ancients, that by the foundation of the Macedonian state he
did something far greater than Alexander by the application of
the powers he inherited, is quite correct. … When we regard
him as the creator of his state, by uniting the most different
nations, Macedonians and Greeks; … when we reflect what a
man he must have been, from whom proceeded the impulse to
train such great generals, … to whom Alexander, it must be
observed, did not add one, for all Alexander's generals
proceeded from the school of Philip, and there is not one whom
Alexander did not inherit from Philip;—when we perceive the
skill with which he gained over nations and states, … we
cannot but acknowledge that he was an extraordinary man."
B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
lectures 69 and 66 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapters 43-46 (volumes 5-6).
T. Leland,
History of the Life and Reign of Philip of Macedon,
books 2-5.
GREECE: B. C. 351-348.
The Olynthian War.
Destruction of Olynthus by Philip of Macedonia.
After the overthrow of Spartan domination in Greece, Olynthus
recovered its independence and regained, during the second
quarter of the fourth century B. C., a considerable degree of
prosperity and power. It was even helped in its rise by the
cunning, dangerous hand of Philip of Macedon, who secured many
and great advantages in his treacherous diplomacy by playing
the mutual jealousies of Athens and Olynthus against one
another. The Olynthian Confederacy, formed anew, just served
its purpose as a counterpoise to the Athenian Confederacy,
until Philip had no more need of that service. He was the
friend and ally of the former until he had secured Amphipolis,
Methone, and other necessary positions in Macedonia and
Thrace. Then the mask began to slip and Olynthus (B. C. 351)
got glimpses of the true character of her subtle neighbor. Too
late, she made overtures to Athens, and Athens, too late, saw
the vital importance of a league of friendship between the two
Greek confederacies, against the half Hellenic, half barbaric
Macedonian kingdom. Three of the great speeches of
Demosthenes—the "Olynthiac orations"—were made upon this
theme, and the orator succeeded for the first time in
persuading his degenerated countrymen to act upon his clear
view of the situation. Athens and Olynthus were joined in a
defensive league and Athenian ships and men were sent to the
Chalcidian peninsula,—too late. Partly by the force of his
arms and partly by the power of his gold, buying traitors,
Philip took Olynthus (B. C. 348) and all the thirty-two lesser
towns that were federated with her. He took them and he
destroyed them most brutally. "The haughty city of Olynthus
vanished from the face of the earth, and together with it
thirty-two towns inhabited by Greeks and flourishing as
commercial communities. … The lot of those who saved life
and liberty was happy in comparison with the fate of those
who, like the majority of the Olynthians, fell into the hands
of the conqueror and were sold into slavery, while their
possessions were burnt to ashes or flung as booty to the
mercenaries. … The mines continued to be worked for the
royal treasury; with this exception the whole of Chalcidice
became a desert"
E. Curtius,
History of Greece,
book 7, chapter 3 (volume 5).
ALSO IN:
A. M. Curteis,
Rise of the Macedonian Empire,
chapters 4-5.
B. G. Niebuhr,
Lectures on Ancient History,
lectures 66-68 (volume 2).
GREECE: B. C. 340.
Siege of Byzantium by Philip of Macedonia.
The enmity between Athens and Byzantium yielded in 340 B. C.
to their common fear of Philip of Macedon, and the exertions
of Demosthenes brought about an alliance of the two cities, in
which Perinthus, the near neighbor of Byzantium, was also
joined. Philip, in wrath, proceeded with a fleet and army
against both cities, laying siege, first to Perinthus and
afterwards to Byzantium, but without success in either case.
He was compelled to withdraw, after wasting several months in
the fruitless undertaking. It was one of the few failures of
the able Macedonian.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 90 (volume 11).
GREECE: B. C. 336-335.
Northern campaign of Alexander of Macedonia.
Revolt at Thebes.
Destruction of the city.
"Alexander … took up and continued the political and
military schemes which his father had begun. We first make
acquaintance with him and his army during his campaign against
the tribes on the northern frontier of Makedonia. This
campaign he carried out with energy equal to that of Philip,
and with more success (spring of 335 B. C.). The distinctive
feature of the war was that the Makedonian phalanx, the
organization and equipment of which were adapted from Grecian
models, everywhere won and maintained the upper hand. … Even
at this epoch Byzantium was rising into importance. That city
had, owing to its hostility with Persia, deserted the side of
the Greeks for that of the Makedonians. It was from Byzantium
that Alexander summoned triremes to help him against the
island in the Danube on which the king of the Triballi had
taken refuge. … The great successes of Alexander induced all
the neighboring nationalities to accept the proposals of
friendship which he made to them. … In Greece false reports
concerning the progress of events in the north had raised to
fever heat the general ferment which naturally existed.
{1599}
Alexander relied upon the resolutions of the League of the
Public Peace [formed by the Congress at Corinth], which had
recognized his father and afterwards himself as its head. But
he was now opposed by all those who were unable to forget
their former condition, and who preferred the alliance with
Persia which had left them independent, to the league with
Makedonia which robbed them of their autonomy. … Thebes took
the lead of the malcontents, and set about ridding herself of
the garrison which Philip had placed in the Cadmeia. She thus
became the centre of the whole Hellenic opposition. The
enemies of Makedon, who had been exiled from every city,
assembled in Thebes. … The same party was stirring in
Lakedæmon, in Arcadia, in Ætolia, and, above all, at Athens.
From Athens the Thebans were supplied, through the mediation
of Demosthenes, and doubtless by means of Persian gold, with
arms, of which they were likely to stand in need. …
Alexander had no sooner settled with his enemies in the north
than he turned to Hellas. So rapid was his movement that he
found the pass of Thermopylæ still open, and, long before he
was expected, appeared before the walls of Thebes." The fate
of the city was decided by a battle in which the Makedonians
were overwhelmingly victorious. "In the market-place, in the
streets, in the very houses, there ensued a hideous massacre.
… The victors were, however, not satisfied with the
slaughter. Alexander summoned a meeting of his League, by
which the complete destruction of Thebes was decreed, and this
destruction was actually carried out (October, 335 B. C.). [At
the same time Platæa, which Thebes had destroyed, was ordered
to be rebuilt.] In Grecian history it was no unheard-of event
that the members of the defeated nation should be sold into
slavery, and so it happened on this occasion. The sale of the
slaves supplied Alexander with a sum of money which was no
inconsiderable addition to his military chest. But his main
object was to strike terror, and this was spread through
Greece by the ruthless destruction of the city of Œdipus, of
Pindar, and of Epameinondas. … Deep and universal horror
fell upon the Greeks. … The close connection that existed at
this moment between Grecian and Persian affairs forbade him to
lose a moment in turning his arms towards Asia. … A war
between Alexander and Persia was inevitable, not only on
account of the relation of the Greeks to Makedon, whose yoke
they were very loth to bear, but on account of their relation
to Persia, on whose support they leaned. … The career which
Philip had begun, and in which Alexander was now proceeding,
led of necessity to a struggle with the power that held sway
in Asia Minor. Until that power were defeated, the Makedonian
kingdom could not be regarded as firmly established."
L. von Ranke,
Universal History:
The Oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks,
chapter 10, part 2.
ALSO IN:
Arrian,
Anabasis of Alexander,
book 1, chapters 1-10.
T. A. Dodge,
Alexander,
chapters 14-17.
GREECE: B. C. 334-323.
Asiatic conquests of Alexander the Great.
See MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330; and 330-323.
GREECE: B. C. 323-322.
Attempt to break the Macedonian yoke.
The Lamian War.
Subjugation of Athens.
Suppression of democracy.
Expulsion of poor citizens.
Death of Demosthenes.
On the death of Alexander the Great, B. C. 323, a party at
Athens which still hoped for freedom in Greece set on foot a
vigorous movement designed to break the Macedonian yoke. A
league was formed in which many cities joined—a larger
assemblage of Hellenic states, says Mr. Grote, than that which
resisted Xerxes in 480 B. C. A powerful army of Greek citizens
and mercenaries was formed and placed under the command of a
capable Athenian, Leosthenes, who led it into Thessaly, to
meet the Macedonian general Antipater, who now ruled Greece.
See MACEDONIA: B. C. 323-316.
The latter was defeated in a battle which ensued, and was
driven into the fortified Thessalian town of Lamia, where he
was besieged. Unfortunately, Leosthenes was killed during the
progress of the siege, and a long interval occurred before a
new commander could be agreed on. This gave Antipater time to
obtain succor from Asia. A Macedonian army, under Leonnatus,
crossed the Hellespont, and the besiegers of Lamia were forced
to break up their camp in order to meet it. They did so with
success; Leonnatus was slain and his army driven back. But
meantime Antipater escaped from Lamia, joined the defeated
troops and retreated into Macedonia. The war thus begun, and
which took the name of the Lamian War, was continued, not
unfavorably to the confederates, on the whole, until the
following summer—August, 322 B. C.—when it was ended by a
battle fought on the plain of Krannon, in Thessaly. Antipater,
who had been joined by Kraterus, from Asia, was the victor,
and Athens with all her allies submitted to the terms which he
dictated. He established a Macedonian garrison in Munychia,
and not only suppressed the democratic constitution of Athens,
but ordered all the poorer citizens—all who possessed less
than 2,000 drachmæ's worth of property, being 12,000 out of
the 21,000 who then possessed the Athenian franchise—to be
driven from the city; thus leaving a selected citizenship of
9,000 of the richer and more manageable men. The banished or
deported 12,000 were scattered in Thrace, Illyria, Italy and
even in northern Africa. The leaders of the anti-Macedonian
rising were pursued with unrelenting animosity. Demosthenes,
the great orator, who had been conspicuous among them, was
dragged from a temple at Kalauria, to which he had fled, and
took poison to escape the worse death which probably awaited
him.
G. Grote,
History of Greece,
part 2, chapter 95 (volume 12).
GREECE: B. C. 323-301.
Wars of the Diadochi or Successors of Alexander.
See MACEDONIA: B. C. 323-316; 315-310; and 310-301.
GREECE: B. C. 321-312.
The contest for Athens and Peloponnesus, between Cassander and
Polysperchon.
Execution of Phocion.
Restoration of Thebes.
"Antipater, after the termination of the Lamian war, passed
over to Asia and took part in the affairs there.
See MACEDONIA: A. D. 323-316.
Being appointed guardian to the Kings, as the children and
relatives of Alexander were called, he returned to Macedonia,
leading them with him. … Antipater died (Olympiad 115, 3)
shortly after his return to Macedonia. He directed that
Polysperchon, his ancient mate in arms, should succeed him in
his office, while to his son Cassander he left only the second
place. But Cassander, an ambitious youth, looked upon his
father's authority as his inheritance; and relying on the aid
of the aristocratic party in the Grecian states, of Ptolemæus,
who ruled in Egypt, and of Antigonus, the most powerful
general in Asia, he resolved to dispute it with Polysperchon.
{1600}
Under pretext of going a-hunting, he escaped out of Macedonia,
and passed over to Asia to concert matters with Antigonus.
Polysperchon, seeing war inevitable, resolved to detach
Greece, if possible, from Cassander. Knowing that the
oligarchies established in the different states by Antipater
would be likely to espouse the cause of his son, he issued a
pompous edict, in the name of the Kings, restoring the
democracies. … At Athens (Olympiad 115,4) [B. C. 317],
Nicanor, who commanded in the Munychia, finding that the
people were inclined toward Polysperchon, secretly collected
troops, and seized the Piræeus. The people sent to him
Phocion, Conon the son of Timotheüs, and Clearchus, men of
distinction, and his friends; but to no purpose. A letter also
came to him from Olympias, Alexander's mother, whom
Polysperchon had recalled from Epeirus, and given the charge
of her infant grandson, ordering him to surrender both the
Munychia and the Piræeus; but to as little effect. Finally,
Polysperchon's son Alexander entered Attica with an army, and
encamped before the Piræeus. Phocion and other chiefs of the
aristocracy went to Alexander, and advised him not to give
these places up to the people, but to hold them himself till
the contest with Cassander should be terminated. They feared,
it is evident, for their own safety, and not without reason;
for the people, ferocious with the recovery of power, soon
after held an assembly, in which they deposed all the former
magistrates, appointed the most furious democrats in their
room, and passed sentences of death, banishment, and
confiscation of goods on those who had governed under the
oligarchy. Phocion and his friends fled to Alexander, who
received them kindly, and sent them with letters in their
favor to his father, who was now in Phocis. The Athenians also
despatched an embassy, and, yielding to motives of interest,
Polysperchon sent his suppliants prisoners to Athens, to stand
a trial for their lives before the tribunal of an anarchic
mob. … The prisoners were condemned and led off to prison,
followed by the tears of their friends and the triumphant
execrations of their mean-spirited enemies. They drank the
fatal hemlock-juice, and their bodies were cast unburied
beyond the confines of Attica. Four days after the death of
Phocion, Cassander arrived at the Piræeus with 35 ships,
carrying 4,000 men, given him by Antigonus. Polysperchon
immediately entered Attica with 20,000 Macedonian foot and
4,000 of those of the allies, 1,000 horse, and 65 elephants,
which he had brought from Asia, and encamped near the Piræeus.
But as the siege was likely to be tedious, and sufficient
provisions for so large an army could not be had, he left a
force such as the country could support with his son
Alexander, and passed with the remainder into Peloponnesus, to
force the Megalopolitans to submit to the Kings; for they
alone sided with Cassander, all the rest having obeyed the
directions to put to death or banish his adherents. The whole
serviceable population of Megalopolis, slaves included,
amounted to 15,000 men; and under the directions of one Damis,
who had served in Asia under Alexander, they prepared for a
vigorous defence. Polysperchon sat down before the town, and
his miners in a short time succeeded in throwing down three
towers and a part of the wall. He attempted a storm, but was
obliged to draw off his men, after an obstinate conflict. …
The Athenians meantime saw themselves excluded from the sea,
and from all their sources of profit and enjoyment, while
little aid was to be expected from Polysperchon, who had been
forced to raise the siege of Megalopolis, and whose fleet had
just now been destroyed by Antigonus in the Hellespont. A
citizen of some consideration ventured at length to propose in
the assembly an arrangement with Cassander. The ordinary
tumult at first was raised, but the sense of interest finally
prevailed. Peace was procured, on the conditions of the
Munychia remaining in Cassander's hands till the end of the
present contest; political privileges being restricted to
those possessed of ten minas and upwards of property, and a
person appointed by Cassander being at the head of the
government. The person selected for this office was Demetrius
of Phaleron, a distinguished Athenian citizen; and under his
mild and equitable rule the people were far happier than they
could have been under a democracy, for which they had proved
themselves no longer fit. Cassander then passed over into
Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Tegea. While here, he heard
that Olympias had put to death several of his friends in
Macedonia; among the rest, Philip Aridæus and his wife
Eurydice, members of the royal family. He at once (Olympiad
116, 1) [B. C. 316] set out for Macedonia; and, as the pass of
Pylæ was occupied by the Ætolians, he embarked his troops in
Locris, and landed them in Thessaly. He besieged Olympias in
Pydna, forced her to surrender, and put her to death.
Macedonia submitted to him, and he then set forth for
Peloponnesus, where Polysperchon's son Alexander was at the
head of an army. He forced a passage through Pylæ, and coming
into Bœotia, announced his intention of restoring Thebes,
which had now lain desolate for twenty years. The scattered
Thebans were collected; the towns of Bœotia and other parts of
Greece (Athens in particular), and even of Italy and Sicily,
aided to raise the walls and to supply the wants of the
returning exiles, and Thebes was once more numbered among the
cities of Greece. As Alexander guarded the Isthmus, Cassander
passed to Megara, where he embarked his troops and elephants,
and crossed over to Epidaurus. He made Argos and Messene come
over to his side, and then returned to Macedonia. In the
conflict of interests which prevailed in this anarchic period,
Antigonus was ere long among the enemies of Cassander. He sent
one of his generals to Laconia, who, having obtained
permission from the Spartans to recruit in Peloponnesus,
raised 8,000 men. The command in Peloponnesus was given to
Polysperchon, whose son Alexander was summoned over to Asia to
accuse Cassander of treason before the assembly of the
Macedonian soldiers. Cassander was proclaimed a public enemy
unless he submitted to Antigonus; at the same time the Greeks
were declared independent, Antigonus hoping thus to gain them
over to his side. He then sent Alexander back with 500
talents; and when Ptolemæus of Egypt heard what Antigonus had
done, he also hastened to declare the independence of the
Greeks; for all the contending generals were anxious to stand
well with the people of Greece, from which country, exclusive
of other advantages, they drew their best soldiers.
{1601}
… Antigonus, to show the Greeks that he was in earnest in
his promise to restore them to independence, sent one of his
generals, named Telesphorus, with a fleet and army to
Peloponnesus, who expelled Cassander's garrisons from most of
the towns. The following year (Olympiad 117, 1) [B. C. 312] he
sent an officer, named Ptolemæus, with another fleet and army
to Greece. Ptolemæus landed in Bœotia, and being joined by
2,200 foot, and 1,300 horse of the Bœotians, he passed over to
Eubœa; where having expelled the Macedonian garrison from
Chalcis (the only town there which Cassander held), he left it
without any foreign garrison, as a proof that Antigonus meant
fairly. He then took Orôpus, and gave it to the Bœotians; he
entered Attica, and the people forced Demetrius Phalereus to
make a truce with him, and to send to Antigonus to treat of an
alliance. Ptolemæus returned to Bœotia, expelled the garrison
from the Cadmeia, and liberated Thebes."
T. Keightley,
History of Greece,
part 3, chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapter 58 (volume 7).
GREECE: B. C. 307-197.
Demetrius and the Antigonids.
In the spring of the year 307 B. C. Athens was surprised by an
expedition sent from Ephesus by Antigonus, under his
adventurous son Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes.
See MACEDONIA: B. C. 310-301.
The city had then been for ten years subject to Cassander, the
ruling chief in Macedonia for the time, and appears to have
been mildly governed by Cassander's lieutenant, Demetrius the
Phalerian. The coming of the other Demetrius offered nothing
to the Athenians but a change of masters, but they welcomed
him with extravagant demonstrations. Their degeneracy was
shown in proceedings of Asiatic servility. They deified
Demetrius and his father Antigonus, erected altars to them and
appointed ministering priests. After some months spent at
Athens in the enjoyment of these adulations, Demetrius
returned to Asia, to take part in the war which Antigonus was
waging with Ptolemy of Egypt and Lysimachus of Thrace, two of
his former partners in the partition of the empire of
Alexander. He was absent three years, and then returned, at
the call of the Athenians, to save them from falling again
into the hands of Cassander. He now made Athens his capital,
as it were, for something more than a year, while he acquired
control of Corinth, Argos, Sicyon, Chalcis in Eubœa and other
important places, greatly reducing the dominion of the
Macedonian, Cassander. His treatment at Athens, during this
period, was marked by the same impious and disgraceful
servility as before. He was called the guest of the goddess
Athene and lodged in the Parthenon, which he polluted with
intolerable debaucheries. But in the summer of 301 B. C. this
clever adventurer was summoned again to Asia, to aid his
father in the last great struggle, which decided the partition
of the empire of Alexander between his self-constituted heirs.
At the battle of Ipsus (see MACEDONIA: B. C. 310-301),
Antigonus perished and Demetrius was stripped of the kingdom
he expected to inherit. He turned to Athens for consolation,
and the fickle city refused to admit him within her walls. But
after some period of wanderings and adventures the
unconquerable prince got together a force with which he
compelled the Athenians to receive him, on more definite terms
of submission on their part and of mastery on his. Moreover,
he established his rule in the greater part of Peloponnesus,
and finally, on the death of Cassander (B. C. 297), he
acquired the crown of Macedonia. Not satisfied with what
fortune had thus given him, he attempted to recover the
Asiatic kingdom of his father, and died, B. C. 283, a captive
in the hands of the Syrian monarch, Seleucus. His Macedonian
kingdom had meantime been seized by Pyrrhus of Epirus; but it
was ultimately recovered by the eldest legitimate son of
Demetrius, called Antigonus Gonatus. From that time, for a
century, until the Romans came, not only Macedonia, but Greece
at large, Athens included, was ruled or dominated by this king
and his descendants, known as the Antigonid kings.
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapters 59-60 (volumes 7-8).
GREECE: B. C. 297-280.
Death of Cassander.
Intrigues and murders of Ptolemy Keraunos and his strange
acquisition of the Macedonian throne.
See MACEDONIA: B. C. 297-280.
GREECE: B. C. 280-279.
Invasion by the Gauls.
See GAULS: B. C. 280-279.
GREECE: B. C. 280-275.
Campaigns of Pyrrhus in Italy and Sicily.
See ROME: B. C. 282-275.
GREECE: B. C. 3d Century.
The Hellenistic world.
As the result of the conquests of Alexander and the wars of
his successors, there were, in the third century before
Christ, three great Hellenistic kingdoms, Macedonia, Egypt,
Syria, which lasted, each under its own dynasty, till Rome
swallowed them up. The first of these, which was the poorest,
and the smallest, but historically the most important,
included the ancestral possessions of Philip and Alexander—
Macedonia, most of Thrace, 'Thessaly, the mountainous centre
of the peninsula, as well as a protectorate more or less
definite and absolute over Greece proper, the Cyclades, and
certain tracts of Caria. … Next came Egypt, including Cyrene
and Cyprus, and a general protectorate over the sea-coast
cities of Asia Minor up to the Black Sea, together with claims
often asserted with success on Syria, and on the coast lands
of Southern Asia Minor. … Thirdly came what was now called
Syria, on account of the policy of the house of Seleucus, who
built there its capital, and determined to make the Greek or
Hellenistic end of its vast dominions its political centre of
gravity. The Kingdom of Syria owned the south and south-east
of Asia Minor, Syria, and generally Palestine, Mesopotamia,
and the mountain provinces adjoining it on the East, with
vague claims further east when there was no king like
Sandracottus to hold India and the Punjaub with a strong hand.
There was still a large element of Hellenism in these remote
parts. The kingdom of Bactria was ruled by a dynasty of kings
with Greek names—Euthydemus is the chief—who coined in Greek
style, and must therefore have regarded themselves as
successors to Alexander. There are many exceptions and
limitations to this general description, and many secondary
and semi-independent kingdoms, which make the picture of
Hellenism infinitely various and complicated. There was, in
fact, a chain of independent kingdoms reaching from Media to
Sparta, all of which asserted their complete freedom, and
generally attained it by balancing the great powers one
against the other.
{1602}
Here they are in their order. Atropatene was the kingdom in
the northern and western parts of the province of Media, by
Atropates, the satrap of Alexander, who claimed descent from
the seven Persian chiefs who put Darius I. on the throne. Next
came Armenia, hardly conquered by Alexander, and now
established under a dynasty of its own. Then Cappadocia, the
land in the heart of Asia Minor, where it narrows between
Cilicia and Pontus, ruled by sovereigns also claiming royal
Persian descent. … Fourthly, Pontus, under its equally
Persian dynast Mithridates—a kingdom which makes a great
figure in Eastern history under the later Roman Republic.
There was moreover a dynast of Bithynia, set up and supported
by the robber state of the Celtic Galatians, which had just
been founded, and was a source of strength and of danger to
all its neighbours. Then Pergamum, just being founded and
strengthened by the first Attalid, Philetærus, an officer of
Lysimachus, and presently to become one of the leading
exponents of Hellenism. … Almost all these second-rate
states (and with them the free Greek cities of Heracleia,
Cyzicus, Byzantium, &c.) were fragments of the shuttered
kingdom of Lysimachus. … We have taken no account of a very
peculiar feature extending all through even the Greek
kingdoms, especially that of the Selucids—the number of large
Hellenistic cities founded as special centres of culture, or
points of defence, and organized as such with a certain local
independence. These cities, most of which we only know by
name, were the real backbone of Hellenism in the world.
Alexander had founded seventy of them, all called by his name.
Many were upon great trade lines, like the Alexandria which
still exists. Many were intended as garrison towns in the
centre of remote provinces, like Candahar—a corruption of
Iskanderieh, Iskendar being the Oriental form for Alexander.
Some were mere outposts, where Macedonian soldiers were forced
to settle, and guard the frontiers against the barbarians,
like the Alexandria on the Iaxartes. … As regards Seleucus
… we have a remarkable statement from Appian that he founded
cities through the length and breadth of his kingdom, viz.,
sixteen Antiochs called after his father, five Laodiceas after
his mother, nine Seleucias after himself, three Apameias and
one Stratoniceia after his wives. … All through Syria and
Upper Asia there are many towns bearing Greek and Macedonian
names—Berea, Edessa, Perinthos, Aclæa, Pella, &c. The number
of these, which have been enumerated in a special catalogue by
Droysen, the learned historian of Hellenism, is enormous, and
the first question which arises in our mind is this: where
were Greek-speaking people found to fill them? It is indeed
true that Greece proper about this time became depopulated,
and that it never has recovered from this decay. … Yet …
the whole population of Greece would never have sufficed for
one tithe of the cities—the great cities—founded all over
Asia by the Diadochi. We are therefore driven to the
conclusion that but a small fraction, the soldiers and
officials of the new cities, were Greeks—Macedonians, when
founded by Alexander himself—generally broken down veterans,
mutinous and discontented troops, and camp followers. To these
were associated people from the surrounding country, it being
Alexander's fixed idea to discountenance sporadic country life
in villages and encourage town communities. The towns
accordingly received considerable privileges. … The Greek
language and political habits were thus the one bond of union
among them, and the extraordinary colonizing genius of the
Greek once more proved itself."
J. P. Mahaffy,
The Story of Alexander's Empire,
chapter 10.
See, also,
HELLENIC GENIUS AND INFLUENCE.
GREECE: B. C. 280-146.
The Achaian League.
Its rise and fall.
Destruction of Sparta.
Supremacy of Rome.
The Achaian League, which bore a leading part in the affairs
of Greece during the last half of the third and first half of
the second century before Christ, was in some sense the
revival of a more ancient confederacy among the cities of
Achaia in Peloponnesus. The older League, however, was
confined to twelve cities of Achaia and had little weight,
apparently, in general Hellenic politics. The revived League
grew beyond the territorial boundaries which were indicated by
its name, and embraced the larger part of Peloponnesus. It
began about 280 B. C. by the forming of a union between the
two Achaian cities of Patrai and Dyme. One by one their
neighbors joined them, until ten cities were confederated and
acting as one. "The first years of the growth of the Achaian
League are contemporary with the invasion of Macedonia and
Greece by the Gauls and with the wars between Pyrrhos and
Antigonos Gonatas.
See MACEDONIA, &c.: B. C. 277-244.
Pyrrhos, for a moment, expelled Antigonos from the Macedonian
throne, which Antigonos recovered while' Pyrrhos was warring
in Peloponnesos. By the time that Pyrrhos was dead, and
Antigonos again firmly fixed in Macedonia, the League had
grown up to maturity as far as regarded the cities of the old
Achaia. … Thus far, then, circumstances had favoured the
quiet and peaceful growth of the League." It had had the
opportunity to grow firm enough and strong enough, on the
small scale, to offer some lessons to its disunited and
tyrannized neighbors and to exercise an attractive influence
upon them. One of the nearest of these neighbors was Sikyon,
which groaned under a tyranny that had been fastened upon it
by Macedonian influence. Among the exiles from Sikyon was a
remarkable young man named Aratos, or Aratus, to whom the
successful working of the small Achaian League suggested some
broader extension of the same political organism. In B. C.
251, Aratos succeeded in delivering his native city from its
tyrant and in bringing about the annexation of Sikyon to the
Achaian League. Eight years later, having meantime been
elected to the chief office of the League, Aratos accomplished
the expulsion of the Macedonians and their agents from
Corinth, Megara, Troizen and Epidauros, and persuaded those
four cities to unite themselves with the Achaians. During the
next ten years he made similar progress in Arkadia, winning
town after town to the federation, until the Arkadian federal
capital, Megalopolis, was enrolled in the list of members, and
gave to the League its greatest acquisition of energy and
brain. In 229 B. C. the skill of Aratos and the prestige of
the League, taking advantage of disturbances in Macedonia,
effected the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons from
Athens and the liberation of that city, which did not become
confederated with its liberators, but entered into alliance
with them. Argos was emancipated and annexed, B. C. 228, and
"the League was now the greatest power of Greece.
{1603}
A Federation of equal cities, democratically governed,
embraced the whole of old Achaia, the whole of the Argolic
peninsula, the greater part of Arkadia, together with Phlious,
Sikyon, Corinth, Megara, and the island of Aigina." The one
rival of the Achaian League in Peloponnesus was Sparta, which
looked with jealousy upon its growing power, and would not be
confederated with it. The consequences of that jealous rivalry
were fatal to the hopes for Greece which the Achaian union had
seemed to revive. Unfortunately, rather than otherwise, the
Lacedæmonian throne came to be occupied at this time by the
last of the hero-kings of the Herakleid race—Kleomenes. When
the inevitable collision of war between Sparta and the League
occurred (B. C. 227-221), the personal figure of Kleomenes
loomed so large in the conflict that it took the name of the
Kleomenic War. Aratos was the worst of generals, Kleomenes one
of the greatest, and the Achaians were steadily beaten in the
field. Driven to sore straits at last, they abandoned the
whole original purpose of their federation, by inviting the
king of Macedonia to help them crush the independence of
Sparta. To win his aid they gave up Corinth to him, and under
his leadership they achieved the shameful victory of Sellasia
(B. C. 221), where all that is worthy in Lacedæmonian history
came to an end. The League was now scarcely more than a
dependency of the Macedonian kingdom, and figured as such in
the so-called Social War with the Ætolian League, B. C.
219-217. The wars of Rome with Macedonia which followed
renewed its political importance considerably for a time.
Becoming the ally of Rome, it was able to maintain a certain
dignity and influence until the supremacy of the Roman arms
had been securely proved, and then it sank to the helpless
insignificance which all Roman alliances led to in the end. It
was in that state when, on some complaint from Rome (B. C.
167), a thousand of the chief citizens of Achaia were sent as
prisoners to Italy and detained there until less than 300
survived to return to their homes. Among them was the
historian Polybios. A little later (B. C. 146) there was a
wild revolt from the Roman yoke, in which Corinth took the
lead. A few months of war ensued, ending in a decisive battle
at Leukopetra. Then Corinth was sacked and destroyed by the
Roman army and the Achaian League disappeared from history.
E. A. Freeman,
History of Federal Government,
chapters 5-9.
ALSO IN:
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapters 61-66 (volume 8).
Polybius,
History.
GREECE: B. C. 214-146.
The Roman conquest.
The series of wars in which the Romans made themselves masters
of Greece were known in their annals as the Macedonian Wars.
At the beginning, they were innocent of aggression. A young
and ambitious but unprincipled king of Macedonia—Philip, who
succeeded the able Antigonos Doson—had put himself in
alliance with the Carthaginians and assailed the Romans in the
midst of their desperate conflict with Hannibal. For the time
they were unable to do more than trouble Philip so far as to
prevent his bringing effective reinforcements to the enemy at
their doors, and this they accomplished in part by a treaty
with the Ætolians, which enlisted that unscrupulous league
upon their side. The first Macedonian war, which began B. C.
214, was terminated by the Peace of Dyrrachium, B. C. 205. The
Peace was of five years duration, and Philip employed it in
reckless undertakings against Pergamus, against Rhodes,
against Athens, everyone of which carried complaints to Rome,
the rising arbiter of the Mediterranean world, whose hostility
Philip lost no opportunity to provoke. On the Ides of March,
B. C. 200, the Roman senate declared war. In the spring of B.
C. 197 this second Macedonian War was ended at the battle of
Cynoscephalæ—so called from the name of a range of hills
known as the Dog-heads—where the Macedonian army was
annihilated by the consul T. Quinctius Flamininus. At the next
assembly of the Greeks for the Isthmian Games, a crier made
proclamation in the arena that the Roman Senate and T.
Quinctius the General, having conquered King Philip and the
Macedonians, declared all the Greeks who had been subject to
the king free and independent. Henceforth, whatever freedom
and independence the states of Greece enjoyed were according
to the will of Rome. An interval of twenty-five years, broken
by the invasion of Antiochus and his defeat by the Romans at
Thermopylæ (see SELEUCIDÆ: B. C. 224-187), was followed by a
third Macedonian War. Philip was now dead and succeeded by his
son Perseus, known to be hostile to Rome and accused of
intrigues with her enemies. The Roman Senate forestalled his
intentions by declaring war. The war which opened B. C. 171
was closed by the battle of Pydna, fought June 22, B. C. 168,
where 20,000 Macedonians were slain and 11,000 taken
prisoners, while the Romans lost scarcely 100 men. Perseus
attempted flight, but was soon driven to give himself up and
was sent to Rome. The Macedonian kingdom was then extinguished
and its territory divided between four nominal republics,
tributary to Rome. Twenty years after, there was an attempt
made by a pretender to re-establish the Macedonian throne, and
a fourth Macedonian War occurred; but it was soon finished (B.
C. 146—see above, B. C. 280-146). The four republics then
gave way, to form a Roman province of Macedonia and Epirus,
while the remainder of Greece, in turn, became the Roman
province of Achaia.
C. Thirlwall,
History of Greece,
chapters 64-66 (volume 8).
ALSO IN:
H. G. Liddell,
History of Rome,
chapters 39, 43 and 45.
E. A. Freeman,
History of Federal Government,
chapters 8-9.
Polybius,
General History.
GREECE: B. C. 191.
War of Antiochus of Syria and the Romans.
See SELEUCIDÆ: B. C. 224-187.
GREECE: B. C. 146-A. D. 180.
Under the Romans, to the reign of Marcus Aurelius.
Sufferings in the Mithridatic war and revolt,
and in the Roman civil wars.
Treatment by the emperors.
Munificence of Herodes Atticus.
"It was some time [after the Roman conquest] before the Greeks

had great reason to regret their fortune. A combination of
causes, which could hardly have entered into the calculations
of any politician, enabled them to preserve their national
institutions, and to exercise all their former social
influence, even after the annihilation of their political
existence. Their vanity was flattered by their admitted
superiority in arts and literature, and by the respect paid to
their usages and prejudices by the Romans. Their political
subjection was at first not very burdensome; and a
considerable portion of the nation was allowed to retain the
appearance of independence.
{1604}
Athens and Sparta were honoured with the title of allies of
Rome. [Athens retained this independent existence, partaking
something of the position of Hamburg in the Germanic body,
until the time of Caracalla, when its citizens were absorbed
into the Roman empire.—Footnote.] The nationality of the
Greeks was so interwoven with their municipal institutions,
that the Romans found it impossible to abolish the local
administration; and an imperfect attempt made at the time of
the conquest of Achaia was soon abandoned. … The Roman
senate was evidently not without great jealousy and some fear
of the Greeks; and great prudence was displayed in adopting a
number of measures by which they were gradually weakened, and
cautiously broken to the yoke of their conquerors. … It was
not until after the time of Augustus, when the conquest of
every portion of the Greek nation had been completed, that the
Romans began to view the Greeks in the contemptible light in
which they are represented by the writers of the capital.
Crete was not reduced into the form of a province until about
eight years after the subjection of Achaia, and its conquest
was not effected without difficulty, after a war of three
years, by the presence of a consular army. The resistance it
offered was so obstinate that it was almost depopulated ere
the Romans could complete its conquest. … The Roman
government … soon adopted measures tending to diminish the
resources of the Greek states when received as allies of the
republic. … If we could place implicit faith in the
testimony of so firm and partial an adherent of the Romans as
Polybius, we must believe that the Roman administration was at
first characterised by a love of justice, and that the Roman
magistrates were far less venal than the Greeks. … Less than
a century of irresponsible power effected a wonderful change
in the conduct of the Roman magistrates. Cicero declares that
the senate made a traffic of justice to the provincials. …
But as the government of Rome grew more oppressive, and the
amount of the taxes levied on the provinces was more severely
exacted, the increased power of the republic rendered any
rebellion of the Greeks utterly hopeless. … For sixty years
after the conquest of Achaia, the Greeks remained docile
subjects of Rome. … The number of Roman usurers increased,
and the exactions of Roman publicans in collecting the taxes
became more oppressive, so that when the army of Mithridates
invaded Greece, B. C. 86, while Rome appeared plunged in
anarchy by the civil broils of the partisans of Marius and
Sylla, the Greeks in office conceived the vain hope of
recovering their independence. …
See MITHRIDATIC WARS;
and ATHENS: B. C. 87-86.
Both parties, during the Mithridatic war, inflicted severe
injuries on Greece. … Many of the losses were never
repaired. The foundations of national prosperity were
undermined, and it henceforward became impossible to save from
the annual consumption of the inhabitants the sums necessary
to replace the accumulated capital of ages, which this short
war had annihilated."
G. Finlay,
Greece under the Romans,
chapter 1.
"Scarcely had the storm of Roman war passed by, when the
Cilician pirates, finding the coasts of Greece peculiarly
favorable for their marauding incursions, and tempted by the
wealth accumulated in the cities and temples, commenced their
depredations on so gigantic a scale that Rome felt obliged to
put forth all her military forces for their suppression. The
exploits of Pompey the Great, who was clothed with autocratic
power to destroy this gigantic evil, fill the brightest
chapter in the history of that celebrated but too unfortunate
commander. …
See CILICIA, PIRATES OF.
The civil wars in which the great Republic expired had the
fields of Greece for their theatre. Under the tramp of
contending armies, her fertile plains were desolated, and
Roman blood, in a cause not her own; again and again moistened
her soil.
See ROME: B. C. 48, 44-42, and 31.
But at length the civil wars have come to an end, and the
Empire introduces, for the first time in the melancholy
history of man, a state of universal peace. Greece still
maintains her pre-eminence in literature and art, and her
schools are frequented by the sons of the Roman aristocracy.
Her elder poets serve as models to the literary genius of the
Augustan age. … The historians form themselves on Attic
prototypes, and the philosophers of Rome divide themselves
among the Grecian sects, while in Athens the Platonists, the
Stoics, the Peripatetics, and the Epicureans still haunt the
scenes with which the names of their masters were inseparably
associated. … The establishment of the Empire made but
little change in the administration of Greece. Augustus,
indeed, showed no great solicitude, except to maintain the
country in subjection by his military colonies,—especially
those of Patræ and Nicopolis. He even deprived Athens of the
privileges she had enjoyed under the Republic, and broke down
the remaining power of Sparta, by declaring the independence
of her subject towns. Some of his successors treated the
country with favor, and endeavored, by a clement use of
authority, to mitigate the sufferings of its decline. Even
Nero, the amiable fiddler of Rome, was proud to display the
extent of his musical abilities in their theatres. … The
noble Trajan allowed the Greeks to retain their former local
privileges, and did much to improve their condition by his
wise and just administration. Hadrian was a passionate lover
of Greek art and literature. Athens especially received the
amplest benefits from his taste and wealth. He finished the
temple of Olympian Zeus; established a public library; built a
pantheon and a gymnasium; rebuilt the temple of Apollo at
Megara; improved the old roads of Greece and made new ones.
… Antoninus and Marcus Aurelius showed good will to Greece.
The latter rebuilt the temple at Eleusis, and improved the
Athenian schools, raising the salaries of the teachers, and in
various ways contributing to make Athens, as it had been
before, the most illustrious seat of learning in the world. It
was in the reign of this Emperor, in the second century of our
era, that one of the greatest benefactors of Athens and all
Greece lived,--Herodes Atticus, distinguished alike for
wealth, learning, and eloquence. Born at Marathon, …
educated at Athens by the best teachers his father's wealth
could procure, he became on going to Rome, in early life, the
rhetorical teacher of Marcus Aurelius himself. Antoninus Pius
bestowed on him the honor of the consulship; but he preferred
the career of a teacher at Athens to the highest political
dignities … , and he was followed thither by young men of
the most eminent Roman families, from the Emperor's down. …
{1605}
At Athens, south of the Ilissus, he built the stadium … and
the theatre of Regilla. … At Corinth he built a theatre; at
Olympia, an aqueduct; at Delphi, a race-course; and at
Thermopylæ, a hospital. Peloponnesus, Eubœa, Bœotia, and
Epeirus experienced his bounty, and even Italy was not
forgotten in the lavish distribution of his wealth. He died in
A. D. 180."
C. C. Felton,
Greece, Ancient and Modern, 4th course,
lecture 3 (volume 2).
On the influence which Greek genius and culture exercised upon
the Romans,
See HELLENIC GENIUS AND INFLUENCE.
ALSO IN:
T. Mommsen,
History of Rome: The Provinces,
chapter 7 (volume 1).
J. P. Mahaffy,
The Greek World under Roman Sway.
See, also, ATHENS: B. C. 197-A. D. 138.
GREECE: B. C. 48.
Cæsar's campaign against Pompeius.
Pharsalia.
See ROME: B. C. 48.
GREECE: A. D. 258-395.
Gothic invasions.
See GOTHS.
GREECE: A. D. 330.
Transference of the capital of the Roman Empire to Byzantium
(Constantinople).
See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 330.
GREECE: A. D. 394-395.
Final division of the Roman Empire between the sons of
Theodosius.
Definite organization of the Eastern Empire under Arcadius.
See ROME: A. D. 394-395.
GREECE: A. D. 425.
Legal separation of the Eastern and Western Empires.
See Rome: A. D. 423-450.
GREECE: A. D. 446.
Devastating invasion of the Huns.
See HUNS: A. D. 441-446.
GREECE: A. D. 527-567.
The reign of Justinian at Constantinople.
His recovery of Italy and Africa.
See ROME: A. D. 527-567, and 535-553.
GREECE: 7th Century.
Slavonic occupation of the Peninsula.
See SLAVONIC PEOPLES: 6TH AND 7TH CENTURIES.
GREECE: A. D. 717-1205.
The Byzantine Empire to its fall.
See BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 717, to 1204-1205.
GREECE: A. D. 1205-1261.
Overthrow of the Byzantine Empire by the Crusaders.
The Latin Empire of Romania.
The Greek Empire of Nicæa.
The dukedoms of Athens and Naxos;
The principality of Achaia.
See ROMANIA; GREEK EMPIRE OF NICÆA;
ATHENS: A. D.1205;
ACHAIA: A. D. 1205-1387;
and NAXOS.
GREECE: A. D. 1261-1453.
The restored Byzantine or Greek Empire.
See CONSTANTINOPLE; A. D. 1261-1453;
and BYZANTINE EMPIRE: A. D. 1261-1453.
GREECE: A. D. 1453-1479.
The Turkish Conquest.
See TURKS: A. D. 1451-1481;
CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1453, and 1453-1481;
and ATHENS: A. D. 1456.
GREECE: A. D. 1454-1479.
War of Turks and Venetians in the Peninsula.
Siege of Corinth.
Sack of Athens.
Massacres at Negropont and Croia.
"The taking of Constantinople by the Turks, and the captivity
of the Venetians settled in Pera, threatened [the power of
Venice] … in the East; and she felt no repugnance to enter
into a treaty with the enemies of her religion. After a year's
negotiation, terms were concluded [1454] between the Sultan
and Venice; by which her possessions were secured to her, and
her trade guaranteed throughout the empire. In virtue of this
treaty she continued to occupy Modon, Coron, Napoli di
Romania, Argos, and other cities on the borders of the
Peninsula, together with Eubœa (Negropont) and some of the
smaller islands. But this good understanding was interrupted
in 1463, when the Turks contrived an excuse for attacking the
Venetian territory. Under pretence of resenting the asylum
afforded to a Turkish refugee, the Pasha of the Morea besieged
and captured Argos; and the Republic felt itself compelled
immediately to resent the aggression. A re-inforcement was
sent from Venice to Napoli, and Argos was quickly recaptured.
Corinth was next besieged, and the project of fortifying the
isthmus was once more renewed. … The labour of 30,000
workmen accomplished the work in 15 days; a stone wall of more
than 12 feet high, defended by a ditch and flanked by 136
towers, was drawn across the isthmus. … But the approach
of the Turks, whose numbers were probably exaggerated by
report, threw the Venetians into distrust and consternation;
and, unwilling to confide in the strength of their rampart,
they abandoned the siege of Corinth, and retreated to Napoli,
from which the infidels were repulsed with the loss of 5,000
men. The Peloponnesus was now exposed to the predatory
retaliations of the Turks and Venetians; and the Christians
appeared anxious to rival or surpass the Mahomedans in the
refinement of their barbarous inflictions. … In the year
1465, Sigismondo Malatesta landed in the Morea with a
re-inforcement of 1,000 men; and, without effecting the
reduction of the citadel, captured and burned Misitra [near
the ruins of ancient Sparta]. In the following year, Vittore
Cappello, with the Venetian fleet, arrived in the straits of
Euripus; and landing at Aulis marched into Attica. After
making himself master of the Piræus, he laid siege to Athens;
her walls were overthrown; her inhabitants plundered; and the
Venetians retreated with the spoil to the opposite shores of
Eubœa. The victorious career of Matthias Corvinus, King of
Hungary, for a time diverted the Sultan from the war in the
Morea; but … in the beginning of the year 1470 a fleet of
108 gallies, besides a number of smaller vessels, manned by a
force 70,000 strong, issued from the harbour of
Constantinople, and sailed for the straits of Euripus. … The
army landed without molestation on the island, which they
united to the mainland by a bridge of boats, and immediately
proceeded to lay siege to the city of Negropont. … The hopes
of the besieged were now centred in the Venetian fleet, which,
under the command of Nicolo Canale, lay at anchor in the
Saronic Gulf. But that admiral, whilst he awaited a
re-inforcement, let slip the favourable opportunity of
preventing the debarcation of the enemy, or of shutting up the
Turks in the island by the destruction of their half-deserted
fleet and bridge of boats. By an unaccountable inactivity, he
suffered the city to be attacked, which, after a vigorous
resistance of nearly a month, was carried by assault [July 12,
1470]; and all the inhabitants, who did not escape into the
citadel, were put to the sword. At length that fortress was
also taken; and the barbarous conqueror, who had promised to
respect the head of the intrepid governor, deemed it no
violation of his word to saw his victim in halves. After this
decisive blow, which reduced the whole island, Mahomed led
back his conquering army to Constantinople. … This success
encouraged the Turks to attack the Venetians in their Italian
territory; and the Pasha of Bosnia invaded Istria and Friuli,
and carried fire and sword almost to the gates of Udine.
{1606}
In the following year [1474], however, the Turks were baffled
in their attempt to reduce Scutari in Albania, which had been
delivered by the gallant Scanderbeg to the guardian care of
Venice. Some abortive negotiations for peace suspended
hostilities until 1477, when the troops of Mahomed laid siege
to Croia in Albania, which they reduced to the severest
distress. But a new incursion into Friuli struck a panic into
the inhabitants of Venice, who beheld, from the tops of their
churches and towers, the raging flames which devoured the
neighbouring villages." The Turks, however, withdrew into
Albania, where the siege of Croia was terminated by its
surrender and the massacre of its inhabitants, and the Sultan,
in person, renewed the attack on Scutari. The stubborn
garrison of that stronghold, however, resisted, with fearful
slaughter, a continuous assault made upon their walls during
two days and a night. Mahomed was forced to convert the siege
into a blockade, and his troops reappeared in Friuli. "These
repeated aggressions on her territories made Venice every day
more anxious to conclude a peace with the Sultan," and a
treaty was signed in April, 1479. "It was agreed that the
islands of Negropont and Mitylene, with the cities of Croia
and Scutari in Albania, and of Tenaro in the Morea, should be
consigned to the Turk; whilst other conquests were to be
reciprocally restored to their former owners. A tribute of
10,000 ducats was imposed upon Venice, and the inhabitants of
Scutari [now reduced to 500 men and 150 women] were to be
permitted to evacuate the city."
Sir R. Comyn,
History of the Western Empire,
chapter 31 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
Sir E. S. Creasy,
History of the Ottoman Turks,
chapter 5.
GREECE: A. D. 1645-1669.
The war of Candia.
Surrender of Crete to the Turks by the Venetians.
See TURKS: A. D. 1645-1669.
GREECE: A. D. 1684-1696.
Conquests by the Venetians from the Turks.
See TURKS: A. D. 1684-1696.
GREECE: A. D. 1699.
Cession of part of the Morea to Venice by the Turks.
See HUNGARY: A. D. 1683-1699.
GREECE: A. D. 1714-1718.
The Venetians expelled again from the Morea by the Turks.
Corfu defended.
See TURKS: A. D. 1714-1718.
GREECE: A. D. 1770-1772.
Revolt against the Turkish rule.
Russian encouragement and desertion.
See TURKS: A. D. 1768-1774.
GREECE: A. D. 1821-1829.
Overthrow of Turkish rule.
Intervention of Russia, England and France.
Battle of Navarino.
Establishment of national independence.
"The Spanish revolution of 1820 [see SPAIN: A. D. 1814-1827],
which was speedily followed by the revolutions of Naples,
Sicily, and Piedmont, caused a great excitement throughout
Europe, and paved the way for the Greek revolution of 1821.
Since the beginning of the century the Greeks had been
preparing for the struggle; in fact, for more than fifty years
there had been a general movement in the direction of
independence. … There had been many insurrections against
the Turkish authority, but they were generally suppressed
without difficulty, though with the shedding of much Greek
blood. Nearly every village in Greece suffered from pillage by
the Turks, and the families were comparatively few that did
not mourn a father, son, or brother, killed by the Turks or
carried into slavery, or a daughter or sister transported to a
Turkish harem. … Notwithstanding their subjugation, many of
the Greeks were commercially prosperous, and a large part of
the traffic of the East was in their hands. They conducted
nearly all the coasting trade of the Levant, and a few years
before the revolution they had 600 vessels mounting 6,000 guns
(for defence against pirates) and manned by 18,000 seamen. …
In laying their plans for independence the Greeks resorted to
the formation of secret societies, and so well was the scheme
conducted that everything was ripe for insurrection before the
Turkish rulers had any suspicion of the state of affairs. A
great association was formed which included Greeks everywhere,
not only in Greece and its islands, but in Constantinople,
Austria, Germany, England, and other countries, wherever a
Greek could be found. Men of other nationalities were
occasionally admitted, but only when their loyalty to the
Greek cause was beyond question, and their official positions
gave them a chance to aid in the work. Several distinguished
Russians were members, among them Count Capo D'Istria, a Greek
by birth, who held the office of private secretary to the
Emperor Alexander I. of Russia. The society was known as the
Hetaira, or Hetairist, and consisted of several degrees or
grades. The highest contained only sixteen persons, whose
names were not all known, and it was impossible for any member
of the lower classes to ascertain them. … All the Hetairists
looked hopefully towards Russia, partly in consequence of
their community of religion, and partly because of the
fellow-feeling of the two countries in cordially detesting the
Turk. … The immediate cause of the revolution, or rather the
excuse for it, was the death of the Hospodar of Wallachia,
January 30, 1821, followed by the appointment of his
successor. During the interregnum, which naturally left the
government in a weakened condition, the Hetairists determined
to strike their blow for liberty. A band of 150 Greeks and
Arnauts, under the command of Theodore Vladimiruko, formerly a
lieutenant-colonel in the Russian service, marched out of
Bucharest and seized the small town of Czernitz, near Trajan's
Bridge, on the Danube. There Theodore issued a proclamation,
and such was the feeling of discontent among the people, that
in a few days he had a force of 12,000 men under his command.
Soon afterwards there was an insurrection in Jassy, the
capital of Moldavia, headed by Prince Alexander Ipsilanti, an
officer in the Russian service. He issued a proclamation in
which the aid of Russia was distinctly promised, and as the
news of this proclamation was carried to Greece, there was a
general movement in favor of insurrection. The Russian
minister assured the Porte that his government had nothing to
do with the insurrection, and the Patriarch and Synod of
Constantinople issued a proclamation emphatically denouncing
the movement, but in spite of this assurance and proclamation
the insurrection went on. Count Nesselrode declared officially
that Ipsilanti's name would be stricken from the Russian army
list, and that his act was one for which he alone was
responsible. This announcement was the death-blow of the
insurrection in Moldavia and Wallachia, as the forces of
Theodore and Ipsilanti were suppressed, after some sharp
fighting, by the hordes of Moslems that were brought against
them. … Nearly the whole of Greece was in full insurrection
in a few months, and with far better prospects than had the
insurrection on the Danube.
{1607}
Turks and Greeks were embittered against each other; the
war-cry of the Turk was, 'Death to the Christian!' while that
of the Christian was, 'Death to the Turk!' The example was set
by the Turks, and, to the eternal disgrace of the Turkish
government, slaughter in cold blood was made official. It was
by the order and authority of the Porte that Gregory,
Patriarch of Constantinople, a revered prelate, eighty years
of age, was seized on Easter Sunday, as he was descending from
the altar where he had been celebrating divine service, and
hanged at the gate of his archiepiscopal palace, amid the
shouts and howls of a Moslem mob. After hanging three hours,
the body was cut down and delivered to some Jews, who dragged
it about the streets and threw it into the sea, whence it was
recovered the same night by some Christian fishermen. Some
weeks later it was taken to Odessa and buried with great
ceremony. This act of murder was the more atrocious on the
part of the Turks, since the Patriarch had denounced the
insurrection in a public proclamation, and his life and
character were most blameless and exemplary. It is safe to say
that this barbarity had more to do with fanning the fires of
revolt than any other act of the Turkish government. But it
was by no means the only act of the kind of which the Turks
were guilty. The Patriarch of Adrianople with eight of his
ecclesiastics was beheaded, and so were the dragoman of the
Porte and several other eminent residents of Constantinople,
descended from Greek settlers of two or three centuries ago.
Churches were everywhere broken open and plundered; Greek
citizens of the highest rank were murdered, their property
stolen, and their wives and daughters sold as slaves; on the
15th of June five archbishops and a great number of laymen
were hanged in the streets, and 450 mechanics were sold and
transported into slavery; at Salonica the battlements of the
town were lined with Christian heads, from which the blood ran
down and discolored the water in the ditch. In all the great
towns of the empire there were similar atrocities; some were
the work of mobs, which the authorities did not seek to
restrain, but the greater part of them were ordered by the
governors or other officials, and met the approval of the
Porte. At Smyrna, the Christian population was massacred by
thousands without regard to age or sex, and in the island of
Cyprus a body of 10,000 troops sent by the Porte ravaged the
island, executed the metropolitan, five bishops, and
thirty-six other ecclesiastics, and converted the whole island
into a scene of rapine, bloodshed, and robbery. Several
thousand Christians were killed before the atrocities ceased,
and hundreds of their wives and daughters were carried into
Turkish harems. These and similar outrages plainly told the
Greeks that no hope remained except in complete independence
of the Turks, and from one end of Greece to the other the
fires of insurrection were everywhere lighted. The islands, as
well as the mainland, were in full revolt, and the fleet of
coasting vessels, nearly all of them armed for resisting
pirates, gave the Turks a great deal of trouble. … On the
land, battle followed battle in different parts of the
country, and the narration of the events of the insurrection
would fill a bulky volume. … During the latter part of 1821,
the advantages to the Greeks were sufficient to encourage them
to proclaim their independence, which was done in January,
1822. In the same month the Turks besieged Corinth, and in the
following April they besieged and captured Chios (Scio),
ending the capture with the slaughter of 40,000 inhabitants,
the most horrible massacre of modern times. In July, the
Greeks were victorious at Thermopylæ; in the same month
Corinth fell, with great slaughter of the defenders. In April,
1823, the Greeks held a national congress at Argos; the
victories of Marco Bozzaris occurred in the following June,
and in August he was killed in a night attack upon the Turkish
camp; in August, too, Lord Byron landed at Athens to take part
in the cause of Greece, which was attracting the attention of
the whole civilized world. The first Greek loan was issued in
England in February, 1824; Lord Byron died at Missolonghi in
the following April; in August the Capitan Pasha was defeated
at Samos with heavy loss; in October, the provisional
government of Greece was set up; and the fighting became
almost continuous in the mountain districts of Greece. In
February, 1825, Ibrahim Pasha arrived with a powerful army
from Egypt, which captured Navarino in May, and Tripolitza in
June of the same year. In July, the provisional government
invoked the aid of England; in the following April (1826),
Ibrahim Pasha took Missolonghi after a long and heroic defence
[for twelve months]; and nearly a year later Reschid Pasha
captured Athens. Down to the beginning of 1826, the Greeks had
felt seriously the deprivation of Russian sympathy and aid for
which they had been led to look before the revolution. The
death of Alexander I., and the accession of Nicholas in
December, 1825, caused a change in the situation. The British
government sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg
ostensibly to congratulate Nicholas on his elevation to the
throne, but really to secure concert of action in regard to
Greece. On the 4th of April a protocol was signed by the Duke
of Wellington, Prince Lieven, and Count Nesselrode, which may
be considered the foundation of Greek independence. Out of
this protocol grew the treaty of July 6, 1827, between
England, Russia, and France, by which it was stipulated that
those nations should mediate between the contending Greeks and
Turks. They proposed to the Sultan that he should retain a
nominal authority over the Greeks, but receive from them a
fixed annual tribute. … The Sultan … refused to listen to
the scheme of mediation, and immediately made preparations for
a fresh campaign, and also for the defence of Turkey in case
of an attack. Ships and reinforcements were sent from
Constantinople, and the Egyptian fleet, consisting of two
84-gun ships, twelve frigates, and forty-one transports, was
despatched from Alexandria with 5,000 troops, and reached
Navarino towards the end of August, 1827. The allied powers
had foreseen the possibility of the Porte's refusal of
mediation, and taken measures accordingly; an English fleet
under Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, and a French fleet under
Admiral De Rigny, were in the Mediterranean, and were shortly
afterwards joined by the Russian fleet under Admiral Heiden.
… The allied admirals held a conference, and decided to
notify Ibrahim Pasha that he must stop the barbarities of
plundering and burning villages and slaughtering their
inhabitants.
{1608}
But Ibrahim would not listen to their remonstrances, and to
show his utter disregard for the powers, he commanded four of
his ships to sail to the Gulf of Patras to occupy Missolonghi
and relieve some Turkish forts, in effect to clear those
waters of every Greek man-of-war which was stationed there.
This he did easily, the allied squadrons being temporarily
absent. Admiral Codrington pursued him and, without
difficulty, drove him back to Navarino. … A general muster
of all the ships was ordered by Admiral Codrington,
Commander-in-Chief of the squadron. … The allied fleet
mounted 1,324 guns, while the combined Turkish and Egyptian
fleet mounted 2,240 guns. To this superiority in the number of
guns on board must be added the batteries on shore, which were
all in the hands of the Turks. But the Christians had a point
in their favor in their superiority in ships of the line, of
which they possessed ten, while the Turks had but three. …
The allied fleet entered the Bay of Navarino about two o'clock
on the afternoon of October 20, 1827. … In less than four
hours from the beginning of the contest the Ottoman fleet had
ceased to be. Every armed ship was burnt, sunk, or destroyed;
the only remaining vessels belonging to the Turks and
Egyptians were twenty-five of the smallest transports, which
were spared by order of Admiral Codrington. It was estimated
that the loss in men on the Turkish and Egyptian vessels was
fully 7,000. On the side of the allies, no vessels were
destroyed, but the Asia, Albion, and Genoa of the English
fleet were so much injured, that Admiral Codrington sent them
to Malta for repairs which would enable them to stand the
voyage home to England. Seventy-five men were killed and 197
wounded on the British fleet, and the loss of the French was
43 killed and 117 wounded. The Russian loss was not reported.
… It was feared that when the news of the event at Navarino
reached Constantinople, the lives of all Europeans in that
city, including the foreign ambassadors, would be in great
danger, but happily there was no violence on the part of the
Turks. The ambassadors pressed for an answer to their note of
August 16th, and at length the Sultan replied: 'My positive,
absolute, definitive, unchangeable, eternal answer is, that
the Sublime Porte does not accept any proposition regarding
the Greeks, and will persist in its own will regarding them
even to the last day of judgment.' The Porte even demanded
compensation for the destruction of the fleet, and
satisfaction for the insult, and that the allies should
abstain from all interference in the affairs of Greece. The
reply of the ambassadors was to the effect that the treaty of
July obliged them to defend Greece, and that the Turks had no
claim whatever for reparation for the affair of Navarino. The
ambassadors left Constantinople on the 8th December, and soon
afterwards Count Capo D'Istria, who had been elected President
of Greece, took his seat, and issued a proclamation, declaring
that the Ottoman rule over the country was at an end after
three centuries of oppression. Thus was the independence of
Greece established. There was little fighting after the events
of Navarino, and early in 1828 Admiral Codrington and Ibrahim
Pasha held a convention and agreed upon measures for
evacuating the land of the Hellenes. During the summer and
autumn Patras, Navarino, and Modon were successively
surrendered to the French, and the Morea was evacuated by the
Turks. Missolonghi was surrendered to Greece early in 1829,
and by the Treaty of Adrianople in September of the same year
the Porte acknowledged the independence of Greece, which was
henceforth to be one in the family of nations."
T. W. Knox,
Decisive Battles since Waterloo,
chapter 3.
ALSO IN:
C. A. Fyffe,
History of Modern Europe,
volume 2, chapter 4.
S. G. Howe,
Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution.
T. Gordon,
History of the Greek Revolution.
Lord Byron,
Letters and Journals, 1823-4 (volume 2).
E. J. Trelawny,
Records of Shelley, Byron, etc.,
chapters 19-20 (volume 2).
S. Walpole,
History of England,
chapters 9 and 11 (volume 2).
GREECE: A. D. 1822-1823.
The Congress of Verona.
See VERONA, THE CONGRESS OF.
GREECE: A. D. 1830-1862.
The independent kingdom constituted under Otho of Bavaria.
Its unsatisfactoriness.
Dethronement of King Otho.
Election of Prince George of Denmark.
"On February 3d, 1830, a protocol was signed which constituted
Greece an independent State; and on the 11th of the same month
Prince Leopold of Belgium accepted the crown which was offered
to him by the Powers: He, however, soon resigned the honour;
giving for his main reason the hopelessness of establishing a
Greek kingdom from which Krete, Epeiros, and Thessaly were to
be excluded. The northern boundary, as drawn in 1830,
stretched from the Gulf of Zeitoun to the mouth of the
Aspropotamos, thus depriving Greece of the greater part of
Akarnania and Aitolia. After the assassination [by the family
of an insurgent chief] of Count Capodistna (who was the
popularly elected President of Greece from April 14th, 1827,
to October 9th, 1831), and after the Powers had selected
Prince Otho of Bavaria for the position declined by Prince
Leopold, an arrangement was concluded between England, France,
Russia, and Turkey, whereby the boundary was drawn from the
Gulf of Arta to the same termination in the Gulf of Zeitoun.
But a few months later the district of Zeitoun, north of the
Spercheios, was added to Greece; and the new kingdom paid to
the Porte an indemnity of 40,000,000 piastres, or about
£460,000. The Powers guaranteed a loan to Greece of 60,000,000
francs, out of which the payment of the indemnity was made;
and thus, at last, in the autumn of 1832, the fatherland of
the Greeks was redeemed. Under Otho of Bavaria the country was
governed at first by a Council of Regency, consisting of Count
Armansperg, Professor Maurer, and General Heideck. Maurer was
removed in 1834, and Armansperg in 1837; and at the close of
the latter year, after the trial of another Bavarian as
president of the Council, a Greek was for the first time
appointed to the principal post in the Ministry. The greatest
benefit conferred upon the country by its German rulers was
the reinforcement of the legal system, and the elevation of
the authority of the law. But, on the other hand, an
unfortunate attempt was made to centralize the whole
administration of Greece, her ancient municipal rights and
customs were overlooked, taxation was almost as indiscriminate
and burdensome as under the Turks, whilst large sums of money
were spent upon the army, and on other objects of an
unremunerative or insufficiently remunerative character, so
that the young State was laden with pecuniary liabilities
before anything had been done to develope her resources. …
{1609}
No national assembly was convened, no anxiety was shown to
conciliate the people, liberty of expression was curtailed,
personal offence was given by the foreigners, and by
Armansperg in particular; brigandage and piracy flourished,
and Greece began to suffer all the evils which might have been
expected to arise from the government of unsympathetic aliens.
… In addition to the rapid and alarming increase of
brigandage by land and piracy by sea, there were popular
insurrections in Messenia, Maina, Akarnania, and elsewhere.
One of the most capable Englishmen who have ever espoused the
cause of the Greeks, General Gordon, was commissioned in 1835
to clear northern Greece of the marauders by whom it was
overrun. He executed his mission in an admirable manner,
sweeping the whole of Phokis, Aitolia, and Akarnania, and
securing the cooperation of the Turkish Pasha at Larissa.
Hundreds of brigands were put to flight,—but only to return
again next year, and to enjoy as great immunity as ever. …
In the absence of a strong and active organization of the
national forces, brigandage in Greece was an ineradicable
institution; and, as a matter of fact, it was not suppressed
until the year 1870. Gradually the discontent of the people,
and the feebleness and infatuation of the Government, were
breeding a revolution. … The three Guaranteeing Powers urged
on Otho and his advisers the necessity of granting a
Constitution, which had been promised on the establishment of
the kingdom; and moral support was thus given to two very
strong parties, known by the titles of Philorthodox and
Constitutional, whose leaders looked to Russia and England
respectively. The King and the Government neglected symptoms
which were conspicuous to all besides, and the revolution of
1843 found them practically unprepared and helpless. On the
15th of September, after a well-contrived demonstration of the
troops, which was acquiesced in and virtually sanctioned by
the representatives of the three Powers, King Otho gave way,
and signed the decrees which had been submitted to him. The
Bavarian Ministers were dismissed, Mavrokordatos was made
Premier, a National Assembly was convoked, and a Constitution
was granted. For the first time since the Roman conquest,
Greece resumed the dignity of self-government. The
Constitution of 1844 was by no means an adequate one. It did
not fully restore the privileges of local self-rule, and it
only partially modified the system of centralization, from
which so many evils had sprung. But it was nevertheless a
great advance towards popular liberty. … The difficulties
which arose between Russia and Turkey in 1853, and which led
up to the Crimean War, inspired the Greeks with a hope that
their 'grand idea'—the inheritance of the dominion of Turkey
in Europe, so far as the Greek-speaking provinces are
concerned—might be on the eve of accomplishment. … The
Russian army crossed the Pruth in July, 1853, and preparations
were at once made by the Greeks to invade Turkey. … The
temper of the whole country was such that England and France
deemed it necessary to take urgent measures for preventing an
alliance between Russia and Greece. In May, 1854, an
Anglo-French force was landed at the Peiraios, where it
remained until February, 1857. Pressure was thus brought to
bear upon King Otho, who was not in a position to resist it.
… The humiliation of the Greeks under the foreign occupation
weakened the authority of the King and his Ministers, and the
unhappy country was once more a prey to rapine and disorder.
… From the year 1859 a new portent began to make itself
apparent in Greece. As the insurrection of 1821 may be said to
have derived some of its energy from the upheaval of France
and Europe in the preceding decades, so the Greek revolution
of 1862 was doubtless hastened, if not suggested, by the
Italian regeneration of 1848-1861. … On February 13th, 1862,
the garrison of Nauplia revolted; other outbreaks followed;
and at last, in October, during an ill-advised absence of the
Monarch from his capital, the garrison of Athens broke out
into open insurrection. A Provisional Government was
nominated; the deposition of King Otho was proclaimed; and
when the royal couple hurried back to the city they were
refused an entrance. The representatives of the Powers were
appealed to in vain; and the unfortunate Bavarian, after
wearing the crown for thirty years, sailed from the Peiraios
never to return. The hopes of the Greeks at once centred in
Prince Alfred of England for their future king. … But the
agreement of the three Powers on the establishment of the
kingdom expressly excluded from the throne all members of the
reigning families of England, France, and Russia; and thus,
although Prince Alfred was elected king with practical
unanimity, the English Government would not sanction his
acceptance of the crown. The choice eventually and happily
fell upon Prince George of Denmark, the present King of the
Hellenes; and neither Greece nor Europe has had reason to
regret the selection. … From this time forward the history
of modern Greece enters upon a brighter phase."
L. Sergeant,
Greece,
chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
L. Sergeant,
New Greece,
part 2, chapter 8-10.
GREECE: A. D. 1846-1850.
Rude enforcement of English claims.
The Don Pacifico Affair.
"Greek independence had been established under the joint
guardianship of Russia, France, and England. Constitutional
government had been guaranteed. It had however been constantly
delayed. Otho, the Bavarian Prince, who had been placed upon
the throne, was absolute in his own tendencies, and supported
by the absolute Powers; and France, eager to establish her own
influence in the East, … had sided with the Absolutists,
leaving England the sole supporter of constitutional rule. The
Government and administration were deplorably bad. … Any
demands raised by the English against the Government—and the
bad administration afforded abundant opportunity for
dispute—were certain to encounter the opposition of the King,
supported by the advice of all the diplomatic body. Such
questions had arisen. Ionians, claiming to be British
subjects, had been maltreated, the boat's crew of a Queen's
ship roughly handled, and in two cases the money claims of
English subjects against the Government disregarded. They were
trivial enough in themselves; a piece of land belonging to a
Mr. Finlay [the historian of mediæval and modern Greece], a
Scotchman, had been incorporated into the royal garden, and
the price—no doubt somewhat exorbitant—which he set upon it
refused. The house of Don Pacifico, a Jew, a native of
Gibraltar, had been sacked by a mob, without due interference
on the part of the police. He demanded compensation for
ill-usage, for property destroyed, and for the loss of certain
papers, the only proof as he declared of a somewhat doubtful
claim against the Portuguese Government.
{1610}
Such claims in the ordinary course of things should have been
made in the Greek Law Court. But Lord Palmerston, placing no
trust in the justice to be there obtained, made them a direct
national claim upon the Government. For several years, on
various pretences, the settlement of the question had been
postponed, and Palmerston had even warned Russia that he
should some day have to put strong pressure upon the Greek
Court to obtain the discharge of their debts. At length, at
the close of 1849, his patience became exhausted. Admiral
Parker, with the British fleet, was ordered to the Piræus. Mr.
Wyse, the English Ambassador, embarked in it. The claims were
again formally laid before the King, and upon their being
declined the Piræus was blockaded, ships of the Greek navy
captured and merchant vessels secured by way of material
guarantee for payment. The French and the Russians were
indignant at this unexpected act of vigour." The Russians
threatened; the French offered mediation, which was accepted.
The French negotiations at Athens had no success; but at
London there was promise of a friendly settlement of the
matter, when Mr. Wyse, the English Minister at the Greek
Court, being left in ignorance of the situation, brought fresh
pressure to bear upon King Otho and extorted payment of his
claims. The French were enraged and withdrew their Minister
from London. "For the time, this trumpery little affair caused
the greatest excitement, and, being regarded as a typical
instance of Lord Palmerston's management of the Foreign
Office, it formed the ground of a very serious attack upon the
Government."
J. F. Bright,
History of England,
period 4, pages 200-203.
ALSO IN:
S. Walpole,
History of England, from 1815,
chapter 22 (volume 4).
J. McCarthy,
History of Our Own Times,
chapter 19 (volume 2).
See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1849-1850.
GREECE: A. D. 1862.
Annexation of the Ionian Islands.
See IONIAN ISLANDS: A. D. 1815-1862.
GREECE: A. D. 1862-1881.
The Cretan struggle and defeat.
The Greek question in the Berlin Congress.
Small cession of territory by Turkey.
"The annexation of the Heptannesos [the seven (Ionian)
islands] was a great benefit to Hellas. It was not only a
piece of good fortune for the present but an earnest of the
future. … There still remained the delusion of the Integrity
of the Turkish Empire; but the Christians of the East really
cannot believe in the sincerity of all the Powers who proclaim
and sustain this extraordinary figment, any more than they are
able to fall a prey to the hallucination itself. The reunion
of the Heptannesos with the rest of Hellas was therefore
regarded as marking the beginning of another and better era—a
sanction to the hopes of other re-unions in the future. The
first of the Hellenes who endeavoured to gain for themselves
the same good fortune which had fallen upon the Ionians were
again the Cretans. They defied Turkey for three years,
1866-7-8. With the exception of certain fortresses, the whole
island was free. Acts of heroism and sacrifice such as those
which had rendered glorious the first War of Independence,
again challenged the attention of the world. Volunteers from
the West recalled the Philhellenic enthusiasm of old days. The
Hellenes of the mainland did not leave their brethren alone in
the hour of danger; they hastened to fight at their side,
while they opened in their own homes a place of refuge for the
women and children of the island. Nearly 60,000 fugitives
found protection there. For a while there was room for
believing that the deliverance of Crete was at last
accomplished. Russia and France were favourably disposed.
Unhappily the good-will of these two Powers could not overcome
the opposition of England, strongly supported by Austria.
Diplomacy fought for the enslavement of the Cretans with as
much persistence and more success than those with which it had
opposed the deliverance of Greece. Freedom has not yet come
for Crete. The islanders obtained by their struggle nothing
but a doubtful amelioration of their condition by means of a
sort of charter which was extracted from the unwillingness of
the Porte in 1868, under the name of the 'Organic Regulation.'
This edict has never been honestly put in force. However, even
if it had been carried out, it would not have been a
settlement of the Cretan question. The Cretans have never
concealed what they want, or ceased to proclaim their
intention of demanding it until they obtain it. At the time of
the Congress of Berlin they thought once more that they would
succeed. They got nothing but another promise from the Porte
'to enforce scrupulously the Organic Regulation of 1868, with
such modifications as might be judged equitable.' … The
history of the Greek Question at the Congress of Berlin and
the conferences which followed it, is not to be treated in
detail here. The time is not come for knowing all that took
place. … We do not know why Hellas herself remained so long
with her sword undrawn during the Russo-Turkish War—what
promises or what threats held her back from moving when the
armies of Russia, checked before Plevna, would have welcomed a
diversion in the West, and when the Hellenic people both
within and without the Kingdom were chafing at the do-nothing
attitude of the Government of Athens. Everyone in Greece felt
that the moment was come. The measures taken by hordes of
Bashi-Bazooks were hardly sufficient to repress the
insurrection which was ready in all quarters, and which at
length broke out in the mountains of Thessaly. … It was only
at the last moment, when the war was on the point of being
closed by the treaty which victorious Russia compelled Turkey
to grant at San Stefano, that the Greek Government, under the
Presidency of Koumoundouros, yielded tardily to the pressure
of the nation, and allowed the army to cross the frontier. It
was too late for the diversion to be of any use to Russia, and
it could look for no support from any other Government in
Europe. This fact was realized at Athens, but men felt, at the
same time, that it was needful to remind the world at any
price that there is a Greek Question connected with the
Eastern Question. The step was taken, but it was taken with a
hesitation which betrayed itself in act as well as in word.
… Diplomacy saw the danger of the fresh conflagration which
the armed intervention of Greece was capable of kindling.
{1611}
The utmost possible amount of pressure was therefore brought
to bear upon the Government of Athens in order to induce it to
retrace the step, and in the result an order was obtained to the
Greek Commander-in-Chief to recross the frontier, upon the
solemn assurance of the great Powers 'that the national
aspirations and interests of the Greek populations should be
the subject of the deliberations of the approaching Congress.'
… On July 5, 1878, the Congress accepted the resolution
proposed by the French plenipotentiary, 'inviting the Porte to
come to an understanding with Greece for a rectification of
the frontiers in Thessaly and Epiros, a rectification which
may follow the valley of the Peneus upon the Eastern side, and
that of the Thyamis (or Kalamas) upon the Western.' In other
words, they assign to Hellas the whole of Thessaly and a large
part of Epiros. Notwithstanding the abandonment of the island
of Crete, this was some satisfaction for the wrongs which she
had suffered at the delimitation of the Kingdom. … But the
scheme suggested by the Congress and sanctioned by the
Conference of Berlin on July 1, 1880, was not carried out.
When Turkey found that she was not confronted by an Europe
determined to be obeyed, she refused to submit. And then the
Powers, whose main anxiety was peace at any price, instead of
insisting upon her compliance, put upon Hellas all the
pressure which they were able to exercise, to induce her to
submit the question of the frontiers to a fresh arbitration.
… Hellas had to yield, and on July 2, 1881, three years
after the signing of the famous Protocol of Berlin, she signed
the convention by which Turkey ceded to her the flat part of
Thessaly and a small scrap of Epiros."
D. Bikelas,
Seven Essays on Christian Greece,
essay 6.
GREECE: A. D. 1864-1893.
Government under the later constitution.
A new constitution, framed by the National Assembly, "was
ratified by the King on November 21, 1864. Abolishing the old
Senate, it established a Representative Chamber of 150
deputies, since increased to 190, and again to 307, elected by
ballot by all males over the age of twenty-one, from equal
electoral districts (they were afterwards elected by
nomarchies; the system now is by eparchies). Mr. Sergeant
gives the number of electors (in 1879) at 311 per 1,000, but I
do not know what he does with the women and minors, who must
be about 75 per cent of the population. The present [1893]
number of electors is 450,000, or 205 per 1,000. The King has
considerable power: he is irresponsible; he appoints and
dismisses his ministers and all officers and officials; and he
can prorogue or suspend Parliament. Nor is his power merely
nominal. In 1866 the Chamber behaved illegally, and the King
promptly dissolved it; in 1875 again the King successfully
steered his country out of a whirlpool of corruption; and,
lastly, in 1892, his Majesty, finding M. Deleyannes obstinate
in his financial dilatoriness, dismissed him. … Before King
Otho there were 4 administrations; under his rule 24 (13
before the Constitution was granted and 11 after), 10 in the
interregnum, and 42 under King George. This gives 70
administrations in 62 years, or about one every 10½ months,
or, deducting the two kingless periods, 56 administrations in
60 years—that is, with an average duration of nearly 13
months. This compares for stability very well with the
duration of French Ministries, 28 of which have lasted 22
years, or about 9½ months each. It should also be stated that
there has been a distinct tendency to greater Ministerial
longevity of late years in Greece. Under King Otho there were
seven Parliaments in 18 years, which allows 2 years and 7
months for each Parliamentary period. Under King George there
have been 13 in 28 years, or with a life of 2 years and 2
months each. However, we know that Parliament had not the same
free play under the first King that it has had under the
second; and, besides, the present Parliament, considering the
Prime Minister's enormous majority, is likely to continue some
time, and bring up the Georgian average. … There have been
no notable changes of the Greek Constitution since its first
promulgation, though there has been a natural expansion,
especially in the judicial section. This very fact is of
itself a vindication of Hellenic national stability."
R. A. H. Bickford-Smith,
Greece under King George,
chapter 18.
----------GREECE: End----------
GREEK, Origin of the name.
See HELLAS.
GREEK CHURCH, The.
See CHRISTIANLY: A. D. 330-1054.
GREEK EDUCATION.
See EDUCATION, ANCIENT.
GREEK EMPIRE, called Byzantine: A.D. 700-1204.
See BYZANTINE EMPIRE.
GREEK EMPIRE OF CONSTANTINOPLE (A. D. 1261-1453).
See CONSTANTINOPLE: A. D. 1261-1453.
GREEK EMPIRE OF NICÆA: A. D. 1204-1261.
The conquest of Constantinople by the Venetians and the
Crusaders, in 1204, broke the Byzantine Empire into many

fragments, some of which were secured by the conquerors and
loosely bound together in the feudal empire of Romania, while
others were snatched from the ruin and preserved by the
Greeks, themselves. For the sovereignty of these latter
numerous claimants made haste to contend. Three fugitive
emperors were wandering in the outer territories of the
shattered realm. One was that Alexius III., whose deposition
of Isaac Angelos had afforded a pretext for the crusading
conquest, and who had fled when Isaac was restored. A second
was Alexius V. (Murtzuphlos), who pushed Isaac Angelos and his
son Alexius IV. from the shaking throne when Constantinople
resolved to defend itself against the Christians of the West,
but who abandoned the city in the last hours of the siege. The
third was Theodore Lascaris, son-in-law of Alexius III., who
was elected to the imperial office as soon as the flight of
Alexius V. became known—even after the besiegers had entered
the city—and who, then, could do nothing but follow his
fugitive predecessors. This last was the only one of the three
who found a piece of defensible territory on which to set up
his throne. He established himself in Bithynia, associating
his claims with those of his worthless father-in-law, and
contenting himself with the title of Despot, at first. But the
convenient though objectionable father-in-law was not
permitted to enjoy any share of the sovereignty which he
acquired. Theodore, in fact, managed his affairs with great
vigor and skill. The district in which his authority was
recognized widened rapidly and the city of Nicæa became his
capital. There, in 1206, he received the imperial crown, more
formally and solemnly, anew, and rallied the Greek resistance
which was destined to triumph, a little more than half a
century later, over the insolent aggression of the Latin West.
{1612}
The small empire of Nicæa had to contend, not merely with the
Latins in Constantinople and Greece, and with the Turkish
Sultan of Iconium, but also with another ambitious fragment of
Greek empire at Trebizond, which showed itself persistently
hostile. His successors, moreover, were in conflict with a
third such fragment in Europe, at Thessalonica. But, ten years
after the flight of Theodore from Constantinople, his empire
of Nicæa "extended from Heracleia on the Black Sea to the head
of the Gulf of Nicomedia; from thence it embraced the coast of
the Opsikian theme as far as Cyzicus; and then descending to
the south, included Pergamus, and joined the coast of the
Ægean. Theodore had already extended his power over the
valleys of the Hermus, the Caister, and the Mæander." Theodore
Lascaris died in 1222, leaving no son, and John Dukas
Vatatzes, or Vataces as his name is written by some
historians, a man of eminent abilities and high qualities, who
had married Theodore's daughter, was elected to the vacant
throne. He was saluted as John III.—assuming a continuity
from the Byzantine to the Nicæan series of emperors. In a
reign of thirty-three years, this prudent and capable emperor,
as Gibbon expresses the fact, "rescued the provinces from
national and foreign usurpers, till he pressed on all sides
the imperial city [Constantinople], a leafless and sapless
trunk, which must fall at the first stroke of the axe." He did
not live to apply that blow nor to witness the fall of the
coveted capital of the East. But the event occurred only six
years after his death, and owed nothing to the energy or the
capability of his successors. His son, Theodore II., reigned
but four years, and left at his death, in 1258, a son, John
IV., only eight years old. The appointed regent and tutor of
this youth was soon assassinated, and Michael Paleologos, an
able officer, who had some of the blood of the imperial
Angelos family in his veins, was made in the first instance
tutor to the young emperor, and soon afterwards raised to the
throne with him as a colleague. In 1260 the new emperor made
an attack on Constantinople and was repulsed. But on the 25th
of July in the next year the city was taken by a sudden
surprise, while 6,000 soldiers of its garrison were absent on
an expedition against Daphnusia in the Black Sea. It was
acquired almost without resistance, the Latin emperor, Baldwin
II., taking promptly to flight. The destruction of life was
slight; but the surprising party fired a considerable part of
the city, to cover the smallness of its numbers, and
Constantinople suffered once more from a disastrous
conflagration. On the recovery of its ancient capital, the
Greek empire ceased to bear the name of Nicæa, and its history
is continued under the more imposing appellation of the Greek
empire of Constantinople.
G. Finlay,
History of the Byzantine and Greek Empires,
from 716 to 1453,
book 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
E. Gibbon,
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
chapter 62.
GREEK EMPIRE OF TREBIZOND.
See TREBIZOND: A. D. 1204-1461.
GREEK FIRE.
"The important secret of compounding and directing this
artificial flame was imparted [in the later part of the
seventh century to the Greeks, or Byzantines, at
Constantinople] by Callinicus, a native of Heliopolis, in
Syria, who deserted from the service of the caliph to that of
the emperor. The skill of a chemist and engineer was
equivalent to the succour of fleets and armies; and this
discovery or improvement of the military art was fortunately
reserved for the distressful period when the degenerate Romans
of the East were incapable of contending with the warlike
enthusiasm and youthful vigour of the Saracens. The historian
who presumes to analyze this extraordinary composition should
suspect his own ignorance and that of his Byzantine guides, so
prone to the marvellous, so careless, and, in this instance,
so jealous of the truth. From their obscure, and perhaps
fallacious hints, it should seem that the principal ingredient
of the Greek fire was the naphtha, or liquid bitumen, a light,
tenacious, and inflammable oil, which springs from the earth.
… The naphtha was mingled, I know not by what methods or in
what proportions, with sulphur and with the pitch that is
extracted from evergreen firs. From this mixture, which
produced a thick smoke and a loud explosion, proceeded a
fierce and obstinate flame … ; instead of being extinguished
it was nourished and quickened by the element of water; and
sand, urine, or vinegar were the only remedies that could damp
the fury of this powerful agent. … It was either poured from
the ramparts [of a besieged town] in large boilers, or
launched in red-hot balls of stone and iron, or darted in
arrows and javelins, twisted round with flax and tow, which
had deeply imbibed the inflammable oil; sometimes it was
deposited in fire-ships … and was most commonly blown
through long tubes of copper, which were planted on the prow
of a galley, and fancifully shaped into the mouths of savage
monsters, that seemed to vomit a stream of liquid and
consuming fire. This important art was preserved at
Constantinople, as the palladium of the state. … The secret
was confined, above 400 years, to the Romans of the East. …
It was at length either discovered or stolen by the
Mahometans; and, in the holy wars of Syria and Egypt, they
retorted an invention, contrived against themselves, on the
heads of the Christians. … The use of the Greek, or, as it
might now be called, the Saracen fire, was continued to the
middle of the fourteenth century."
E. Gibbon,
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,
chapter 52.
GREEK GENIUS AND INFLUENCE.
See HELLENIC GENIUS, &c.
GREELEY, Horace,
The Peace Conference at Niagara.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1864 (JULY).
Presidential candidacy and defeat.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1872.
GREEN, Duff, in the "Kitchen Cabinet" of President Jackson.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1829.
GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS.
See VERMONT: A. D. 1749-1774.
GREENBACK PARTY, The.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1880.
GREENE, General Nathaniel, and the American Revolution.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1775 (MAY-AUGUST); 1780-1781;
and 1781 (JANUARY-MAY).
----------GREENLAND: Start--------
GREENLAND: A D.876-984.
Discovery and settlement by the Northmen.
See NORMANS.—NORTHMEN: A. D. 876-984.
GREENLAND: A. D. 1450-1585.
The lost Icelandic colony, absorbed by Eskimo. Rediscovery of
the country.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ESKIMAUAN FAMILY.
----------GREENLAND: End----------
{1613}
GREENS, Roman Faction of the.
See CIRCUS, FACTIONS OF THE ROMAN.
GREENVILLE TREATY WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES.
See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1790-1795.
GREGORIAN CALENDAR.—GREGORIAN ERA.
See CALENDAR, GREGORIAN.
GREGORY I. (called The Great), Pope, A. D. 590-604.
Gregory II., Pope, 715-731.
Gregory III., Pope, 731-741.
Gregory IV., Pope, 827-844.
Gregory V., Pope, 996-999.
Gregory VI., Pope, 1044-1046.
Gregory VII., Pope, 1075-1085.
Gregory VIII., Pope, 1187, October to December.
Gregory IX., Pope, 1227-1241.
Gregory X., Pope, 1271-1276.
Gregory XI., Pope, 1371-1378.
Gregory XII., Pope, 1406-1415.
Gregory XIII., Pope, 1572-1585.
Gregory XIV., Pope, 1590-1591.
Gregory XV., Pope, 1621-162.
Gregory XVI., Pope, 1831-1846.
GRENVILLE MINISTRY, The.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1760-1763; and 1765-1768.
GRÉVY, Jules, President of the French Republic, 1879-1887.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1875-1889.
GREY, Earl, The Ministry of.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1830-1832; and 1834-1837.
GREY FRIARS.
See MENDICANT ORDERS.
GREY LEAGUES, The.
See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1396-1499.
GREYS, OR BIGI, of Florence, The.
See BIGI.
GRIERSON'S RAID.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1863 (APRIL-MAY: MISSISSIPPI).
GRIQUAS.—GRIQUALAND.
"The Griquas or Baastards, a mixed race sprung from the
intercourse of the 'Boers' [of South Africa] with their
Hottentot slaves," migrated from Cape Colony after the
Emancipation Act of 1833, "and, under the chiefs Waterboer and
Adam Kok, settled in the country north of the confluence of
the Orange and Vaal, the present Griqualand West.
Subsequently, in 1852, Adam Kok's section of the Griquas again
migrated to the territory then called No Man's Land, between
Kafraria and southern Natal, now known as Griqualand East, or
New Griqualand. … In consequence of the discovery of
diamonds in the Griqua country in 1867, and the rush thither
of thousands of Europeans from all the surrounding states, as
well as from Europe, America, and Australia, the chief
Waterboer ceded his rights to the British Government, and this
region was annexed to the Cape Colony as the
Lieutenant-Governorship of Griqualand West in 1871."
Hellwald-Johnston,
Africa (Stanford's Compendium),
chapter 23, section 5.
----------GRISONS: Start--------
GRISONS, The.
Achievement of democratic independence.
See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1396-1499.
GRISONS: The Valtelline revolt and war.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1624-1626.
----------GRISONS: End----------
GROCHOW, Battles of (1831).
See POLAND: A. D. 1830-1832.
GROL, Capture of (1627).
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1621-1633.
GRONENBURG: A. D. 1593.
Capture by Prince Maurice.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1588-1593.
GROS VENTRE INDIANS, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: HIDATSA,
and ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.
GROSS BEEREN, Battle of.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (AUGUST).
GROSS GÖRSCHEN, OR LUTZEN, Battle of.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (APRIL-MAY).
GROSSE RATH, The.
See SWITZERLAND: A. D. 1848-1890.
GROSSWARDEIN, Treaty of.
See HUNGARY: A. D. 1526-1567.
GROTIUS, HUGO, Imprisonment and escape of.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1603-1619.
GROVETON, Battle of.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1862 (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER).
GRUTHUNGI, The.
See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 376.
GRÜTLI, OR RÜTLI, The Meadow of.
See SWITZERLAND: THE THREE FOREST CANTONS.
GRYNEUM, The Oracle of.
See ORACLES OF THE GREEKS.
GUADACELITO OR SALADO, Battle of (1340).
See SPAIN: A. D. 1273-1460.
GUADALETE, Battle of the.
See SPAIN: A. D. 711-713.
GUADALOUPE HIDALGO, Treaty of.
See MEXICO: A. D. 1848.
GUADALUPES.
See GACHUPINES.
GUAICARUS, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.
GUAJIRA, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: COAJIRO.
GUANAJUATO, Battles of.
See MEXICO: A. D. 1810-1819.
GUANAS, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.
GUANCHES, The.
See LIBYANS.
GUARANI, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: TUPI.
GUASTALLA, Battle of (1734).
See FRANCE: A. D. 1733-1735.
----------GUATEMALA: Start--------
GUATEMALA:
The name.
"According to Fuentes y Guzman, derived from 'Coctecmalan'
—that is to say 'Palo de leche,' milk-tree, commonly called
'Yerba mala,' found in the neighborhood of Antigua Guatemala.
… In the Mexican tongue, if we may believe Vasquez, it was
called 'Quauhtimali,' rotten-tree. … Others derive it from
'Uhatezmalha,' signifying 'the hill which discharges water';
and Juarros suggests that it may be from Juitemal, the first
king of Guatemala."
H. H. Bancroft,
History of the Pacific States,
volume 1, page 620, foot-note.
GUATEMALA:
Aboriginal inhabitants, and ruins of Ancient Civilization.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: MAYAS, and QUICHES;
also, MEXICO, ANCIENT.
GUATEMALA: A. D. 1524.
Conquest by Alvarado, the lieutenant of Cortes.
See MEXICO: A. D. 1521-1524.
GUATEMALA: A. D. 1821-1871.
Separation from Spain.
Brief annexation to Mexico.
Resistance to Central American Federation.
The wars of the states.
See CENTRAL AMERICA: A. D. 1821-1871.
----------GUATEMALA: End----------
GUAYANAS, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.
{1614}
GUCK OR COCO TRIBES.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: GUCK OR COCO GROUP.
----------GUELDERLAND: Start--------
GUELDERLAND: A. D. 1079-1473.
Under the House of Nassau.
Acquisition by the Duke of Burgundy.
"The arable extent of Guelderland, its central position, and
the number of its ancient towns, rendered it at all times of
great importance. The men of Zutphen and Arnheim were foremost
among the claimants of civic freedom; and at Tiel and Bommel
industry struck early root, and struggled bravely to maturity
through countless storms of feudal violence and rapine.
Guelderland was constituted a county, or earldom, by Henry
III. [Emperor, A. D. 1079], and bestowed on Otho, count of
Nassau; and thus originated the influence of that celebrated
family in the affairs of the Netherlands. Three centuries
later the province was created a duchy of the empire. Vigour
and ability continued to distinguish the house of Nassau, and
they were destined to become eventually the most popular and
powerful family in the nation. Apart from their influence,
however, Guelderland hardly occupies as important a place in
the general history of the country as Utrecht or Holland." In
1473, when the House of Burgundy had acquired sovereignty over
most of the Netherland states, Charles the Bold availed
himself of a domestic quarrel between the reigning prince of
Guelderland and his heir "to purchase the duchy from the
former for 92,000 crowns of gold. The old duke died before the
pecuniary portion of the bargain was actually completed; and,
the rightful heir being detained in prison, the grasping lord
of Burgundy entered into possession of his purchase, for which
no part of the price was ever paid."
W. T. McCullagh,
Industrial History of Free Nations,
chapters 8 and 10 (volume 2).
GUELDERLAND: A. D. 1713.
The Spanish province ceded to Prussia.
See UTRECHT: A. D. 1712-1714.
----------GUELDERLAND: End----------
GUELF PARTY, Captains of the.
See FLORENCE: A. D. 1358.
GUELF PARTY:
Guelfic origin of the House of Hanover, or Brunswick-Lüneburg.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1714;
also, GUELFS AND GHIBELLINES;
and ESTE, HOUSE OF.
----------GUELFS: Start--------
GUELFS, OR GUELPHS, AND GHIBELLINES:
German origin of these Factions and their feuds.
On the death (A. D. 1125) of Henry V., the last of the
Franconian dynasty of Germanic emperors, Lothaire, Duke of
Saxony, was elected emperor, in rather a tumultuous and
irregular manner. Lothaire, and the Saxons generally, were
embittered in enmity against the house of Franconia, and
against the new family—the Suabiau or Hohenstauffen—which
succeeded by inheritance, through the female line, to the
Franconian claims. It was the object of his reign, moreover,
to pass the imperial crown from his own head to that of his
son-in-law, Henry the Proud. Hence arose a persecution of the
Suabian family, under Lothaire, which stirred deep passions.
Henry the Proud, for whose succession Lothaire labored, but
vainly, united in himself several ancient streams of noble
blood. He "was fourth in descent from Welf [or Guelf], son of
Azon marquis of Este, by Cunegonda, heiress of a distinguished
family, the Welfs of Altorf in Suabia." His ancestor, Welf,
had been invested with the duchy of Bavaria. He himself
represented, by right of his mother, the ancient ducal house
of Saxony; and, by favor of his imperial father-in-law, the
two powerful duchies, Bavaria and Saxony, were both conferred
on him. He also received Hanover and Brunswick as the dowry of
his wife. "On the death of Lothaire in 1138 the partisans of
the house of Suabia made a hasty and irregular election of
Conrad [one of the Hohenstauffen princes], in which the Saxon
faction found itself obliged to acquiesce. The new emperor
availed himself of the jealousy which Henry the Proud's
aggrandizement had excited. Under pretence that two duchies
could not legally be held by the same person, Henry was
summoned to resign one of them, and on his refusal, the diet
pronounced that he had incurred a forfeiture of both. Henry
made but little resistance, and before his death, which
happened soon afterwards, saw himself stripped of all his
hereditary as well as acquired possessions. Upon this occasion
the famous names of Guelf [or Guelph] and Ghibelin were first
heard, which were destined to keep alive the flame of civil
dissension in far distant countries, and after their meaning
had been forgotten. The Guelfs, or Welfs, were, as I have
said, the ancestors of Henry, and the name has become a sort
of patronymic in his family. The word Ghibelin is derived from
Wibelung, a town in Franconia, whence the emperors of that
line are said to have sprung. The house of Suabia were
considered in Germany as representing that of Franconia; as
the Guelfs may, without much impropriety, be deemed to
represent the Saxon line."
H. Hallam,
The Middle Ages,
chapter 5 (volume 2).
Sir Andrew Halliday, in his "Annals of the House of Hanover,"
traces the genealogy of the Guelfs with great minuteness and
precision—with more minuteness, perhaps, in some remote
particulars, and more precision, than seems consistent with
entire credibility. He carries the line back to Edico, king or
prince of the Heruli, or Rugii, or Scyrii,—the stock from
which came Odoacer, who overturned the Western Roman Empire
and made himself the first king of Italy. Edico, who was
subject to Attila, and the favorite adviser of the king of the
Huns, is thought to have had a son or brother named Guelf or
Welf, who fell in battle with the Ostrogoths. It is to him
that Sir Andrew is disposed to assign the honor of being the
historical chief of the great family of the Guelfs. If not
from this shadowy Guelf, it is from another of like name in
the next generation—a brother of Odoacer—that he sees the
family spring, and the story of its wide-branching and
many-rooted growth, in Friuli, Altdorf, Bavaria, old Saxony,
Brunswick, Hanover,—and thence, more royally than ever, in
England,—is as interesting as a narrative of highly
complicated genealogy can be.
Sir A. Halliday,
Annals of the House of Hanover.
From the Guelf uncertainly indicated above were descended two
Marquesses of Este, "successively known in German and Italian
story as the first and second of that name. … Azo, the
second Marquess of Este in Italy (born A. D. 995, died 1097),
the head of the Italian (junior) branch of Guelphs [see ESTE],
married Cunigunda, the sole heiress of the German Guelphs of
Altdorf, thus uniting in his family the blood, wealth, and
power of both branches of the old Guelphs, and becoming the
common father of the later German and Italian princes of the
name of Guelph.
{1615}
No wonder, then, that he was elected by the Emperor, Henry
III., as his representative in Italy. … Cunigunda, the first
wife of Azo II., bore him one son, Guelph, who was known in
German history as Guelph VI. He succeeded to his mother's
titles and vast estates on her death, A. D. 1055, and to those
of his father, A. D. 1097. … Henry IV. invested him with the
Duchy of Bavaria, A. D. 1071—a title first assumed 170 years
before (A. D. 900) by his almost mythological ancestor, Henry
of the Golden Chariot." This Guelph VI. was the grandfather of
Henry the Proud, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, referred to
above.
P. M. Thornton,
The Brunswick Accession,
chapter 1.
ALSO IN:
O. Browning,
Guelfs and Ghibellines.
See, also,
SAXONY: A. D. 1178-1183;
and GERMANY: A. D. 1138-1268;
and, also, ESTE, HOUSE OF.
GUELFS:
The outcrop of the contention in Italy.
Its beginnings, causes, course and meaning.
See ITALY: A. D. 1215;
and FLORENCE: A. D. 1248-1278.
----------GUELFS: End----------
GUÉLFS. White and Black (Bianchi and Neri).
See FLORENCE: A. D. 1295-1300;
and 1301-1313.
GUELPHS OF HANOVER, The Order of the.
"The Hanoverian troops having much distinguished themselves at
the battle of Waterloo, George IV. (then prince regent)
determined to found an order of merit which might, with
especial propriety, be conferred upon such of them as deserved
the distinction, and the 12th of August, 1815, was fixed upon
as the date of its foundation. By the second statute, the
Order is inseparably annexed to the possession of the
Hanoverian crown, by vesting the grand-mastership in the
sovereign of that country for the time being."
C. R. Dodd,
Manual of Dignities,
part 3.
GUERANDE. Treaty of.
See BRITTANY: A. D. 1341-1365.
GUERNSEY, The Isle of.
See JERSEY AND GUERNSEY.
GUERRA DOS CABANOS.
See BRAZIL: A. D. 1825-1865.
GUERRILLAS.
A term of Spanish origin, derived from 'guerilla', signifying
little or petty warfare, and applied to small, irregular bands
of troops, carrying on war against an enemy by harassing,
destructive raids.
GUEUX OF THE NETHERLAND REVOLT.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1562-1566.
----------GUIANA: Start--------
GUIANA: The aboriginal inhabitants.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: CARIBS.
GUIANA: 16th Century.
The search for El Dorado.
See EL DORADO.
GUIANA: A. D. 1580-1814.
Dutch, French and English settlements and conquests.
"There was one European nation which was not likely to hunt
for a golden city, when gold was to be earned by plain and
matter of fact commerce. The Dutch had as early as 1542
established a systematic if contraband trade with the Spanish
Main; and in 1580 they began to settle in Guiana by planting a
depot on the river Pomeroon, in what is now the county of
Essequibo. In 1599 they built two forts at the mouth of the
Amazon, but were driven out by the Portuguese; and about 1613
they established a colony on the Essequibo, building the fort
of 'Kyk over al', 'Look over all,' on an island where the
Massaruni flows into the Essequibo. The colony was founded by
Zeeland merchants, was known as Nova Zeelandia, and came under
the control of the Netherlands West India Company, which was
incorporated in 1621. Shortly afterwards colonisation began
further to the east on the Berbice river. The founder was a
Flushing merchant, Van Peere by name; he founded his
settlement about 1624, and he held his rights under contract
with the Chamber of Zeeland. … Thus was the present province
of British Guiana colonised by Dutchmen. … While English
discovery was attracted to the west and Orinoco, the first
attempts at English settlement were far to the east on the
Wyapoco or Oyapok river. Here, in 1604, while Ralegh was in
prison, Captain Charles Leigh founded a colony at the mouth of
the river. … In 1609 Robert Harcourt of Stanton Harcourt in
Oxfordshire took up the work in which Leigh had failed. … In
1613 he obtained from King James a grant of 'all that part of
Guiana or continent of America lying between the river of
Amazones and the river of Dessequebe,' which was not actually
possessed or inhabited by any Christian power in friendship
with England. … In 1619 a scheme was started for an Amazon
Company, the leading spirit in which was Captain Roger North.
… The company was fortunate enough to secure the powerful
patronage of the Duke of Buckingham. Harcourt threw in his lot
with them, and on the 19th of May 1627 a royal grant was made
to the Duke of Buckingham and 55 other adventurers, including
the Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, who were incorporated
under the title of 'the governor and company of noblemen and
gentlemen of England for the plantation of Guiana.' The Duke
of Buckingham was Governor, North was Deputy-Governor, and the
grant included the 'royal' river of the Amazon. For about two
years the company did some solid work, sending out four ships
and 200 colonists; an attempt was then made in 1629 to bring
the territory covered by their grant immediately under royal
protection, and upon its failure their efforts at colonisation
appear to have gradually died away. The English were not the
only Europeans who tried their hand at settlement in the east
of Guiana. … In 1613, 160 French families settled in
Cayenne. The first colony failed, but in 1624 and 1626 fresh
attempts were made a little to the west on the rivers Sinamari
and Cananama; and in 1643 a Rouen Company, incorporated under
the name of the Cape North Company, sent out three or four
hundred men to Cayenne under the Sieur de Bretigny. Bretigny
ruined the scheme by savage ill-treatment of Indians and
colonists alike, and the remains of the settlement were
absorbed by a new and more powerful Normandy Company." This
failed in its turn, and gave way to a "French Equinoctial
Company," organized under the auspices of Colbert, which sent
out 1,200 colonists and fairly established them at Cayenne.
Colbert, in 1665, placed the colony, "with all the other
French possessions in the West Indies, under one strong West
India Company. Such were the beginnings of colonisation in the
west and east of Guiana. Between them lies the district now
known as Dutch Guiana or Surinam." The first settlement in
this was made in 1630 by 60 English colonists, under a Captain
Marshall.
{1616}
The colony failed, and was revived in 1650 by Lord Willoughby,
then representing the fugitive King Charles II., as Governor
of Barbadoes. In 1663, after the Restoration, Lord Willoughby,
in conjunction with Lawrence Hyde, second son of the Earl of
Clarendon, received Letters Patent "constituting them lords
and proprietors of the district between the Copenam and the
Maroni (which included the Surinam river) under the name of
Willoughby Land." Soon afterwards "war broke out with the
Dutch, and in March 1667 the colony capitulated to the Dutch
admiral Crynsenn. The peace of Breda between Great Britain and
the Netherlands, which was signed in the following July,
provided that either nation should retain the conquests which
it had made by the preceding 10th of May, and under this
arrangement Surinam was ceded to the Netherlands, while New
York became a British possession. … Thus ended for many long
years all British connexion with Guiana. … When at length
the English returned [in 1796 and 1803, during the subjection
of the Dutch to Napoleon, and while they were forced to take
part in his wars], they came as conquerors rather than as
settlers, and by a strange perversity of history, the original
Dutch colonies on the Berbice and Essequibo became a British
dependency, while the Netherlanders retain to this day the
part of Guiana which Lord Willoughby marked out for his own."
These arrangements were settled in the convention between
Great Britain and the Netherlands signed at London in 1814.
C. P. Lucas,
History Geography of the British Colonies,
volume 2, section 2, chapter 8.
ALSO IN:
H. G. Dalton,
History of British Guiana.
----------GUIANA: End--------
GUIENNE, OR GUYENNE.
A corruption of the name of Aquitaine, which came into use,
apparently, about the 13th century.
See AQUITAINE: A. D. 884-1151.
GUILDS, OR GILDS, Mediæval.
"The history of the Gild Merchant begins with the Norman
Conquest. The latter widened the horizon of the English
merchant even more than that of the English annalist. The
close union between England and Normandy led to an increase in
foreign commerce, which in turn must have greatly stimulated
internal trade and industry. Moreover, the greatly enhanced
power of the English crown tempered feudal turbulence,
affording a measure of security to traders in England that was
as yet unknown on the continent. … With this expansion of
trade the mercantile element would become a more potent factor
in town life, and would soon feel the need of joint action to
guard its nascent prosperity against encroachments. Not until
there was something of importance to protect, not until trade
and industry began to predominate over agriculture within the
borough, would a protective union like the Gild Merchant come
into being. Its existence, in short, presupposes a greater
mercantile and industrial development than that which
prevailed in England in the tenth century. This circumstance
and the absence of all mention of the Gild Merchant in the
records of the Anglo-Saxon period render it probable that this
fraternity first appeared in England soon after the Conqueror
had established his sway and restored order in the land.
Whether it was merely a reorganization of older gilds, a
spontaneous adaptation of the gild idea to the newly-begotten
trade interests, or a new institution directly transplanted
from Normandy, we have no means of determining with certainty.
The last-mentioned view is strongly favoured by the
circumstance that, at the time of the Conquest, the Gild
Merchant doubtless existed in Northern France and Flanders.
From the Frenchmen who became burgesses of English towns, and
from the Norman merchants who thronged the marts of England
after the Conquest, the English would soon ascertain the
advantages of formal trade organization. The earliest distinct
references to the Gild Merchant occur in a charter granted by
Robert Fitz-Hamon to the burgesses of Burford (1087-1107), and
in a document drawn up while Anselm was Archbishop of
Canterbury (1093-1109). … Whether we place the inception of
the fraternity immediately before or after the Norman
Conquest, whether we make it a continuation of older
Anglo-Saxon gilds, or a derivative from Normandy, or a wholly
new and spontaneous growth, it was doubtless at first merely a
private society, unconnected with the town government, having
for its object the protection of its members, the tradesmen of
the borough, and the maintenance of the newly invigorated
trade interests. During the twelfth century it gradually
became a recognised part of the town constitution, thus
entering upon its second stage of development. How this came
to pass can be easily realised from the later history of
English gilds in general. For in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries … a simple social-religious gild at times
attained such power in a community that it came to be regarded
as an important constituent element of the civic
administration. Quite similar must have been the growth of the
Gild Merchant, which from the outset was doubtless composed of
the most influential burgesses, and which, as the exponent of
the mercantile interests, must always have been greatly
concerned in the increase of the privileges and prosperity of
the borough in general. It was very natural that the town
authorities should use such a society for public purposes,
entrusting to it the surveillance of the trade monopoly, in
which its members were particularly interested,—allowing it
to gradually become an important part of the civic
administrative machinery. … The beginning of this third and
final stage of development cannot be definitely fixed; for in
some places it was of an earlier date than in others. The
fourteenth century may in general be called the period of
gradual transition. In the fifteenth century the
transformation was completed. In this and the following
centuries the term 'Gilda Mercatoria' became less and less
frequent. In many places it soon wholly disappeared. Where it
continued to subsist, the Gild no longer had an individuality
of its own. Its alderman and other peculiar officers, its
whole organization as a distinctive entity, had vanished. It
had merged its identity in that of the general municipal
organism. The head of the fraternity was now the head of the
town; borough and Gild, burgesses and gildsmen were now
identical. What had once been a distinct integral part of the
civic body politic became vaguely blended with the whole of it.
{1617}
The old Gild Merchant was now rarely mentioned in connection
with the municipal trade restrictions and regulations, the
latter being commonly applied to burgesses, craftsmen,
freemen, or 'foreigners.' The exegesis of this transformation
… was due mainly to three causes: (1) the expansion of trade
and the multiplication of the craft and mercantile
fraternities, which absorbed the ancient functions of the Gild
Merchant and rendered it superfluous; (2) the growth of the
select governing body, which usurped most of the privileges of
the old burghers at large, and hence tended to obliterate the
distinction between them, or their less privileged successors,
and the ancient gildsmen, leaving both only certain trade
immunities; (3) the decay of the leet—the rallying point of
the old burghers as distinguished from that of the
gildsmen—the functions of which passed, in part, to the crafts,
but mainly to the select body and to the justices of the
peace. But even after the Gild Merchant and the borough had
thus become identical, the old dual idea did not completely
disappear, the Gild being often regarded as a particular phase
or function of the town, namely, the municipality in its
character of a trade monopoly. Hence the modern survivals of
the Gild Merchant help to elucidate its actual functions in
ancient times. In a few boroughs the select governing body of
the town—the narrow civic corporation, in distinction from
the burgesses or freemen at large—succeeded to the name and
traditions of the Gild Merchant. In some of these cases the
signification of the latter gradually dwindled down to a
periodical civic feast of the privileged few. … In the
eighteenth century we meet the word much less frequently than
in the seventeenth; and toward the beginning of the present
century it became very rare. The Municipal Corporations
Commission, in 1835, found it still used in only a few
boroughs. The remnants of the Gild Merchant and of the craft
fraternities were rapidly vanishing before the new ideas of a
more liberal age,—the age of laissez faire. The onerous,
self-destructive restrictions of gilds were now being
superseded by the stimulating measures of Chambers of
Commerce. More than six centuries elapsed before the enactment
of Magna Carta that all merchants 'may go through England, by
land and water, to buy and sell, free from all unjust
imposts,' became a realised fact throughout the realm. The
Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 provided that 'every person
in any borough may keep any shop for the sale of all lawful
wares and merchandizes by wholesale or retail, and use every
lawful trade, occupation, mystery, and handicraft, for hire,
gain, sale, or otherwise, within any borough.' In a single
town of England the Gild Merchant still subsists, but only as
the shadow of its former self—a spectre from the distant
past. At Preston the Gild Merchant has been 'celebrated'
regularly once every twenty years for more than three
centuries, on which occasions the burgesses renew their
freedom and indulge in all the festivities of a civic
carnival. The last Gild Merchant was held in 1882. There was
then much feasting and dancing, there were gay processions of
townsmen, and much talk of the glories of the past. And yet
how few even of the scholars and noblemen there assembled from
various parts of Great Britain knew what an important role the
Gild Merchant had played in the annals of English municipal
history, what strange vicissitudes it had undergone, what a
remarkable transformation the centuries had wrought in it."
C. Gross,
The Gild Merchant,
chapters 1 and 9 (volume 1).
"The rise of the craft gilds is, roughly speaking, a century
later [than the rise of the merchant gilds]; isolated examples
occur early in the twelfth century, they become more numerous
as the century advances, and in the thirteenth century they
appear in all branches of manufacture and in every industrial
centre. Craft gilds were associations of all the artisans
engaged in a particular industry in a particular town, for
certain common purposes. … Their appearance marks the second
stage in the history of industry, the transition from the
family system to the artisan (or gild) system. In the former
there was no class of artisans properly so called; no class,
that is to say, of men whose time was entirely or chiefly
devoted to a particular manufacture; and this because all the
needs of a family or other domestic group, whether of
monastery or manor-house, were satisfied by the labours of the
members of the group itself. The latter, on the contrary, is
marked by the presence of a body of men each of whom was
occupied more or less completely in one particular
manufacture. The very growth from the one to the other system,
therefore, is an example of 'division of labour,' or, to use a
better phrase, of 'division of employments.' … When the
place of the young manufactures of the twelfth century in the
development of mediæval society is thus conceived, the
discussion as to a possible Roman 'origin' of the gilds loses
much of its interest. No doubt modern historians have
exaggerated the breach in continuity between the Roman and the
barbarian world; no doubt the artisans in the later Roman
Empire had an organization somewhat like that of the later
gilds. Moreover, it is possible that in one or two places in
Gaul certain artisan corporations may have had a continuous
existence from the fifth to the twelfth century. It is even
possible that Roman regulations may have served as models for
the organization of servile artisans on the lands of
monasteries and great nobles,—from which, on the continent,
some of the later craft gilds doubtless sprang. But when we
see that the growth of an artisan class, as distinguished from
isolated artisans here and there, was impossible till the
twelfth century, because society had not yet reached the stage
in which it was profitable or safe for a considerable number
of men to confine themselves to any occupation except
agriculture; and that the ideas which governed the craft gilds
were not peculiar to themselves but common to the whole
society of the time; then the elements of organization which
may conceivably have been derived from or suggested by the
Roman artisan corporations become of quite secondary
importance. There is, as we have said, little doubt that some
of the craft gilds of France and Germany were originally
organizations of artisan serfs on the manors of great lay or
ecclesiastical lords. This may also have been the case in some
places in England, but no evidence has yet been adduced to
show that it was so. … The relation of the craft gilds to
the merchant gild is a still more difficult question. In many
of the towns of Germany and the Netherlands a desperate
struggle took place during the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries between a burgher oligarchy, who monopolized the
municipal government, and were still further strengthened in
many cases by union in a merchant gild, and the artisans
organized in their craft gilds; the craftsmen fighting first
for the right of having gilds of their own, and then for a
share in the government of the town.
{1618}
These facts have been easily fitted into a symmetrical theory
of industrial development; the merchant gilds, it is said,
were first formed for protection against feudal lords, but
became exclusive, and so rendered necessary the formation of
craft gilds; and in the same way the craft gilds became
exclusive afterwards, and the journeymen were compelled to
form societies of their own for protection against the
masters. … The very neatness of such a theory, the readiness
with which it has been accepted by popular writers in spite of
the paucity of English evidence, have perhaps led some
historians to treat it with scant consideration. … At the
end of the reign of Edward III. there were in London
forty-eight companies or crafts, each with a separate
organization and officers of its own, a number which had
increased to at least sixty before the close of the century."
W. J. Ashley,
An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory,
book 1, chapter 2 (volume 1).
"The unions known by the names of mystery, faculty, trade,
fellowship, or (from the fact of possessing particular
costumes) livery company, existed in large numbers throughout
the realm, and were frequently divided into two or three
categories. Thus in London the principal crafts were the
twelve 'substantial companies' or 'livery companies' [Mercers,
Grocers, Drapers, Fishmongers, Goldsmiths, Skinners, Merchant
Tailors, Haberdashers, Salters, Ironmongers, Vintners,
Cloth-workers]. … A perfect acquaintance with the details of
the trade and the desire as well as the ability to produce
good work were in all cases preliminary requisites [of
membership]. In fact the main provisions of the craft, the
very soul of its constitution, were the regulations intended
to ensure the excellence of the products and the capacity of
the workman. … The whole character of the craft guild is
explained by these regulations, designed to prevent fraud and
deception of the public."
E. R. A. Seligman,
Mediæval Guilds of England
(American Economics Association,
volume 2, number 5), part 2, section 2.
ALSO IN:
W. Stubbs,
Constitutional History of England,
chapter 11.
W. Herbert,
History of Twelve Great Livery Companies.
See, also, COMMUNE.
GUILDS OF FLANDERS.
"In the course of the tenth century Bruges had waxed great and
wealthy through its trade with England, while the Ghent people
constructed a port at the junction of their two rivers. The
Flemings, nevertheless, were still noted for the boorishness
of their demeanour, their addiction to intemperance, and their
excessive turbulence. Their pagan ancestors had been
accustomed to form associations for their mutual protection
against accidents by fire or water, and similar misadventures.
These unions were called 'Minne,' or Friendships—an idea
reproduced in the 'Amicitiæ,' to which allusion is so
frequently made in the deeds of ancient corporations. …
After a time the name of 'Minne' came to be supplanted by that
of 'Ghilde,' meaning a feast at the common expense. Each
ghilde was placed under the tutelage of a departed hero, or
demigod, and was managed by officers elected by the members—
social equality being the foundation of each fraternity.
Subsequent to the introduction of Christianity the demigod was
replaced by a saint, while the members were enjoined to
practise works of piety. … The Ghildes were the base of the
municipal administration, and gradually assumed the government
of the town, but took another form and appellation. The word
was thenceforward applied, in its restricted sense of Guild,
as referring to trade corporations, while the previous
organisation came to be described in French and Latin
documents as Commune or Communia, and embraced all who were
entitled to gather together in the cauter, or public place,
when the bell rang out the summons from the town belfry. In
Flanders the Communes grew out of popular institutions of
ancient date, and, though, no doubt, their influence was
sensibly increased by their confirmation at the hands of King
or Count, they did not owe their origin to royal or
seigniorial charters."
J. Hutton,
James and Philip Van Arteveld,
part 1, chapter 1.
GUILDS OF FLORENCE.
See FLORENCE: A. D. 1250-1293.
GUILFORD COURT HOUSE, Battle of (1781).
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781.
GUILLOTINE, The origin of the.
"It was during these winter months [of the session of the
French National Assembly, 1790] that Dr. Guillotin read his
long discourse upon the reformation of the penal code; of
which the 'Moniteur' has not preserved a single word. This
discourse attracts our attention on two accounts:—First, it
proposed a decree that there should be but one kind of
punishment for capital crimes; secondly, that the arm of the
executioner should be replaced by the action of a machine,
which Dr. Guillotin had invented. 'With the aid of my
machine,' said the glib doctor, 'I will make your head spring
off in the twinkling of an eye, and you will suffer nothing.'
Bursts of laughter met this declaration; nevertheless, the
Assembly listened with attention, and adopted the proposal."
G. H. Lewes,
Life of Robespierre,
chapter 10.
ALSO IN:
G. Everitt,
Guillotine the Great and her Successors.
J. W. Croker,
History of the Guillotine.
----------GUINEGATE: Start--------
GUINEGATE, Battle of (1478).
A bloody but indecisive battle, fought between the French, on
one side, and Flemish and Burgundian troops on the other, in
the war produced by the attempt of Louis XI. to rob Mary of
Burgundy of her heritage. It was followed by a long truce, and
a final treaty.
E. Smedley,
History of France,
part 1, chapter 17.
GUINEGATE: Battle of (1513).
See FRANCE: A. D. 1513-1515.
----------GUINEGATE: End----------
GUINES, Treaty of (1547).
See FRANCE: A. D. 1532-1547.
GUISCARD, Robert, and Roger and the Norman conquest of Southern
Italy and Sicily.
See ITALY: A. D. 1000-1090; and 1081-1194.
GUISE, Duke of, Assassination.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1584-1589.
GUISES, The.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1547-1559.
GUIZOT'S MINISTRY.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1841-1848.
GUJERAT, Battle of (1849).
See INDIA: A. D. 1845-1849.
GUNDEBERTUS, King of the Lombards, A. D. 662-672.
{1619}
GUNPOWDER PLOT, The.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1605.
GURKHAS, OR GOORKAS, The.
See INDIA: THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS.
GURU, OR GOOROO.
See SIKHS.
GUSTAVUS (I.) Vasa, King of Sweden, A. D. 1523-1560.
See SCANDINAVIAN STATES: A. D. 1397-1527, and 1523-1604.
Gustavus (II.) Adolphus, King of Sweden, 1611-1632.
Campaigns and death in Germany.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1630-1631, to 1631-1632.
Gustavus III., King of Sweden, 1771-1792.
Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 1792-1809.
GUTBORM, King of Norway, A. D. 1204-1205.
GUTENBERG, and the invention of Printing.
See PRINTING: A. D. 1430-1456.
GUTSTADT, Battle of.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (FEBRUARY-JUNE).
GUTHRIE, The founding of the city of.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1889-1890.
GUTTONES, The.
See PRUSSIAN LANGUAGE, THE OLD.
GUUCHIES, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: PAMPAS TRIBES.
GUY FAWKES' DAY.
November 5, the anniversary of the day on which the
conspirators of the "Gunpowder Plot" intended to blow up King
and Parliament, in England.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1605.
GWENT.

See BRITAIN: 6TH CENTURY.
GWLEDIG.
A Welsh title, signifying ruler, or prince, which was taken by
the native leader in Britain after the Romans left. He was the
successor of the Roman Duke of Britain.
J. Rhys,
Celtic Britain,
chapter 3.
See, also, ARTHUR, KING.
GWYNEDD.
See BRITAIN: 6TH CENTURY.
GYLIPPUS, and the defense of Syracuse.
See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.
GYMNASIA, German.
See EDUCATION, MODERN:
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.—PRUSSIA: A. D. 1874.
GYMNASIA, Greek.
"Amongst public buildings [of the ancient Greeks] we mentioned
first the gymnasia, which, originating in the requirements of
single persons, soon became centre-points of Greek life.
Corporeal exercise was of great importance amongst the Greeks,
and the games and competitions in the various kinds of bodily
skill … formed a chief feature of their religious feasts.
This circumstance reacted on both sculpture and architecture,
in supplying the former with models of ideal beauty, and in
setting the task to the latter of providing suitable places
for these games to be celebrated. For purposes of this kind
(as far as public exhibition was not concerned) the palæstrai
and gymnasia served. In earlier times these two must be
distinguished. In the palæstra … young men practised
wrestling and boxing. As these arts were gradually developed,
larger establishments with separate compartments became
necessary. Originally such places were, like the schools of
the grammarians, kept by private persons; sometimes they
consisted only of open spaces, if possible near a brook and
surrounded by trees. Soon, however, regular
buildings—gymnasia—became necessary. At first they
consisted of an uncovered, court surrounded by colonnades,
adjoining which lay covered spaces, the former being used for
running and jumping, the latter for wrestling. In the same
degree as these exercises became more developed, and as
grown-up men began to take an interest in these youthful
sports, and spent a great part of their day at the gymnasia,
these grew in size and splendour. They soon became a necessary
of life, and no town could be without them, larger cities
often containing several."
E. Guhl and W. Koner,
Life of the Greeks and Romans,
section 25.
Of gymnasia "there were many at Athens; though three only,
those of the Academy, Lyceum, and Cynosarges, have acquired
celebrity: The site of the first of these gymnasia being low
and marshy was in ancient times infested with malaria, but
having been drained by Cimon and planted with trees it became
a favourite promenade and place of exercise. Here, in walks
shaded by the sacred olive, might be seen young men with
crowns of rushes in flower upon their heads, enjoying the
sweet odour of the smilax and the white poplar, while the
platanos and the elm mingled their murmurs in the breeze of
spring. The meadows of the Academy, according to Aristophanes
the grammarian, were planted with the Apragmosune, a sort of
flower so called as though it smelt of all kind of fragrance
and safety, like our heart's-ease or flower of the Trinity.
This place is supposed to have derived its name from Ecadamos,
a public-spirited man who bequeathed his property for the
purpose of keeping it in order. … The name of the Lyceum,
sometimes derived from Lycus, son of Pandion, probably owed
its origin to the temenos of Lycian Apollo there situated. It
lay near the banks of the Ilissos, and was adorned with
stately edifices, fountains and groves. … In this place
anciently the Polemarch held his court and the forces of the
republic were exercised before they went forth to war.
Appended to the name of the Cynosarges, or third gymnasium
surrounded with groves, was a legend which related that when
Diomos was sacrificing to Hestia, a white dog snatched away a
part of the victim from the altar, and running straightway out
of the city deposited it on the spot where this gymnasium was
afterwards erected."
J. A. St. John,
The Hellenes,
book 2, chapter 5.
"The name of that most illustrious of the Athenian gymnasia,
the Academy, has been preserved through the dark ages, and
exactly in the situation indicated by ancient testimony. We
are informed that the Academy was six or eight stades distant
from a gate in the wall of the asty named Dipylum, and that
the road from thence to the Academy led through that part of
the outer Cerameicus, in which it was a custom to bury the
Athenian citizens who had fallen in battle on important
occasions. Dipylum was the gate from whence began the Sacred
Way from Athens to Eleusis. … It appears also that the
Academy lay between the Sacred Way and the Colonus Hippius, a
height near the Cephissus, sacred to Neptune, and the scene of
the Œdipus Coloneus of Sophocles; for the Academy was not far
from Colonus, and the latter was ten stades distant from the
city. That part of the plain which is near the olive-groves,
on the northeastern side of Athens, and is now called
Akadhimia, is entirely in conformity with these data. It is on
the lowest level, where some water-courses from the ridges of
Lycabettus are consumed in gardens and olive plantations."
W. M. Leake,
Topography of Athens,
section 2.
See, also,
EDUCATION, ANCIENT: GREECE.
{1620}
GYMNASIARCH.
See LITURGIES.
GYPSIES, The.
"Having in various and distant countries lived in habits of
intimacy with these people, I have come to the following
conclusions respecting them: that wherever they are found,
their manners and customs are virtually the same, though
somewhat modified by circumstances, and that the language they
speak amongst themselves, and of which they are particularly
anxious to keep others in ignorance, is in all countries one
and the same, but has been subjected more or less to
modification; and lastly, that their countenances exhibit a
decided family resemblance, but are darker or fairer according
to the temperature of the climate, but invariably darker, at
least in Europe, than the natives of the countries in which
they dwell, for example, England and Russia, Germany and
Spain. The names by which they are known differ with the
country, though, with one or two exceptions, not materially;
for example, they are styled in Russia, Zigani; in Turkey and
Persia, Zingarri; and in Germany, Zigeuner; all which words
apparently spring from the same etymon, which there is no
improbability in supposing to be 'Zincali,' a term by which
these people, especially those of Spain, sometimes designate
themselves, and the meaning of which is believed to be, 'The
black men of Zend or Ind.' In England and Spain they are
commonly known as Gypsies and Gitanos, from a general belief
that they were originally Egyptians, to which the two words
are tantamount; and in France as Bohemians, from the
circumstance that Bohemia was the first country in civilized
Europe where they made their appearance; though there is
reason for supposing that they had been wandering in the
remote regions of Sclavonia for a considerable time previous,
as their language abounds with words of Sclavonic origin,
which could not have been adopted in a hasty passage through a
wild and half populated country. But they generally style
themselves and the language which they speak, Rommany. This
word … is of Sanscrit origin, and signifies, 'The Husbands,'
or that which pertaineth unto them. From whatever motive this
appellation may have originated, it is perhaps more applicable
than any other to a sect or caste like them, who have no love
and no affection beyond their own race; who are capable of
making great sacrifices for each other, and who gladly prey
upon all the rest of the human species, whom they detest, and
by whom they are hated and despised. It will perhaps not be
out of place to observe here, that there is no reason for
supposing that the word Roma or Rommany is derived from the
Arabic word which signifies Greece or Grecians, as some people
not much acquainted with the language of the race in question
have imagined. … Scholars have asserted that the language
which they speak proves them to be of Indian stock, and
undoubtedly a great number of their words are Sanscrit. …
There is scarcely a part of the habitable world where they are
not to be found; their tents are alike pitched on the heaths
of Brazil and the ridges of the Himalayan hills, and their
language is heard at Moscow and Madrid, in the streets of
London and Stamboul."
G. Borrow,
The Zincali,
volume 1, pages 2-5.
"One day, 450 years ago, or thereabouts, there knocked at the
gates of the city of Lüneburg, on the Elbe, as strange a
rabble rout as had ever been seen by German burgher. There
were 300 of them, men and women, accompanied by an
extraordinary number of children. They were dusky of skin,
with jet-black hair and eyes; they wore strange garments; they
were unwashed and dirty even beyond the liberal limits
tolerated by the cold-water-fearing citizens of Lüneburg; they
had with them horses, donkeys, and carts; they were led by two
men whom they described as Duke and Count. … All the
Lüneburgers turned out to gaze open-mouthed at these pilgrims,
while the Duke and the Count told the authorities their tale,
which was wild and romantic. … Many years before, they
explained, while the tears of penitence stood in the eyes of
all but the youngest children, they had been a Christian
community, living in orthodoxy, and therefore happiness, in a
far-off country known as Egypt. … They were then a happy
Christian flock. To their valley came the Saracens, an
execrable race, worshipping Mahound. Yielding, in an evil
hour, to the threats and persecutions of their conquerors,
they—here they turned their faces and wept aloud—they
abjured Christ. But thereafter they had no rest or peace, and
a remorse so deep fell upon their souls that they were fain to
arise, leave their homes, and journey to Rome in hope of
getting reconciliation with the Church, They were graciously
received by the Pope, who promised to admit them back into the
fold after seven years of penitential wandering. They had
letters of credit from King Sigismund—would the Lüneburgers
kindly look at them?—granting safe conduct and recommending
them to the protection of all honest people. The Lüneburg folk
were touched at the recital of so much suffering in a cause so
good; they granted the request of the strangers. They allowed
them to encamp, … The next day the strangers visited the
town. In the evening a good many things were missed,
especially those unconsidered trifles which a housewife may
leave about her doorway. Poultry became suddenly scarce; eggs
doubled in price; it was rumoured that purses had been lost
while their owners gazed at the strangers; cherished cups of
silver were not to be found. … While the Lüneburgers took
counsel, in their leisurely way, how to meet a case so
uncommon, the pilgrims suddenly decamped, leaving nothing
behind them but the ashes of their fires and the picked bones
of the purloined poultry. … This was the first historical
appearance of Gipsies. It was a curious place to appear in.
The mouth of the Elbe is a long way from Egypt, even if you
travel by sea, which does not appear to have been the case;
and a journey on laud not only would have been infinitely more
fatiguing, but would, one would think, have led to some notice
on the road before reaching Lüneburg. There, however, the
Gipsies certainly are first heard of, and henceforth history
has plenty to say about their doings. From Lüneburg they went
to Hamburg, Lübeck, Rostock, Griefswald, travelling in an
easterly direction. They are mentioned as having appeared in
Saxony, where they were driven away, as at Lüneburg, for their
thievish propensities. They travelled through Switzerland,
headed by their great Duke Michael, and pretending to have
been expelled from Egypt by the Turks, Their story in these
early years, though it varied in particulars, remained the
same in essentials.
{1621}
In Provence they called themselves Saracens; in Swabia they
were Egyptians doomed to everlasting wanderings for having
refused hospitality to the Virgin and Joseph; at Bâle, where
they exhibited letters of safe conduct from the Pope, they
were also Egyptians. Always the Land of the Nile; always the
same pretence, or it may be reminiscence, of sojourn in Egypt;
always, to soothe the suspicions of priests, faithful and
submissive sons of the Church. From the very first their real
character was apparent. They lie, cheat, and steal at
Lüneburg; they lie and steal everywhere; they tell fortunes
and cut purses, they buy and sell horses, they poison pigs,
they rob and plunder, they wander and they will not work. They
first came to Paris in the year 1427, when more people went to
see them, we are told, than ever crowded to the Fair of
Laudet. … They remained at St. Denis for a month, when they
received peremptory orders to quit for the usual reason. …
In the 16th century trouble began for the Roman folk. By this
time their character was perfectly well known. They were
called Bohemians, Heathen, Gitanos, Pharaohites, Robbers,
Tartars, and Zigeuner. They had abandoned the old lying story
of the penitential wanderings; they were outcasts; their hand
was against every man's hand; their customs were the same then
as they are described now by Leland or Borrow."
Gipsies and their Friends
(Temple Bar, volume 47), pages 65-67.
"Since the publication of Pott's book upon the gypsies [Die
Zigeuner in Europa und Asien]—about 30 years ago—we have
come to regard the origin of this singular people with
considerable unanimity of opinion. Almost nobody doubts now
that they are Indians; and the assumption that all the gypsies
scattered throughout Europe are descended from one parent
stock meets with little contradiction. Both of these beliefs
are the outcome of the investigation of their language. …
Pott, in the introduction to his book, and quoting from the
'Shah-Name' of Firdousi, informs us that, during the 5th
century of our era, the Persian monarch, Behram Gour, received
from an Indian king 12,000 musicians of both sexes, who were
known as Luris. Now, as this is the name by which the gypsies
of Persia are known even at the present day, and as, moreover,
the author of the Persian work 'Modjmal at-tawarikh'
emphatically says that the Luris or Lulis of modern Persia are
the descendants of these same 12,000 musicians, there is no
hazard in the assumption that we have here the first recorded
gypsy migration. Confirmation of this is afforded by the
Arabian historian, Hamza of Ispahan, who wrote half a century
before Firdousi, and who was well versed in the history of the
Sassasinides. It is related by this author that Behram Gour
caused 12,000 musicians, called Zott, to be sent from India
for the benefit of his subjects. And 'Zott' is the name by
which the gypsies were known to the Arabs, and which they even
bear in Damascus at the present day. In the Arabic dictionary
'al-Kamus' this entry occurs: 'Zott, arabicized from Jatt, a
people of Indian origin. The word might be pronounced Zatt
with equal correctness.' … For the fatherland of these Zott,
or Jatt, we have not long to seek. Istakhri and Ibn-Haukal,
the celebrated 10th-century geographers, recount as follows:—
'Between al-Mansura and Mokran the waters of the Indus have
formed marshes, the borders of which are inhabited by certain
Indian tribes, called Zott; those of them who dwell near the
river live in huts, like the huts of the Berbers, and subsist
chiefly on fish and water-fowl; while those occupying the
level country further inland live like the Kurds, supporting
themselves on milk, cheese, and maize.' In these same regions
there are yet two more tribes placed by these geographers,
namely, the Bodha and the Meid. The former are properly,
according to Ibn-Haukal, a subdivision of the Zott. … In
course of time the Meds (to adopt the spelling favoured by Sir
Henry Elliott) overcame the Zotts, whom they treated with such
severity that they had to leave the country. The Zotts then
established themselves on the river Pehen, where they soon
became skilful sailors"; while those living farther to the
north, known as Kikan, became famed as breeders of horses and
herders of buffalos. When the Arabs, in their career of
conquest, came in contact with the Zotts, the latter joined
them, and large colonies of them were removed, for some
reason, to western Asia, and settled with their herds on the
lower Euphrates and Tigris, and in Syria. The Zotts on the
Tigris became strong and troublesome in time, and in 834 the
khalif Motacem, after subjugating them by force, removed them
from the country, to the number of 27,000, sending them to
Ainzarba, on the northern frontier of Syria. In 855, Ainzarba
was captured by the Byzantines, who carried off the Zotts,
with all their buffalo herds. "Here, then, we have the first
band of gypsies brought into the Greek Empire. … As regards
the destinies of the Zotts after they had been brought to Asia
Minor from Ainzarba, in the year 855, I have been unable—in
the course of a hurried search—to discover anything. But, now
that we know the year in which they entered Byzantine
territory, others may be more successful. Whether the name
Zott, or rather its Indian form Jatt (or Jaut), has also been
brought with them into Europe, I am, of course, as little able
to say."
M. J. de Goeje,
A Contribution to the History of the Gypsies
(In "Accounts of the Gypsies of India,"
edited by D. MacRitchie).
"Students of the gipsies, and especially those who have
interested themselves in the history of the race, will have
read with regret the announcement of the death, at Paris, on
March 1st, of the veteran 'tsiganologue,' M. Paul Bataillard.
For the last half century he had devoted his leisure time to
the study of the early notices of the presence of gipsies in
Europe. … It was his opinion that there have been gipsies in
Eastern Europe since prehistoric times, and that it is to them
Europe owes its knowledge of metallurgy. Heterodox although
this opinion may be, it has recently been observed by Mr. F.
H. Groome that 'Bataillard's theory is gaining favour with
foreign archæologists, among whom MM. Mortillet, Chantre, and
Burnouf had arrived independently at similar conclusions.'"
The Athenæum,
March 31, 1894.
ALSO IN:
C. G. Leland,
English Gipsies,
chapters 8-10.
W. Simson.
History of the Gipsies.
GYRWAS.
"Fen-folk"—the name taken by a body of Engle freebooters who
occupied the islands in the Fen district of England for a long
time before they were able to possess the Roman-British towns
and country on its border.
J. R. Green,
The Making of England,
chapter 2.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 547-633.
{1622}
H
HAARLEM: A. D. 1572-1573.
Siege and capture by Alva's Spaniards.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1572-1573.
HABEAS CORPUS, Act and Writ of.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1679 (MAY).
HABSBURG, or HAPSBURG, Origin of the House of.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1246-1282.
HABSBURG-LORRAINE, The House of.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1745 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER).
HACKINSACKS, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: ALGONQUIAN FAMILY.
HADI, Al, Caliph, A. D. 786-809.
HADRIAN,
Roman Emperor, A. D. 117-138.
Hadrian I., Pope, 772-795.
Hadrian II., Pope, 867-872.
Hadrian III., Pope, 884-885.
Hadrian IV., Pope, 1154-1159.
Hadrian V., Pope, 1276, July to August.
HADRIANOPLE.
See ADRIANOPLE.
HADRIAN'S MAUSOLEUM.
See CASTLE ST. ANGELO.
HADRIAN'S WALL.
See ROMAN WALLS IN BRITAIN.
HADRUMETUM, OR ADRUMETUM.
See CARTHAGE, THE DOMINION OF.
HÆDUI, The.
See ÆDUI.
HÆMUS, Mount.
The ancient name of the Balkan chain of mountains.
HÆRRED, The.
See HUNDRED, THE.
HAGENAU, Treaty of (1330).
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1330-1364.
HAGUE, The:
Origin and Name.
"Unlike other Dutch cities, the Hague owed its importance, not
to commerce or manufactures, but to having early been made the
seat of government of the United Provinces, and to the
constant presence of the officers of state and the foreign
ministers accredited to the republic. For four centuries the
abode of the counts of Holland, it derives its name from the
'Haeg 'or hedge encircling the magnificent park which formed
their ancient hunting ground, and the majestic trees in which,
at this day, attract the admiration of Europe."
J. R. Brodhead,
History of the State of New York,
volume 1, page 61.
HAGUENAU: Cession to France.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.
HAIDAS, The.
See AMERICAN ABORIGINES: SKITTAGETAN FAMILY.
HAIDERABAD, OR HYDERABAD, The Nizam of.
See INDIA: A. D. 1662-1748; and 1877.
HAINAULT.
Hainault, the region of the Netherlands occupied anciently by
the Nervii, became a county under hereditary lords in the 9th
century. In the 11th century it was joined by marriage to the
territories of the counts of Flanders, and so remained, until
the beginning of the 14th century. In 1300 Hainault and
Holland became joined under the same family of counts.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 922-1345.
HAITI.
See HAYTI.
HAKO, OR HAKON I. (called the Good),
King of Norway, A. D. 940-963.
Hako II. (Jarl), King of Norway, 977-995.
Hako III., King of Norway, 1202-1204.
Hako IV., King of Norway, 1207-1263.
Hako V., King of Norway, 1299-1319.
Hako VI., King of Norway, 1343-1380.
HALF-BREEDS.
See STALWARTS.
HALFWAY COVENANT, The.
See BOSTON: A. D. 1657-1669.
HALIARTUS, Battle of (B. C. 395).
See GREECE: B. C. 399-387.
HALICARNASSUS.
See CARIANS;
and ASIA MINOR;
THE GREEK COLONIES;
also, MACEDONIA: B. C. 334-330.
HALIDON HILL, Battle of (1333).
See BERWICK-UPON-TWEED: A. D. 1293-1333;
and SCOTLAND: A. D. 1332-1333.
HALIFAX: A. D. 1749.
The founding of the city.
"In the year [1749] after the peace [of Aix-la-Chapelle] the
land forces in Great Britain were reduced to little more than
18,000 men; those in Minorca, Gibraltar, and the American
plantations, to 10,000; while the sailors retained in the
Royal Navy were under 17,000. From the large number both of
soldiers and seamen suddenly discharged, it was feared that
they might be either driven to distress or tempted to
depredation. Thus, both for their own comfort and for the
quiet of the remaining community, emigration seemed to afford
a safe and excellent resource. The province of Nova Scotia was
pitched upon for this experiment, and the freehold of fifty
acres was offered to each settler, with ten acres more for
every child brought with him, besides a free passage, and an
exemption from all taxes during a term of ten years. Allured
by such advantages, above 4,000 persons, with their families,
embarked under the command of Colonel Cornwallis, and landed
at the harbour of Chebuetow. The new town which soon arose
from their labours received its name from the Earl of Halifax,
who presided at the Board of Trade, and who had the principal
share in the foundation of this colony. In the first winter
there were but 300 huts of wood, surrounded by a palisade."
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 31 (volume 4).
See, also,
NOVA SCOTIA: A. D. 1749-1755.
HALIFAX CURRENCY.
"For many years Canada used what was called 'Halifax
currency,' in which the nomenclature of sterling money was
that employed, but having a pound of this currency valued at
four dollars."
G. Bryce,
Short History of the Canadian People,
page 433.
HALIFAX FISHERY AWARD.
See FISHERIES, NORTH AMERICAN: A. D. 1877-1888.
HALLECK, General Henry W. Command in Missouri.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1861 (JULY-NOVEMBER).
Command in the Valley of the Mississippi.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1862 (FEBRUARY-APRIL: TENNESSEE);
(APRIL-MAY: TENNESSEE-MISSISSIPPI);
(JUNE-OCTOBER: TENNESSEE-KENTUCKY).
Command of all the armies.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1862 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER: MISSISSIPPI).
HAMADAN.
The capital city of ancient Media.
HAMATH, Kingdom of.
"It is impossible to doubt that the Hamathites are identical
with the Canaanitish tribe that was settled in the town of
Hamath, afterwards called Epiphania, on the Orontes, between
the Hittites and the Amorites of Kadesh. After the time of
David they were succeeded in that town by the Arimæans."
F. Lenormant,
Manual of Ancient History of the East,
book 6, chapter 1 (volume 2).
{1623}
----------HAMBURG: Start----------
HAMBURG:
The origin of the city, its freedom and commercial rise.
See HANSA TOWNS.
HAMBURG: A. D. 1801-1803.
One of six Free Cities which survived the Peace of Luneville.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803.
HAMBURG: A. D. 1806.
Occupied and oppressed by the French.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).
HAMBURG: A. D. 1810.
Annexation to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (FEBRUARY-DECEMBER).
HAMBURG: A. D. 1810-1815.
Loss and recovery of the autonomy of a Free City.
See CITIES, IMPERIAL AND FREE, OF GERMANY.
HAMBURG: A. D. 1813.
Expulsion of the French.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1812-1813.
HAMBURG: A. D. 1813.
Defense by Marshal Davoust.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).
HAMBURG: A. D. 1815.
Once more a Free City and a member of the Germanic
Confederation.
See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.
HAMBURG: A. D. 1888.
Surrender of free privileges.
Absorption in the Zollverein and Empire.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1888.
----------HAMBURG: End----------
HAMILCAR BARCA, and the First Punic War.
See PUNIC WAR, THE FIRST.
HAMILTON, Alexander,
The framing and adoption of the Federal Constitution.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1787, and 1787-1789.
HAMILTON, Alexander:
Financial organization of the United States Government.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1792;
also, TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES):
A. D. 1789-1791.
HAMILTON, Alexander:
The Federal Party.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1792,
and 1797-1799.
HAMILTON, Alexander:
Fatal duel with Aaron Burr.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1806-1807.
HAMITES.—HAMITIC LANGUAGES.
The name Hamites, as now used among ethnologists, is
restricted more closely than it once was to certain African
races, whose languages are found to be related. The languages
classed as Hamitic are those of the ancient Egyptians and the
modern Copts, most of the Abyssinian tribes, the Gallas and
the Berbers. Some of the older writers, Lenormant, for
example, embraced the Phœnicians and all their Canaanite
neighbors among the Hamites; but this is not now an accepted
view. It was undoubtedly formed under the influence of the
theory from which the name Hamites came, namely that the
people so designated were descendants of Ham; and it sought to
adjust a division of the Hamitic family to four lines of
descent, indicated by the Biblical account of the four sons of
Ham,—Cush, Mizraim, Phut, and Canaan. This hypothesis
identified the Cushites with the Ethiopians (modern
Abyssinians and Nubians), the descendants of Mizraim with the
Egyptians, those of Phut with the Libyans, and those of Canaan
with the Canaanites, including the Phœnicians. Some held that
the Hamites occupied originally a great part of western and
southern Asia; that they were the primitive inhabitants of
southern Mesopotamia, or Chaldea, southern Persia, and
southern Arabia, and were displaced by the Semites; also that
they once inhabited the most of Asia Minor, and that the
Carians were a surviving remnant of them. But the more
conservative sense in which the term Hamite is now used
restricts it, as stated above, to certain races which are
grouped together by a relationship in their languages. Whether
or not the Hamitic tongues have an affinity to the Semitic
seems still an open question; and, in fact, the whole subject
is in an undetermined state, as may be inferred from the
following extract: "The so-called Hamitic or sub-Semitic
languages of Northern Africa … exhibit resemblances to the
language of ancient Egypt as well as to those of the Semitic
family. In the Libyan dialects we find the same double verbal
form employed with the same double function as in Assyrian,
and throughout the 'Hamitic' languages the causative is
denoted by a prefixed sibilant as it was in the parent Semitic
speech. We cannot argue, however, from language to race, …
and the Libyans have ethnologically no connection with the
Semites or the Egyptians. Moreover, in several instances the
Hamitic' dialects are spoken by tribes of negro or Nubian
origin, while the physiological characteristics of the
Egyptians are very different from those of the Semite."
A. H. Sayce,
The Races of the Old Testament,
chapter 4.
HAMPDEN, John.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1634-1637; 1640-1641;
1642 (JANUARY), (OCTOBER-DECEMBER);
and 1643 (AUGUST-SEPTEMBER).
HAMPDEN CLUBS.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1816-1820.
HAMPTON COURT CONFERENCE.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1604.
HAMPTON ROADS PEACE CONFERENCE.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1865 (FEBRUARY).
HANAU, Battle of.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).
HANCOCK, John, and the American Revolution.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1775 (MAY-AUGUST); and 1776 (JULY).
HANDVESTS.
See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1559-1562.
HANES.
An ancient Egyptian city, once mentioned in the Bible by that
name (Isaiah xxx. 4). Its ruins have been identified, about 70
miles above Cairo, on the western bank of the Nile. The
Egyptian name of the city was Chenensu; the Greek name
Heracleopolis.
R. S. Poole,
Cities of Egypt,
chapter 3.
HANNIBAL, The war of, with Rome.
See PUNIC WAR, THE SECOND.
----------HANOVER: Start--------
HANOVER, OR BRUNSWICK-LÜNEBURG:
Origin of the Kingdom and House.
See SAXONY: THE OLD DUCHY,
and A. D. 1178-1183.
HANOVER:
The Guelf connection.
See GUELFS AND GHIBELLINES;
and ESTE, HOUSE OF.
HANOVER: A. D. 1529.
The Duke joins in the Protest which gave origin to the name
Protestants.
See PAPACY: A. D. 1525-1529.
HANOVER: A. D. 1546.
Final separation from the Wolfenbüttel branch of the House.
The two principalities of Brunswick and Lüneburg, which had
been divided, were reunited by Ernest, called the Confessor.
On his death, in 1546, they were again divided, the heir of
his elder son taking Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, or Brunswick, and
the younger receiving Brunswick-Lüneburg, or Hanover. From the
latter branch sprang the Electoral House of Hanover, and the
present royal family of England; from the former descended the
Ducal Brunswick family.
Sir A. Halliday,
Annals of the House of Hanover,
book 9 (volume 2).
{1624}
HANOVER: A. D. 1648.
Losses and acquisitions in the Peace of Westphalia.
The alternating Bishopric.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1648.
HANOVER: A. D. 1692.
Rise to Electoral rank.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1648-1705; and 1125-1152.
HANOVER: A. D. 1694-1696.
The war of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV.
See FRANCE: A.D. 1694; and 1695-1696.
HANOVER: A. D. 1701.
Settlement of the Succession of the Brunswick-Lüneberg line to
the English Crown.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1701.
HANOVER: A. D. 1714.
Succession of the Elector to the British Crown.
See ENGLAND: A. D. 1714.
HANOVER: A. D. 1720.
Acquisition of the duchies of Bremen and Verden by the
Elector.
See SCANDINAVIAN STATES (SWEDEN): A. D. 1719-1721.
HANOVER: A. D. 1741.
The War of the Austrian Succession: Neutrality declared.
See AUSTRIA: A. D. 1741 (AUGUST-NOVEMBER).
HANOVER: A. D. 1745.
The English-Hanoverian defeat at Fontenoy.
See NETHERLANDS (THE AUSTRIAN PROVINCES): A. D. 1745.
HANOVER: A. D. 1757-1762.
French attack and British defense of the electorate in the
Seven Years War.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1757 (JULY-DECEMBER), to 1761-1762.
HANOVER: A. D. 1763.
The Peace of Paris, ending the Seven Years War.
See SEVEN YEARS WAR: THE TREATIES.
HANOVER: A. D. 1776.
Troops hired to Great Britain for service in the American War.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1776 (JANUARY-JUNE).
HANOVER: A. D. 1801-1803.
Annexation of Osnabruck.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1801-1803.
HANOVER: A. D. 1803-1806.
Seizure by the French.
Cession to Prussia.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1802-1803;
and GERMANY: 1806 (JANUARY-AUGUST).
HANOVER: A. D. 1807.
Absorbed in the kingdom of Westphalia.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (JUNE-JULY).
HANOVER: A. D. 1810.
Northern part annexed to France.
See FRANCE: A. D. 1810 (FEBRUARY-DECEMBER).
HANOVER: A. D. 1813.
Deliverance from Napoleon.
Restoration to the King of England.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1813 (OCTOBER-DECEMBER).
HANOVER: A. D. 1815.
Raised to the rank of a kingdom, with territorial enlargement.
See VIENNA, THE CONGRESS OF.
HANOVER: A. D. 1837,
Separation of the Crown from that of Great Britain.
"From the hour that the Crown of these kingdoms [Great Britain
and Ireland] devolved upon Queen Victoria, dates a change
which was a real blessing in the relations of the Sovereign to
the Continent of Europe. Hanover was at that instant wholly
separated from Great Britain. By the law of that country a
female could not reign except in default of heirs male in the
Royal family. But in addition to the great advantage of
separating the policy of England wholly from the intrigues and
complications of a petty German State, it was an immediate
happiness that the most hated and in some respects the most
dangerous man in these islands was removed to a sphere where
his political system might be worked out with less danger to
the good of society than amongst a people where his influence
was associated with the grossest follies of Toryism and the
darkest designs of Orangeism. On the 24th of June the duke of
Cumberland, now become Ernest Augustus, King of Hanover, left
London. On the 28th he made a solemn entrance into the capital
of his states, and at once exhibited to his new subjects his
character and disposition by refusing to receive a deputation
of the Chambers, who came to offer him their homage and their
congratulations. By a proclamation of the 5th of July he
announced his intention to abolish the representative
constitution, which he had previously refused to recognize by
the customary oath. We shall have little further occasion to
notice the course of this worst disciple of the old school of
intolerance and irresponsible government, and we may therefore
at once state that he succeeded in depriving Hanover of the
forms of freedom under which she had begun to live; ejected
from their offices and banished some of the ablest professors
of the University of Gottingen, who had ventured to think that
letters would flourish best in a free soil; and reached the
height of his ambition in becoming the representative of
whatever in sovereign power was most repugnant to the spirit
of the age."
C. Knight,
Popular History of England,
volume 8, chapter 23.
HANOVER: A. D. 1866.
Extinction of the kingdom.
Absorption by Prussia.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1866.
----------HANOVER: End--------
HANOVER, The Alliance of.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1713-1725.
HANOVER JUNCTION, Engagement at.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 18112 (MAY-JUNE: VIRGINIA).
HANSA TOWNS, The.
"In consequence of the liberty and security enjoyed by the
inhabitants of the free towns [of Germany—see CITIES:
IMPERIAL AND FREE, OF GERMANY], while the rest of the country
was a prey to all the evils of feudal anarchy and oppression,
they made a comparatively rapid progress in wealth and
population. Nuremberg, Augsburg, Worms, Spires, Frankfort, and
other cities, became at an early period celebrated alike for
the extent of their commerce, the magnificence of their
buildings, and the opulence of their citizens. … The
commercial spirit awakened in the north about the same time as
in the south of Germany. Hamburgh was founded by Charlemagne
in the beginning of the ninth century, in the intention of
serving as a fort to bridle the Saxons, who had been
subjugated by the emperor. Its favourable situation on the
Elbe necessarily rendered it a commercial emporium. Towards
the close of the twelfth century, the inhabitants, who had
already been extensively engaged in naval enterprizes, began
to form the design of emancipating themselves from the
authority of their counts, and of becoming a sovereign and
independent state; and in 1189 they obtained an Imperial
charter which gave them various privileges, including among
others the power of electing councillors, or aldermen, to
whom, in conjunction with the deputy of the count, the
government of the town was to be entrusted. Not long after
Hamburgh became entirely free. In 1224 the citizens purchased
from Count Albert the renunciation of all his rights, whether
real or pretended, to any property in or sovereignty over the
town, and its immediate vicinity. And the government was thus
early placed on that liberal footing on which it has ever
since remained. Lubeck, situated on the Trave, was founded
about the middle of the twelfth century. It rapidly grew to be
a place of great trade.
{1625}
It became the principal emporium for the commerce of the
Baltic, and its merchants extended their dealings to Italy and
the Levant. At a period when navigation was still imperfect,
and when the seas were infested with pirates, it was of great
importance to be able to maintain a safe intercourse by land
between Lubeck and Hamburgh, as by that means the difficult
and dangerous navigation of the Sound was avoided. And it is
said by some, that the first political union between these
cities had the protection of merchandize carried between them
by land for its sole object. But this is contradicted by
Lambec in his 'Origines Hamburgenses' (lib. xi., pa. 26). …
But whatever may have been the motives which led to the
alliance between these two cities, it was the origin of the
famous Hanseatic League, so called from the German word
'hansa,' signifying a corporation. There is no very distinct
evidence as to the time when the alliance in question was
established; but the more general opinion seems to be that it
dates from the year 1241. … From the beginning of the
twelfth century, the progress of commerce and navigation in
the north was exceedingly rapid. The countries which stretch
along the bottom of the Baltic from Holstein to Russia, and
which had been occupied by barbarous tribes of Sclavonic
origin, were then subjugated by the Kings of Denmark, the
Dukes of Saxony, and other princes. The greater part of the
inhabitants being exterminated, their place was filled by
German colonists, who founded the towns of Stralsund, Rostock,
Wismar, etc. Prussia and Poland were afterwards subjugated by
the Christian princes, and the Knights of the Teutonic order.
So that in a comparatively short period, the foundations of
civilization and the arts were laid in countries whose
barbarism had ever remained impervious to the Roman power. The
cities that were established along the coasts of the Baltic,
and even in the interior of the countries bordering upon it,
eagerly joined the Hanseatic confederation. They were indebted
to the merchants of Lubeck for supplies of the commodities
produced in more civilized countries, and they looked up to
them for protection against the barbarians by whom they were
surrounded. The progress of the league was in consequence
singularly rapid. Previously to the end of the thirteenth
century it embraced every considerable city in all those vast
countries extending from Livonia to Holland; and was a match
for the most powerful monarchs. The Hanseatic confederacy was
at its highest degree of power and splendour during the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It then comprised from
sixty to eighty cities, which were distributed into four
classes or circles. Lubeck was at the head of the first
circle, and had under it Hamburgh, Bremen, Rostock, Wismar,
etc. Cologne was at the head of the second circle, with
twenty-nine towns under it. Brunswick was at the head of the
third circle, consisting of thirteen towns. Dantzic was at the
head of the fourth circle, having under it eight towns in its
vicinity, besides several that were more remote. The supreme
authority of the League was vested in the deputies of the
different towns assembled in Congress. In it they discussed
all their measures; decided upon the sum that each city should
contribute to the common fund; and upon the questions that
arose between the confederacy and other powers, as well as
those that frequently arose between the different members of
the confederacy. The place for the meeting of Congress was not
fixed, but it was most frequently held at Lubeck, which was
considered as the capital of the League, and there its
archives were kept. … Besides the towns already mentioned,
there were others that were denominated confederated cities,
or allies. … The Golden Bull proscribed all sorts of leagues
and associations, as contrary to the fundamental laws of the
empire, and to the subordination due to the emperor and the
different princes. But Charles IV., the author of this famous
edict, judged it expedient to conciliate the Hanseatic League;
and his successors seem generally to have followed his
example. As the power of the confederated cities was increased
and consolidated, they became more ambitious. Instead of
limiting their efforts to the mere advancement of commerce and
their own protection, they endeavoured to acquire the monopoly
of the trade of the North, and to exercise the same sort of
dominion over the Baltic that the Venetians exercised over the
Adriatic. For this purpose they succeeded in obtaining, partly
in return for loans of money, and partly by force, various
privileges and immunities from the Northern sovereigns which
secured to them almost the whole foreign commerce of
Scandinavia, Denmark, Prussia, Poland, Russia, etc. They
exclusively carried on the herring-fishery of the Sound, at
the same time that they endeavoured to obstruct and hinder the
navigation of foreign vessels in the Baltic. … The Kings of
Denmark, Sweden and Norway were frequently engaged in
hostilities with the Hanse towns. They regarded, and it must
be admitted not without pretty good reason, the privileges
acquired by the League in their kingdoms as so many
usurpations. But their efforts to abolish these privileges
served, for more than two centuries, only to augment and
extend them. … Waldemar III., who ascended the Danish throne
in 1340, engaged in a furious contest with the League. Success
seemed at first rather to incline to his arms. Ultimately,
however, he was completely defeated by the forces of the
League and its allies, and was even obliged to fly from his
kingdom. In his exile he prevailed on the Emperor and the Pope
to interpose in his favour. But neither the imperial rescripts
nor the thunders of the Vatican were able to divert the
confederated cities from their purposes. At length, in 1370,
the regents, to whom the government of Denmark had been
intrusted during the absence of the monarch, concluded a peace
with the League on the conditions dictated by the latter; one
of which was that most of the strong places in the kingdom
should be given up to the League for fifteen years, in
security for the faithful performance of the treaty. Waldemar
having assented to these humiliating terms, returned soon
after to Denmark. In the early part of the fifteenth century
the Hanse towns having espoused the side of the Count of
Holstein, who was at war with Eric X., King of Denmark, sent
an armament of upwards of 200 ships, having more than 12,000
troops on board, to the assistance of their ally. This
powerful aid decided the contest in his favour. Nearly at the
same time the League raised their ally, Albert of
Mecklenburgh, to the throne of Norway, who confirmed to them
several important commercial privileges.
{1626}
In their contests with Sweden, during the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, the League were equally successful. Such,
indeed, was their ascendancy in that kingdom, that they were
authorized to nominate some of the principal magistrates in
most of the Swedish maritime towns of any importance! … The
town of Wisby, situated on the west coast of the island of
Gothland, became, during the ascendancy of the League, one of
its principal depots, and also one of the best frequented
emporiums of the North. But Wisby is chiefly famous from its
name having become identified with the code of maritime laws
that was long of paramount authority in the Baltic. … The
principal Northern jurists and historians regard the Wisby
code, or compilation, as anterior to the code, or compilation,
denominated the Rules or Judgments of Oleron, and as being in
fact the most ancient monument of the maritime laws of the
middle ages. But no learning or ingenuity can give
plausibility to so improbable a theory. … In order to
facilitate and extend their commercial transactions, the
League established various factories in foreign countries, the
principal of which were at Novogorod in Russia, London in
England, Bruges in the Netherlands, and Bergen in Norway.
Novogorod, situated at the confluence of the Volkof with the
Imler Lake, was, for a lengthened period, the most renowned
emporium in the north-eastern parts of Europe. … The
merchants of the Hanse towns, or Hansards, as they were then
commonly termed, were established in London at a very early
period, and their factory here was of considerable magnitude
and importance. They enjoyed various privileges and
immunities; they were permitted to govern themselves by their
own laws and regulations; the custody of one of the gates of
the city (Bishopsgate) was committed to their care; and the
duties on various sorts of imported commodities were
considerably reduced in their favour. These privileges
necessarily excited the ill-will and animosity of the English
merchants. … The League exerted themselves vigorously in
defence of their privileges; and having declared war against
England, they succeeded in excluding our vessels from the
Baltic, and acted with such energy, that Edward IV. was glad
to come to an accommodation with them, on terms which were
anything but honourable to the English. In the treaty for this
purpose, negotiated in 1474, the privileges of the merchants
of the Hanse towns were renewed, and the king assigned to
them, in absolute property, a large space of ground, with the
buildings upon it, in Thames Street, denominated the Steel
Yard, whence the Hanse merchants have been commonly
denominated the Association of the Steel Yard. … In 1498,
all direct commerce with the Netherlands being suspended, the
trade fell into the hands of the Hanse merchants, whose
commerce was in consequence very greatly extended. But,
according as the spirit of commercial enterprise awakened in
the nation, and as the benefits resulting from the prosecution
of foreign trade came to be better known, the privileges of
the Hanse merchants became more and more obnoxious. They were
in consequence considerably modified in the reigns of Henry
VII. and Henry VIII., and were at length wholly abolished in
1597. The different individuals belonging to the factory in
London, as well as those belonging to the other factories of
the League, lived together at a common table, and were
enjoined to observe the strictest celibacy. … By means of
their factory at Bergen, and of the privileges which had been
either granted to or usurped by them, the League enjoyed for a
lengthened period the monopoly of the commerce of Norway. But
the principal factory of the League was at Bruges in the
Netherlands. Bruges became, at a very early period, one of the
first commercial cities of Europe, and the centre of the most
extensive trade carried on to the north of Italy. The art of
navigation in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was so
imperfect, that a voyage from Italy to the Baltic and back
again could not be performed in a single season, and hence,
for the sake of their mutual convenience, the Italian and
Hanseatic merchants determined on establishing a magazine or
store-house of their respective products in some intermediate
situation. Bruges was fixed upon for this purpose, a